

Prachya Bharati Series-11

HEMACANDRA'S

PRAMĀNA-MĪMĀMSĀ

Text and Translation with Critical Notes

By

SATKARI MOOKERJEE, M. A., Ph. D.,

Head of the Dept. of Sanskrit, Calcutta University.

in collaboration with

NATHMAL TATIA, M.A.,

P.C. Nahar Research Fellow, Calcutta University.

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To

PRAMATHANATH BANERJEE, Esqr.

M.A., B.L., Barrister-at-law,

*Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, the unfailing
friend and patron of scholars to whom
nothing is dearer than the preservation
and propagation of India's cultural
heritage, this volume is
respectfully dedicated.*

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A NOTE

It is with genuine pleasure that I place before the scholarly world this first number of Śrī Bahadur Singh Singhi Jain Series. Hemacandra Sūri's standard work on Jain Logic "Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā" was so long not easily accessible to the students of Jain Philosophy for want of an authoritative translation into English or in any vernacular.

This difficult work was entrusted with Dr. Satkari Mookerjee who, well versed in both the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy and the Buddhist and Jain Philosophy, is the best scholar available at least in this part of India. His student, Mr. Nathmal Tatia, a young research scholar who has already made his mark in the Jain lore collaborated with him. I thank both of them on behalf of the Bhārati Jain Pariṣat for their kind and valuable co-operation and they have placed the scholars interested in the Jain cult under a deep debt of gratitude.

It may not be out of place to recall here in brief the facts that led to the starting of this Series of publications. This Pariṣat, which aims at wide propagation of the Jain Literature by publication of the best products with texts and translations, by making researches into them and by other means was inaugurated by late Śrī Bahadur Singh Singhi, a true lover and patron of Indian Culture in general and Jainology in particular. He along with the present writer of this note prepared an elaborate scheme to develop this Pariṣat into a full-fledged Institution of Jain Culture, a seat for training Jain preachers and teachers. By his sudden death the scheme could not be given an immediate effect. His worthy sons Messrs. Rajendra Singh Singhi and Narendra Singh Singhi who were present at the meeting organised to condole the death of their revered father were impressed with the idea of perpetuating the memory of the departed by starting three different series of publications named after him e.g. (1) The Jain Āgamas

(Sacred Books) with texts, translations and Notes in Bengali and other vernaculars (2) translation (with or without texts) with Notes into English of the best treatises on Jaina Literature (3) popular bulletins in Bengali and other vernaculars embodying the gems of Jaina cult. His sons readily accepted the proposal and kindly agreed to patronise the cause. The present book is the first outcome of the 2nd series of publications. A few books of series No. 1 are under compilation and a few bulletins of Series no. 3 have already been published.

The publication of the present treatise has been unusually delayed mainly due to Calcutta riot and we owe an apology to the authors and patrons alike for the same. With the return of normal time, we expect to publish other treatises in quick succession.

It is needless to mention that the Jaina Literature embraces almost all branches of human knowledge prevalent in those days. Their magnificent contributions have enriched the field of knowledge and culture to a very great extent. But unfortunately for want of proper propagation they have not been well appreciated by the scholars particularly of the West. It is expected therefore that our venture in the direction will meet with a ready response and co-operation.

Lastly, this Pariṣat conveys its sincere thanks to Messrs. Rajendra Singh Singhi and Narendra Singh Singhi but for whose patronage it could not have been undertaken. This Pariṣat also expects that other members of the rich Jaina community will follow the example of these noble men and extend us similar co-operation and patronage in other branches of Jaina Culture.

SATIS CHANDRA SEAL

PREFACE

The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra occupies an important position in the philosophical literature of India in general and in the Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is standard text-book on Jaina logic and epistemology which every student of Jaina philosophy has got to study. It is quite natural that Hemacandra is deeply indebted to the previous writers both of Jaina and non-Jaina schools and a fastidious critic will find in Hemacandra's text reproduction both of *ipissima verba* as well as of thoughts of previous writers, sometimes acknowledged and sometimes without explicit acknowledgement. But this need not detract from the merits of the work since Indian writers do not make a fetish of originality either of thought or of language and they make no scruple of inserting the arguments of predecessors even in their own language provided the views expressed therein accord with their philosophical position. The writings of predecessors are looked upon as public property and they are used with perfect freedom and impunity. It is absolutely plain that authors like Hemacandra with their extraordinary command of the Sanskrit idiom could with the least difficulty express these thoughts in their own language and pass them off as their own original production. But the fact that these authors with their uncommon felicity of verbal expression did not stoop to such tactics is symptomatic of a profound trait of Indian character in the past ages. It shows that they were more interested in the views which they regarded as sound exponents of truth than in their personal triumph. And as for the reproduction of the very linguistic expressions or the manner of delivery it can be accounted for by the hypothesis that they thought them to be unexceptionable forms of expression which required no improvement or variation for being more effective or impressive. We, therefore, take the earliest opportunity of sounding a warning against the application of tests of recent criticism in the assessment of the value of an ancient philosophical work.

As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of minor importance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work on philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculations and what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the school, and originality was more or less suspect with the adherents of the system as rather furnishing a pitfall for error or misconception. We must not therefore expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of an abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of distinctive individuality. What then should be the criteria of our judgement of the claim of a new book on our attention? In other words, what are the grounds for believing a book to be worthy of our study and attention? Again, what justification would there be for the writing of a book when it does not and cannot lay claim to establish a new conclusion or to throw new light on the problems that have exercised the human mind? To make it more precise and to press the question home on the issue at hand, we may ask why did Hemacandra compose his work and what was his purpose if he could not establish an original thesis?

It is an undeniable fact that Hemacandra is one of the later writers, if not the latest, of the mediæval period on Jaina Philosophy. Hemacandra was preceded by a galaxy of talented writers on Jaina logic, the foremost of whom are Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra of the Digambara School and Siddhasena Divākara, Haribhadra, Siddharṣi, and Abhayadeva of the Śvetāmbara School. He had in Vādi Devasūri, the author of the encyclopædic work, *Syādvādaratnākara*, a living contemporary. All of them wrote on Jaina logic and epistemology and there is scarcely any topic or problem which has not been discussed thoroughly in their works. This being the situation there scarcely seems to be any necessity for writing a book on the above lines. What was then the incentive for Hemacandra to compose this work?

It is a fact that Hemacandra had very little scope for making a new contribution. But the previous writings were extremely elaborate and not at all calculated to satisfy the needs of average students. It would take years of extraordinary labour to make a study of these works and there again is every possibility for missing the forest in the trees. It was necessary that there should be a work which would not degenerate into a compendious manual and at the same time would embody the solid results achieved by the previous thinkers. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is not as learned a work as the *Syādvādaratnākāra* or the works of Prabhācandra. But the *Syādvādaratnākāra* is encyclopædic both in size and scope and in spite of its wonderfully lucid and elegant treatment is bound to remain a sealed book to the majority of students. And as regards Prabhācandra's works they are literally formidable for their abstruse array of arguments and their forbidding language which has neither grace nor literary charm. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is written on the same pattern of *sūtra* and commentary as the celebrated work of Vādī Devasūri. But it compares favourably with the latter in that it avoids the unremitting elaboration of arguments and prolixity of expression which have stood in the way of its popularity. It contains all the arguments that are necessary to elucidate a problem and the range of information is not substantially inferior to that of the more ambitious works referred to above. Hemacandra could satisfy the critic in the words of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa who frankly avowed that he had no original theory of his own to offer to the readers and his purpose for writing the work was to give a rounded exposition and treatment which would satisfy the needs of the average run of students who would learn all that was essential without unnecessary exertion.

It is not to be expected that Hemacandra's work can be understood independently of the aid of a teacher. Hemacandra did not sacrifice matter for that would involve injustice both to the subject-matter and to the students. But he had to compress his information within a limit so that it would not frighten the young learners by its sheer bulk. The result has been that Hemacandra

is rather terse and more suggestive than expressive. It is an ideal text book and in spite of its truncated character all the relevant problems of logic and epistemology have received an adequate treatment in it. It is absolutely clear that a student of Jaina logic and epistemology will derive a comprehensive knowledge of the subject from the study of this work. The popularity of this book is due to its comprehensive character alone. It is no doubt a difficult book but considering the range of topics dealt with within the limits it is idle to expect that it should be easy to follow. Hemacandra's purpose was to write a standard text book and he did not condescend to cater for men of dull understanding. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is most probably the last work of Hemacandra and from all available manuscripts of the work which end abruptly in the same place it is evident that he could not finish it. Whatever might be the reason the book remains incomplete. It is a great loss that we do not get the entire book which was in the contemplation of the author.

We have given a faithful English translation of this standard work and as translation involves exposition and thus serves the purpose of a commentary within its natural limitations it may be reasonably expected that this English translation will help the understanding of this work and consequently of the problems of Jaina logic and epistemology among the students of our universities. It is contemplated to add critical and explanatory notes which will appear in a separate part. For the present we wish that the English translation should see the light of the day and reach the hands of scholars interested in Indian thought. We are conscious of the limitations of our work and we have fully realised in the course of our labour that however one may try to make it as perfect as possible no translation can be a substitute for the original. This particularly holds good in the case of Sanskrit works. Our authors have developed a technique and a style which are peculiar to Sanskrit works which are known for their love of economy of expression. Besides Indian logic has got a technique of its own which has very little in common with that of European logic. Our difficulty has been particularly enhanced by the fact

that Hemacandra is fond of laconic expression and is again determined to leave no expression vague or ambiguous. He has sought to clarify the meanings of technical terms both by logical definitions and etymological explanations. These etymological explanations have caused us the greatest difficulty and we are not sure that they will be intelligible to persons who are not acquainted with Sanskrit idiom. But the translator is bound to give a faithful rendering of the text and it will be an unpardonable offence on his part if he seeks to avoid these linguistic speculations or to give his own independent exposition. We felt that it would be far easier and pleasanter to give an independent exposition in one's own language than to give a faithful translation. But whereas an independent exposition of the matter would be liable to suspicion of misrepresentation and the modern look of it might give the impression that modern thoughts have been introduced in the name of an ancient writer, a faithful translation on the other hand avoids this risk inasmuch as it presents the thoughts of the writer in his own language. It further serves to acquaint a modern mind with the ancient technique and mode of presentation. An exposition can be appreciated if it is preceded by a knowledge of the text either in the original or in the translation. It may not therefore be wrong to expect that our present venture will serve a useful purpose.

It will be a dereliction of duty on our part if we do not speak a word on the genesis of the work. Mr. S. C. Seal, Hony. General Secretary, Indian Research Institute and the Bhārati Jaina Pariṣat proposed to inaugurate a series of publications on Jainalogy in the memory of the Late Babu Bahadur Singh Singhi, who was a patron of Jaina culture and research. It is a matter of supreme gratification to us that this work will occupy the first place in the Bahadur Singh Singhi Jaina Series. We gladly undertook this arduous task in spite of our knowledge that the labour involved would be out of all proportion to the actual achievement. But we have not shirked the labour because we have all along been conscious of our moral obligation to the memory of the great man and we wanted

to pay our humble tribute to the departed soul. It is not a small consolation that his worthy sons are as much alive to the necessity of the resuscitation of Jaina Culture as their great father was. We shall fail in our duty if we do not place on record our grateful appreciation of the encouragement that we have received from Babu Rajendra Singh Singhi and Babu Narendra Singh Singhi who are keen on the perpetuation of the memory of their father in various ways.

It will be sheer perversity if we do not frankly put on record our obligation and gratitude to Pandit Sukhlal Sanghavi, the editor of the original text with a critical introduction and notes in Hindi. Pt. Sukhlalji is the most learned man in the Jaina Community and one of the foremost scholars of India. His knowledge of the Buddhist, Jaina and Nyāya systems is astounding and this has enabled him to edit the masterpieces of Jaina Philosophy with perfect mastery and accuracy. The world will remain indebted to him for his contributions. He is one of the few intellectual stalwarts in the traditional field of Sanskrit scholarship that still are left to us. Had he been born in Europe he would have received the unstinted homage of the whole continent. India at present is too much obsessed with economic and political problems to appreciate scholarship. We therefore take this opportunity of expressing our admiration for this uncommon man. We have followed his text and the plan of arrangement adopted and our departure has been inconsiderable. We would ask the readers of our book to consult his edition of the text.

In conclusion we must record our hearty thanks to Babu Bijoy Singh Nahar, M.L.C., the proprietor of Gulabkumari Library and Mr. Sasankashekhar Dhar, the librarian for the free access to the library which is still the best collection of Jaina books in Calcutta.

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

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BOOK I

Lecture—1

pp. 1—81

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Basis of the work questioned: lack of definite beginning of the sciences stressed; *Tattvārthasūtras* given out as the basis (§ 1).

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Further meaning of the term *mīmāṃsā*—respectful disquisition which includes the consideration of *nayas* and *pramāṇa*, final emancipation (*mokṣa*) and means thereto and its opposites (§ 6).

General definition of organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)—authentic definitive cognition of an object (§ 7).

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Why negation not a separate organ; Since it has no object, reality being made up of both being and non-being—Ślokavārttika quoted. Mīmāṃsīs accept reality as partaking of nature of both being and non-being—*being* the province of perceptual cognitions—*non-being* cognised by negation—negation thus has object of its own—Śloka-vārttika quoted. (§ 38—§ 40).

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Perceptual cognition defined—immediacy-cum-lucidity the defining characteristic—objections refuted (§ 43—§ 44).

Immediacy-cum-lucidity means 'independence of services of another organ', or 'apprehension of its content as this' (§ 45—§ 46).

Two fold division of perceptual cognition—transcendent and empirical, full manifestation of innate nature of self on total cessation of obstructive veils is transcendent—also called supreme (*mukhya*) being supreme of all cognitions, and pure (*kevala*) being

independent of services of sense-organs, etc., and cognisant of all objects (§ 47—§ 48).

Self-luminous, nature of self established on the grounds of 'being not susceptible to doubt', 'being the knower', 'being the author of an act (of cognition) cannot be an object of it' ; obscuration of knowledge, etc., by respective *karmas* justified—removal of obscuration effected by meditation and contemplation ; obscuration, though not historical but coeval with self, removable just like dross in ore of gold ; obscuration of amorphous being possible like obscuration of consciousness by spirituous liquor, etc.; self variable constant—a continuum running through successive modes; causality impossible in the theory of changeless eternity and discontinuous flux—Akalaṅka quoted (§49—§53).

View that neither perceptual cognition, nor inference, nor authoritative texts prove transcendent intuition or a person possessed of it stated and refuted; transcendent intuition proved by 'necessity of final consummation of progressive development of knowledge', 'perceptibility of knowable things' and 'actual verification of astronomical knowledge' ; were omniscience an impossibility, for whom would the Veda assert things spread over three divisions of time ? Scriptures confirmed by perceptual and inferential knowledge prove person cognisant of supersensible reality : non-absolutism subject-matter of scriptures—established by perceptual cognition and inference; scripture sets forth the truth and indirectly the omniscience of the *Arhat* : perceptual intuition of ascetics cognisant of supersensuous intuition (§54—§57).

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* * Other varieties of transcendent intuition—visual intuition (*avadhi*) and intuition of the modes of other minds (*manahparyāya*)—etymological meaning of *avadhi* 'that which is confined'—it has for its object only things having shape and colour—two kinds of *avadhi*, congenital and acquired by merit; *manahparyāya* is the intuition of mental modes emerging into acts of thought—it knows external object by inference (§63—§65).

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Sense *qua* substance is material atoms possessed of definite shape—sense *qua* function is attainment and conscious activity; sense *qua* attainment generates capacity to apprehend a relevant object—sense *qua* conscious activity is an activity of self cognising

the object—conscious activity is result as well as an *organ* (§ 83—§ 87).

Definition of mind—the organ of apprehension of all objects of all the senses—also called *anindriya* or *no-indriya*—Umāsvāti's definition—mind *qua* substance is substantive matter transformed into mind substance—mind *qua* function is attainment and specific activation of the self (§ 88—§ 90).

Object and light are not the direct conditions of cognition—they are of direct service to subsidence-cum-destruction of knowledge-obscuring *karman* but not to cognition—grounds stated (§ 91—§ 92).

Assuming that sense-intuition is generated by objective datum how would the Naiyāyika account for eternity of God's intuition ? As regards human beings also, such organs as memory and recognition ought to be rejected as invalid because of the absence of the objective datum cognised in the past—Buddhist theory which suppose the cognition and its object to be related as effect and cause is also untenable because the object being momentary cannot exist at the time of its cognition—other problems raised and the conclusion that cognition and its object derive their existence from their own cause and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated established (§ 93).

Cognition not an effect and a copy of the object—destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*. i. e., specific competency of the self, is the cause of cognition—postulation of competency inevitable even in the theory of causality—cognition being a psychical act cannot have spatial dimension and hence is not a copy of the object—hence Dharmakīrti's plea of structural similarity bereft of all substance—other objections raised (§ 94—§ 95).

Determinate perception (*avagraha*) defined—indeterminate intuition transformed into determinate perception—it is not mental construction (§ 96—§ 98).

• • Speculation (*īhā*) defined and illustrated—difference of *īhā* from Reasoning (*ūha*) which is the organ competent for the realisation of universal concomitance (§ 99—§ 101).

Perceptual judgement (*avāya*) defined. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) defined, the mental trace which is the causal stuff of memory is a species of cognition—had it been non-cognitional, it could not have produced recognition which is a species of cognition—absence of lapse also a condition of recollection and hence the definition not in conflict with the Bhāṣyakāra's definition "Absence of lapse is retention" (§ 102—§ 105).

Thread of unity through the different stages of perceptual cognition stressed—difficulty solved (§ 106).

Nyāyasūtra's definition 'Unerring cognition produced by sense-object contact is perceptual and it is indeterminate and determinate' reinterpreted by Trilocana and others—according to them source of such cognition, be it cognitional or non-cognitional (e.g. sense-object contact), is the organ of perceptual cognition—the reinterpretation criticised as unjustifiable—contact of organ of sight with its datum not possible—the organ can work from distance like magnetic stone (§ 107—§ 109).

Buddhist definition of perceptual cognition as free from conceptual construction irrational because it has no bearing upon practical activity (§ 110).

Criticism of Jaimini's definition cognition engendered upon the actual contact of sense-organs is perceptual"—it overlaps such cognitions as doubt and illusion—later interpretations stated and criticised (§ 111—§ 113).

Older Sāṅkhya definition of perceptual cognition as a modification of sense-organ untenable—modification of unconscious senses cannot be conscious—Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition "Perception is the determinate cognition of its specific object" extends to inference and hence untenable (§ 114—§ 115).

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Substance-cum-mode, the object of knowledge—etymology of *dravya* (substance) and *pariyāya* (mode)—Umāsvāti quoted ; positions of Sāṅkhya, Buddhist, Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda stated—causal efficiency which is the only defining characteristic of reality is possible only if reality is substance-cum-mode—elaborate statement of grounds—rival positions of the absolutists refuted—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory also refuted (§ 117—§ 129).

Defects of Non-absolutism (*syādvāda*) which rejects that substance and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and affirms that they are [somehow identical and different both—(1) affirmation and negation in one substratum mutually opposed ; (2) split up in integrity if difference and identity posited with reference to different aspects ; (3) aspects again mutually different and identical with reference to other sets of aspects and so on, *regressus ad infinitum* the consequence : (4) the aspects of difference and identity again would each have difference and identity, confusion the consequence ; (5) the aspect embodying difference will embody identity and *vice versa*, transfusion the consequence ; (6) real, being both identical and different, incapable of being determined in definite reference, and so doubt inevitable ; (7) absence of determination the consequence ; and finally (8) impossibility of determination of objective reality.

Defects unreal—(1) contradictorily opposed things never perceived in the same locus by the self-same cognition—when so perceived contradiction unreal—blue and not-blue not contradictorily opposed as they are perceived in unitary cognition of variegated canvas ; (2) split up in the integrity of an entity also avoided, since the apparently opposed attributes have been proved to be perceived in the same locus ; (3) *regressus ad infinitum* unreal—difference nothing other than substance and modes themselves—similarly identity is substance itself ; (4) & (5) charges of confusion and transfusion parried by instance of cognition of multiform colour, and the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals ; (6) doubt unjustified in a matter definitely established ;

(7) absence of determination also unjustified since an entity is known to be such by experience and consequently (8) charge of impossibility also unjustified. Hence reality as synthesis of substance and mode established (§130).

Nature of reality *vs.* exercise of causal efficiency ; real possessed of dual nature is incapable of exercising causal efficiency as pure substance or pure mode; an entity cannot exercise causal efficiency in sequence since, being efficient, it should not defer its action—substance being unamenable to change, entirely independent of services of auxiliaries—modes also, being momentary, unable to wait for two consecutive moments required for the reception of the service, nor causal activity possible in simultaneity since next moment the entity would be bereft of causal activity and hence bereft of reality (§ 131).

Change defined—continuity together with surrender and appropriation of preceding and succeeding modes respectively constitutes change—this makes causal activity by a real possessing substance and modes as its moments a logical and real possibility. Reality—a *sui generis* multiform entity comprising as its moments continuity, origination and cessation—hence causal activity possible simultaneously or successively according as relevant auxiliary conditions present themselves (§132—§ 133).

Resultant of an organ—illumination of the object, that is, cognition of the object; no incompatibility in self-same knowledge being regarded as the organ and its resultant—activity of knowledge referring to the object is the resultant—the same as relates to the subject is the organ, the illumination of the object being realised immediately on the occurrence of it—organ and the resultant identical in so far as they are the self-same cognition—they are different in respect of the relation of determinant and determinatum. Or cessation of ignorance is the resultant (§ 134—§ 143).

Of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, retention, memory, recognition, reasoning and inference each preceding one is the organ and the immediately succeeding one is the resultant; judgment of avoidance, acceptance and indifference

are also resultants—the question of resultant a matter of volitional interest and point of view (§ 144—§ 147).

Resultant is both identical with and different from its cognitive organs—grounds stated—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika coinherence untenable (§ 148—§ 150).

The judgment 'I know the jar' reveals that self while cognising an object cognises itself as well—self is a variable constant (§ 151—§ 153).

Lecture—2

pp. 82—123

Non-perceptual organ of knowledge defined—sub-divisions viz. recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony stated (§ 1—§ 5).

Recollection conditioned by stimulation of memory-impression, it is non-discrepant with fact and so valid (§ 6—§ 8).

Recognition is synthetic judgment born of observation and recollection; Buddhist opposition stated and proved to be unsound. Recognition is not a species of perception as the Naiyāyikas maintain, it is non-discrepant and hence valid (§ 9—§ 15).

Inductive Reasoning is knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation—perceptual cognition and inference unable to cognise universal concomitance—Vaiśeṣika view that the knowledge of universal concomitance is secured by reflective thought by way of elimination and assimilation criticised—Naiyāyika's position that universal concomitance results from perceptual cognition aided by inductive reasoning criticised (§ 16—§ 22).

Necessary concomitance defined as 'occurrence necessarily of the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*)', or 'the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*) exclusively in the locus where the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) occurs'—the implications explained (§ 23—§ 26).

' ' Inference defined as the knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya*) on the strength of the probans (*sādhana*)—its twofold division as subjective and syllogistic (§27—§29).

Subjective inference defined as 'the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained, by one's own self, as *having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum*'—implication of the definition explained—Buddhist theory of 'triple characteristic' of a valid probans stated, explained, and finally refuted as unnecessary—knowledge of the necessity of the universal concomitance alone is sufficient to prevent the triple fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probantia—implications of 'necessary universal concomitance' stated—Naiyāyika's 'quantuple characteristic' also is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance (§30—§34).

Universal concomitance consists in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events and the knowledge of it is achieved by means of Inductive Reasoning (§ 35—§ 38).

Five types of probantia viz. essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite explained and solved—non-cognition of the first four probantia is also valid ground for the establishment of relevant non-existence—illustrations of the last type of probans (§ 39—§ 52).

Probandum of thesis defined and illustrated. Six types of contradiction, viz., by perceptual cognition, inference, scriptural evidence, popular opinion, one's own statement and (linguistic) convention illustrated—probandum is a substantive qualified by an attribute sought to be proved, but in some cases an attribute alone is considered as the probandum—illustration (§ 53—§ 60).

The subject (*dharmin*) is 'what is endorsed by valid knowledge'—Buddhist objection and its answer—the subject is also established by conceptual knowledge—illustration—problem whether existence can be proved—when cognition of contradiction does not arise on the assertion of the subject, its possibility is presumed and in such case existence can be proved (§ 61—§ 67).

The question whether Example is a necessary factor of inference—probans being incompatible with the opposite of the probandum establishes the probandum and hence example is unnecessary—example defined out of deference to a pupil of slow understanding—its two-fold division based on similarity and dissimilarity—illustrations (§ 68—§ 81).

BOOK II

Lecture—1

pp. 124—197

Syllogistic inference defined as 'definite cognition resulting from statement of a probans'—'statement' though only the condition of inference, is called inference by way of metaphor or transference of epithet which is a warranted procedure if there are contradiction of the primary conventional meaning, a purpose and a legitimate ground—the conditions found to be existent in the present case (§ 1—§ 5)

Syllogistic inference is twofold according as it is based on logical possibility of the probans on the occurrence of the 'probandum' and 'logical impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum'—illustrations—the difference merely formal, not in respect of ultimate intention and hence the statement of both unnecessary—Nyāyavatāra quoted (§ 6—§ 12).

The statement of thesis (*pratijñā*) is for demonstrating the subject (*viśaya*)—thesis draws attention of the hearer and so necessary—though the conclusion is known by implication, the advance statement of it as thesis has justification in order to rebut a possible doubt about the locus of the attribute to be proved (§ 13—§ 18).

Constitution of a syllogism—thesis plus probans endowed with positive or negative concomitance—the Buddhist view that 'probans alone it to be stated for the conviction of a knowledgeable person' is unjustifiable—in deference to the calibre of the person to be edified, the syllogism may have five propositions, viz. thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion or even more (§ 19—§ 23).

Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion defined and illustrated—the inter-relation of the five members and other corroborative statements (§ 23—§ 33).

Sham simulant (*ābhāsa*) defined—three fallacies of reasons, viz. non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive and their subdivisions defined and illustrated (§ 34—§ 48).

Sixteen types of false examples stated and illustrated—other types included in these very types—treatment of syllogistic inference concluded (§ 49—§ 59).

Confutation (*dūṣaṇa*) defined as the exposure of the fallacies inherent in an argument (§ 60—§ 61).

False confutation or sophism (*jati*) defined as consisting in the allegations of non-existent defects—they are employed in opposition to a legitimate or false reason advanced by the proponent in case the true nature of the defects in the reasons is not realised—twenty-four types of sophisms stated, defined and illustrated in consonance with the plan adopted by Akṣapāda—the solution of all types of sophisms lies in the examination of the probans as to whether it embodies the characteristic, viz., incompatibility with the opposite (§ 62—65).

Casuistry (*chala*) stated as nothing but sophism—three types (1) based on ambiguity, (2) based on generalisation, (3) based on metaphor—illustrations (§ 66).

Legitimate Discourse defined as the statement of proof and refutation in the presence of judges and other members of the council with a view to the preservation of truth—it has four factors—Judge, President, Proponent and Opponent—it is known as Debate (*kaiḥā*)—Disputation (*jalpa*) and Wrangling (*vitandā*) are not approved forms of Debate—grounds stated (§ 67—§ 71).

Victory and Defeat defined (§ 72—§ 74).

Defeat constitutes censure (*nigraha*)—mere misunderstanding or default of understanding as propounded by the Naiyāyikas does not constitute censure (§ 75—§ 78).

Twenty-two varieties of occasions of censure (*nigrahasiḥāna*) of the Naiyāyikas stated and criticised (§ 79—§ 102).

Buddhist view of an occasion of censure also stated and criticised (§ 103—§ 109).

The author proposes to define an epistle (§ 110).

[Here the book ends. The rest is not available]

ABBREVIATIONS

A	= Answer
ĀN	= Āvaśyakaniryukti
Aph.	= Aphorism
AV	= Ayogavyavacchedikā
DV	= Daśavaikālikasūtra
DV, Nir.	= Daśavaikālikasūtraniryukti
HB	= Hetubindu
LT	= Laghīyastrayī
MBh	= Mahābhāṣya
NA	= Nyāyāvatāra
NB	= Nyāyabindu
NM	= Nyāyamañjarī
NS	= Nyāyasūtra
O	= Objection
PMS	= Parīkṣāmukhasūtra
PP	= Pramāṇaparīkṣā
PS	= Pramāṇasamuccaya
PV	= Pramāṇavārttika
Q	= Question
SB	= Śābarabhāṣya
SiV	= Siddhivinīścaya
ST	= Sanmatitarka
ŚV	= Ślokavārttika
ŚvU	= Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat
TS	= Tattvārthasūtra
TS	= Tattvasaṃgraha
TŚV	= Tattvārthaslokavārttika
VA	= Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (gā = gāthā)

कलिकालसर्वज्ञश्रीहेमचन्द्राचार्यविरचिता स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहिता

॥ प्रमाणमीमांसा ॥

अनन्तदर्शनज्ञानवीर्यानन्दमयात्मने ।

नमोऽर्हते कृपाक्लृप्तधर्मतीर्थाय तायिने ॥ १ ॥

बोधिबीजमुपस्कृतं तत्त्वाभ्यासेन धीमताम् ।

जैनसिद्धान्तसूत्राणां स्वेषां वृत्तिर्विधीयते ॥ २ ॥

१. ननु यदि भवदीयानीमानि जैनसिद्धान्तसूत्राणि तर्हि भवतः पूर्वं कानि किमीयानि वा तान्यासन्निति ? अत्यल्पमिदमन्वयुङ्क्थाः । पाणिनि-पिङ्गल-कणादा-ऽक्षपादादिभ्योऽपि पूर्वं कानि किमीयानि वा व्याकरणादिसूत्राणीत्येतदपि पर्यनुयुङ्क्त्व ! अनादय एवैता विद्याः संक्षेपविस्तरविवक्षया नवनवीभवन्ति तत्तत्कर्तृकाश्चोच्यन्ते । किं नाश्रौषीः 'न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगत्' इति ? यदि वा प्रेक्षस्व वाचकमुख्य-विरचितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणिभूतानि तत्त्वार्थसूत्राणीति ।

२. यद्येवम्—अकलङ्क-धर्मकीर्त्यादिवत् प्रकरणमेव किं नारभ्यते, किमनया सूत्रकारत्वाहोपुरुषिकया ? मैवं वोचः; भिन्नरुचिर्ह्ययं जनः ततो नास्य स्वेच्छाप्रतिबन्धे लौकिकं राजकीयं वा शास्त्रं नमस्तीति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

३. तत्र वर्णसमूहात्मकैः पदैः, पदसमूहात्मकैः सूत्रैः, सूत्रसमूहात्मकैः प्रकरणैः, प्रकरणसमूहात्मकैः आह्निकैः आह्निकसमूहात्मकैः पञ्चभिर-ध्यायैः शास्त्रमेतद्वचयदाचार्यः । तस्य च प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यङ्गमभिधेय-मभिधातुमिदमादिसूत्रम्—

अथ प्रमाणमीमांसा ॥ १ ॥

४ अथ-इत्यस्य अधिकारार्थत्वाच्छास्त्रेणाधिक्रियमाणस्य प्रस्तूय-मानस्य प्रमाणस्याभिधानात् सकलशास्त्रन्नात्पर्यव्याख्यानेन प्रेक्षावन्तो बोधिताः प्रवर्तिताश्च भवन्ति । आनन्तर्यार्थो वा अथ-शब्दः, शब्द-काव्य-छन्दोऽनुशासनेभ्योऽनन्तरं प्रमाणं मीमांस्यत इत्यर्थः । अनेन शब्दानु-

शासनादिभिरस्यैककर्तृकत्वमाह । अधिकारार्थस्य च अथ-शब्दस्यान्यार्थ-
नीयमानकुसुमदामजलकुम्भादेर्दर्शनमिव श्रवणं मङ्गलायापि कल्पत इति ।
मङ्गले च सति परिपन्थिविघ्नविघातात् । अक्षेपेण शास्त्रसिद्धिः,
आयुष्मच्छ्रोतृकता च भवति । परमेष्ठिनमस्कारादिकं तु मङ्गलं कृत-
मपि न निवेशितं लाघवार्थिना सूत्रकारेणेति ।

५. प्रकर्षेण संशयादिन्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्त्वं
येन तत् प्रमाणं प्रमायां साधकतमम्, तस्य मीमांसा—उद्देशादिरूपेण
पर्यालोचनम् । त्रयी हि शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा च ।
तत्र नामधेयमात्रकीर्तनमुद्देशः, यथा इदमेव सूत्रम् । उद्दिष्टस्यासाधा-
रणधर्मवचनं लक्षणम् । तद् द्वेधा—सामान्यलक्षणं विशेषलक्षणं च ।
सामान्यलक्षणमनन्तरमेव सूत्रम् । विशेषलक्षणम् “विशदः प्रत्यक्षम्”
(१.१.१३) इति । विभागस्तु विशेषलक्षणस्यैवाङ्गमिति न पृथगुच्यते ।
लक्षितस्य ‘इदमित्थं भवति नेत्थम्’ इति न्यायतः परीक्षणं परीक्षा,
यथा तृतीयं सूत्रम् ।

६. पूजितविचारवचनश्च मीमांसा-शब्दः । तेन न प्रमाणमात्रस्यैव
विचारोऽत्राधिकृतः, किन्तु तदेकदेशभूतानां दुर्नयनिराकरणद्वारेण
परिशोधितमार्गाणां नयानामपि—“प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः” (तत्त्वा० १.६)
इति हि वाचकमुख्यः सकलपुरुषार्थेषु मूर्द्धाभिषिक्तस्य सोपायस्य
सप्रतिपक्षस्य मोक्षस्य च । एवं हि पूजितो विचारो भवति । प्रमाण-
मात्रविचारस्तु प्रतिपक्षनिराकरणपर्यवसायी वाक्कलहमात्रं स्यात् ।
तद्विवक्षायां तु “अथ प्रमाणपरीक्षा” (प्रमाणपरी० पृ० १) इत्येव
क्रियेत । तत् स्थितमेतत्—प्रमाणनयपरिशोधितप्रमेयमार्गं सोपायं
सप्रतिपक्षं मोक्षं विवक्षितुं मीमांसाग्रहणमकार्याचार्येणेति ॥ १ ॥

७. तत्र प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमाह—

सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः प्रमाणम् ॥ २ ॥

८. प्रमाणम्—इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, शेषं लक्षणम्, प्रसिद्धानुवादेन
ह्यप्रसिद्धस्य विधानं लक्षणार्थः । तत्र यत्तद्विवादेन प्रमाणमिति धर्मि
प्रसिद्धं तस्य सम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मकत्वं धर्मो विधीयते । अत्र प्रमाणत्वादिति
हेतुः । न च धर्मिणो हेतुत्वमनुपपन्नम्; भवति हि विशेषे धर्मिणि
तत्सामान्यं हेतुः, यथा—अयं धूमः साग्निः, धूमत्वात्, पूर्वोपलब्ध-

धूमवत् । न च दृष्टान्तमन्तरेण न गमकत्वम्; अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यसिद्धेः,
'सात्मकं जीवच्छरीरम्, प्राणादिमत्त्वात्' इत्यादिवदिति दर्शयिष्यते ।

६. तत्र निर्णयः संशयानध्यवसायाविकल्पकत्वरहितं ज्ञानम् । ततो
निर्णय-पदेनाज्ञानरूपस्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादेः, ज्ञानरूपस्यापि संशयादेः
प्रमाणत्वनिषेधः ।

१०. अर्थतेऽर्ह्यते वा अर्थो हेयोपादेयोपेक्षणीयलक्षणः, हेयस्य
हातुम्, उपादेयस्योपादातुम्, उपेक्षणीयस्योपेक्षितुम् अर्ह्यमानत्वात् । न
चानुपादेयत्वादुपेक्षणीयो हेय एवान्तर्भवति; अहेयत्वादुपादेय एवान्त-
र्भावप्रसक्तेः । उपेक्षणीय एव च मूर्द्धाभिषिक्तोऽर्थः, योगिभिस्तस्यै-
वार्यमाणत्वात् । अस्मदादीनामपि हेयोपादेयाभ्यां भूयानेवोपेक्ष-
णीयोऽर्थः; तन्नायमुपेक्षितुं क्षमः । अर्थस्य निर्णय इति कर्मणि षष्ठी,
निर्णीयमानत्वेन व्याप्यत्वादर्थस्य । अर्थग्रहणं च स्वनिर्णयव्यवच्छे-
दार्थं तस्य सतोऽप्यलक्षणत्वादिति वक्ष्यामः ।

११. सम्यग्-इत्यविपरीतार्थमव्ययं समञ्चतेर्वा रूपम् । तच्च निर्ण-
यस्य विशेषणम्, तस्यैव सम्यक्त्वाऽसम्यक्त्वयोगेन विशेषदुमुचितत्वात्;
अर्थस्तु स्वतो न सम्यग् नाप्यसम्यगिति सम्भवव्यभिचारयोरभावान्न
विशेषणीयः । तेन सम्यग् योऽर्थनिर्णय इति विशेषणाद्विपर्यय-
निरासः । ततोऽतिव्याप्त्यसम्भवदोषविकलमिदं प्रमाणलामान्य-
लक्षणम् ॥ २ ॥

१२. ननु अर्थनिर्णयवत् स्वनिर्णयोऽपि वृद्धैः प्रमाणलक्षणत्वे-
नोक्तः—“प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि” (न्यायाव० १) इति, “स्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं
ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्” (तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवा० १.१०.७७) इति च । न चासावसन्,
'घटमहं जानामि' इत्यादौ कर्तृकर्मवत् ज्ञप्तेरप्यवभासमानत्वात् ।
न च अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्यार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिद्धयति । न च ज्ञानान्तरात्
तदुपलम्भसम्भावनम्, तस्याप्यनुपलब्धस्य प्रस्तुतोपलम्भप्रत्यक्षी-
काराभावात् । उपलम्भान्तरसम्भावने चानवस्था । अर्थोपलम्भात्
तस्योपलम्भे अन्योन्याश्रयदोषः । प्रतेन 'अर्थस्य सम्भवो नोपपद्येत
न चे(त्) ज्ञानं स्यात्' इत्यर्थापत्त्यापि तदुपलम्भः प्रत्युक्तः; तस्या
अपि ज्ञापकत्वेनाज्ञाताय ज्ञापकत्वायोगात् । अर्थापत्त्यन्तरात् तज्ज्ञाने
अनवस्थेतरैतराश्रयदोषापत्तेस्तदवस्थः परिभवः । तस्मादर्थोन्मुखतयेव

स्वोन्मुखतयापि ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासात् स्वनिर्णयात्मकत्वमप्यस्ति । ननु अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः; मैवं वोचः, ज्ञातुर्ज्ञातृत्वेनेव अनुभूतेरनुभूतित्वेनैवानुभवात् । न चानुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वं दोषः; अथपि क्षयानुभूतित्वात्, स्वापेक्षयाऽनुभाव्यत्वात्, स्वपितृपुत्रापेक्षयैकस्य पुत्रत्वपितृत्ववत् विरोधाभावात् । न च स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधः; अनुभवसिद्धेऽर्थे विरोधासिद्धेः । अनुमानाच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धिः; तथाहि—ज्ञानं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति, प्रकाशकत्वात्, प्रदीपवत् । संवेदनस्य प्रकाशयत्वात् प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धमिति चेत्; न; अज्ञाननिरासादिद्वारेण प्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः । न च नेत्रादिभिरनैकान्तिकता; तेषां भावेन्द्रियरूपाणामेव प्रकाशकत्वात् । भावेन्द्रियाणां च स्वसंवेदनरूपतैवेति न व्यभिचारः । तथा, संवित् स्वप्रकाशा, अर्थप्रतीतित्वात्, यः स्वप्रकाशो न भवति नासावर्थप्रतीतिः यथा घटः । तथा, यत् ज्ञानं तत् आत्मबोधं प्रत्यनपेक्षितपरव्यापारम् यथा गोचरान्तरग्राहिज्ञानात् प्राग्भावि गोचरान्तरग्राहिज्ञानप्रबन्धस्यान्त्यज्ञानम्, ज्ञानं च विवादाध्यासितं रूपादिज्ञानमिति । संवित् स्वप्रकाशे स्वावान्तरजातीयं नापेक्षते, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवत् । संवित् परप्रकाश्या, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवदिति चेत्; न; अस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, न खलु घटस्य वस्तुत्वात् परप्रकाशयता अपि तु बुद्धिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । तस्मात् स्वनिर्णयोऽपि प्रमाणलक्षणमस्त्वित्याशङ्क्याह-

स्वनिर्णयः सन्नप्यलक्षणम्, अप्रमाणेऽपि भावात् ॥ ३ ॥

१३. सन्नपि इति परोक्तमनुमोदते । अयमर्थः—न हि अस्ति इत्येव सर्वं लक्षणत्वेन वाच्यं किन्तु यो धर्मो विपक्षाद्व्यावर्त्तते । स्वनिर्णयस्तु अप्रमाणेऽपि संशयादौ वर्तते; न हि काचित् ज्ञानमात्रा सास्ति या न स्वसंविदिता नाम । ततो न स्वनिर्णयो लक्षणमुक्तोऽस्माभिः, वृद्धैस्तु परीक्षार्थमुपक्षिप्त इत्यदोषः ॥ ३ ॥

१४. ननु च परिच्छिन्नमर्थं परिच्छिन्नदत्ता प्रमाणेन पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यात् । तथा च गृहीतग्राहिणां धारावाहिज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । ततोऽपूर्वार्थनिर्णय इत्यस्तु न लक्षणम्; यथाहुः—“स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्” (परीक्षामु० १.१) इति, “तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानम्” इति च । तत्राह—

ग्रहीष्यमाणग्राहिण इव गृहीतग्राहिणोऽपि नाप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ४ ॥

१५. अयमर्थः—द्रव्यापेक्षया वा गृहीतग्राहित्वं विप्रतिषिध्येत पर्यायापेक्षया वा ? तत्र पर्यायापेक्षया धारावाहिज्ञानानामपि गृहीतग्राहित्वं न सम्भवति, क्षणिकत्वात् पर्यायाणाम् ; तत्कथं तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं विशेषणमुपादीयेत ? अथ द्रव्यापेक्षयाः तदप्ययुक्तम् ; द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वादेकत्वेन गृहीतग्रहीष्यमाणावस्थयोर्न भेदः । ततश्च कं विशेषमाश्रित्य ग्रहीष्यमाणग्राहिणः प्रामाण्यम्, न गृहीतग्राहिणः ? अपि च अवग्रहेहादीनां गृहीतग्राहित्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यमिष्यत एव । न चैषां भिन्नविषयत्वम् : एवं ह्यवगृहीतस्य अनीहनात्, ईहितस्य अनिश्चयादसमञ्जसमापद्येत । न च पर्यायापेक्षया अनधिगतविशेषावसायादपूर्वार्थत्वं वाच्यम् ; एवं हि न कस्यचिद् गृहीतग्राहित्वमित्युक्तप्रायम् ।

१६. स्मृतेश्च प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगताया गृहीतग्राहित्वमेव सतत्त्वम् । यैरपि स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यमिष्टं तैरप्यर्थादनुत्पाद एव हेतुत्वेनोक्तो न गृहीतग्राहित्वम्, यदाह—

“न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम् ।
अपि त्वनर्थजन्यत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम्” ॥

(न्याय० म० पृ० २३)

इति ॥ ४ ॥

१७. अथ प्रमाणलक्षणप्रतिक्षिप्तानां संशयानध्यवसायविपर्ययाणां लक्षणमाह—

अनुभयत्रोभयकोटिस्पर्शी प्रत्ययः संशयः ॥ ५ ॥

१८. अनुभयस्वभावे वस्तुनि उभयान्तपरिमर्शनशीलं, ज्ञानं सर्वात्मना शेत इवात्मा यस्मिन् सति स संशयः, यथा अन्धकारे दूरादूर्वाकारवस्तूपलम्भात् साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति ‘स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा’ इति प्रत्ययः । अनुभयत्रग्रहणमुभयरूपे वस्तुन्युभयकोटिस्पर्शेऽपि संशयत्वनिराकरणार्थम्, यथा ‘अस्ति च नास्ति च घटः’, ‘नित्यश्चानित्यश्चात्मा’ इत्यादि ॥ ५ ॥

विशेषानुल्लेख्यनध्यवसायः ॥ ६ ॥

१९. दूरान्धकारादिवशादसाधारणधर्माविमर्शरहितः प्रत्ययः अनिश्चयात्मकत्वात् अनध्यवसायः, यथा ‘किमेतत्’ इति । यदप्यविकल्पकं

प्रथमक्षणभावि परेषां प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणत्वेनाभिमतं तदप्यनध्यवसाय एव, विशेषोत्प्लेखस्य तत्राप्यभावादिति ॥ ६ ॥

अतस्मिंस्तदेवेति विपर्ययः ॥ ७ ॥

२०. यत् ज्ञाने प्रतिभासते तद्रूपरहिते वस्तुनि 'तदेव' इति प्रत्ययो विपर्यासरूपत्वाद्विपर्ययः, यथा धातुवैषम्यान्मधुरादिषु द्रव्येषु तिक्तादि-प्रत्ययः, तिमिरादिदोषात् एकस्मिन्नपि चन्द्रे द्विचन्द्रादिप्रत्ययः, नौयानात् अगच्छत्स्वपि वृक्षेषु गच्छत्प्रत्ययः, आशुभ्रमणात् अलाता-दावचक्रेऽपि चक्रप्रत्यय इति । अवसितं प्रमाणलक्षणम् ॥ ७ ॥

२१. ननु अस्तूक्तलक्षणं प्रमाणम् तत्प्रामाण्यं तु स्वतः, परतो वा निश्चीयेत ? न तावत् स्वतः; तद्धि श्व(स्व)संविदितत्वात् ज्ञानमित्येव गृह्णीयात्, न पुनः सम्यक्त्वलक्षणं प्रामाण्यम्, ज्ञानत्वमात्रं तु प्रामाणाभाससाधारणम् । अपि च स्वतः प्रामाण्ये सर्वेषामविप्रतिपत्ति-प्रसङ्गः । नापि परतः, परं हि तद्गोचरगोचरं वा ज्ञानम् अभ्युपेयेत; अर्थक्रियानिर्भासं वा, तद्गोचरनान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनं वा ? तच्च सर्वं स्वतोऽनवधृतप्रामाण्यमव्यवस्थितं सत् कथं पूर्वं प्रवर्तकं ज्ञानं व्यवस्थापयेत् ? स्वतो वाऽस्य प्रामाण्ये कोऽपराधः प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्य येन तस्यापि तन्न स्यात् ? न च प्रामाण्यं ज्ञायते स्वत इत्युक्तमेव, परतस्त्वनवस्थेत्याशङ्क्याह—

प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स्वतः परतो वा ॥ ८ ॥

प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः क्वचित् स्वतः यथाभ्यासदशापन्ने स्वकरतलादि-ज्ञाने, स्नानपानावगाहनोदन्योपशमादावर्थक्रियानिर्भासे वा प्रत्यक्ष-ज्ञाने; नहि तत्र परीक्षाकाङ्क्षास्ति प्रेक्षावताम्, तथाहि—जलज्ञानम्, ततो दाहपिपासार्त्तस्य तत्र श्रवृत्तिः, ततस्तत्प्राप्तिः, ततः स्नानपानादीनि, ततो दाहोदन्योपशम इत्येतावतैव भवति कृती प्रमाता; न पुनर्दाहोदन्योपशमज्ञानमपि परीक्षते इत्यस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् । अनुमाने तु सर्वस्मिन्नपि सर्वथा निरस्तसमस्तव्यभिचाराशङ्के स्वत एव प्रामाण्यम्, अव्यभिचारिलिङ्गसमुत्पत्त्यात्; न लिङ्गाकारं ज्ञानं लिङ्गं विना, न च लिङ्गं लिङ्गिनं विनेति ।

२२. क्वचित् परतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः, यथा अनभ्यासदशापन्ने प्रत्यक्षे । न हि तत् अर्थेन गृहीताव्यभिचारमिति तदेकविषयात् संवाक्कात्

ज्ञानान्तराद्वा, अर्थक्रियानिर्भासाद्वा, नान्तरीयार्थदर्शनाद्वा, तस्य प्रामाण्यं निश्चीयते । तेषां च स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयान्नानवस्थादिदौस्थ्यवकाशः ।

२४. शाब्दे तु प्रमाणे दृष्टार्थेऽर्थाव्यभिचारस्य दुर्ज्ञानत्वात् संवादाद्यधीनः परतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः, अदृष्टार्थे तु दृष्टार्थग्रहोपराग-नष्ट-मुष्ट्यादिप्रतिपादकानां संवादेन प्रामाण्यं निश्चित्य संवादमन्तरेणाप्याप्तोक्तत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति सर्वमुपपन्नम् ।

२५. “अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम्” इति नैयायिकाः । तत्रार्थोपलब्धौ हेतुत्वं यदि निमित्तत्वमात्रम्, तदा तत् सर्वकारकसाधारणमिति कर्तृकर्मादेरपि प्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ कर्तृकर्मादिविलक्षणं करणं हेतुशब्देन विवक्षितम्; तर्हि तत् ज्ञानमेव युक्तं नेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादि, यस्मिन् हि सत्यर्थं उपलब्धो भवति स तत्करणम् । न च इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षसामप्रचारादौ सत्यपि ज्ञानाभावे स भवति, साधकतमं हि करणमव्यवहितफलं च तदिष्यते, व्यवहितफलस्यापि करणत्वे दधि-भोजनादेरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः । तत्र ज्ञानादन्यत्र प्रमाणत्वम्, अन्यत्रोपचारात् ।

२६. “सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्” (न्यायसा० पृ० १) इत्यत्रापि साधनग्रहणात् कर्तृकर्मनिरासेन करणस्य प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यति, तथाप्यव्यवहितफलत्वेनसाधकतमत्वं ज्ञानस्यैवेति तदेव प्रमाणत्वेनैष्टव्यम् ।

२७. “प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्” (प्रमाणवा० २.१) इति सौगताः । तत्रापि यद्यविकल्पकं ज्ञानम्; तदा न तद् व्यवहारजननसमर्थम् । सांव्यवहारिकस्य चैतत् प्रमाणस्य लक्षणमिति च भवन्तः, तत्कथं तस्य प्रामाण्यम्? उत्तरकालभाविनो व्यवहारजननसमर्थाद्विकल्पात् तस्य प्रामाण्ये याचितकमण्डनन्यायः, वरं च व्यवहारहेतोर्विकल्पस्यैव प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगन्तुम्; एवं हि परम्परापरिश्रमः परिहृतो भवति । विकल्पस्य चाप्रामाण्ये कथं तन्निमित्तो व्यवहारोऽविसंवादी? दृष्ट-
(श्य) विकल्प(ल्प्य)योरर्थयोरेकीकरणेन तैमिरिकज्ञानवत् संवादाभ्युपगमे चोपचरितं संवादित्वं स्यात् । तस्मादनुपचरितमविसंवादित्वं प्रमाणस्य लक्षणमिच्छता निर्णयः प्रमाणमेष्टव्य इति ॥ ८ ॥

२८. प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमुक्त्वा परीक्ष्य च विशेषलक्षणं वक्तुकामो विभागमन्तरेण तद्वचनस्याशक्यत्वात् विभागप्रतिपादनार्थमाह—

प्रमाणं द्विधा ॥ ९ ॥

२६. सामान्यलक्षणसूत्रे प्रमाणग्रहणं परीक्षयान्तरितमिति न तदा परामृष्टं किन्तु साक्षादेवोक्तं प्रमाणमिति । द्विधा द्विप्रकारमेव, विभागस्यावधारणफलत्वात् । तेन प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रामाण्यमिति चार्वाकाः, प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रामाण्यमिति वैशेषिकाः, तान्येवेति साङ्ख्याः, सहोपमानेन चत्वारिती नैयायिकाः, सहार्थापत्त्या पञ्चेति प्राभाकराः, सहाऽभावेन षडिति भाट्टाः इति न्यूनाधिकप्रमाणवादिनः प्रतिक्षिप्ताः । तत्प्रतिक्षेपश्च वक्ष्यते ॥ ९ ॥

३०. तर्हि प्रमाणद्वैविध्यं किं तथा यथाहुः सौगताः “प्रत्यक्ष-मनुमानं च” (प्रमाणसं० १.२ न्यायवि० १.३) इति, उतान्यथा ? इत्याह—

प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च ॥ १० ॥

३१. अश्नुते अक्ष्णोति वा व्याप्नोति सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावानिति अक्षो जीवः, अश्नुते विषयम् इति अक्षम् इन्द्रियं च । प्रतिः प्रतिगतार्थः । अक्षं प्रतिगतं तदाश्रितम्, अक्षाणि चेन्द्रियाणि तानि प्रतिगतमिन्द्रियाण्याश्रित्योज्जहीते यत् ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् । अक्षेभ्यः परतो वर्तते इति परेणोन्द्रियादिना चोच्यत इति परोक्षं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणमेव । चकारः स्वविषये द्वयोस्तुल्यबलत्वख्यापनार्थः । तेन यदाहुः ‘सकलप्रमाणज्येष्ठं प्रत्यक्षम्’ इति तदपास्तम् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वादितरप्रमाणानां तस्य ज्येष्ठतेति चेत् न; प्रत्यक्षस्यापि प्रमाणान्तरपूर्वकत्वोपलब्धेः, लिङ्गात् आप्तोपदेशाद्वा बहुयादिकमवगम्य प्रवृत्तस्य तद्विषयप्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तेः ॥ १० ॥

३२. न प्रत्यक्षादन्यत्प्रमाणमिति लौकायतिकाः । तत्राह—

व्यवस्थान्यधीनिषेधानां सिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षैतरप्रमाणसिद्धिः ॥ ११ ॥

३३. प्रमाणाप्रमाणविभागस्य, परबुद्धेः, अतीन्द्रियार्थनिषेधस्य च सिद्धिर्नानुमानादिप्रमाणं विना । चार्वाको हि काश्चिज्ज्ञानव्यक्तीः संवादित्वेनाव्यभिचारिणीरूपलभ्यान्याश्च विसंवादित्वेन व्यभिचारिणीः पुनः कालान्तरे तादृशीतराणां ज्ञानव्यक्तीनामवश्यं प्रमाणेतरते व्यवस्थापयेत् । न च सन्निहिताथर्बलेनोत्पद्यमानं पूर्वापरपरामर्शशून्यं प्रत्यक्षं पूर्वापरकालभाविनीनां ज्ञानव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं

निमित्तमुपलक्षयितुं क्षमते । न चायं स्वप्रतीतिगोचराणामपि ज्ञानव्यक्तीनां परं प्रति प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा व्यवस्थापयितुं प्रभवति । तस्माद्यथादृष्टज्ञानव्यक्तिसाधर्म्यद्वारेणेदानीन्तनज्ञानव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्या-प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं परप्रतिपादकं च परोक्षान्तर्गतमनुमानरूपं प्रमाणा-न्तरमुपासीत ।

३४. अपि च (अ) प्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् 'नायं लौकिको न परीक्षकः' इत्युन्मत्तवदुपेक्षणीयः स्यात् । न च प्रत्यक्षेण परचेतो-वृत्तीनामधिगमोऽस्ति । चेष्टाविशेषदर्शनात्तदवगमे च परोक्षस्य प्रामाण्यम-निच्छतोऽप्यायातम् ।

३५. परलोकादिनिषेधश्च न प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण शक्यः कर्तुम्; सन्निहित-मात्रविषयत्वात्तस्य । परलोकादिकं चाप्रतिषिध्य नायं सुखमास्ते प्रमाणान्तरं च नेच्छतीति डिम्भहेवाकः ।

३६. किञ्च, प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यर्थाव्यभिचारादेव प्रामाण्यं तच्चार्थप्रतिबद्ध-लिङ्गशब्दद्वारा सनुन्मज्जतः परोक्षस्याप्यर्थाव्यभिचारादेव किं नेष्यते ? व्यभिचारिणोऽपि परोक्षस्य दर्शनादप्रामाण्यमिति चेत् ; प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तिमिरादिदोषादप्रमाणस्य दर्शनात् सर्वत्राप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षाभासं तदिति चेत् ; इतरत्रापि तुल्यमेतदन्यत्र पक्षपातात् । धर्मकीर्ति-रप्येतदाह—

“प्रमाणेतरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यधियो गतेः ।

प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः प्रतिषेधाच्च कस्यचित् ॥ १ ॥

अर्थस्यासम्भवेऽभावात् प्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रमाणता ।

प्रतिबद्धस्वभावस्य तद्वेतुत्वे समं द्वयम्” ॥ २ ॥

इति ।

३७. यथोक्तसङ्ख्यायोगेऽपि च परोक्षार्थविषयमनुमानमेव सौगतै-रुपगम्यते; तदयुक्तम्; शब्दादीनामपि प्रमाणत्वात्, तेषां चानुमानेऽन्त-र्भावयितुमशक्यत्वात् । एकेन तु सर्वसंप्राप्तिना प्रमाणेन प्रमाणान्तर-संप्रहे नायं दोषः । तत्र यथा इन्द्रियजमानसात्मसंवेदनयोगिज्ञानानां प्रत्यक्षेण संप्रहस्तथा स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोद्धानुमानागमानां परोक्षेण संप्रहो लक्षणस्याविशेषात् । स्मृत्यादीनां च विशेषलक्षणानि स्वस्थान एव वक्ष्यन्ते । एवं परोक्षस्योपमानस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञाने, अर्थापत्तेरनुमाने-ऽन्तर्भावोऽभिधास्यते ॥ ११ ॥

३८. यत्तु प्रमाणमेव न भवति न तेनान्तर्भूतेन बहिर्भूतेन वा किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम्, यथा अभावः । कथमस्याप्रामाण्यम् ? निर्विषयत्वात् इति ब्रूमः । तदेव कथम् ? इति चेत्—

भावाभावात्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनो निर्विषयोऽभावः ॥ १२ ॥

३९. नहि भावैकरूपं वस्त्वस्ति विश्वस्य वैश्वरूप्यप्रसङ्गात्, नाप्य-
भावैकरूपं नीरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात्; किन्तु स्वरूपेण सत्त्वात् पररूपेण चासत्त्वात्
भावाभावरूपं वस्तु, तथैव प्रमाणानां प्रवृत्तेः । तथाहि—प्रत्यक्षं तावत्
भूतलमेवेदं घटादिर्न भवतीत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकद्वारेण वस्तु परिच्छिन्दत्
तदधिकं विषयमभावैकरूपं निराचष्ट इति कं विषयमाश्रित्याभावलक्षणं
प्रमाणं स्यात् ? एवं परोक्षाण्यपि प्रमाणानि भावाभावरूपवस्तुग्रहण-
प्रवणान्येव, अन्यथाऽसङ्कीर्णस्वस्वविषयग्रहणासिद्धेः, यदाह—

“अयमेवेति यो ह्येष भावे भवति निर्णयः ।

नैष वस्त्वन्तराभाव संवित्यनुगमाद्वे ॥”

(एलोकवा० अभाव० श्लो. १५)

इति ।

४०. अथ भवतु भावाभावरूपता वस्तुनः, किं नश्च्छिन्नम् ?
वयमपि हि तथैव प्रत्यपीपयाम । केवलं भावांश इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टत्वात्
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणगोचरः अभावांशस्तु न तथेत्यभावप्रमाणगोचर इति कथम-
विषयत्वं स्यात् ? तदुक्तम्—

“न तावदिन्द्रियेणैष नास्तीत्युत्पाद्यते मतिः ।

भावांशेनैव संयोगो योग्यत्वादिन्द्रियस्य हि ॥ १ ॥

गृहीत्वा वस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।

मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षया ॥ २ ॥

(एलोकवा० अभाव० श्लो० १८, २७)

इति ।

४१. ननु भावांशादभावांशस्याभेदे कथं प्रत्यक्षेणाग्रहणम् ? भेदे वा
घटाद्यभावरहितं भूतलं प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति घटादयो गृह्यन्त इति
प्राप्तम्, तदभावाग्रहणस्य तद्भावाग्रहणान्तरीयकत्वात् । तथा चाभाव-

प्रमाणमपि पश्चात्प्रवृत्तं न तानुत्सारयितुं पटिष्ठं स्यात्, अन्यार्थाऽसं-
ङ्कीर्णस्य संङ्कीर्णताग्रहणात् प्रत्यक्षं भ्रान्तं स्यात् ।

४२. अपि चायं प्रमाणपञ्चकनिवृत्तिरूपत्वात् तुच्छः । तत् एवा-
ज्ञानरूपः कथं प्रमाणं भवेत् ? तस्मादभावांशात्कथञ्चिदभिन्नं भावांशं
परिच्छिन्दतां प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमाणेनाभावांशो गृहीत एवेति तदतिरिक्त
विषयाभावान्निविषयोऽभावः । तथा च न प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ॥ १२ ॥

४३. विभागमुक्त्वा विशेषलक्षणमाह —

विशदः प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १३ ॥

४४. सामान्यलक्षणानुवादेन विशेषलक्षणविधानात् 'सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः'
इति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमनूय 'विशदः' इति विशेषलक्षणं प्रसिद्धस्य
प्रत्यक्षस्य विधीयते । तथा च प्रत्यक्षं धर्मि । विशदसम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मक-
मिति साध्यो धर्मः । प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति हेतुः । यद्विशदसम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मकं
न भवति न तत् प्रत्यक्षम्, यथा परोक्षमिति व्यतिरेकी । धर्मिणो
हेतुत्वेऽनन्वयदोष इति चेत् ; न, विशेषे धर्मिणि धर्मिसामान्यस्य
हेतुत्वात् । तस्य च विशेषनिष्ठत्वेन विशेषेऽनन्वयसम्भवात् । सपक्षे
वृत्तिमन्तरेणापि च विपक्षव्यावृत्तिबलाद्गमकत्वमित्युक्तमेव ॥ १३ ॥

४५. अथ किमिदं वैशद्यं नाम ? यदि स्वविषयग्रहणम् ; तत्परोक्षे-
ष्यक्षुण्णम् । अथ स्फुटत्वम् ; तदपि स्वसंविदितत्वात् सर्वविज्ञानानां
सममित्याशङ्क्याह —

प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षेदन्तया प्रतिभासो वा वैशद्यम् ॥ १४ ॥

४६. प्रस्तुतात् प्रमाणाद् यदन्यत् प्रमाणं शब्दलिङ्गादिज्ञानं तत्
प्रमाणान्तरं तन्निरपेक्षता 'वैशद्यम्' । नहि शाब्दानुमानादिवत् प्रत्यक्षं
स्वोत्पत्तौ शब्दलिङ्गादिज्ञानं प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते इत्येकं वैशद्यलक्षणम् ।
लक्षणान्तरमपि 'इदन्तया प्रतिभासो वा' इति, इदन्तया विशेषनिष्ठतया
यः प्रतिभासः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयस्य सोऽपि 'वैशद्यम्' । 'वा'शब्दो
लक्षणान्तरत्वसूचनार्थः ॥ १४ ॥

४७. अथ मुख्यसांख्यवहारिकभेदेन द्वैविध्यं प्रत्यक्षस्य हृदि निधाय
मुख्यस्य लक्षणमाह —

तत् सर्वथावरणविलये चेतनस्य स्वरूपाविर्भावो मुख्यं केवलम् ॥ १५ ॥

४८. 'तत्' इति प्रत्यक्षपरामर्शार्थम्, अन्यथानन्तरमेव वेशद्यमभिसम्बध्येत । दीर्घकालनिरन्तरसत्कारासेवितरत्नत्रयप्रकर्षपर्यन्ते एकत्ववितर्काविचारध्यानबलेन निःशेषतया ज्ञानावरणादीनां घातिकर्मणां प्रक्षये सति चेतनास्वभावस्यात्मनः प्रकाशस्वभावस्येति यावत्, स्वरूपस्य प्रकाशस्वभावस्य सत् एवावरणापगमेन 'आविर्भावः' आविर्भूतं स्वरूपं मुखमिव शरीरस्य सर्वज्ञानानां प्रधानं 'मुख्यम्' प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्चचेन्द्रियादिसहायकविरहात् सकलविषयत्वादसाधारणत्वाच्च 'केवलम्' इत्यागमे प्रसिद्धम् ।

४९. प्रकाशस्वभावता कथमात्मनः सिद्धेति चेत्, एते ब्रूमः—आत्मा प्रकाशस्वभावः, असन्दिग्धस्वभावत्वात्, यः प्रकाशस्वभावो न भवति नासावसन्दिग्धस्वभावो यथा घटः न च तथात्मा, न खलु कश्चिद्-हमस्मि न वेति सन्दिग्धे इति नासिद्धो हेतुः । तथा, आत्मा प्रकाशस्वभावः, बोद्धृत्वात्, यः प्रकाशस्वभावो न भवति नासौ बोद्धा यथा घटः, न च न बोद्धास्मेति । तथा, यो यस्याः क्रियायाः कर्ता न स तद्विषयो यथा गतिक्रियायाः कर्ता चैत्रो न तद्विषयः, ज्ञाप्तिक्रियायाः कर्ता चात्मेति ।

५०. अथ प्रकाशस्वभावत्व आत्मनः कथमावरणम् ? आवरणे वा सततावरणप्रसङ्गः, नैवम् प्रकाशस्वभावस्यापि चन्द्रार्कादेरिव रजोनीहारा-भ्रपटलादिभिरिव ज्ञानावरणीयादिकर्मभिरावरणस्य सम्भवात्, चन्द्रार्कादेरिव च प्रबलपवमानप्रायैर्ध्यानभावनादिभिर्विलयस्येति ।

५१. ननु सादित्वे स्यादावरणस्योपायतो विलयः; नैवम्, अनादेरपि सुवर्णमलस्य क्षारमृत्पुटपाकादिना विलयोपलम्भात्, तद्वदेवानादेरपि ज्ञानावरणीयादिकर्मणः प्रतिपक्षभूतरत्नत्रयाभ्यासेन विलयोपपत्तेः ।

५२. न चामूर्त्तस्यात्मनः कथमावरणमिति वाच्यम्; अमूर्ताया अपि चेतनाशक्तेर्मदिरामदनकोद्रवादिभिरावरणदर्शनात् ।

५३. अथावरणीयतत्प्रतिपक्षाभ्यामात्मा विक्रियेत न वा ? किं चातः ?

“वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।

चर्मोपमश्चेत् सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥”

इति चेत् न; अस्य दूषणस्य कूटस्थनित्यतापक्ष एव सम्भवात्, परिणामिनित्यश्चात्मेति तस्य पूर्वापरपर्यायोत्पादविनाशसहितानुवृत्तिरूपत्वात्, एकान्तनित्यक्षणिकपक्षयोः सर्वार्थक्रियाविरहात्, यदाह—

“अर्थक्रिया न युज्येत नित्यक्षणिकपक्षयोः ।

क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां भावानां सा लक्षणतया मंता ॥”

(लघो० २.१)

इति ।

५४. ननु प्रमाणाधीना प्रमेयव्यवस्था । न च मुख्यप्रत्यक्षस्य तद्वतो वा सिद्धौ किञ्चित् प्रमाणमस्ति । प्रत्यक्षं हि रूपादिविषयविनियमितव्यापारं नातीन्द्रियेऽर्थे प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहते । नाप्यनुमानम् प्रत्यक्षदृष्टलिङ्गलिङ्गि सम्बन्धबलो(प)जननधर्मकत्वात्तस्य । आगमस्तु यद्यतीन्द्रियज्ञानपूर्वकस्तत्साधकः; तदेतरेतराश्रयः—

“नर्ते तदागमात्सिध्येन्न च तेनागमो विना ।”

(श्लोकवा० सू० २ श्लो० १४२)

इति । अपौरुषेयस्तु तत्साधको नास्त्येव । योऽपि—

“अपाणिपादो ह्यमनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।

स वेति विश्वं न हि तस्य वेत्ता तमाहुरग्र्यं पुरुषं महान्तम् ॥”

(श्वेताश्व० ३.१९)

इत्यादिः कश्चिदर्थवादरूपोऽस्ति नासौ प्रमाणम् विधावेव प्रामाण्योपगमात् । प्रमाणान्तराणां चात्रानवसर एवेत्याशङ्क्याह—

प्रज्ञातिशयविश्रान्त्यादिसिद्धेस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १६ ॥

५५. प्रज्ञाया अतिशयः—तारतम्यं कचिद्विश्रान्तम्, अतिशयत्वादपरिमाणातिशयवदित्यनुमानेन निरतिशयप्रज्ञासिद्ध्या तस्य केवलज्ञानस्य सिद्धिः, तत्सिद्धिरूपत्वात् केवलज्ञानसिद्धेः । “आदि” ग्रहणात् सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षाः प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदित्यतो ज्योतिर्ज्ञानाविसंवादान्यथानुपपत्तेश्च तत्सिद्धिः, यदाह—

“धीरत्यन्तपरोक्षेऽर्थे न चेत् पुंसां कुतः पुनः ।

ज्योतिर्ज्ञानाविसंवादः श्रुताच्चेत् साधनान्तरम् ॥”

(सिद्धिवि० पृ० ४१३A)

५६. अपि च—“नोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमेवञ्जातीयकमर्थमवगमयति नान्यत्किञ्चनेन्द्रियम्”—

(शावरभा० १.१.२)

इति वदता भूताद्यर्थपरिज्ञानं कस्यचित् पुंसोऽभिमतमेव, अन्यथा कस्मै वेदस्त्रिकालविषयमर्थं निवेदयेत् ? स हि निवेदयंस्त्रिकालविषय-
तत्त्वज्ञमेवाधिकारिणमुपादत्ते । तदाह—

“त्रिकालविषयं तत्त्वं कस्मै वेदो निवेदयेत् ।

अक्षय्यावरणैकान्तान्न चेद्वेद तथा नरः ॥”

(सिद्धिवि० पृ० ४१४A)

इति त्रिकालविषयवस्तुनिवेदनाऽन्यथानुपपत्तेरतीन्द्रियवेवलज्ञान-
सिद्धिः ।

५७. किञ्च, प्रत्यक्षानुमानसिद्धसंवादं शास्त्रमेवातीन्द्रियार्थदर्शिसद्भावे
प्रमाणम् । य एव हि शास्त्रस्य विषयः स्याद्वादः स एव प्रत्यक्षादेरपीति
संवादः, तथाहि—

“सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च ।

अन्यथा सर्वसत्त्वं स्यात् स्वरूपस्याप्यसम्भवः ॥”

इति दिशा प्रमाणसिद्धं स्याद्वादं प्रतिपादयन्नागमोऽर्हत्तस्सर्वज्ञतामपि
प्रतिपादयति, यदस्तु—

“यदीयसम्पत्त्वबलात् प्रतीमो भवादृशानां परमात्मभावम् ।

कुवासनापाशविनाशनाय नमोऽस्तु तस्मै तव शासनाय ॥”

(आयोग० २१)

इति । प्रत्यक्षं तु यद्यप्यैन्द्रिय(य)कं नातीन्द्रियज्ञानविषयं तथापि
समाधिबलबन्धजन्मकं योगिप्रत्यक्षमेव बाह्यार्थस्येव स्वस्यापि वेदकमिति
प्रत्यक्षतोऽपि तत्सिद्धिः ।

५८. अथ---

ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं च जगत्पतेः ।

ऐश्वर्यं चैव धम्मंश्च सहसिद्धं चतुष्टयम् ॥

इति वचनान् सर्वज्ञत्वमीश्वरादीनामस्तु, मानुषस्य तु कस्यचिद्विद्या-
चरणवतोपि तदसम्भावनीयम्, यत्कुमारिलः—

“अथापि वेददेहत्वाद् ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ।

कामं भवन्तु सर्वज्ञाः सार्वज्ञ्यं मानुषस्य किम् ॥”

(तत्त्वसं० का० ३२०८)

इति; आ ! सर्वज्ञापलापपातकिन् ! दुर्वदवादिन् ! मानुषत्वनिन्दार्थ-
वादापदेशेन देवाधिदेवानाधिपतिः ? ये हि जन्मान्तराज्जितो जित-
पुण्यप्राग्भाराः सुरभवभवमनुपमं सुखमनुभूय दुःखपङ्कमप्रमखिलं
जीवलोकमुद्दिधीर्षवो नरकेष्वपि क्षणं क्षिप्तसुखासिकामृतवृष्टयो
मनुष्यलोकमवतेरुः जन्मसमयसमकालचलितासनसकलसुरेन्द्रवृन्दविहित-
जन्मोत्सवाः किङ्करायमाणसुरसमूहाहमहमिकारब्धसेवाविधयः स्वय-
मुपनतामतिप्राज्यसाम्राज्यश्रियं तृणवदवधूय समतृणमणिशत्रुमित्र-
वृत्तयो निजप्रभावप्रशमितेतिमरकादिजगदुपद्रवाः शुक्लध्यानानल-
निर्दग्धघातिकर्माण आविर्भूतनिखिलभावाभावस्वभावावभासिकेवलबल-
दलितसकलजीवलोकमोहप्रसराः सुरासुरविनिर्मितां समवसरणभुवमधिष्ठाय
स्वस्वभाषापरिणामिनीभिर्वाग्भिः प्रवर्ततधर्मतीर्थाश्चतुस्त्रिंशदतिशयमयीं
तीर्थनाथत्वलक्ष्मीमुपभुज्य परं ब्रह्म सततानन्दं सकलकर्मनिर्मोक्षमुपेयि-
वांसस्तान्मानुषत्वादिसाधारणधर्मोपदेशेनापवदन् सुमेरुमपि लेष्ट्वादिना
साधारणीकर्तुं पार्थिवत्वेनापवदेः ! किञ्च, अन्वरतवनिताङ्गसम्भोग-
दुर्ललितवृत्तीनां विविधहेतिसमूहधारिणामक्षमालाद्यायत्तमनःसंयमानां
रागद्वेषमोहकलुषितानां ब्रह्मादीनां सर्ववित्त्वसाम्राज्यम् ! यदवदाम
स्तुतौ—

“मदेन मानेन मनोभवेन क्रोधेन लोभेन ससम्भवेन ।

पराजितानां प्रसभं सुराणां वृथैव साम्राज्यरुजां परेषाम् ॥”

(आयोग० २५)

इति । अथापि रागादिदोषकालुष्यविरहिताः सततज्ञानानन्दमयमूर्तयो ब्रह्मादयः, तर्हि तादृशेषु तेषु न विप्रतिपद्यामहे, अवोचाम हि—

“यत्र तत्र समये यथा तथा योऽसि सोऽस्यभिधया यया तथा ।
वीतदोषकलुषः स चेद्भवानेक एव भगवन्नमोऽस्तु ते ॥”

(आयोग० ३१)

इति केवलं ब्रह्मादिदेवताविषयाणां श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणेतिहासकथानां वैतथ्यमासज्येत । तदेवं साधकेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्योऽतीन्द्रियज्ञानसिद्धि-
त्वा ॥ १६ ॥

बाधकाभावाच्च ॥१७॥

५९. सुनिश्चितासम्भवद्वाधकत्वात् सुखादिवत् तत्सिद्धिः इति सम्ब-
ध्यते । तथाहि केवलज्ञानबाधकं भवत् प्रत्यक्षं वा भवेत् प्रमाणान्तरं
वा ? न तावत् प्रत्यक्षम्; तस्य विधावेर्वाधिकारात्—

“सम्बद्धं वर्तमानं च गृह्यते चक्षुरादिना ।”

(श्लोकवा० सू० ४, श्लो० ८४)

इति स्वयमेव भाषणात् ।

६०. अथ न प्रवर्तमानं प्रत्यक्षं तद्वाधकं किन्तु निवर्तमानम् तत् ; तर्हि
(द्वि) यदि नियतदेशकालविषयत्वेन बाधकं तर्हि सम्प्रतिपद्यामहे । अथ
सकलदेशकालविषयत्वेन; तर्हि न तत् सकलदेशकालपुरुषपरिपत्साक्षा-
त्कारमन्तरेण सम्भवतीति सिद्धं नः समीहितम् । न च जैमिनिरन्यो वा
सकलदेशादिसाक्षात्कारी सम्भवति सत्त्वपुरुषत्वादेः रथ्यापुरुषवत् ।
अथ प्रज्ञायाः सातिशयत्वात्तत्प्रकर्षोऽप्यनुमीयते; तर्हि तत् एव सकलार्थ-
दर्शी किं नानुमीयते ? स्वपक्षे चानुपलम्भप्रमाणयन् सर्वज्ञाभावे कुतः
प्रमाणयेदविशेषात् ?

६१. न चानुमानं तद्वाधकं सम्भवति; धर्मिग्रहणमन्तरेणानुमाना-
प्रवृत्तेः, धर्मिग्रहणे वा तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणबाधितत्वादनुमानमेवानुमानस्य ।
अथ विवादाध्यासितः पुरुषः सर्वज्ञो न भवति वक्तृत्वात् पुरुषत्वाद्वा रथ्या-
पुरुषवदित्यनुमानं तद्वाधकं ब्रूषे; तदसत्; यतो यदि प्रमाणपरिदृष्टार्थ-
वक्तृत्वं हेतुः तदा विरुद्धः, तोदृशस्य वक्तृत्वस्य सर्वज्ञ एव भावात् ।
अथासद्भूतार्थवक्तृत्वम्; तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थवादिनाम-

सर्वज्ञत्वेनेष्टत्वात् । वक्तृत्वमात्रं तु सन्दिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकत्वादनै-
कान्तिकम्, ज्ञानप्रकर्षे वक्तृत्वापकर्षादर्शनात्; प्रत्युत ज्ञानातिशयवतो
वक्तृत्वातिशयस्यैवोपलब्धेः । एतेन पुरुषत्वमपि निरस्तम् । पुरुषत्वं हि
यदि रागाद्यदूषितं तदा विरुद्धम्, ज्ञानवैराग्यादिगुणयुक्तपुरुषत्वस्य
सर्वज्ञतामन्तरेणानुपपत्तेः । रागादिदूषिते तु पुरुषत्वे सिद्धसाध्यता ।
पुरुषत्वसामान्यं तु सन्दिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकमित्यवाधकम् ।

६२. नाप्यागमस्तद्वाधकः तस्यापौरुषेयस्यासम्भवात्; सम्भवे वा
तद्वाधकस्य तस्यादर्शनात् । सर्वज्ञोपज्ञश्चागमः कथं तद्वाधकः ? इत्य-
लमतिप्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ १७ ॥

६३. न केवलं केवलमेव मुख्यं प्रत्यक्षमपि त्वन्यदपीत्याह—

तत्तारतम्येऽवधिमनःपर्यायौ च ॥ १८ ॥

६४. सर्वथावरणविलये केवलम्, तस्यावरणविलयस्य “तारतम्ये”
आवरणक्षयोपशमविशेषे तन्निमित्तकः ‘अवधिः’ अवधिज्ञानं ‘मनः पर्यायः,
मनःपर्यायज्ञानं च मुख्यमिन्द्रियानपेक्षं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्रावधीयत इति
‘अवधिः’ मर्यादा सा च “रूपिष्ववधेः” (तत्त्वा० १-२८) इति वचनात्
रूपवद्द्रव्यविषया । अवध्युपलक्षितं ज्ञानमप्यवधिः । स द्वेधा भवप्रत्ययो
गुणप्रत्ययश्च । तत्राद्यो देवनारकाणां पक्षिणामिव वियद्गमनम् । गुण-
प्रत्ययो मनुष्याणां तिरश्चां च ।

६५. मनसो द्रव्यरूपस्य पर्यायाश्चिन्तनानुगुणाः परिणामभेदास्त-
द्विषयं ज्ञानं ‘मनःपर्यायः’ । तथाविधमनःपर्यायान्यथानुपपत्त्या तु
यद्वाह्यचिन्तनीयार्थज्ञानं तत् आनुमानिकमेव न मनःपर्यायप्रत्यक्षम्,
यदाहुः—

“जाणइ बज्जेणुमाणेण ।”

(विशेषा० गा० ८१४)

६६. ननु रूपिद्रव्यविषयत्वे क्षायोपशमिकत्वे च तुल्ये को विशेषोऽ-
वधिमनःपर्यायोरित्याह—

विशुद्धिक्षेत्रस्वामिविषयभेदात् तद्भेदः ॥ १९ ॥

६७. सत्यपि कथञ्चित्साधर्म्ये विशुद्ध्यादिभेदादवधिमनःपर्याय-
ज्ञानयोर्भेदः । तत्रावधिज्ञानान्मनःपर्यायज्ञानं विशुद्धतरम् । यानि हि

मनोद्रव्याणि अवधिज्ञानी जानीते तानि मनःपर्यायज्ञानी विशुद्धतराणि जानीते ।

६८. क्षेत्रकृतश्चानयोर्भेदः—अवधिज्ञानमङ्गुलस्यासङ्क्षेयभागादिषु भवति आ सर्वलोकात्, मनःपर्यायज्ञानं तु मनुष्यक्षेत्र एव भवति ।

६९. स्वामिकृतोऽपि—अवधिज्ञानं संयतस्यासंयतस्य संयतासंयतस्य च सर्वगतिषु भवति; मनःपर्यायज्ञानं तु मनुष्यसंयतस्य प्रकृष्टचारित्रस्य प्रमत्तादिषु क्षीणकषायान्तेषु गुणस्थानकेषु भवति । तत्रापि वर्धमान-परिणामस्य नेतरस्य । वर्धमानपरिणामस्यापि ऋद्धिप्राप्तस्य नेतरस्य । ऋद्धिप्राप्तस्यापि कस्यचिन्न सर्वस्येति ।

७०. विषयकृतश्च—रूपवद्द्रव्येष्वसर्वपर्यायेष्ववयवेष्वविषयनिबन्धस्त-दनन्तभागे मनःपर्यायस्य इति । अवसितं मुख्यं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १६ ॥

७१. अथ सांव्यवहारिकमाह—

इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तोऽवग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा

सांव्यवहारिकम् ॥ २० ॥

७२. इन्द्रियाणि स्पर्शनादीनि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाणि, मनश्च निमित्तं कारणं यस्य स तथा । सामान्यलक्षणानुवृत्तेः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयस्यैवं विशेषणं तेन इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः । कारणमुक्त्वा स्वरूपमाह—‘अवग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा’ । अवग्रहादयो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः त आत्मा यस्य सोऽवग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा । ‘आत्मग्रहणं च क्रमेणोत्पद्यमानानाम-प्यवग्रहादीनां नात्यन्तिको भेदः किन्तु पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरात्तररूपतया परिणामा-देकात्मकत्वमिति प्रदर्शनार्थम् । समीचीनः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः सांव्यवहारस्तत्प्रयोजनं ‘सांव्यवहारिकम्’ प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तत्वं च समस्तं व्यस्तं च बोद्धव्यम् । इन्द्रियप्राधान्यात् मनोबलाधानाच्चोत्पद्य-मान इन्द्रियजः । मनस एव विशुद्धिसव्यपेक्षादुपजायमानो मनोनिमित्त इति ।

७३. ननु स्वसंवेदनरूपमन्यदपि प्रत्यक्षमस्ति तत् कस्मान्नोक्तम् ? इति न वाच्यम् ; इन्द्रियजज्ञानस्वसंवेदनस्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षे, अनिन्द्रियज-सुखादिसंवेदनस्य मनःप्रत्यक्षे, योगिप्रत्यक्षस्वसंवेदनस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षेऽन्त-र्भावात् । स्मृत्यादि स्वसंवेदनं तु मानसमेवेति नापरं स्वसंवेदनं नाम प्रत्यक्षमस्तीति भेदेन नोक्तम् ॥ २० ॥

७४. इन्द्रियेत्युक्तमितीन्द्रियाणि लक्षयति—

स्पर्शरसगन्धरूपशब्दग्रहणलक्षणानि स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुः-

श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि द्रव्यभावभेदानि ॥ २१ ॥

७५. स्पर्शादिग्रहणं लक्षणं येषां तानि यथासङ्ख्यं स्पर्शनादीनीन्द्रियाणि । तथाहि स्पर्शाद्युपलब्धिः करणपूर्वा क्रियात्वात् द्विदिक्रियावत् । तत्रेन्द्रेणकर्मणा सृष्टानीन्द्रियाणि नामकर्मोदयनिमित्तत्वात् । इन्द्रस्यात्मनो लिङ्गानि वा, कर्ममलीमसस्य हि स्वयमर्थानुपलब्धुमसमर्थस्यात्मनोऽर्थोपलब्धौ निमित्तानि इन्द्रियाणि ।

७६. नन्वेवमात्मनोऽर्थज्ञानमिन्द्रियात् लिङ्गादुपजायमानमानुमानिकं स्यात् । तथा च लिङ्गापरिज्ञानेऽनुमानानुदयात् । तस्यानुमानात्परिज्ञानेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः, नैवम् ; भावेन्द्रियस्य स्वसंविदितत्वेनानवस्थानवकाशात् । यद्वा, इन्द्रस्यात्मनो लिङ्गान्यात्मगमकानि इन्द्रियाणि करणस्य वास्यादिवत्कर्त्रधिष्ठितत्वदर्शनात् ।

७७. तानि च द्रव्यभावरूपेण भिद्यन्ते । तत्र द्रव्येन्द्रियाणि नामकर्मोदयनिमित्तानि, भावेन्द्रियाणि पुनस्तदावरणवीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपशमनिमित्तानि । सैषा पञ्चसूत्री स्पर्शग्रहणलक्षणं स्पर्शनेन्द्रियं, रसग्रहणलक्षणं रसनेन्द्रियमित्यादि । सकलसंसारिषु भावाच्छरीरव्यापकत्वाच्च स्पर्शनस्य पूर्वं निर्देशः, ततः क्रमेणाल्पाल्पजीवविषयत्वाद्रसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्राणाम् ।

७८. तत्र स्पर्शनेन्द्रियं तदावरणक्षयोपशमसम्भवं पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतीनां शेषेन्द्रियावरणवतां स्थावराणां जीवानाम् । तेषां च “पृथ्वी चित्तमन्तमवखाया” (दशवै० ४.१) इत्यादेराप्तागमात्सिद्धिः । अनुमानाच्च—ज्ञानं क्वचिदात्मनि परमापकर्षवत् अपकृष्यमाणविशेषत्वात् परिमाणवत्, यत्र तदपकर्षपर्यन्तस्त एकेन्द्रियाः स्थावराः । न च स्पर्शनेन्द्रियस्याप्यभावे भस्मादिषु ज्ञानस्यापकर्षो युक्तः । तत्र हि ज्ञानस्याभाव एव न पुनरपकर्षस्ततो यथा गगनपरिमाणादारभ्यापकृष्यमाणविशेषं परिमाणं परमाणौ परमापकर्षवत् तथा ज्ञानमपि केवलज्ञानादारभ्यापकृष्यमाणविशेषमेकेन्द्रियेष्वत्यन्तमपकृष्यते । पृथिव्यादीनां च प्रत्येकं जीवत्वसिद्धिरग्रे वक्ष्यते । स्पर्शनरसनेन्द्रिये कृमि-अपादिका-नूपुरक-गण्डूपद-शङ्ख-शुक्तिका-शम्बूका-जलूकाप्रभृतीनां त्रसानाम् । स्पर्शन-रसन-घ्राणानि पिपीलिकारोहणिका-उपचिका-कुन्थु-तुबरक-त्रपुस-बीज-कर्पासास्थिका-शतपदी-अये - नक-तृणपत्र-काष्ठहारकादीनाम् । स्पर्शन-रसन-घ्राण-चक्षुषि भ्रमर-वटेर-

सारङ्ग-मक्षिका-पुत्तिका-दंश-मशक-वृश्चिक नन्द्यावर्त-कीटक-पतङ्गादीनाम् । सह श्रोत्रेण तानि मत्स्य-उरग-भुजग-पक्षि-चतुष्पदानां तिर्यग्योनिजानां सर्वेषां च नारकमनुष्यदेवानामिति ।

७९. ननु वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्द हेतवो वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थ-लक्षणान्यपीन्द्रियाणीति साङ्ख्यास्तत्कथं पञ्चैवेन्द्रियाणि ? न ज्ञानविशेष-हेतूनामेवेहेन्द्रियत्वेनाधिकृतत्वात्, चेष्टाविशेषनिमित्तत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वकल्प-नायामिन्द्रियानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः, चेष्टाविशेषाणामनन्तत्वात्, तस्माद् व्यक्तिनि-र्देशात् पञ्चैवेन्द्रियाणि ।

८०. तेषां च परस्परं स्यादभेदो द्रव्यार्थादेशात्, स्याद्भेदः पर्या-यार्थादेशात्, अभेदैकान्ते हि स्पर्शनेन स्पर्शस्येव रसादेरपि ग्रहणप्रसङ्गः । तथा चेन्द्रियान्तरकल्पनावैयर्थ्यम्, कस्यचित् साकल्ये वैकल्ये बान्येषां साकल्यवैकल्यप्रसङ्गश्च । भेदैकान्तेऽपि तेषामेकत्र सकल(सङ्कलन)-ज्ञानजनकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गः सन्तानान्तरेन्द्रियवत् । मनस्तस्य जनकमिति चेत् ; न; तस्येन्द्रियनिरपेक्षस्य तज्जनकत्वाभावात् । इन्द्रियापेक्षं मनोऽनु-सन्धानस्य जनकमिति चेत् ; सन्तानान्तरेन्द्रियापेक्षस्य कुतो न जनकत्व-मिति वाच्यम् ? प्रत्यासत्तेरभावादिति चेत् ; अत्र का प्रत्यासत्तिरन्यत्रै-कद्रव्यतादात्म्यात् ?, प्रत्यासत्त्यन्तरस्य च व्यभिचारादिति । एतेन तेषा-मात्मना भेदाभेदैकान्तौ प्रतिव्यूहौ । आत्मना करणानामभेदैकान्ते कर्तृत्व-प्रसङ्गः, आत्मनो वा करणत्वप्रसङ्गः उभयोरुभयात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गो वा, विशेषाभावात् । ततस्तेषां भेदैकान्ते चात्मनः करणत्वाभावः सन्ता-नान्तरकरणवद्विपर्ययो वेति प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वाद्वाधकाभावाच्चानेकान्त एवाश्रयणीयः ।

८१. द्रव्येन्द्रियाणामपि परस्परं स्वारम्भकपुद्गलद्रव्येभ्यश्च भेदाभेदद्वारानेकान्त एव युक्तः, पुद्गलद्रव्यार्थादेशादभेदस्य पर्यायार्था-देशाच्च भेदस्योपपद्यमानत्वात् ।

८२. एवमिन्द्रियविषयाणां स्पर्शादीनामपि द्रव्यपर्यायरूपतया भेदाभेदात्मकत्वमवसेयम्, तथैव निर्बाधमुपलब्धेः । तथा च न द्रव्यमात्रं पर्यायमात्रं वेन्द्रियविषय इति स्पर्शादीनां कर्मसाधनत्वं भावसाधनत्वं च द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ २१ ॥

८३. 'द्रव्यभावभेदानि' इत्युक्तं तानि क्रमेण लक्षयति—

द्रव्येन्द्रियं नियताकाराः पुद्गलाः ॥ २२ ॥

८४. 'द्रव्येन्द्रियम्' इत्येकवचनं जात्याश्रयणात् । नियतो विशिष्टो बाह्य आभ्यन्तरश्चाकारः संस्थानविशेषो येषां ते 'नियताकाराः' पूरण-गलनधर्माणः स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवन्तः 'पुद्गलाः', तथाहि श्रोत्रादिषु यः कर्णशङ्कुलीप्रभृतिर्बाह्यः पुद्गलानां प्रचयो यश्चाभ्यन्तरः कदम्बगोल-काद्याकारः स सर्वो द्रव्येन्द्रियम्, पुद्गलद्रव्यरूपत्वात् । अप्राधान्ये वा द्रव्यशब्दो यथा अङ्गारमर्द्दको द्रव्याचार्य इति । अप्रधानमिन्द्रियं द्रव्येन्द्रियम्, व्यापारवत्यपि तस्मिन् सन्निहितेऽपि चालोकप्रभृतिनि सहकारिपटले भावेन्द्रियं विना स्पर्शाद्युपलब्ध्यसिद्धेः ॥ २२ ॥

भावेन्द्रियं लब्ध्युपयोगौ ॥ २३ ॥

८५. लभ्यते 'लब्धिः' ज्ञानावरणकर्मक्षयोपशमविशेषः । यत्सन्निधानादात्मा द्रव्येन्द्रियनिवृत्तिं प्रति व्याप्रियते तन्निमित्त आत्मनः परिणामविशेष उपयोगः । अत्रापि 'भावेन्द्रियम्' इत्येकवचनं जात्याश्रय-णात् । भावशब्दोऽनुपसर्जनार्थः । यथैवेन्दनधर्मयोगित्वेनानुपचरितेन्द्रत्वो भावेन्द्र उच्यते तथैवेन्द्रलिङ्गत्वादिधर्मयोगेनानुपचरितेन्द्रलिङ्गत्वादि-धर्मयोगि 'भावेन्द्रियम्' ।

८६. तत्र लब्धिस्वभावं तावदिन्द्रियं स्वार्थसंविक्तावात्मनो योग्यतामादधद्भावेन्द्रियतां प्रतिपद्यते । नहि तत्रायोग्यस्य तदुत्पत्ति-राकाशवदुपपद्यते स्वार्थसंविद्योग्यतैव च लब्धिरिति । उपयोगस्वभावं पुनः स्वार्थसंविदि व्यापारात्मकम् । नह्यव्यावृत्तं स्पर्शनादिसंवेदनं स्पर्शादि प्रकाशयितुं शक्तम् सुपुप्तादीनामपि तत्प्रकाशकत्वप्राप्तेः ।

८७. स्वार्थप्रकाशने व्यापृतस्य संवेदनस्योपयोगत्वे फलत्वादि-न्द्रियत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न; कारणधर्मस्य कार्येऽनुवृत्तेः । नहि पावकस्य प्रकाशकत्वे तत्कार्यस्य प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशकत्वं विरुध्यते । न च येनैव स्वभावेनोपयोगस्येन्द्रियत्वम्, तेनैव फलत्वमिष्यते येन विरोधः स्यात् । साधकतमस्वभावेन हि तस्येन्द्रियत्वं क्रियारूपतया च फलत्वम् । यथैव हि प्रदीपः प्रकाशात्मना प्रकाशयतीत्यत्र साधकतमः प्रकाशात्मा करणम्, क्रियात्मा फलम्, स्वतन्त्रत्वाच्च कर्त्तैति सर्वमिदमनेकान्तवादे न दुर्लभमित्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ॥ २३ ॥

८८. 'मनोनिमित्तः' इत्युक्तमिति मनो लक्षयति—

सर्वार्थग्रहणं मनः ॥ २४ ॥

८९. सर्वे न तु स्पर्शनादीनां स्पर्शादिवत् प्रतिनियता एवार्था गृह्यन्तेऽनेनेति 'सर्वार्थग्रहणं मनः' 'अनिन्द्रियम्' इति 'नोऽन्द्रियम्' इति चोच्यते । सर्वार्थं मन इत्युच्यमाने आत्मन्यपि प्रसङ्ग इति करणत्व-प्रतिपादनार्थं 'ग्रहणम्' इत्युक्तम् । आत्मा तु कर्तेति नातिव्याप्तिः, सर्वार्थग्रहणं च मनसः प्रसिद्धमेव । यत् वाचकमुख्यः "श्रुतमनिन्द्रियस्य" (तत्त्वा० २.२२) श्रुतमिति हि विषयिणा विषयस्य निर्देशः । उपलक्षणं च श्रुतं मतेः, तेन मतिश्रुतयोर्यो विषयः स मनसो विषय इत्यर्थः । "मतिश्रुतयोर्निबन्धो द्रव्येष्वसर्वपर्यायेषु" (तत्त्वा० १.२७) इति वाचकवचनान्मतिश्रुतज्ञानयोः सर्वविषयत्वमिति मनसोऽपि सर्वविषयत्वं सिद्धम् ।

९०. मनोऽपि पञ्चेन्द्रियवद् द्रव्यभावभेदात् द्विविधमेव । तत्र द्रव्यमनो मनस्त्वेन परिणतानि पुद्गलद्रव्याणि । भावमनस्तु तदा-वरणीयकर्मक्षयोपशमात्मा लब्धिरात्मनश्चार्थग्रहणोन्मुखो व्यापारविशेष इति ॥ २४ ॥

९१. नन्वत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते 'इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तः' इति । अन्यदपि हि चक्षुर्ज्ञानस्य निमित्तमर्थं आलोकश्चास्ति, यदाहुः

"रूपालोकमनस्कारचक्षुर्भ्यः सम्प्रजायते ।

विज्ञानं मणिसूर्याशुगोशकृदभ्य इवानलः ॥

इत्यत्राह—

नार्थालोकौ ज्ञानस्य निमित्तमव्यतिरेकात् ॥ २५ ॥

९२. बाह्यो विषयः प्रकाशश्च न चक्षुर्ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्कारणम्, देशकालादिवत्तु व्यवहितकारणत्वं न निवार्यते, ज्ञानावरणादिक्षयोपशम-सामग्र्यामारादुपकारित्वेनाज्ञादिवच्चक्षुरूपकारित्वेन चाभ्युपगमात् । कुतः पुनः साक्षात्त कारणत्वमित्याह—'अव्यतिरेकात्' व्यतिरेकाभावात् । न हि तद्भावे भावलक्षणोऽन्वय एव हेतुफलभावनिश्चयनिमित्तम्, अपि तु तदभावेऽभावलक्षणो व्यतिरेकोऽपि । न चासावर्थालोकयोर्हेतुभावेऽस्ति; मरुमरीचिकादौ जलाभावेऽपि जलज्ञानस्य, वृषदंशादीनां चालोकाभावेऽपि सान्द्रतमतमः पटलविलिप्तदेशगतवस्तुप्रतिपत्तेश्च दर्शनात् । योगिनां

चातीतानागतार्थग्रहणे किमर्थस्य निमित्तत्वम् ? निमित्तत्वे चार्थक्रिया-
कारित्वेन सत्त्वादतीतानागतत्वक्षतिः ।

६३. न च प्रकाश्यादात्मलाभ एव प्रकाशकस्य प्रकाशकत्वम्, प्रदी-
पादेर्घटादिभ्योऽनुत्पन्नस्यापि तत्प्रकाशकत्वदर्शनात् । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य च
नित्यत्वेनाभ्युपगतस्य कथमर्थजन्यत्वं नाम ? अस्मदादीनामपि जनकस्यैव
ग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमे स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानादेः प्रमाणस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । येषां
चैकान्तक्षणिकोऽर्थो जनकश्च ग्राह्य इति दर्शनम्, तेषामपि जन्यजनक-
योर्ज्ञानार्थयोर्भिन्नकालत्वान्न ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः सम्भवति । अथ न जन्य-
जनकभावातिरिक्तः सन्दंशयोगोलकवत् ज्ञानार्थयोः कश्चिद् ग्राह्यग्राहक-
भाव इति मतम् ।

“भिन्नकालं कथं ग्राह्यमिति चेद् ग्राह्यतां विदुः ।

हेतुत्वमेव युक्तिज्ञा ज्ञानाकारार्पणक्षमम् ॥”

(प्रमाणवा० ३.२४७)

इति वचनात् ; तर्हि सर्वज्ञज्ञानस्य वार्तमानिकार्थविषयत्वं न कथ-
ञ्चिदुपपद्यते वार्तमानिकक्षणस्याजनकत्वात् अजनकस्य चाग्रहणात् । स्वसं-
वेदनस्य च स्वरूपाजन्यत्वे कथं ग्राहकत्वं स्वरूपस्य वा कथं ग्राह्यत्वमिति
चिन्त्यम् । तस्मात् स्वस्वसामग्रीप्रभवयोर्दीपप्रकाशघटयोरिव ज्ञानार्थयोः
प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावसम्भवान्न ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वमर्थालोकयोरिति स्थितम् ।

९४. नन्वर्थजन्यत्वे ज्ञानस्य कथं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था ? तदुत्पत्तितदा-
कारताभ्यां हि सोपपद्यते, तस्मादनुत्पन्नस्यातदाकारस्य च ज्ञानस्य सर्वा-
र्थान् प्रत्यविशेषात् ; नैवम् ; तदुत्पत्तिमन्तरेणाप्यावरणक्षयोपशमलक्ष-
णया योग्यतयैव प्रतिनियतार्थप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः । तदुत्पत्तावपि च
योग्यतावश्याश्रयणीया, अन्यथाऽशेषार्थसान्निध्येऽपि कुतश्चिदेवार्थात्
कस्यचिदेव ज्ञानस्य जन्मेति कौतस्कुतोऽयं विभागः । तदाकारता त्वर्था-
कारसङ्क्रान्त्या तावदनुपपन्ना, अर्थस्य निराकरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अर्थेन च
मूर्तेनामूर्तस्य ज्ञानस्य कीदृशं सादृश्यमित्यर्थविशेषग्रहणपरिणाम एव
साभ्युपेया । अतः—

“अर्थेन घटयत्येतां न हि मुक्त्वाऽर्थरूपताम् ।”

(प्रमाण वा० ३.३०५)

इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

९५. अपि च व्यस्ते समस्ते वैते ग्रहणकारणं स्याताम् । यदि व्यस्ते;
तदा कपालाद्यक्षणे घटान्त्यक्षणस्य, जलचन्द्रो वा नभश्चन्द्रस्य ग्राहकः

प्राप्नोति, तदुत्पत्तेस्तदाकारत्वाच्च । अथ समस्ते; तर्हि घटोत्तरक्षणः पूर्वघटक्षणस्य ग्राहकः प्रसजति । ज्ञानरूपत्वे सत्येते ग्रहणकारणमिति चेत्, तर्हि समानजातीयज्ञानस्य समनन्तरपूर्वज्ञानग्राहकत्वं प्रसज्येत । तन्न; योग्यतामन्तरेणान्यद् ग्रहणकारणं पश्यामः ॥२५॥

६६. 'अवग्रहेद्वावायधारणात्मा' इत्युक्तमित्यवग्रहादील्लक्ष्यति—

अक्षार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरमर्थग्रहणमवग्रहः ॥ २६ ॥

६७. 'अक्षम्' इन्द्रियं द्रव्यभावरूपम्, 'अर्थः' द्रव्यपर्यायात्मा, तयोः 'योगः' सम्बन्धोऽनतिदूरासन्नव्यवहितदेशाद्यवस्थानलक्षणा योग्यता । नित्यता हि सा विषयविपरिणोः, यदाह—

“पुटं सुणेइ सद्दं रूवं पुण पासाए अपुटं तु ॥”

(आव० नि० ५)

इत्यादि । तस्मिन्नक्षार्थयोगे सति 'दर्शनम्' अनुल्लिखितविशेषस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपत्तिः । तदनन्तरमिति क्रमप्रतिपादनार्थमेतत् । एतेन दर्शनस्यावग्रहं प्रति परिणामितोक्ता, नह्यमत एव सर्वथा कस्यचिदुत्पादः, सतो वा सर्वथा विनाश इति दर्शनमेवोत्तरं परिणामं प्रतिपद्यते । 'अर्थस्य' द्रव्यपर्यायात्मनोऽर्थक्रियाक्षमस्य 'ग्रहणम्', 'सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः' इति सामान्यलक्षणानुवृत्तेर्निर्णयो न पुनरविकल्पकं दर्शनमात्रम् 'अवग्रहः' ।

६८. न चायं मनसो विकल्पः, चक्षुरादिसन्निधानापेक्षत्वात् प्रातिसंख्यानेनाप्रत्याख्येयत्वाच्च । मानसो हि विकल्पः प्रतिसंख्यानेन निरुध्यते, न चायं तथेति न विकल्पः ॥ २६ ॥

अवगृहीतविशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा ॥ २७ ॥

६९. अवग्रहगृहीतस्य शब्दादेरर्थस्य 'किमयं शब्दः शाङ्गः शाङ्गो वा' इति संशये सति 'माधुर्यादयः शाङ्गधर्मा एवोपलभ्यन्ते न कार्कश्यादयः शाङ्गधर्माः' इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकरूपविशेषपर्यालोचनरूपा मतेष्वेष्टा 'ईहा' । इह चावग्रहेहयोरन्तराले अभ्यस्तेऽपि विषये संशयज्ञानमस्त्येव आशुभावात् नोपलक्ष्यते । न तु प्रमाणम्, सम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मकत्वाभावात् ।

१००. ननु परोक्षप्रमाणभेदरूपमूहाख्यं प्रमाणं वक्ष्यते तत्कस्तस्मादीहाया भेदः ? उच्यते—त्रिकालगोचरः साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहणपटुरुहो

यमाश्रित्य “व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले योगीव सम्पद्यते प्रमाता” इति न्यायविदो वदन्ति । ईहा तु वार्त्तमानिकार्थविषया प्रत्यक्षप्रभेद इत्यपौनरुक्त्यम् ।

१०१. ईहा च यद्यपि चेष्टोच्यते तथापि चेतनस्य सेति ज्ञानरूपैवेति युक्तं प्रत्यक्तभेदत्वमस्याः । न चानिर्णयरूपत्वादप्रमाणत्वमस्याः शङ्कनीयम् स्वविषयनिर्णयरूपत्वात्, निर्णयान्तरासादृश्ये निर्णयान्तराणामप्यनिर्णयत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ २७ ॥

ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः ॥ २८ ॥

१०२. ईहाक्रोडीकृते वस्तुनि विशेषस्य ‘शाङ्ख एवायं शब्दो न शार्ङ्गः’ इत्येवंरूपस्यावधारणम् ‘अवायः’ ॥ २८ ॥

स्मृतिहेतुर्धारणा ॥ २९ ॥

१०३. स्मृतेः’ अतीतानुसन्धानरूपाया ‘हेतुः’ परिणामिकारणम्, संस्कार इति यावत्, सङ्ख्येयमसङ्ख्येयं वा कालं ज्ञानस्यावस्थानं ‘धारणा’ । अवग्रहादयस्तु त्रय आन्तर्मौहूर्तिकाः ।

१०४. संस्कारस्य च प्रत्यक्षभेदरूपत्वात् ज्ञानत्वमुन्नेयम्, न पुनर्थथाहुः परे—“ज्ञानादतिरिक्तो भावनाख्योऽयं संस्कारः” इति । अस्य ह्यज्ञानरूपत्वे ज्ञानरूपस्मृतिजनकत्वं न स्यात्, नहि सत्ता सत्तान्तरमनुविशति । अज्ञानरूपत्वे चास्यात्मधर्मत्वं न स्यात्, चेतनधर्मस्याचेतनत्वाभावात् ।

१०५. नन्वविच्युतिमपि धारणामन्वशिष्यन् वृद्धाः, यद्भाष्यकारः—अविच्युर्ध्वं धारणा होई’ (विशेषा० गा० १८०), तत्कथं स्मृतिहेतोरेव धारणात्वमसूत्रयः ? सत्यम्, अस्त्यविच्युतिर्नाम धारणा, किन्तु साऽवाय एवान्तर्भूतेति न पृथगुक्ता । अवाय एव हि दीर्घदीर्घोऽविच्युतिर्धारणेत्युच्यत इति । स्मृतिहेतुत्वाद्वाऽविच्युतिर्धारणयैव सङ्गृहीता । न ह्यवायमात्रादविच्युतिरहितात् स्मृतिर्भवति, गच्छत्तृणस्पर्शप्रायाणामवायानां परिशीलनविकलानां स्मृतिजनकत्वाददर्शनात् । तस्मात् स्मृतिहेतू अविच्युतिसंस्कारावनेन सङ्गृहीतावित्यदोषः । यद्यपि स्मृतिरपि धारणाभेदत्वेन सिद्धान्तेऽभिहिता तथापि परोक्षप्रमाणभेदत्वादिद् नोक्तेति सर्वमवदातम् ।

१०६. इह च क्रमभाविनामप्यवग्रहादीनां कथञ्चिदेकत्वमवसेयम् । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो ह्येकत्वप्रतिपत्तिपरिपन्थी । न चाऽसौ प्रमाणप्रतिपन्ने-

ऽर्थे प्रत्यर्थितां भजते । अनुभूयते हि खलु हर्षविषादादिविरुद्धविवर्त्ता-
क्रान्तमेकं चैतन्यम् । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाच्च विभ्यद्भिरपि कथमेकं चित्रपटी-
ज्ञानमेकानेकाकारोल्लेखशेखरमभ्युपगम्यते सौगतैः, चित्रं वा रूपं नैया-
यिकादिभिरिति ?

१०७. नैयायिकास्तु —“इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्य-
मव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्” (न्याय १.१.४) इति प्रत्यक्षलक्षण-
माचक्षते । अत्र च पूर्वाचार्यकृतव्याख्यावैमुख्येन सङ्ख्यावद्विस्त्रितलोचन-
वाचस्पतिप्रमुखैरयमर्थः समर्थितो यथा—इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञान-
मव्यभिचारि प्रत्यक्षमित्येव प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम् । ‘यतः’—शब्दाध्याहारेण च
यत्तदोन्तित्याभिसम्बन्धादुक्तविशेषणविशिष्टं ज्ञानं यतो भवति तत्
तथाविधज्ञानसाधनं ज्ञानरूपमज्ञानरूपं वा प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमिति । अस्य च
फलभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य द्वयी गतिरविकल्पं सविकल्पं च । तयोरुभयोरपि
प्रमाणरूपत्वमभिधातुं विभागवचनमेतद् ‘अव्यपदेश्यं व्यवसायात्म-
कम्’ इति ।

१०८. तत्रोभयरूपस्यापि ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमुपेक्ष्य ‘यतः’ शब्दा-
ध्याहारक्लेशेनाऽज्ञानरूपस्य सन्निकर्षादेः प्रामाण्यसमर्थनमयुक्तम् ।
कथं ह्यज्ञानरूपाः सन्निकर्षादयोऽर्थपरिच्छिन्नौ साधकतमा भवन्ति व्यभि-
चारात् ? सत्यपीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेऽर्थोपलब्धेरभावात् । ज्ञाने सत्येव
भावात्, साधकतमं हि करणमव्यवहितफलं च तदिति ।

१०९. सन्निकर्षोऽपि यदि योग्यतातिरिक्तः संयोगादिसम्बन्धस्तर्हि
स चक्षुषोऽर्थेन सह नास्ति अप्राप्यकारित्वात्तस्य । दृश्यते हि काचाभ्र-
स्फटिकादिव्यवहितस्याप्यर्थस्य चक्षुषोपलब्धिः । अथ प्राप्यकारि चक्षुः
करणत्वाद्वास्यादिवदिति ब्रूषे; तर्ह्ययस्कान्ताकर्षणोपलेन लोहासन्निकृष्टेन
व्यभिचारः । न च संयुक्तसंयोगादिः सन्निकर्षस्तत्र कल्पयितुं शक्यते,
अतिप्रसङ्गादिति ।

११०. सौगतास्तु “प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तम्” (न्यायवि० १.४)
इति लक्षणमवोचन् । “अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासा प्रतीतिः कल्पना
तथा रहितम्”—(न्यायवि० १.५, ६) कल्पनापोढम् इति । एतच्च व्यव-
हारानुपयोगित्वाप्रमाणस्य लक्षणमनुपपन्नम्, तथाहि—एतस्माद्विनिश्चि-
त्यार्थमर्थक्रियाथिनस्तत्समर्थेऽर्थे प्रवर्तमाना विमंवादभाजो मा भूवन्निति
प्रमाणस्य लक्षणपरीक्षायां प्रवर्तन्ते परीक्षकाः । व्यवहारानुपयोगिनश्च

तस्य वायससदसदशनपरीक्षायामिव निष्फलः परिश्रमः । निर्विकल्पो-
त्तरकालभाविनः । सविकल्पकात्तु व्यहारोपगमे वरं तस्यैव प्रामाण्य-
मास्थेयम्, किमविकल्पकेन शिखण्डिनेति ?

१११. जैमिनीयास्तु धर्मं प्रति अनिमित्तत्वव्याजेन “सत्सम्प्रयोगे
पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत् प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात्”
(जैमि० १.१४) इत्यनुवादभङ्ग्या प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाचक्षते, यदाहुः—

“एवं सत्यनुवादित्वं लक्षणस्यापि सम्भवेत्” (श्लोकवा० सू० ४.३६)
इति । व्याचक्षते च—इन्द्रियाणां सम्प्रयोगे सति पुरुषस्य जायमाना
बुद्धिः प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

११२. अत्र संशयविपर्ययबुद्धिजन्मनोऽपीन्द्रियसंप्रयोगे सति प्रत्य-
क्षत्वप्रसङ्गादतिव्याप्तिः । अथ ‘सत्सम्प्रयोग’ इति सता सम्प्रयोग इति
व्याख्यायते, तर्हि निरालम्बनविभ्रमा एवार्थनिरपेक्षजन्मानो निरस्ता
भवेयुर्न सालम्बनौ संशयविपर्ययौ । अथ सति सम्प्रयोग इति सत्सम्प्र-
पक्ष एव न त्यज्यते संशयविपर्ययनिरासाय च ‘सम्प्रयोग’ इत्यत्र ‘सम्’
इत्युपसर्गो वर्ण्यते, यदाह—

“सम्यगर्थं च संशब्दो दुष्प्रयोगनिवारणः ।

दुष्टत्वाच्छ्रुतिकायोगो वार्यते रजतेक्षणात् ॥”

(श्लोकवा० सू० ४.३८-३९)

इति; तथापि प्रयोगसम्यक्त्वस्यातीन्द्रियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षानवगम्यत्वात्
कार्यतोऽवगतिर्वक्तव्या । कार्यं च ज्ञानम् न च तद्विशेषितमेव प्रयोग-
सम्यक्त्वावगमनायालम् । न च तद्विशेषणपरमिह पदमस्ति । सतां
सम्प्रयोग इति च वरं निरालम्बनविज्ञाननिवृत्तये, ‘सति’ इति तु सप्तम्यैव
गतार्थत्वादनर्थकम् ।

११३. येऽपि “तत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म सत्प्रत्यक्षं
यद्विषयं ज्ञानं तेन सम्प्रयोगे इन्द्रियाणां पुरुषस्य बुद्धिजन्म सत्प्रत्यक्षं
यदन्यविषयं ज्ञानमन्यसम्प्रयोगे भवति न तत्प्रत्यक्षम्” (शाबरभा०
१.१.५) इत्येवं तत्सतोर्व्यत्ययेन लक्षणमनवद्यमित्याहुः, तेषामपि क्लृष्ट-
कल्पनैव, संशयज्ञानेन वर्णाभचारानिवृत्तं । तत्र हि यद्विषयं ज्ञानं तेन
सम्प्रयोगे इन्द्रियाणामस्त्येव । यद्यपि चोभयविषयं संशयज्ञानं तथापि
तयोरन्यतरेणेन्द्रियं संयुक्तमेव* उभयावमर्शित्वाच्च संशयस्य येन संयुक्तं

चक्षुस्तद्विषयमपि तज्ज्ञानं भवत्येवेति नातिव्याप्तिपरिहारः । अव्याप्तिश्च चाक्षुषज्ञानस्येन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगजत्वाभावात् । अप्राप्यकारि च चक्षुरित्युक्तप्रायम् ।

११४. “श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका प्रत्यक्षम्” इति वृद्धसांख्याः । अत्र गोत्रादीनामचेतनत्वात्तद्वृत्तेः सुतरामचेतन्यमिति कथं प्रमाणत्वम् ? चेतनसंसर्गात्तच्चैतन्याभ्युपगमे वरं चित एव प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तम् । न चाविकल्पकत्वे प्रामाण्यमस्तीति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

११५. “प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्” (सां० का० ५) इति प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमिति श्वरकृष्णः । तदप्यनुमानेन व्यभिचारित्वादलक्षणम् । अथ ‘प्रतिः’ आभिमुख्ये वर्तते तेनाभिमुख्येन विषयाध्यवसायः प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते, तदप्यनुमानेन तुल्यम् । घटोऽयमितिवदयं पर्वतोऽग्निमानित्याभिमुख्येन प्रतीतेः । अथ अनुमानादिविलक्षणो अभिमुखोऽध्यवसायः प्रत्यक्षम्, तर्हि प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमकरणीयमेव शब्दानुमानलक्षणविलक्षणतयैव तत्सिद्धेः ।

११६. ततश्च परकीयलक्षणानां दुष्टत्वादिदमेव ‘विशदः प्रत्यक्षम्’ इति प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमनवद्यम् ॥ २९ ॥

११७. प्रमाणविषयफलप्रमातृरूपेषु चतुर्षु विधिषु तत्त्वं परिसमाप्यत इति विषयादिलक्षणमन्तरेण प्रमाणलक्षणमसम्पूर्णमिति विषयं लक्षयति—

प्रमाणस्य विषयो द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु ॥ ३० ॥

११८. प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रकृतत्वात्तस्यैव विषयादौ लक्षयितव्ये प्रमाणस्य’ इति प्रमाणसामान्यग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रमाणान्तराणामपि विषयादिलक्षणमिहैव वक्तुम् युक्तमविशेषात्तथा च लाघवमपि भवतीत्येवमर्थम् । जातिनिर्देशाच्च प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्षादीनां ‘विषयः’ गोचरो ‘द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु’ । द्रवति तांस्तान् पर्यायान् गच्छति इति द्रव्यं ध्रौव्यलक्षणम् । पूर्वोत्तरविवर्त्तवर्त्यन्वयप्रत्ययसंघिगम्यमूर्ध्वतासामान्यमिति यावत् । परियन्त्युत्पादविनाशधर्माणो भवन्तीति पर्याया विवर्त्ताः । तच्च ते चात्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तत् द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु, परमार्थसदित्यर्थः, यद्वाचकमुख्यः—“उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सद्” (तत्त्वा० ५.२६) इति, पारमर्षमपि “उपश्लेह वा विगमेह वा ध्रुवेह वा” इति ।

११६. तत्र 'द्रव्यपर्याय'ग्रहणेन द्रव्यैकान्तपर्यायैकान्तवादिपरि-
कल्पितविषयव्युदासः । 'आत्म'ग्रहणेन चात्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्यपर्याय-
वादिकाणादयौगाभ्युपगतविषयनिरासः । यच्छ्रीसिद्धसेनः—

“दोहि वि नएहि नीयं सत्थमुलूएण तहवि मिच्छत्तं ।

जं सविसयप्पहाणत्तणेण अब्बोन्ननिरविकख ॥”

(सन्म० ३.४६) त्ति ॥ ३० ॥

१२०. कुतः पुनर्द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकमेव वस्तु प्रमाणानां विषयो न
द्रव्यमात्रं पर्यायमात्रमुभयं वा स्वतन्त्रम् ? इत्याह—

अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यात् ॥ ३१ ॥

१२१. 'अर्थस्य' हानोपादानादिलक्षणस्य 'क्रिया' निष्पत्तिस्तत्र 'साम-
र्थ्यात्' द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकस्यैव वस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियासमर्थत्वादित्यर्थः ॥ ३१ ॥

१२२. यदि नामैवं ततः किमित्याह—

तल्लक्षणत्वाद्वस्तुनः ॥ ३२ ॥

१२३. 'तद्' अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यं 'लक्षणम्' असाधारणं रूपं यस्य
तत् तल्लक्षणं तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । कस्य ? 'वस्तुनः' परमार्थसतो
रूपस्य । अयमर्थः— अर्थक्रियार्था हि सर्वः प्रमाणमन्वेपते, अपि नामेतः
प्रमेयमर्थक्रियाक्षमं विनिश्चित्य कृतार्थो भवेयमिति न व्यसन्नितया ।
तद्यदि प्रमाणविषयोऽर्थोऽर्थक्रियाक्षमो न भवेत्तदा नासौ प्रमाणपरीक्षण-
माद्रियेत । यदाह—

“अर्थक्रियाऽसमर्थस्य विचारैः किं तदर्थिनाम् ।

षण्ढस्य रूपवैरूप्ये कामिन्याः किं परीक्षया ?”

(प्रमाणवा १.२१५)

इति ।

१२४. तत्र न द्रव्यैकरूपोऽर्थोऽर्थक्रियाकारी, स ह्यप्रच्युतानुत्पन्न-
स्थिरैकरूपः कथमर्थक्रियां कुर्वीत क्रमेणाक्रमेण वा ? अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेद-
रूपाणां प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् । तत्र न क्रमेण; स हि कालान्तरभाविनीः
क्रियाः प्रथमक्रियाकाल एव प्रसाद्य कुर्यात् समर्थस्य कालक्षेपायोगात्,
कालक्षेपिणो वाऽसामर्थ्यप्राप्तेः । समर्थोऽपि तत्तत्सहकारिसमवधाने तं
तमर्थं करोतीति चेत्, न तर्हि तस्य सामर्थ्यमपरसहकारिसापेक्षवृत्तित्वात्

“सापेक्षमसमर्थम्” (पात० महा० ३.१.५) इति हि किं नाशौषीः ? न तेन सहकारिणोऽपेक्ष्यन्तेऽपि तु कार्यमेव सहकारिष्वसत्त्वमभवत् तानपेक्षत इति चेत् ; तर्हि स भावोऽसमर्थः ? । समर्थश्चेत् , किं सहकारिमुखप्रेक्षणदीनानि तान्युपेक्षते न पुनर्ज्ञातिरिति घटयति ? ननु समर्थमपि बीजमिलाजलादिसहकारिसहितमेवाकुरं करोति नान्यथा ; तत् किं तस्य सहकारिभिः किञ्चिदुपक्रियेत, न वा ? नो चेत् , स किं पूर्ववन्नोदास्ते । उपक्रियेत चेत् ; स तर्हि तैरुपकारो भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा क्रियत इति निर्वचनीयम् । अभेदे स एव क्रियते इति लाभमिच्छतो मूलक्षतिरायाता । भेदे स कथं तस्योपकारः ? किं न सहाविन्ध्यादेरपि ? तत्सम्बन्धात्स्यायमिति चेत् ; उपकार्योपकारयोः कः सम्बन्धः ? न संयोगः, द्रव्ययोरेव तस्य भावात् । नापि समवायस्तस्य प्रत्यासत्तिविप्रकर्षाभावेन सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वान्न नियतसम्बन्धिसम्बन्धत्वं युक्तम्, तत्त्वे वा तत्कृत उपकारोऽस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तथा च सत्युपकारस्य भेदाभेदकल्पना तदवस्थैव । उपकारस्य समवायादभेदे समवाय एव कृतः स्यात् । भेदे पुनरपि समवायस्य न नियतसम्बन्धिसम्बन्धत्वम् । नियतसम्बन्धिसम्बन्धत्वे समवायस्य विशेषणविशेष्यभावो हेतुरिति चेत् ; उपकार्योपकारकभावाभावे तस्यापि प्रतिनियमहेतुत्वाभावात् । उपकारे तु पुनर्भेदाभेदविकल्पद्वारेण तदेवावर्तते । तन्नैकान्तनित्यो भावः क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कुरुते ।

१२५. नाप्यक्रमेण । न ह्येको भावः सकलकालकलाभाविनीयुगपत् सर्वाः क्रियाः करोतीति प्रातीतिकम् । कुरुतां वा, तथापि द्वितीयक्षणे किं कुर्यात् ? । करणे वा क्रमपक्षभावी दोषः । अकरणेऽनर्थक्रियाकारित्वादवस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः—इत्येकान्तनित्यात् क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्तार्थक्रियाव्यापकानुपलब्धिबलात् व्यापकनिवृत्तौ निवर्तमाना व्याप्यमर्थक्रियाकारित्वं निवर्तयति तदपि स्वव्याप्यं सत्त्वमित्यसन् द्रव्यैकान्तः ।

१२६. पर्यायैकान्तरूपोऽपि प्रतिक्षणविनाशी भावो न क्रमेणार्थक्रियासमर्थः देशकृतस्य कालकृतस्य च क्रमस्यैवाभावात् । अवस्थितस्यैव हि नानादेशकालव्याप्तिर्देशक्रमः कालक्रमश्चाभिधीयते । न चैकान्तविनाशिनि सास्ति । यदाहुः—

“यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ।

न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते ॥”

१२७. न च सन्तानापेक्षया पूर्वोत्तरक्षणानां क्रमः सम्भवति, सन्तानस्याऽवस्तुत्वात् । वस्तुत्वेऽपि तस्य यदि क्षणिकत्वं न तर्हि क्षणेभ्यः कश्चिद्विशेषः । अथाक्षणिकत्वम्, सुस्थितः पर्यायैकान्तवादः । यदाहुः—

“अथापि नित्यं परमार्थसन्तं सन्ताननामानमुपैषि भावम् ।

उत्तिष्ठ भिक्षो ! फलितास्तवाशाः सोऽयं समाप्तः क्षणभङ्गवादः ॥”

(न्यायम० पृ० ४६४) इति ।

१२८. नाप्यक्रमेण क्षणिकेऽर्थक्रिया सम्भवति । स ह्येको रूपादि-क्षणो युगपदनेकान् रसादिक्षणान् जनयन् यद्येकेन स्वभावेन जनयेत्तदा तेषामेकत्वं स्यादेकस्वभावजन्यत्वात् । अथ नानास्वभाववैर्जनयति—किञ्चिदुपादानभावेन किञ्चित् सहकारित्वेन; ते तर्हि स्वभावास्तस्यात्मभूता अनात्मभूता वा ? अनात्मभूताश्चेत्, स्वभावहानिः । यदि तस्यात्मभूताः, तर्हि तस्यानेकत्वं स्वभावानां चैकत्वं प्रसज्येत । अथ य एवैकत्रोपादानभावः स एवान्यत्र सहकारिभाव इति न स्वभावभेद इष्यते, तर्हि नित्यस्यैकरूपस्यापि क्रमेण नानाकार्यकारिणः स्वभावभेदः कार्यसाङ्ग्यं च मा भूत् । अथाक्रमात् क्रमिणामनुत्पत्तेर्नैवमिति चेत्; एकानंशकरणात् युगपदनेककारणसाध्यानेककार्यविरोधात् क्षणिकानामप्यक्रमेण कार्यकारित्वं मा भूदिति पर्यायैकान्तादापि क्रमाक्रमयोर्व्यापकयोर्निवृत्त्यैव व्याप्याऽर्थक्रियापि व्यावर्तते । तद्व्यावृत्तौ च सत्त्वमपि व्यापकानुपलब्धिबलेनैव निवर्तते इत्यसन् पर्यायैकान्तोऽपि ।

१२९. कारणादास्तु द्रव्यपर्यायावुभावप्युपागमन् पृथिव्यादीनि गुणाद्याधाररूपाणि द्रव्याणि, गुणादयस्त्वाधेयत्वात्पर्यायाः । ते च केचित् क्षणिकाः, केचिद्यावद्द्रव्यभाविनः, केचिन्नित्या इति केवलमितरेतरविनिर्मुक्तितधर्मिधर्माभ्युपगमात् समीचीनविषयवादिनः । तथाहि—यदि द्रव्यादत्यन्तविलक्षणं सत्त्वं तदा द्रव्यमसदेव भवेत् । सत्तायोगात् सत्त्वमस्त्येवेति चेत्; असतां सत्तायोगेऽपि कुतः सत्त्वम् ? सतां तु निष्फलः सत्तायोगः । स्वरूपसत्त्वं भावानामस्त्येवेति चेत्; तर्हि किं शिखण्डिना सत्तायोगेन ? । सत्तायोगात् प्राक् भावो न सन्नाप्यसन्, सत्तासम्बन्धात् सन्निति चेत्, वाङ्मात्रमेतत्, सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रकारान्तरस्यासम्भवात् । अपि च ‘पदार्थः सत्ता योगः’ इति न त्रितयं चकास्ति । पदार्थसत्तयोश्च योगो यदि तादात्म्यम्, तदनभ्युपगमबाधितम् । अत एव न

संयोगः, समवायस्त्वनाश्रित इति सर्वं सर्वेण सम्बन्धीयात्र वा किञ्चित् केनचित् । एवं द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यत्वादिभिः, द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यगुणकर्म-सामान्यविशेषैः, पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायूनां पृथिवीत्वादिभिः, आकाशादीनां च द्रव्याणां स्वगुणैर्योगे यथायोगं सर्वमभिधानीयम्, एकान्तभिन्नानां केन-चित् कथञ्चित् सम्बन्धायोगात् इत्यौलूख्यपक्षेऽपि विषयव्यवस्था दुःस्था ।

१३०. ननु द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनस्तदवस्थमेव दौःस्थ्यम् ; तथा हि—द्रव्यपर्याययोरैकान्तिकभेदाभेदपरिहारेण कथाञ्जद्वेदाभेदवादः स्याद्वादिभिरुपेयते, न चासौ युक्तो विरोधादिदोषात्—विधिप्रतिषेधरूप-योरेकत्र वस्तुन्यसम्भवात्रीलानीलवत् १ । अथ केनचिद्रूपेण भेदः केनचिद-भेदः, एवं सति भेदस्यान्यदधिकरणमभेदस्य चान्यदिति वैयधिकरण्यम् २ । यं चात्मानं पुरोधाय भेदो यं चाश्रित्याभेदस्तावप्यात्मानौ भिन्नाभिन्ना-वन्यथैकान्तवादप्रसक्तिस्तथा च सत्यनवस्था ३ । येन च रूपेण भेदस्तेन भेदश्चाभेदश्च येन चाभेदस्तेनाप्यभेदश्च भेदश्चेति सङ्करः ४ । येन रूपेण भेदस्तेनाभेदो येनाभेदस्तेन भेद इति व्यतिकरः ५ । भेदाभेदात्मकत्वे च वस्तुनो विविक्तेनाकारेण निश्चेतुमशक्तेः संशयः ६ । ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिः ७ इति च विषयव्यवस्था ८ । नैवम्, प्रतीयमाने वस्तुनि विरोधस्यासम्भ-वात् । यत्सन्निधाने यो नोपलभ्यते स तस्य विरोधीति निश्चीयते । उप-लभ्यमाने च वस्तुनि को विरोधगन्धावकाशः ? नीलानीलयोरपि यद्येकत्रो-पलम्भोऽस्ति तदा नास्ति विरोधः । एकत्र चित्रपटीज्ञाने सौगतैर्नीलानील-योर्विरोधानभ्युपगमात् एकस्यैव च पटादेश्चलाचलरक्तास्कावृत्तानावृत्ता-दिविरुद्धधर्माणामुपलब्धेः प्रकृते को विरोधशङ्कावकाशः ? एतेन वैयधि-करण्यदोषोऽप्यपास्तः, तयोरेकाधिकरणत्वेन प्रागुक्तयुक्तिदिशा प्रतीतिः । यदप्यनवस्थानं दूषणमुपन्यस्तम् तदप्यनेकान्तवादिमतानभिज्ञेनैव । तन्मतं हि द्रव्यपर्यायात्मके वस्तुनि द्रव्यपर्यायावेव भेदः भेदध्वनिना तयोरेषा-भिधानात्, द्रव्यरूपेणाभेदः इति द्रव्यमेवाभेदः एकानेकात्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनः । यौ च सङ्करव्यतिकरौ तौ मेचकज्ञाननिदर्शनेन सामान्यविशेषदृष्टान्तेन च परिहृतौ । अथ तत्र तथा प्रतिभासः समाधानम्, परस्यापि तदेवास्तु प्रतिभासस्यापक्षपातित्वात् । निर्णीते चार्थे संशयोऽपि न युक्तः तस्य सकम्पप्रतिपत्तिरुपत्वादकम्पप्रतिपत्तौ दुर्घटत्वात् । प्रतिपन्ने च वस्तुन्य-प्रतिपत्तिरिति साहसम् । उपलब्ध्यभिधानादनुपलम्भोऽपि न सिद्धस्ततो नाभाव इति दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धं द्रव्यपर्यायकं वस्त्विति ॥ ३२ ॥

१३१. ननु द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः कथमर्थक्रिया नाम ? सा हि क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्ता द्रव्यपर्यायैकान्तबहुभयात्मकादपि व्यावर्तताम् । शक्यं हि वक्तुमुभयात्मा भावो न क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कर्तुं समर्थः, समर्थस्य श्लेषायोगात् । न च सहकार्यपेक्षा युक्ता, द्रव्यस्याविकार्यत्वेन सहकारिकृतोपकारनिरपेक्षत्वात् । पर्यायाणां च क्षणिकत्वेन पूर्वापरकार्यकालाप्रतीक्षणात् । नाप्यक्रमेण, युगपद्वि सर्वकार्याणि कृत्वा पुनरकुर्वतोऽनर्थक्रियाकारित्वादसत्त्वम्, कुर्वतः क्रमपक्षभावी दोषः द्रव्यपर्यायवादोश्च यो दोषः स उभयवादेऽपि समानः—

“प्रत्येकं यो भवेद्दोषो द्वयोर्भावे कथं न सः ?”

इति वचनादित्याह—

पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामे-

नास्यार्थक्रियोपपत्तिः ॥ ३३ ॥

१३२. ‘पूर्वोत्तरयोः’ ‘आकारयोः’ विवर्तयोर्यथा सङ्ख्येन यौ ‘परिहारस्वीकारौ’ ताभ्यां स्थितिः सैव ‘लक्षणम्’ यस्य स चासौ परिणामश्च, तेन ‘अस्य’ द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकस्यार्थक्रियोपपद्यते ।

१३३. अयमर्थः—न द्रव्यरूपं न पर्यायरूपं नोभयरूपं वस्तु, येन तत्तत्पक्षभावी दोषः स्यात्, किन्तु स्थित्युत्पादव्ययात्मकं शबलं जात्यन्तरमेव वस्तु । तेन तत्तत्सहकारि सन्निधाने क्रमेण युगपद्वा तां तामर्थक्रियां कुर्वतः सहकारिकृतां चोपकारपरम्परामुपजीवतो भिन्नाभिन्नोपकारादिनोदनानुमोदनाप्रमुदिततमनः उभयपक्षभाविदोषशङ्काकलङ्काऽकान्दिशीकस्य भावस्य न व्यापकानुपलब्धिबलेनार्थक्रियायाः, नापि तद्रूपस्याप्यसत्त्वस्य निवृत्तिरिति सिद्धं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु प्रमाणस्य विषयः ॥ ३३ ॥

१३४. फलमाह—

फलमर्थप्रकाशः ॥ ३४ ॥

१३५. ‘प्रमाणस्य’ इति वर्तते, प्रमाणस्य ‘फलम्’ ‘अर्थप्रकाशः’, ‘अर्थप्रकाशः’ अर्थसंवेदनम्; अर्थार्थी हि सर्वः प्रमातेत्यर्थसंवेदनमेव फलं युक्तम् । नन्वेवं प्रमाणमेव फलत्वेनोक्तं स्यात्, ओमिति चेत्, तर्हि प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः स्यात् । ततः किं स्यात् ? प्रमाणफलयोरैक्ये सदसत्पक्षभावी दोषः स्यात्, नासतः करणत्वं न सतः फलत्वम् । सत्यम्, अस्त्ययं दोषो जन्मनि न व्यवस्थायाम् । यदाहुः—

“नासतो हेतुता नापि सतो हेतोः फलात्मता ।

इति जन्मनि दोषः स्याद व्यवस्था तु न दोषाभागे ॥”

इति ॥ ३४ ॥

१३६. व्यवस्थामेव दर्शयति—

कर्मस्था क्रिया ॥ ३५ ॥

१३७. कर्मोन्मुखो ज्ञानव्यापारः फलम् ॥ ३५ ॥

१३८. प्रमाणं किमित्याह—

कर्तृस्था प्रमाणम् ॥ ३६ ॥

१३९. कर्तृव्यापारमुल्लिखन् बोधः प्रमाणम् ॥ ३६ ॥

१४०. कथमस्य प्रमाणत्वम् ? करणं हि तत् साधकृतं च करण-
मुच्यते । अव्यवहितं फलं च तदित्याह—

तस्यां सत्यामर्थप्रकाशसिद्धेः ॥ ३७ ॥

१४१. ‘तस्याम्’ इति कर्तृस्थायां प्रमाणरूपायां क्रियायां ‘सत्याम्’
‘अर्थप्रकाशस्य’ फलस्य ‘सिद्धेः’ व्यवस्थापनात् । एकज्ञानगतत्वेन प्रमाण-
फलयोरभेदो, व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावात् भेद इति भेदाभेदरूपः
स्याद्वादमवाधितमनुपपत्तिः प्रमाणफलभाव इतीदमखिलप्रमाणसाधारण-
मव्यवहितं फलमुक्तम् ॥ ३७ ॥

१४२. अव्यवहितमेव फलान्तरमाह—

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्वा ॥ ३८ ॥

१४३. प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वं प्रमातुविवक्षिते विषये यत् ‘अज्ञानम्’ तस्य
‘निवृत्तिः’ फलमित्यन्ये । यदाहुः—

“प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।

केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥”

(न्याया० २८) इति ॥ ३८ ॥

१४४. व्यवहितमाह—

अवग्रहादीनां वा क्रमोपजनधर्माणां पूर्वं पूर्वं

प्रमाणमुत्तरमुत्तरं फलम् ॥ ३९ ॥

१४५. अवग्रहेहावायधारणास्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानानां क्रमेणो-
पजायमानानां यद्यत् पूर्वं तत्तत्प्रमाणं यद्यदुत्तरं तत्तत्फलरूपं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

अवग्रहपरिणामवान् ह्यात्मा ईहारूपफलतया परिणमति इतीहाफला-
पेक्षया अवग्रहः प्रमाणम् । ततोऽपीहा प्रमाणमवायः फलम् । पुनरवायः
प्रमाणं धारणा फलम् । ईहाधारणयोर्ज्ञानोपादानत्वात् ज्ञानरूपतोन्नेया ।
ततो धारणा प्रमाणं स्मृतिः फलम् । ततोऽपि स्मृतिः प्रमाणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं
फलम् । ततोऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमूहः फलम् । ततोऽप्यूहः प्रमाणमनु-
मानं फलमिति प्रमाणफलविभाग इति ॥ ३६ ॥

१४६ फलान्तरमाह —

हानादिबुद्धयो वा ॥ ४९ ॥

१४७ हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयो वा प्रमाणस्य फलम् । फलबहुत्व-
प्रतिपादनं सर्वेषां फलत्वेन न विरोधो वैवक्ष्यत्वात् फलस्येति प्रतिपाद-
नार्थम् ॥ ४० ॥

१४८. एकान्तभिन्नाभिन्नफलवादिमतपरीक्षार्थमाह —

प्रमाणाद्भिन्नाभिन्नम् ॥ ४१ ॥

१४९. करणरूपत्वात् क्रियारूपत्वाच्च प्रमाणफलयोर्भेदः । अभेदे
प्रमाणफलभेदव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः प्रमाणमेव वा फलमेव वा भवेत् ।
अप्रमाणाद् व्यावृत्त्या प्रमाणव्यवहारः, अफलाद् व्यावृत्त्या च फलव्यव-
हारो भविष्यतीति चेत् ; नैवम् ; एवं सति प्रमाणान्तराद् व्यावृत्त्याऽप्रमा-
णव्यवहारः, फलान्तराद् व्यावृत्त्याऽफलव्यवहारोऽप्यस्तु, विजातीयादिव
सजातीयादपि व्यावृत्तत्वाद्भूतुनः ।

१५०. तथा, तस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूप-
तया परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः । भेदे त्वात्मान्तर-
वृत्तदनुपपत्तिः । अथ यत्रैवात्मनि प्रमाणं समवेतं फलमपि तत्रैव समवेत-
मिति समवायलक्षणया प्रत्यासत्या प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थितिरिति नात्मान्तरे
तत्प्रसङ्ग इति चेत् ; न ; समवायस्य नित्यत्वाद् व्यापकत्वान्नियतात्मवत्स-
र्वात्मस्वप्नविशेषान्न ततो नियतप्रमातृसम्बन्धप्रतिनियमः तत् सिद्धमेतत्
प्रमाणात्फलं कथञ्चिद्भिन्नमभिन्नं चेति ॥ ४१ ॥

१५१. प्रमातारं लक्षयति —

स्वपराभासी परिणाम्यात्मा प्रमाता ॥ ४२ ॥

१५२. स्वम् आत्मानं परं चार्थमाभासयितुं शीलं यस्य स 'स्वपरा-
भासी' स्वोन्मुखतयाऽर्थोन्मुखतया चावभासनात् घटमहं जानामीति कर्म-

कर्तृक्रियाणां प्रतीतेः, अन्यतरप्रतीत्यपलापे प्रमाणाभावात् । न च परप्रकाशकत्वस्य स्वप्रकाशकत्वेन विरोधः प्रदीपवत् । नहि प्रदीपः स्वप्रकाशे परमपेक्षते । अनेनैकान्तस्वाभासिपराभासिर्वादिमतनिरासः । स्वपराभास्येव 'आत्मा प्रमाता' ।

१५३. तथा, परिणाम उक्तलक्षणः स विद्यते यस्य स 'परिणामी' कूटस्थनित्ये ह्यात्मनि हर्षविषादसुखदुःखभोगादयो विवर्ताः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिधर्माणो न वर्तेरन् । एकान्तनाशिनि च कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमौ स्याताम्, स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञाननिहितप्रत्युन्मार्गेणप्रभृतयश्च प्रतिप्राणिप्रतीता व्यवहारा विशीर्येरन् । परिणामिनि तूत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यधर्मण्यात्मनि सर्वमुपपद्यते । यदाहुः—

“यथाहेः कुण्डलावस्था व्यपैति तदनन्तरम् ।
सम्भवत्यार्जवावस्था सर्पत्वं त्वदनुवर्तते ॥
तथैव नित्यचैतन्यस्वरूपस्यात्मनो हि न ।
निःशेषरूपविगमः सर्वस्यानुगमोऽपि वा ॥
किं त्वस्य विनिवर्तन्ते सुखदुःखादिलक्षणाः ।
अवस्थास्ताश्च जायन्ते चैतन्यं त्वदनुवर्तते ॥
स्यातामत्यन्तनाशे हि कृतनाशाकृतागमौ ।
सुखदुःखादिभोगश्च नैव स्यादेकरूपिणः ॥
न च कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वे पुंसोऽवस्थां समाश्रिते ।
ततोऽवस्थावतस्तत्त्वात् कर्तैवाप्नोति तत्फलम् ॥”

(तत्त्व० सं० का० २२३-२२७)

इति अनेनैकान्तनित्यानित्यवादव्युदासः । 'आत्मा' इत्यनात्मवादिनो व्युदस्यति । कायप्रमाणता त्वात्मनः प्रकृतानुपयोगान्नोक्तेति सुस्थितं प्रमातृलक्षणम् ॥४२॥

॥ इत्याचार्यश्रीहेमचन्द्रविरचितायाः प्रमाणमीमांसायास्तद्वृत्तेश्च
प्रथमस्याध्ययस्य प्रथममाल्लिकम् ॥

॥ अथ द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥

१. इहोद्दिष्टे प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षलक्षणौ प्रमाणद्वये लक्षितं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
इदानीं परोक्षलक्षणमाह—

अविशदः परोक्षम् ॥ १ ॥

२. सामान्यलक्षणानुवादेन विशेषलक्षणविधानात् 'सम्यगर्थनि-
र्णयः' इत्यनुवर्तते । तेनाविशदः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः परोक्षप्रमाणमिति ॥ १ ॥

३. विभागमाह—

स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानागमास्तद्विधयः ॥ २ ॥

४. 'तद्' इति परोक्षस्य परामर्शस्तेन परोक्षस्यैते प्रकारा न तु स्वत-
न्त्राणि प्रमाणान्तराणि प्रक्रान्तप्रमाणसंख्याविघातप्रसङ्गात् ।

५. ननु स्वतन्त्राण्येव स्मृत्यादीनि प्रमाणानि किं नोच्यन्ते ? किम-
नेन द्रविडमण्डकभक्षणन्यायेन ? मैवं वोचः, परोक्षलक्षणसंगृहीतानि
परोक्षप्रमाणान्न विभेदवर्तीनि; यथैव हि प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसंगृहीतानीन्द्रिय-
ज्ञान-मानस-स्वसंवेदन-योगिज्ञानानि सौगतानां न प्रत्यक्षादतिरिच्यन्ते,
तथैव हि परोक्षलक्षणाक्षिप्तानि स्मृत्यादीनि न मूलप्रमाणसंख्यापरिपंथी-
नीति । स्मृत्यादीनां पञ्चानां द्वन्द्वः ॥ २ ॥

६. तत्र स्मृतिं लक्षयति—

वासनोद्बोधहेतुका तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

७. 'वासना' संस्कारस्तस्याः 'उद्बोधः' प्रबोधस्तद्वेतुका तन्निबन्धना,

“कालमसंखं संखं च धारणा होइ नायव्वा”

(विशेषा० गा० ३३३)

इति वचनाच्चिरकालस्थायिन्यपि वासनाऽनुद्बुद्धा न स्मृतिहेतुः,
आवरणक्षयोपशमसदृशदर्शनादिसामग्रीलब्धप्रबोधा तु स्मृतिं जनयतीति
'वासनोद्बोधहेतुका' इत्युक्तम् : अस्या उल्लेखमाह 'तदित्याकारा' सामा-

न्योक्तौ नपुंसकनिर्देशस्तेन स घटः, सा पटी, तत् कुण्डलमित्युल्लेखवती मतिः स्मृतिः ।

८. सा च प्रमाणम् अविसंवादित्वात् स्वयं निहितप्रत्युन्मार्गणादिव्यवहाराणां दर्शनात् । नन्वनुभूयमानस्य विषयस्याभावान्निरालम्बना स्मृतिः कथं प्रमाणम् ? नैवम्, अनुभूतेनार्थेन सालम्बनत्वोपपत्तेः, अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुभूतार्थविषयत्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्येत । स्वविषयावभासने स्मृतेरप्यावशिष्टम् । विनष्टो विषयः कथं स्मृतेर्जनकः ? तथा चार्थाजन्यत्वान्न प्रामाण्यमस्या इति चेत् ; तत् किं प्रमाणान्तरेऽप्यर्थजन्यत्वमविसंवादहेतुरिति विप्रलब्धोऽसि ? मैवं मुहः, यथैव हि प्रदीपः स्वसामग्रीबललब्धजन्मा घटादिभिरजनितोऽपि तान् प्रकाशयति तथैवावरणक्षयोपशमसव्यपेक्षेन्द्रियानिन्द्रियबललब्धजन्म संवेदनं विषयमवभासयति । “नाननुकृतान्वयव्यतिरेकं कारणं नाकारणं विषयः” इति तु प्रलापमात्रम्, योगिज्ञानस्यातीतानागतार्थगोचरस्य तदजन्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेरेभावात् । किञ्च, स्मृतेरप्रामाण्येऽनुमानाय दत्तो जलाञ्जलिः, तथा व्यापतेरावधयीकरणे तदुत्थानायोगात्, लिङ्गग्रहण-सम्बन्ध-स्मरणपूर्वकमनुमानमिति हि सर्ववादीसिद्धम् । ततश्च स्मृतिः प्रमाणम्, अनुमानप्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

९. अथ प्रत्यभिज्ञानं लक्षयति—

दर्शनस्मरणसम्भवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगी-
त्यादिसङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ॥ ४ ॥

१०. ‘दर्शनम्’ प्रत्यक्षम्, ‘स्मरणम्’ स्मृतिस्ताभ्यां सम्भवो यस्य तत्तथा दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं सङ्कलनाज्ञानं ‘प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्’ । तस्योल्लेखमाह—‘तदेवेदम्’, सामान्यनिर्देशेन नपुंसकत्वम्, स एवायं घटः, सैवेयं पटी तदेवेदं कुण्डमिति । ‘तत्सदृशः’ गोसदृशो गवयः ‘तद्विलक्षणः’ गोविलक्षणो महिषः, ‘तत्प्रतियोगि’ इदमस्मादल्पं महत् दूरमासन्नं वेत्यादि । ‘आदि’ ग्रहणात्—

“रोमशो दन्तुरः श्यामो वामनः पृथुलोचनः ।

यस्तत्र चिपिटघ्राणस्तं चैत्रमवधारये ॥”

(न्यायम० पृ० १४३)

“पयोम्बुभेदी हंसः स्यात्षट्पादैर्भ्रमरः स्मृतः ।
सप्तपर्णस्तु विद्वद्भिर्विज्ञेयो विषमच्छदः ॥
पञ्चवर्णं भवेद्रत्नं मेचकाख्यं पृथुस्तनी ।
युवतिश्चैकशृङ्गोऽपि गण्डकः परिकीर्तितः ॥”

इत्येवमादिशब्दश्रवणात्तथाविधानेव चैत्रहंसादीनवलोक्य तथा सत्या-
पयति यदा, तदा तदपि संकलनाज्ञानमुक्तम्, दर्शनस्मरणसम्भवत्वाविशे-
षात् । यथा वा औदीच्याय क्रमेलकं निन्दतोक्तम् ‘धिककरभमतिदीर्घव-
क्रमीवं प्रलम्बोष्ठं कठोरतीक्ष्णकण्टकाशिनं कुत्सितावयवसन्निवेशमपशदं
पशूनाम्’ इति । तदुपश्रुत्य दाक्षिणात्य उत्तरापथं गतस्तादृशं वस्तुपलभ्य
नूनमयमर्थोऽस्य करभशब्दस्य’ इति (यद्वैति) तदपि दर्शनस्मरणकारण-
कत्वात् सङ्कलनाज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।

११. येषां तु सादृश्यविषयमुपमानाख्यं प्रमाणान्तरं तेषां वैलक्षण्या-
दिविषयं प्रमाणान्तरमनुषज्येत । यदाहुः—

“उपमानं प्रसिद्धार्थसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनम् ।
तद्वैधर्म्यात् प्रमाणं किं स्यात् संज्ञिप्रतिपादनम् ॥”
(लघीय० ३.१०)

“इदमल्पं महद् दूरमासन्नं प्रांशु नेति वा ।
व्यपेक्षातः समर्थेऽर्थे विकल्पः साधनान्तरम् ॥”
(लघीय० ३.१२) इति ।

१२. अथ साधर्म्यमुपलक्षणं योगविभागे करिष्यत इति चेत्; तर्ह्य-
कुशलः सूत्रकारः स्यात्, सूत्रस्य लक्षणरहितत्वात् । यदाहुः—

“अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥”

अस्तोभमनधिकम् ।

१३. ननु ‘तत्’ इति स्मरणम् ‘इदम्’ इति प्रत्यक्षमिति ज्ञानद्वयमेव,
न ताभ्यामन्यत् प्रत्यभिज्ञानाख्यं प्रमाणमुत्पश्यामः । नैतद्युक्तम्, स्मरण-
प्रत्यक्षाभ्यां प्रत्यभिज्ञाविषयस्यार्थस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । पूर्वापराकारैकधु-

रीणं हि द्रव्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य विषयः । न च तत् स्मरणस्य गोचरस्तस्यानुभूतविषयत्वात् । यदाहुः—

“पूर्वप्रमितमात्रे हि जायते स इति स्मृतिः ।

स एवायमितीयं तु प्रत्यभिज्ञाऽतिरेकिणो ॥”

(तत्त्वसं० का० ४५३)

नापि प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, तस्य वर्तमानविवर्तमात्रवृत्तित्वात् । न च दर्शनस्मरणाभ्यामन्यद् ज्ञानं नास्ति, दर्शनस्मरणोत्तरकालभाविनो ज्ञानान्तरस्यानुभूतेः । न चानुभूयमानस्यापलापो युक्तः अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।

१४. ननु प्रत्यक्षमेवेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् इत्येके । नैवम्, तस्य सञ्चितवर्तमाननिकार्थविषयत्वात् ।

“सम्बन्धं वर्तमानं च गृह्यते चक्षुरादिना ।”

(श्लोकबा० सू० ४ श्लोक ८४)

इति मा स्म विस्मरः । ततो नातीतवर्तमानयोरेकत्वमध्यक्षज्ञानगोचरः । अथ स्मरणसहकृतमिन्द्रियं तदेकत्वविषयं प्रत्यक्षमुपजनयतीति प्रत्यक्षरूपतास्य गीयत इति चेत्, न, स्वविषयविनियमितमूर्तेरिन्द्रियस्य विषयान्तरे सहकारिशतसमवधानेऽप्यप्रवृत्तेः । नहि परिमलस्मरणसहायमपि चक्षुरिन्द्रियमविषये गन्धादौ प्रवर्त्तते । अविषयश्चातीतवर्तमानावस्थाव्याप्येकं द्रव्यमिन्द्रियाणाम् । नाप्यदृष्टसहकारिसहितमिन्द्रियमेकत्वविषयमिति वक्तुं युक्तम् उक्तादेव हेतोः । किञ्च, अदृष्टसव्यपेक्षादेवात्मनस्तद्विज्ञानं भवतीति वरं वक्तुं युक्तम् । दृश्यते हि स्वप्नविद्यादिसंस्कृतादात्मनो विषयान्तरेऽपि विशिष्टज्ञानोत्पत्तिः । ननु यथाञ्जनादिसंस्कृतं चक्षुः सातिशयं भवति तथा स्मरणसहकृतमेकत्वविषयं भविष्यति । नैवम्, इन्द्रियस्य स्वविषयानतिलङ्घनेनैवातिशयोपलब्धेः, न विषयान्तरप्रहरणरूपेण । यदाह भट्टः—

“यश्चाप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।

दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यात् न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तितः ॥”

(श्लोका० सू० २ श्लो० ११४)

इति । तत् स्थितमेतत् विषयभेदात्प्रत्यक्षादन्यत्परोक्षान्तर्गतं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति ।

१५. न चैतदप्रमाणम् विसंवादाभावात् । क्वचिद्विसंवादादप्रमाण्ये प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तथा प्रसङ्गो दुर्निवारः । प्रत्यभिज्ञानपरिच्छिन्नस्य चात्मा-दीनामेकत्वस्याभावे बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था नोपपद्यते । एकस्यैव हि बद्धत्वे मुक्तत्वे च बद्धो दुःखितमात्मानं जानन् मुक्तिसुखार्थं प्रयतेत । भेदे त्वन्य एव दुःख्यन्य एव सुखीति कः किमर्थं वा प्रयतेत् ? तस्मात्सकलस्य दृष्टादृष्टव्यवहारस्यैकत्वमूलत्वादेकत्वस्य च प्रत्यभिज्ञायत्तजीवितत्वाद्भवति प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमिति ॥ ४ ॥

१६. अथोहस्य लक्षणमाह—

उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानम् ऊहः ॥ ५ ॥

१७. ‘उपलम्भः’ प्रमाणमात्रमत्र गृह्यते न प्रत्यक्षमेव अनुमेयस्यापि साधनस्य सम्भवात्, प्रत्यक्षवदनुमेयेष्वपि व्याप्तेरविरोधात् । ‘व्याप्तिः’ वक्ष्यमाणा तस्या ‘ज्ञानम्’ तद्ग्राही निर्णयविशेष ‘ऊहः’ ।

१८. न चायं व्याप्तिग्रहः प्रत्यक्षादेवेति वक्तव्यम् । नहि प्रत्यक्षं यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स देशान्तरे कालान्तरे वा पावकस्यैव कार्यं नार्थान्तरस्येतीयतो व्यापारान् कर्तुं समर्थं सन्निहितविषयबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वाच्च ।

१९. नाप्यनुमानात्, तस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले योगीव प्रमाता सम्पद्यत इत्येवंभूतभारासमर्थत्वात् । सामर्थ्येऽपि प्रकृतमेवानुमानं व्याप्तिग्राहकम्, अनुमानान्तरं वा ? तत्र प्रकृतानुमानात् व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावितरेतराश्रयः । व्याप्तौ हि प्रतिपन्नयामनुमानमात्मानमासादयति, तदात्मलाभे च व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिरिति । अनुमानान्तरात्तु व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावनवस्था तस्यापि गृहीतव्याप्तिकस्यैव प्रकृतानुमानव्याप्तिग्राहकत्वात् । तद्व्याप्तिग्रहश्च यदि स्वत एव, तदा पूर्वेण किमपराद्धं येनानुमानान्तरं मृग्यते । अनुमानान्तरेण चेत्; तर्हि युगसहस्रेष्वपि व्याप्तिग्रहणासंभवः ।

२०. ननु यदि निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षमविचारकम् तर्हि तत्पृष्ठभावी विकल्पो व्याप्तिं ग्रहीष्यतीति चेत्; नैतत्, निर्विकल्पकेन व्याप्तेरग्रहणे विकल्पेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् निर्विकल्पकगृहीतार्थविषयत्वाद्विकल्पस्य । अथ निर्विकल्पकविषयनिरपेक्षोऽर्थान्तरगोचरो विकल्पः, स तर्हि प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा ? प्रमाणत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानातिरिक्तं प्रमाणान्तरं तितिक्षितव्यम् ।

२५. यदा तु व्याप्यधर्मतया व्याप्तिर्विवक्ष्यते तदा 'व्याप्यस्य वा' गभकस्य 'तत्रैव' व्यापके गम्ये सति यत्र धर्मिणि व्यापकोऽस्ति तत्रैव 'भावः' न तदभावेऽपि व्याप्तिरिति । अत्रापि नैवमवधार्यते—व्याप्यस्यैव तत्र भाव इति, हेत्वभावप्रसङ्गादव्याप्यस्यापि तत्र भावात् । नापि—व्याप्यस्य तत्र भाव इति, हेत्वभावप्रसङ्गादव्याप्यस्यापि तत्र भावात् । नापि—व्याप्यस्य तत्र भाव एवेति, सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तेरहेतुत्वप्राप्तेः साधारणस्य च हेतुत्वं स्यात्, प्रमेयत्वस्य नित्येष्ववश्यंभावादिति ।

२६. व्याप्यव्यापकधर्मतासङ्कीर्तनं तु व्याप्तेरुभयत्र तुल्यधर्मतयैकाकाराप्रतीतिर्मा भूदिति प्रदर्शनार्थम् । तथाहि—पूर्वात्रायोगव्यवच्छेदेनावधारणम् उत्तरत्रान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेनेति कुत उभयत्रैकाकारता व्याप्तेः ? तदुक्तम्—

“लिङ्गे लिङ्गी भवत्येव लिङ्गिन्येवेतरत् पुनः ।
नियमस्य विपर्ययेऽसम्बन्धो लिङ्गलिङ्गतोः ॥”

इति ॥ ६ ॥

२७. अथ क्रमप्राप्तमनुमानं लक्षयति—

साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानम् अनुमानम् ॥ ७ ॥

साधनं साध्यं च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् । दृष्टादुपदिष्टाद्वा 'साधनात्' यत् 'साध्यस्य' 'विज्ञानम्' सम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मकं तदनुमीयतेऽनेनेति 'अनुमानम्' लिङ्गग्रहणसम्बन्धस्मरणयोः पश्चात् परिच्छेदनम् ॥ ७ ॥

तत् द्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च ॥ ८ ॥

२९. 'तत्' अनुमानं द्विप्रकारं स्वार्थ-परार्थभेदात् । स्वव्यामोहनिवर्तनक्षमम् 'स्वार्थम्' । परव्यामोहनिवर्तनक्षमम् 'परार्थम्' ॥ ८ ॥

३०. तत्र स्वार्थं लक्षयति—

स्वार्थं स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणात् साधनात्
साध्यज्ञानम् ॥ ९ ॥

३१. साध्यं विनाऽभवनं साध्याविनाभावः स्वेनात्मना निश्चितः साध्याविनाभाव एकैकं लक्षणां यस्य तत् 'स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैक-

लक्षणम्' तस्मात्तथाविधात् 'साधनात्' लिङ्गात् 'साध्यस्य' लिङ्गिनो 'ज्ञानम्' 'स्वार्थम्' अनुमानम् । इह च न योग्यतया लिङ्गं परोक्षार्थप्रतिपत्तेरङ्गम्, यथा बीजमङ्कुरस्य, अदृष्टाद् धूमादग्नेरप्रतिपत्तेः; नापि स्वनिश्चयः (स्वविप) यज्ज्ञानापेक्षं यथा प्रदीपो घटादेः, दृष्टादप्यनिश्चिता-विनाभावादप्रतिपत्तेः । तस्मात्परोक्षार्थनान्तरीयकतया निश्चयनमेव लिङ्गस्य व्यापार इति 'निश्चित' ग्रहणम् ।

३२. ननु चासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तकहेत्वाभासानराकरणार्थं हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्त्वम्, विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरिति त्रैलक्षण्यमाचक्षते भिन्नवः । तथाहि -- अनुमेये धर्मिणि लिङ्गस्य सत्त्वमेव निश्चितमित्येकं रूपम् । अत्र सत्त्ववचनेनासिद्धं चाक्षुषत्वादि निरस्तम् । एवकारेण पक्षैकदेशासिद्धो निरस्तो यथा अनित्यानि पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि गन्धवत्त्वात् । अत्र पक्षीकृतेषु पृथिव्यादिषु चतुर्षु भूतेषु पृथिव्यामेव गन्धवत्त्वम् । सत्त्ववचनस्य पश्चात्कृतेनैवकारेणासाधारणो धर्मो निरस्तः । यदि ह्यनुमेय एव सत्त्वमित्युच्येत श्रावणत्वमेव हेतुः स्यात् । निश्चित-ग्रहणेन सन्दिग्धासिद्धः सर्वो निरस्तः । सपक्षे एव सर्वं निश्चितमिति द्वितीयं रूपम् । इहापि सत्त्वग्रहणेन विरुद्धो निरस्तः । स हि नास्ति सपक्षे एवकारेण साधारणानैकान्तिकः, स हि न सपक्षे एव वर्तते किं तु विपक्षेऽपि । सत्त्वग्रहणात् पूर्वमवधारणकरणेन सपक्षाव्यापिनोऽपि प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वादेर्हेतुत्वमुक्तम्, पश्चादवधारणे हि अयमर्थः स्यात्-सपक्षे सत्त्वमेव यस्य स हेतुरिति प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वं न हेतुः स्यात् । निश्चितवचनेन सन्दिग्धान्वयोऽनैकान्तिको निरस्तः यथा सर्वज्ञः काश्चित्कृत्त्वात्, वक्तृत्वं हि सपक्षे सर्वज्ञे सन्दिग्धम् । विपक्षे त्वसत्त्वमेव निश्चितमिति तृतीयं रूपम् । तत्रासत्त्वग्रहणेन विरुद्धस्य निरासः । विरुद्धो हि विपक्षेऽस्ति । एवकारेण साधारणस्य विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तेर्निरासः, प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वे हि साध्येऽनित्यत्वं विपक्षैकदेशे विद्युदादावस्ति, आकाशादौ नास्ति । ततो नियमेनास्य निरासोऽसत्त्वशब्दात् । पूर्वस्मिन्नवधारणे हि अयमर्थः स्यात्- विपक्ष एव यो नास्ति स हेतुः, तथा च प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वं सपक्षेऽपि नास्ति ततो न हेतुः स्यात्ततः पूर्वं न कृतम् । निश्चित-ग्रहणेन सन्दिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकोऽनैकान्तिको निरस्तः । तदेवं त्रैलुप्यमेव हेतोरसिद्धादिदोषपरिहारक्षममिति तदेवाभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तमिति किमेक-लक्षणकत्वेनेति ?

३३. तदयुक्तम्, अविनाभावनियमनिश्चयादेव दोषत्रयपरिहारो-
पपत्तेः । अविनाभावो ह्यन्यथानुपपन्नत्वम् । तच्चासिद्धस्य विरुद्धस्य व्यभि-
चारिणो वा न सम्भवति । त्रैरूप्ये तु सत्यप्यविनाभावाभावे हेतोरगम-
कत्वदर्शनात्, यथा स श्यामो मैत्रतनयत्वात् इतरमैत्रपुत्रवदित्यत्र ।
अथ विपक्षान्नियमवती व्यावृत्तिस्तत्र न दृश्यते ततो न गमकत्वम्; तर्हि
तस्या एवाविनाभारूपत्वादितररूपसद्भावेऽपि तदभावे हेतोः स्वसाध्य-
सिद्धिं प्रति गमकत्वानिष्टौ सैव प्रधानं लक्षणमस्तु । तत्सद्भावेऽपररूप-
द्वयनिरपेक्षतया गमकत्वोपपत्तेश्च, यथा सन्त्यद्वैतवादिनोऽपि प्रमाणाणि
इष्टानिष्टसाधनदूषणान्यथानुपपत्तेः । न चात्र पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं
चास्ति, केवलमविनाभावमात्रेण गमकत्वोपपत्तिः । ननु पक्षधर्मताऽभावे
श्वेतः प्रासादः काकस्य काष्ण्यादित्यादयोऽपि हेतवः प्रसज्येरन्; नैवम्,
अविनाभावबलेनैवापक्षधर्माणामपि गमकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । न चेह सोऽस्ति
ततोऽविनाभाव एव हेतोः प्रधानं लक्षणमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्; सति तस्मिन्न-
सत्यपि त्रैलक्ष्ये हेतोरगमकत्वदर्शनात् । न तु त्रैरूप्यं हेतुलक्षणम् अव्या-
पकत्वात् । तथा च सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वादित्यत्र मूर्द्धाभिषिक्ते साधने सौगतैः
सपक्षेऽसतोऽपि हेतोः सत्त्वस्य गमकत्वमिष्यत एव । तदुक्तम्—

“अन्यथाऽनुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ?

नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र यत्र त्रयेण किम् ?”

इति ।

३४. एतेन पञ्चलक्षणकत्वमपि नैयायिकोक्तं प्रत्युक्तम्, तस्याप्य-
विनाभावप्रपञ्चत्वात् । तथाहि—त्रैरूप्यं पूर्वोक्तम्, अबाधितविषयत्वम्,
असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति पञ्च रूपाणि । तत्र प्रत्यक्षागमवाधितकर्मनिर्देशा-
नन्तरप्रयुक्तत्वं बाधितविषयत्वं यथाऽनुष्णस्तेजोवयवीकृतकत्वात् घटवत् ।
ब्राह्मणेन सुरा पेया (द्रव) द्रव्यत्वात् क्षीरवत् इति । तन्निषेधादबाधित-
विषयत्वम् । प्रतिपक्षहेतुबाधितत्वं सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दो
नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः । अत्र प्रतिपक्षहेतुः—नित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धे-
रिति । तन्निषेधादसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् । तत्र बाधितविषयस्य सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य
चाविनाभावाभावादविनाभावेनैव रूपद्वयमपि सङ्गृहीतम् । यदाह—
“बाधाविनाभावयोर्विरोधात्” (हेतु० परि० ४) इति । अपि च, स्वल-
क्षणलक्षितपक्षविषयत्वाभावात् तद्दोषेणैव दोषद्वयमिदं चरितार्थं किं पुन-
र्यच्चनेन ? तत् स्थितमेतत् साध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणादिति ॥ ६ ॥

३५. तत्राविनाभावं लक्षयति —

सहक्रमभाविनोः सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥ १० ॥

३६. 'सहभाविनोः' एकसामग्र्यधीनयोः फलादिगतयो रूप-
रसयोः व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च शिंशपात्ववृक्षत्वयोः, 'क्रमभाविनोः' कृत्तिको-
दयशकटोदययोः, कार्यकारणयोश्च धूमधूमध्वजयोर्यथासङ्ख्यम् यः 'सह-
क्रमभावनियमः'—सहभाविनोः सहभावनियमः क्रमभाविनोः क्रमभाव-
नियमः, साध्यसाधनयोरिति प्रकरणात्लभ्यते सः 'अविनाभावः' ॥ १० ॥

३७. अथैवंविधोऽविनाभावो निश्चितः साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गमित्युक्तम् ।
तन्निश्चयश्च कुतः प्रमाणात् ? न तावत् प्रत्यक्षात्, तस्यैन्द्रियकस्य
सन्निहितविषयविनियमितव्यापारत्वात् । मनस्तु यद्यपि सर्वविषयं तथा-
पीन्द्रियगृहीतार्थगोचरत्वेनैव तस्य प्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथान्ध-वधिराद्यभाव-
प्रसङ्गः । सर्वविषयता तु सकलेन्द्रियगोचरार्थविषयत्वेनैवोच्यते न स्वात-
न्त्र्येण । योगिप्रत्यक्षेण त्वविनाभावग्रहणेऽनुमेयार्थप्रतिपत्तिरेव ततोऽस्तु,
किं तपस्विनाऽनुमानेन ? अनुमानात्त्वविनाभावनिश्चयेऽनवस्थेतरैतरा-
श्रयदोषप्रसङ्ग उक्त एव । न च प्रमाणान्तरमेवंविधविषयग्रहणप्रवण-
मस्तीत्याह—

ऊहात् तन्निश्चयः ॥ ११ ॥

३८. 'ऊहात्' तर्कादुक्तलक्षणात्तस्याविनाभावस्य 'निश्चयः' ॥ ११ ॥

३९. लक्षितं परीक्षितं च साधनम् । इदानीं तत् विभजति—

स्वभावः कारणं कार्यमेकार्थसमवायि विरोधि चेति

पञ्चधा साधनम् ॥ १२ ॥

४०. स्वभावादीनि चत्वारि विधेः साधनानि, विरोधि तु निषेध-
स्येति पञ्चविधम् 'साधनम्' । 'स्वभावः' यथा शब्दान्तित्यत्वे साध्ये कृत-
कर्त्वं श्रावणत्वं वा ।

४१. ननु श्रावणत्वस्यासाधारणत्वात् कथं व्याप्तिसिद्धिः ? विपर्यये
बाधकप्रमाणबलात् सत्त्वस्येवेति ब्रूमः । न चैवं सत्त्वमेव हेतुः
तद्विशेषस्योत्पत्तिमत्त्व-कृतकत्वप्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्व-प्रत्ययभेदभेदित्वादेर-
हेतुत्वापत्तेः । किं च, किमिदमसाधारणत्वं नाम ? यदि पक्ष एव
वर्तमानत्वम्, तत् सर्वस्मिन् क्षणिके साध्ये सत्त्वस्यापि समानम् ।
साध्यधर्मवतः पक्षस्यापि सपक्षता चेत्, इह कः प्रद्वेषः ? पक्षादन्यस्यैव

सपक्षत्वे लोहलेख्यं वस्त्रं पार्थिवत्वात् काष्ठवदित्यत्र पार्थिवत्वमपि लोहलेख्यतां वस्त्रे गमयेत् । अन्यथानुपपत्तेरभावान्नेति चेत् ; इदमेव तर्हि हेतुलक्षणमस्तु । अपक्षधर्मस्यापि साधनत्वापत्तिरिति चेत् ; अस्तु यद्यविनाभावोऽस्ति, शकटोदये कृत्तिकोदयस्य, सर्वज्ञसदभावे संवादिन उपदेशस्य गमकत्वदर्शनात् । काकस्य कार्ण्यं न प्रासादे धावत्यं विनानुपपद्यमानमित्यनेकान्तादगमकम् । तथा, घटे चाक्षुषत्वं शब्देऽ नित्यतां विनाप्युपपद्यमानमिति । तन्न भ्रावणत्वादिरसाधारणोऽप्य- नित्यतां व्यभिचरति । ननु कृतकत्वाच्छब्दस्यानित्यत्वे साध्ये पर्यायवद् द्रव्येऽप्यनित्यता प्राप्नोति । नैवम्, पर्यायाणामेवानित्यतायाः साध्यत्वात्, अनुक्तमपीच्छाविषयीकृतं साध्यं भवतीति किं स्म प्रस्मरति भवान् ? ननु कृतकत्वनित्यत्वयोस्तादात्म्ये साधनवत् साध्यस्य सिद्धत्वम्, साध्यवच्च साधनस्य साध्यत्वं प्रसजति । सत्यमेतत्, किं तु मोहनिवर्तनार्थः प्रयोगः । यदाह—

“सादेरपि न सान्तत्वं व्यामोहाद्योऽधिगच्छति ।

साध्यसाधनतैकस्य तं प्रति स्यान्न दोषभाक् ॥”

४२. ‘कारणं’ यथा वाष्पभावेन मशकवर्तिरूपतया वा स निदृश्यमाने धूमेऽग्निः, विशिष्टमेघोन्नतिर्वा वृष्टौ । कथमयमाबालगोपालाविपालाङ्ग- नादिप्रसिद्धोऽपि नोपलब्धः सूक्ष्मदर्शनापि न्यायवादिना ? कारणविशेष- दर्शनाद्धि सर्वः कार्यार्थी प्रवर्तते । स तु विशेषो ज्ञातव्यो योऽव्यभि- चारी । कारणत्वनिश्चयादेव प्रवृत्तिरिति चेत् ; अस्त्वसौ लिङ्गविशेषनिश्चयः प्रत्यक्षकृतः, फले तु भाविनि नानुमानादन्यन्निबन्धनमुत्पश्यामः । क्वचिद् व्यभिचारात् सर्वस्य हेतोरहेतुत्वे कार्यस्यापि तथा प्रसङ्गः । वाष्पादेर- कार्यत्वान्नेति चेत् ; अत्रापि यत् यतो न भवति न तत् तस्य कारणमित्य- दोषः । यथैव हि किञ्चित् कारणमुद्दिश्य किञ्चित्कार्यम्, तथैव किञ्चित् कार्यमुद्दिश्य किञ्चित् कारणम् । यद्वदेवाजनकं प्रति न कार्यत्वम्, तद्वदेवाजन्यं प्रति न कारणत्वमिति नानयो कश्चिद्विशेषः । अपि च रसादेकसामग्र्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छता न्यायवादिनेष्टमेव कारणस्य हेतुत्वम् । यदाह—

“एकसामग्र्यधीनस्य रूपादे रसतो गतिः ।

हेतुधर्मानुमानेव धूमेन्धनविकारवत् ॥”

(प्रमाण वा० १.१०) इति ।

४३. न च वयमपि यस्य कस्यचित् कारणस्य हेतुत्वं ब्रूमः ।
अपि तु यस्य न मन्त्रादिना शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो न वा कारणान्तरवैवल्यम् ।
तत् कुतो विज्ञायत इति चेत् ; अस्ति तावद्विगुणादितरस्य विशेषः ।
तत्परिज्ञानं तु प्रायः पांशुरपादानमप्यस्ति । यदाहुः—

“गंभीरगर्जितारम्भनिभिन्नगिरिगह्वराः ।

त्वङ्गत्तडिल्लतासङ्गपिशङ्गोत्तुङ्गविग्रहाः ॥”

(न्यायम० पृ० १२६)

रोलम्बगवलव्यालतमालमलिनत्विषः ।

वृष्टि व्यभिचरन्तीह नैवं प्रायाः पयोमुचः ॥”

(पद्द० २०) इति ।

४४. ‘कार्यम्’ यथा वृष्टौ विशिष्टनदीपूरः कृशानौ धूमः, चैतन्ये
प्राणादिः । पूरस्य वैशिष्ट्यं कथं विज्ञायत इति चेत् ; उक्तमत्र नैयायिकैः ।
यदाहुः—

“भावतंवर्तनाशालि विशालकलुषोदकः ।

कल्लोलविकटास्फालस्फुटफेनच्छटाङ्कितः ॥

बहदबहलशेवालफलशाद्वलसङ्कुलः ।

नदीपूरविशेषोऽपि शक्यते न च वेदितुम् ॥”

(न्याय म० पृ० १३०)

इति धूमप्राणादीनामपि कार्यत्वनिश्चयो न दुष्करः । यदाहुः—

“कार्यं धूमो हुतभुजः कार्यधमनिवृत्तितः ।

स भवंस्तदभावेऽपि हेतुमत्तां विलङ्घयेत् ॥”

(प्रमाण वा० १.३५)

४५. कारणाभावेऽपि कार्यस्य भावे अहेतुत्वमन्यहेतुत्वं वा भवेत् ।
अहेतुत्वे सदा सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा भवेत् । अन्यहेतुत्वे दृष्टान्त्यतोऽपि भवतो
न दृष्टजन्यता अन्याभावेऽपि दृष्टाद्भवतो नान्यहेतुत्वमित्यहेतुकतैव
स्यात् । तत्र चोक्तम्—“यस्त्वन्यतोपि भवन्नुपलब्धो न तस्य धूमत्वं हेतु-
भेदात् । कारणं च बह्विधमस्य इत्युक्तम् ।”

अपि च—

“अग्निस्वभावः शक्रस्य मूर्द्धा यद्यग्निरेव सः ।

अथानग्निस्वभावोऽसौ धूमस्तत्र कथं भवेत् ॥”

(प्रमाण बा० १.३७) इति ।

४६. तथा चेतनां विनानुपपद्यमानः कार्यं प्राणादिरनुमापयति तां श्रावणत्वमिवानित्यताम्, विपर्यये बाधकवशात्सत्त्वस्येवास्यापि व्याप्ति-
सिद्धेरित्युक्तप्रायम् । तत्र प्राणादिरसाधारणोऽपि चेतनां व्यभिचरति ।

४७. किं च, नान्वयो हेतो रूपं तदभावे हेत्वाभासाभावात् । विपक्ष
एव सन् विरुद्धः, विपक्षेऽपि—अनैकान्तिकः सर्वज्ञत्वे साध्ये वक्तृत्व-
स्यापि व्यतिरेकाभाव एव हेत्वाभासत्वे निमित्तम्, नान्वयसन्देह इति
न्यायवादिनापि व्यतिरेकाभावादेव हेत्वाभासावुक्तौ । असाधारणोऽपि
यदि साध्याभावेऽसन्निति निश्चीयेत तदा प्रकारान्तराभावात्साध्यमुपस्था-
पयन्नानैकान्तिकः स्यात् । अपि च यद्यन्वयो रूपं स्यात् तदा यथा विप-
क्षैकदेशवृत्तेः कथञ्चिद्व्यतिरेकादगमकत्वम्, एवं सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तेरपि
स्यात् कथञ्चिदनन्वयात् । यदाह—

“रूपं यद्यन्वयो हेतोव्यतिरेकवदिष्यते ।

स सपक्षोभयो न स्यादसपक्षोभयो यथा ॥”

सपक्ष एव सत्त्वमन्वयो न सपक्षे सत्त्वमेवेति चेत् ; अस्तु स तु
व्यतिरेक एवेत्यस्मन्मतमेवाङ्गीकृतं स्यात् । वयमपि हि प्रत्यपीपदाम
अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुरिति ।

४८. तथा, एकस्मिन्नर्थे दृष्टेऽदृष्टे वा समवाय्याश्रितं साधनं
साध्येन । तच्चैकार्थसमवायित्वम् एकफलादिगतयो रूपरसयोः, शकटोदय-
कृत्तिकोदययोः, चन्द्रोदय-समुद्रवृद्धयोः, वृष्टि-साण्डपिपीलिकाक्षोभयोः,
नागवल्लीदाह-पत्रकोथयोः । तत्र ‘एकार्थसमवायी’ रसो रूपस्य, रूपं वा
रसस्य; नहि समानकालभाविनोः कार्यकारणभावः सम्भवति ।

४९. ननु समानकालकार्यजनकं कारणमनुमास्यते इति चेत् ; न
तर्हि कार्यमनुमितं स्यात् । कारणानुमानं सामर्थ्यात् कार्यमनुमितमेव,
जन्याभावे जनकत्वाभावादिति चेत् ; हन्तैवं कारणं कार्यस्यानुमापकमित्य-

निष्ठमापद्येत । शकटोदयकृत्तिकोदयादीनां तु यथाऽविनाभावं साध्य-
साधनभावः । यदाह—

“एकार्थसमवायस्तु यथा येषां तथैव ते ।

गमका गमकस्तन्न शकटः कृत्तिकोदितेः ॥”

एवमन्येष्वपि साधनेषु वाच्यम् । ननु कृतकत्वानित्यत्वयोरेकार्थ-
समवायः कस्मान्नेष्यते ?; न, तयोरेकत्वात् । यदाह—

“आद्यन्तापेक्षिणी सत्ता कृतकत्वमनित्यता ।

एकैव हेतुः साध्यं च द्वयं नैकाश्रयं ततः ॥”

इति ।

५०. स्वभावादीनां चतुर्णां साधनानां विधिसाधनता, निषेधसाध-
नत्वं तु विरोधिनः । स हि स्वसन्निधानेनेतरस्य प्रतिषेधं साधयति अन्यथा
विरोधासिद्धेः ।

५१. ‘च’ शब्दो यत एते स्वभावकारणकार्यव्यापका अन्यथानु-
पपन्नाः स्वसाध्यमुपस्थापयन्ति तत एव तदभावे स्वयं न भवन्ति, तेषा-
मनुपलब्धिरप्यभावसाधनीत्याह । तत्र स्वभावानुपलब्धिर्यथा नात्र घटः,
द्रष्टुं योग्यस्यानुपलब्धेः । कारणानुपलब्धिर्यथा नात्र धूमोऽग्न्यभावात् ।
कार्यानुपलब्धिर्यथा नात्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यानि धूमकारणानि सन्ति धूमा-
भावात् । व्यापकानुपलब्धिर्यथा नात्र शिशपा वृक्षाभावात् ।

५२. विरोधि तु प्रतिषेध्यस्य तत्कार्यकारणव्यापकानां च विरुद्धं
विरुद्धकार्यं च । तथा न शीतस्पर्शः, नाप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यानि शीतकारणानि,
न रोमहर्षविशेषाः, न तुषारस्पर्शः, अग्नेर्धूमाद्वेति प्रयोगनानात्व-
मिति ॥ १२ ॥

५३. साधनं लक्षयित्वा विभज्य च साध्यस्य लक्षणमाह—

सिषाधयिषितमसिद्धमवाध्यं साध्यं पक्षः ॥ १३ ॥

५४. साधयितुमिष्टं ‘सिषाधयिषितम्’ । अनेन साधयितुमनिष्टस्य
साध्यत्वव्यवच्छेदः, यथा वैशेषिकस्य नित्यः शब्द इति शास्त्रोक्तत्वा-
द्वैशेषिकेणाभ्युपगतस्याप्याकाशगुणत्वादेर्न साध्यत्वम्, तदा साधयितु-
मनिष्टत्वात् । इष्टः पुनरनुक्तोऽपि पक्षो भवति, यथा परार्थाश्चक्षुरादयः

सङ्घातत्वाच्छ्रयनाशनाद्यङ्गवदित्यत्र परार्था इत्यात्मार्थाः बुद्धिमत्कारण-
पूर्वकं क्षित्यादि कार्यत्वादित्यत्राऽशरीरसर्वज्ञपूर्वकत्वमिति ।

५५. 'असिद्धम्' इत्यनेनानध्यवसाय-संशय-विपर्ययविषयस्य वस्तुनः
साध्यत्वम्, न सिद्धस्य यथा श्रावणः शब्द इति । 'नानुपलब्धे न निष्णीति
न्यायः प्रवर्तते' (न्याय भा० १.११) इति हि सर्वपाषाणम् ।

५६. 'अबाध्यम्' इत्यनेन प्रत्यक्षादिबाधतस्य साध्यत्वं मा भूदि-
त्याह । एतत् साध्यस्य लक्षणम् । 'पक्षः' इति साध्यस्यैव नामान्तर-
मेतत् ॥ १३ ॥

५७. अबाध्यग्रहणव्यवच्छेद्यां बाधां दर्शयति—

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनप्रतीतयो बाधाः ॥ १४ ॥

५८. प्रत्यक्षादीनि तद्विरुद्धार्थोपस्थापनेन बाधकत्वात् 'बाधाः' ।
तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधा यथा अनुष्णोऽग्निः, न मधु मधुरम्, न सुगन्धि विद-
लन्मालतीमुकुलम्, अचाक्षुषो घटः, अश्रावणः शब्दः, नास्ति बहिरर्थ
इत्यादि । अनुमानबाधा यथा सरोम हस्ततलम्, निर्दयः शब्द इति वा ।
अत्रानुपलम्भेन कृतकत्वेन चानुमानबाधा । आगमबाधा यथा द्रेत्याऽ-
सुखप्रदो धर्म इति । परलोके सुखप्रदत्वं धर्मस्य सर्वागमसिद्धम् । लोक-
बाधा यथा शुचि नरशिरःकपालमिति । लोके हि नरशिरःकपालादीनाम-
शुचित्वं सुप्रसिद्धम् । स्ववचनबाधा यथा माता मे बन्ध्येति । प्रतीतिबाधा
यथा अचन्द्रः शशीति । अत्र शशिनश्चन्द्रशब्दवाच्यत्वं प्रतीतिसिद्धमिति
प्रतीतिबाधा ॥ १४ ॥

५९. अत्र साध्यं धर्मः धर्मधर्मिसमुदायो वेति संशयव्यवच्छेदा-
याह—

साध्यं साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी, क्वचित्तु धर्मः ॥ १५ ॥

६०. 'साध्यम्' साध्यशब्दवाच्यं पक्षशब्दाभिधेयमित्यर्थः । किमि-
त्याह 'साध्य धर्मेण' अनित्यत्वादिना 'विशिष्टो धर्मी' शब्दादिः । एतत्
प्रयोगकालापेक्षं साध्यशब्दवाच्यत्वम् । 'क्वचित्तु' व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले 'धर्मः'
साध्यशब्देनोच्यते, अन्यथा व्याप्तेरघटनात् । नहि धूमदर्शनात् सर्वत्र
पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति व्याप्तिः शक्या कर्तुं प्रमाणविरोधादिति ॥ १५ ॥

धर्मिस्वरूपनिरूपणायाह—

धर्मी प्रमाणसिद्धः ॥ १६ ॥

६१. 'प्रमाणैः' प्रत्यक्षादिभिः प्रसिद्धो 'धर्मी' भवति यथाग्निमानयं देश इति । अत्र हि देशः प्रत्यक्षेण सिद्धः । एतेन—'सर्व एवानुमानानुमेय-व्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन, न बहिः सदसत्त्वमपेक्षते' इति सौगतं मतं प्रतिक्षिपति । नहीयं विकल्पबुद्धिरन्तर्बहिर्वाऽनासादिता-लम्बना धर्मिणं व्यवस्थापयति, तदवास्तवत्वे तदाधारसाध्यसाधनयोरपि वास्तवत्वानुपपत्तेः तद्बुद्धेः पारम्पर्येणापि वस्तुव्यवस्थापकत्वायोगात् । ततो विकल्पेनान्येन वा व्यवस्थापितः पर्वतादिविषयभावं भजन्नेव धर्मितां प्रतिपद्यते । तथा च सति प्रमाणसिद्धस्य धर्मिता युक्तैव ॥ १६ ॥

६२. अपवादमाह—

बुद्धिसिद्धोऽपि ॥ १७ ॥

६३. नैकान्तेन प्रमाणसिद्ध एव धर्मी किंतु विकल्पबुद्धिप्रसिद्धोऽपि धर्मी भवति । 'अपि' शब्देन प्रमाण-बुद्धिभ्यामुभाभ्यामपि सिद्धो धर्मी भवतीति दर्शयति । तत्र बुद्धिसिद्धे धर्मिणि साध्यधर्मः सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च प्रमाणबलेन साध्यते यथा अस्ति सर्वज्ञः, नास्ति पष्ठं भूतमिति ।

६४. ननु धर्मिणि साक्षादसति भावाभावोभयधर्माणामसिद्धविरुद्धा-नैकान्तिकत्वेनानुमानविषयत्वायोगात् कथं सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः साध्यत्वम् ? तदाह—

“नासिद्धे भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रयः ।

विरुद्धो धर्मोऽभावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम् ?”

(प्रमाण वा० १.१६२-३) इति ।

६५. नैवम्, मानसप्रत्यक्षे भावरूपस्यैव धर्मिणः प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । न च तत्सिद्धौ तत्सत्त्वस्यापि प्रतिपन्नत्वाद् व्यर्थमनुमानम्, तदभ्युपेत-मपि वैयात्याद्यौ न प्रतिपद्यते तं प्रत्यनुमानस्य साफल्यत् । न च मानस-ज्ञानात् खरविषाणादेरपि सद्भावसम्भावनातोऽतिप्रसङ्गः, तज्ज्ञानस्य बाधकप्रत्ययविप्लवितसत्ताकवस्तुविषयतया मानसप्रत्यक्षाभासत्वात् । कथं तर्हि षष्ठभूतादेर्धर्मित्वमिति चेत् ; धर्मिप्रयोगकाले बाधकप्रत्ययानुद-यात्सत्त्वसम्भावनोपपत्तेः । न च सर्वज्ञादौ साधकप्रमाणासत्त्वेन सत्त्व-संशीतिः, सुनिश्चिताऽसम्भवद्विधाधकप्रमाणत्वेन सुखादाविव सत्त्वनिश्चया-त्तत्र संशयायोगात् ।

६६. उभयसिद्धो धर्मा यथा अनित्यः शब्द इति । नहि प्रत्यक्षे-
णार्वाग्दर्शिभिरनित्यतदिगदेशकालावच्छिन्नाः सर्वे शब्दाः शक्या निश्चेतु-
मिति शब्दस्य प्रमाणबुद्ध्युभयसिद्धता तेनानित्यत्वादधिर्मः प्रसाध्यत
इति ॥ १७ ॥

६७. ननु दृष्टान्तोऽप्यनुमानाङ्गतया प्रतीतः । तत् कथं साध्यसाधने
एवानुमानाङ्गमुक्ते न दृष्टान्तः ? इत्याह—

न दृष्टान्तोऽनुमानाङ्गम् ॥ १८ ॥

६८. 'दृष्टान्तः' वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणो नानुमानस्य 'अङ्गम्' कारणम्
॥ १८ ॥

६९. कुत इत्याह—

साधनमात्रात् तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १९ ॥

७०. दृष्टान्तरहितात्साध्यान्याथानुपपत्तिलक्षणात् 'साधनात्' अनु-
मानस्य साध्यप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणस्य भावान्न दृष्टान्तोऽनुमानाङ्गमिति ।

७१. स हि साध्यप्रतिपत्तौ वा, अविनाभावग्रहणे वा, व्याप्तिस्मरणे
वोपयुज्यते ? न तावत् प्रथमः पक्षः, यथोक्तादेव हेतोः साध्यप्रतिपत्तेरु-
पपत्तेः । नापि द्वितीयः, विपक्षे बाधकादेर्वाविनाभावग्रहणात् । किंच,
व्यक्तिरूपो दृष्टान्तः । स कथं साकल्येन व्याप्तिं गमयेत् ? व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु
व्याप्त्यर्थं दृष्टान्तान्तरं मृग्यम् । तस्यापि व्यक्तिरूपत्वेन साकल्येन व्याप्ते-
रवधारयितुमशक्यत्वादपरापरदृष्टान्तापेक्षायामनवस्था स्यात् । नापि
तृतीयः, गृहीतसम्बन्धस्य साधनदर्शनादेव व्याप्तिस्मृतेः । अगृहीतसम्ब-
न्धस्य दृष्टान्तेऽप्यस्मरणात् उपलब्धिपूर्वकत्वात् स्मरणस्येति ॥ १९ ॥

७२. दृष्टान्तस्य लक्षणमाह—

स व्याप्तिदर्शनभूमिः ॥ २० ॥

७३. 'स' इति दृष्टान्तो लक्ष्यं 'व्याप्तिः' लक्षितरूपा 'दर्शनम्'
परस्मै प्रतिपादनं तस्य 'भूमिः' आश्रय इति लक्षणम् ।

७४. ननु यदि दृष्टान्तोऽनुमानाङ्गं न भवति तर्हि किमर्थं लक्ष्यते ?
उच्यते । परार्थानुमाने बोध्यानुरोधादापवादिकस्योदाहरणस्यानुज्ञास्य-
मानत्वात् । तस्य च दृष्टान्ताभिधानरूपत्वादुपपन्नं दृष्टान्तस्य लक्षणम् ।

प्रमातुरपि कस्यचित् दृष्टान्तदृष्टवहिव्याप्तिबलेनान्तव्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति
स्वार्थानुमानपर्वण्यपि दृष्टान्तलक्षणं नानुपपन्नम् ॥ २० ॥

७५. तद्विभागमाह—

स साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां द्वेधा ॥ २१ ॥

७६. स दृष्टान्तः 'साधर्म्येण' अन्वयेन 'वैधर्म्येण' च व्यतिरेकेण
भवतीति द्विप्रकारः ॥ २१ ॥

७७. साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तं विभजते—

साधनधर्मप्रयुक्तसाध्यधर्मयोगी साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ॥ २२ ॥

७८. साधनधर्मेण प्रयुक्तो न तु काकतालीयो यः साध्यधर्मस्तद्वान्
'साधर्म्यं दृष्टान्तः' । यथा कृतकत्वेनान्त्ये शब्दे साध्ये घटादिः ॥ २२ ॥

७९. वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तं व्याचष्टे -

साध्यधर्मनिवृत्तिप्रयुक्तसाधनधर्मनिवृत्तियोगी

वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ॥ २३ ॥

८०. साध्यधर्मनिवृत्त्या प्रयुक्ता न यथाकथञ्चित् या साधनधर्म-
निवृत्तिः तद्वान् 'वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः' । यथाकृतकत्वेनान्त्ये शब्दे साध्ये
आकाशादिरिति ॥ २३ ॥

इत्याचार्यश्रीहिमचन्द्रविरचिताया. प्रमाणमीमांसायास्तद्वृत्तेश्च
प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ।

॥ अथ द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥

१. लक्षितं स्वार्थमनुमानमिदानीं क्रमप्राप्तं परार्थमनुमानं लक्षयति—

यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानजः परार्थम् ॥ १ ॥

२. 'यथोक्तम्' स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणं यत् 'साधनम्' तस्याभिधानम् । अभिधीयते परस्मै प्रतिपाद्यते अनेनेति 'अभिधानम्' वचनम् ; तस्माज्जातः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः 'परार्थम्' अनुमानं परोपदेशापेक्षं साध्यविज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ १ ॥

३. ननु वचनं परार्थमनुमानमित्याहुस्तत्कथमित्याह—

वचनमुपचारात् ॥ २ ॥

४. अचेतनं हि वचनं न साक्षात्प्रमितिफलहेतुरिति न निरूपचरित-प्रमाणभावभाजनम्, मुख्यानुमानहेतुत्वेन तूपचरितानुमानाभिधान-पात्रतां प्रतिपद्यते । उपचारश्चात्र कारणे कार्यस्य । यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानात् तद्विषया स्मृतिरूपद्यते, स्मृतेश्चानुमानम्, तस्मादनुमानस्य पर-स्परया यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानं कारणम्, तस्मिन् कारणे वचने कार्यस्यानुमानस्योपचारः समारोपः क्रियते । ततः समारोपात् कारणं वचनमनुमान-शब्देनोच्यते । कार्ये वा प्रतिपादकानुमानजन्ये वचने कारणस्यानुमान-स्योपचारः । वचनमौपचारिकमनुमानं न मुख्यमित्यर्थः ।

५. इह च मुख्यार्थबाधे प्रयोजने निमित्ते चोपचारः प्रवर्तते । तत्र मुख्योऽर्थः साक्षात्प्रमितिफलः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः प्रमाणशब्दसमानाधिक-रणस्य परार्थानुमानशब्दस्य, तस्य बाधा, वचनस्य निर्णयत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रयोजनम् अनुमानावयवाः प्रतिज्ञादय इति शास्त्रे व्यवहार एव, निर्णया-त्मन्यनंशे तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः । निमित्तं तु निर्णयात्मकानुमानहेतुत्वं वचनस्येति ॥ २ ॥

तद् द्वेधा ॥ ३ ॥

६. तद् वचनात्मकं परार्थानुमानं 'द्वेधा' द्विप्रकारम् ॥ ३ ॥

७. प्रकारभेदमाह—

तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभेदात् ॥ ४ ॥

८. 'तथा' साध्ये 'उपपत्तिः' साधनस्येत्येकः प्रकारः । 'अन्यथा' साध्याभावे 'अनुपपत्तिः' चेति द्वितीयः प्रकारः । यथा अग्निमानयं पर्वतः तथैव धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेः, अन्यथा धूमवत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्वा । एतावन्मात्रकृतः परार्थानुमानस्य भेदो न पारमार्थिकः स इति भेदपदेन दर्शयति ॥ ४ ॥

९. एतदेवाह—

नानयोस्तात्पर्ये भेदः ॥ ५ ॥

१०. 'न' 'अनयोः' तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिरूपयोः प्रयोगप्रकारयोः 'तात्पर्ये' 'यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः' इत्येवंलक्षणे तत्परत्वे, 'भेदः' विशेषः । एतदुक्तं भवति अन्यदभिधेयं शब्दस्यान्यत्प्रकाश्यं प्रयोजनम् । तत्राभिधेयापेक्षया वाचकत्वं भिद्यते, प्रकाश्यं त्वभिन्नम्, अन्वये कथितं व्यतिरेकगतिव्यतिरेके चान्वयगतिरित्युभयत्रापि साधनस्य साध्याविनाभावः प्रकाश्यते । न च यत्राभिधेयभेदस्तत्र तात्पर्यभेदोऽपि । नहि पीनो देवदत्तो दिधा न भुङ्क्ते, पीनो देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते इत्यनयो-र्वाक्ययोरभिधेयभेदोऽस्तीति तात्पर्येणापि भेत्तव्यमिति भावः ॥ ५ ॥

११. तात्पर्याभेदस्यैव फलमाह—

अत एव नोभयोः प्रयोगः ॥ ६ ॥

१२. यत एव नानयोस्तात्पर्ये भेदः 'अत एव नोभयोः' तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्योर्युगपत् 'प्रयोगः' युक्तः । व्याप्त्युपदर्शनाय हि तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभ्यां हेतोः प्रयोगः क्रियते । व्याप्त्युपदर्शनं चैकयैव सिद्धमिति विफलो द्वयोः प्रयोगः । यदाह—

“हेतोस्तथोपपत्त्या वा स्यात्प्रयोगोऽन्यथापि वा ।

द्विविधोऽन्यतरेणापि साध्यसिद्धिर्भवेदिति ॥”

(न्याया० १७)

१३. ननु यद्येकेनैव प्रयोगेण हेतोर्व्याप्त्युपदर्शनं कृतमिति कृतं विफलेन द्वितीयप्रयोगेण; तर्हि प्रतिज्ञाया अपि मा भूत् प्रयोगो विफलत्वात् । नहि प्रतिज्ञामात्रात् कश्चिदर्थं प्राप्तपद्यते, तथा सति हि विप्रतिपत्तिरेव न स्यादित्याह—

विषयोपदर्शनार्थं तु प्रतिज्ञा ॥ ७ ॥

१४. 'विषयः' यत्र तथोपपत्त्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या वा हेतुः स्वसाध्य-
साधनाय प्राथ्यते, तस्य 'उपदर्शनम्' परप्रतीतावारोपणं तदर्थं पुनः
'प्रतिज्ञा' प्रयोक्तव्येति शेषः ।

१५. अयमर्थः—परप्रत्यायनाय वचनमुच्चारयता प्रेक्षावता तदेव परे
बोधयितव्या यद्बुभुत्सन्ते । तथा सत्यनेन बुभुत्सिताभिधायिना परे
बोधिता भवन्ति । न खल्वश्वान् पृष्ठो गवयान् ब्रुवाणः प्रष्टुरवधेयवचनो
भवति । अनवधेयवचनश्च कथं प्रतिपादको नाम ? यथा च शैक्षो भिक्षु-
णाचक्षे—भो शैक्षः, पिण्डपातमाहरेति । स—एवमाचरामीत्यनभिधाय
यदा तदर्थं प्रयतते तदाऽस्मै क्रुध्यति भिक्षुः—आः शिष्याभास भिक्षुखेट,
अस्मानवधीरयसीति विब्रुवाणः । एवमनित्यं शब्दं बुभुत्समानाय अनित्यः
शब्द इति विषयमनुपदर्श्य यदेव किञ्चित्तुच्यते—कृतकत्वादिति वा,
यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमिति वा, कृतकत्वस्य तथैवोपपत्तेरिति वा, कृतकत्व-
स्यान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति वा, तत् सर्वमस्थानपेक्षितमापापतोऽसम्बद्धाभि-
धानबुद्ध्या; तथा चानवहितो न बोद्धुमर्हतीति ।

१६. यत् कृतकं तत् सर्वमनित्यं यथा घटः, कृतकश्च शब्द इति
वचनमर्थसामर्थ्येनैवापेक्षितशब्दानित्यत्वनिश्चायकमित्यवधानमत्रेति चेत्
न, परम्पराश्रयात् । अवधाने हि सत्यतोऽर्थनिश्चयः, तस्माच्चावधानमिति ।
न च परंपरप्रतिवादिनौ प्रमाणीकृतवादिनौ यदेतद्वचनसम्बन्धाय प्रयति-
ष्येते । तथासति न हेत्वाद्यपेक्षेयाताम्, तदवचनादेव तदर्थनिश्चयात् ।
अनित्यः शब्द इति त्वपेक्षिते उक्ते कुत इत्याशङ्कायां कृतकत्वस्य तथैवो-
पपत्तेः कृतकत्वस्यान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वेत्युपतिष्ठते, तदिदं विषयोपदर्शनार्थत्वं
प्रतिज्ञाया इति ॥ ७ ॥

१७. ननु यत् कृतकं तदनित्यं यथा घटः, कृतकश्च शब्द इत्युक्ते
गम्यत एतद् अनित्यः शब्द इति; तस्य सामर्थ्यलब्धत्वात्, तथापि तद्व-
चने पुनरुक्तत्वप्रसङ्गात्, "अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम्"
(न्यायसू० ५.२.१५) । आह च—“डिण्डिकरागं परित्यज्याक्षिणी निमील्य
चिन्तय तावत् किमियता प्रतीतिः स्यान्नवेति, भावे किं प्रपञ्चमालया”
(हेतु० परि० १) इत्याह—

गम्यमानत्वेऽपि साध्यधर्माधारस्त्वेहापनोदाय धर्मिणि

पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् तदुपपत्तिः ॥ ८ ॥

१८. साध्यमेव धर्मस्तस्याधारस्तस्य सन्देहस्तदपनोदाय—यः कृतकः

सोऽनित्यइत्युक्तेऽपि धर्मिविषयसन्देह एव— किमनित्यः शब्दो घटो वेति ? तन्निराकरणाय गम्यमानस्यापि साध्यस्य निर्देशो युक्तः, साध्य-धर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवचनवत् । यथा हि साध्य-व्याप्तसाधनदर्शनेन तदाधारावगतावपि नियतधर्मिसम्बन्धिताप्रदर्शनार्थम्— कृतकश्च शब्द इति पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवचनं तथा साध्यस्य विशिष्टधर्मि-सम्बन्धितावबोधनाय प्रतिज्ञावचनमप्युपपद्यत एवेति ॥ ८ ॥

१६. ननु प्रयोगं प्रति विप्रतिपद्यते वादिनः, तथाहि—प्रतिज्ञाहेतू-दाहरणानीति त्र्यवयवमनुमानमिति साङ्ख्यैः । सहोपनयेन चतुरवयव-मिति मीमांसकाः । सहनिगमनेन पञ्चावयवमिति नैयायिकाः । तदेवं विप्रतिपत्तौ कीदृशोऽनुमानप्रयोग इत्याह—

एतावान् प्रेक्षप्रयोगः ॥ ९ ॥

२०. 'एतावान्' एव यदुत तथोपपत्त्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या वा युक्तं साधनं प्रतिज्ञा च । 'प्रेक्षाय' प्रेक्षावते प्रतिपाद्याय तदवबोधनार्थः 'प्रयोगः' न त्वधिको यथाहुः साङ्ख्येयदयः, नापि हीनो यथाहुः सौगताः—“विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव हि केवलः” (प्रमाण वा० १.२८) इति ॥ ९ ॥

११. ननु परार्थप्रवृत्तैः कारुणिकैरेथाकथञ्चित् परे प्रतिबोधयितव्या नासद्व्यवस्थोपन्यासैरमीषां प्रतिभाभङ्गः करणीयः, तत्किमुच्यते एता-वान् प्रेक्षप्रयोगः ? इत्याशङ्क्य द्वितीयमपि प्रयोगक्रममुपदर्शयति—

बोध्यानुरोधात्प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि

पञ्चापि ॥ १० ॥

२२. 'बोध्यः' शिष्यस्तस्य 'अनुरोधः' तदवबोधनप्रतिज्ञापारतन्त्र्यं तस्मात्, प्रतिज्ञादीनि पञ्चापि प्रयोक्तव्यानि । एतानि चावयवसञ्ज्ञया प्रोच्यन्ते । यदक्षपादः—'प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः' (न्याय सू० १.१.३२) इति । 'अपि' शब्दात् प्रतिज्ञादीनां शुद्ध्यश्च पञ्च बोध्यानु-रोधात् प्रयोक्तव्याः । यच्छ्रीभद्रबाहुस्वामिपूज्यपादाः—

“कथं पञ्चावयवं दसहा वा सव्वहा ण पडिकुट्टंति ॥”

(दश० नि० ५०)

२३. तत्र प्रतिज्ञाया लक्षणमाह—

साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा ॥ ११ ॥

२४. साध्यं सिषाधयिषितधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी, निर्दिश्यते अनेनेति

निर्देशो वचनम्, साध्यस्य निर्देशः 'साध्यनिर्देशः' 'प्रतिज्ञा' प्रतिज्ञायतेऽ-
नयेति कृत्वा, यथा अयं प्रदेशोऽग्निमानिति ॥ ११ ॥

२५. हेतुं लक्षयति—

साधनत्वाभिव्यञ्जकविभक्त्यन्तं साधनवचनं हेतुः ॥ १२ ॥

२६. साधनत्वाभिव्यञ्जिका विभक्तिः पञ्चमी तृतीया वा तदन्तम्,
'साधनस्य' उक्तलक्षणस्य 'वचनम्' हेतुः । धूम इत्यादिरूपस्य हेतुत्व-
निराकरणाय प्रथमं पदम् । अव्याप्तवचनहेतुत्वनिराकरणाय द्वितीय-
मिति । स द्विविधस्तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभ्याम्, तद्यथा धूमस्य तथै-
वोपपत्तेर्धूमस्यान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वेति ॥ १२ ॥

२७. उदाहरणं लक्षयति—

दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् ॥ १३ ॥

२८. 'दृष्टान्तः' उक्तलक्षणस्तत्प्रतिपादकं 'वचनम्' 'उदाहरणम्'
तदपि द्विविधं दृष्टान्तभेदात् । साधनधर्मप्रयुक्तसाध्यधर्मयोगी साध्य-
दृष्टान्तस्तस्य वचनं साध्योदाहरणम्, यथा यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान्
यथा महानसः प्रदेशः । साध्यधर्मनिवृत्तिप्रयुक्तसाधनधर्मनिवृत्तियोगी
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तस्तस्य वचनं वैधर्म्योदाहरणम्, यथा योऽग्निनिवृत्तिमान्
स धूमनिवृत्तिमान् यथा जलाशयप्रदेश इति ॥ १३ ॥

२९. उपनयलक्षणमाह—

धर्मिणि साधनस्योपसंहार उपनयः ॥ १४ ॥

३०. दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि विसृतस्य साधनधर्मस्य साध्यधर्मिणि यः
'उपसंहारः' सः 'उपनयः' उपसंह्रियतेऽनेनोपनीयतेऽनेनेति वचनरूपः
यथा धूमवांश्चायमिति ॥ १४ ॥

३१. निगमनं लक्षयति—

साध्यस्य निगमनम् ॥ १५ ॥

३२. साध्यधर्मस्य धर्मिण्युपसंहारो निगम्यते पूर्वेषामवयवानामर्थोऽ-
नेनेति 'निगमनम्', यथा तस्मादग्निमानिति ।

३३. एते नान्तरीयकत्वप्रतिपादका व्याख्यैकदेशरूपाः पञ्चावयवाः ।
एतेषामेव शुद्धयः पञ्च । यतो न शङ्कितममारोपितदोषाः पञ्चाप्यवयवाः
स्वां स्वामनादीनवामर्थविषयां • धियमाधातुमलमिति प्रतिज्ञादीनां तं तं

दोषमाशङ्क्य तत्परिहाररूपाः पञ्चैव शुद्धयः प्रयोक्तव्या इति दशावयव-
भिदमनुमानवाक्यं बोध्यानुरोधात् प्रयोक्तव्यमिति ॥ १५ ॥

३४. इह शास्त्रे येषां लक्षणमुक्तं ते तल्लक्षणाभावे तदाभासाः
सुप्रसिद्धा एव । यथा प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणाभावे संशयविपर्ययानध्यव-
सायाः प्रमाणाभासाः, संशयादिलक्षणाभावे संशयाद्याभासाः, प्रत्यक्ष-
लक्षणाभावे प्रत्यक्षाभासम्, परोक्षान्तर्गतानां स्मृत्यादीनां स्वस्वलक्षणा-
भावे तत्तदाभासतेत्यादि । एवं हेतूनामपि स्वलक्षणाभावे हेत्वाभासता
सुज्ञानैव । केवलं हेत्वाभासानां सङ्ख्यानियमः प्रतिव्यक्तियुक्तं लक्षणं
च नेषत्करप्रतिपत्तीति तल्लक्षणार्थमाह —

असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकास्त्रयो हेत्वाभासाः ॥ १६ ॥

३५. अहेतवो हेतुवदाभासमानाः 'हेत्वाभासाः' असिद्धादयः ।
यद्यपि साधनदोषा एवैते अदुष्टे साधने तदभावात् तथापि साधनाभि-
धायके हेतावुपचारात् पूर्वाचार्यैरभिहितास्तत्तत्प्रसिद्धिबाधमनाश्रयद्वि-
रस्माभिरपि हेतुदोषत्वेनैवोच्यन्ते इति ।

३६. 'त्रयः' इति सङ्ख्यान्तरव्यवच्छेदार्थम् । तेन कालातीत-प्रक-
रण-समयोर्व्यवच्छेदः । तत्र कालातीतस्य पक्षदोषेऽप्यन्तर्भावः । 'प्रत्यक्षा-
गमबाधितकर्मनिर्देशानन्तरप्रयुक्तः कालात्ययापादयः' इति हि तस्य लक्षण-
मिति, यथा अनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवो कृतकत्वाद् घटवदिति । प्रकरणसमस्तु
न सम्भवत्येव, नह्यस्ति सम्भवो यथोक्तलक्षणेऽनुमाने प्रयुक्तेऽदूषिते
वाऽनुमानान्तरस्य । यत्तूदाहरणम्- अन्तयः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्य-
तरत्वात् इत्येकेनोक्ते द्वितीय आह—अन्तयः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतर-
त्वादिति । तदतीवासाम्प्रतम् । को हि चतुरङ्गसभायां वादी प्रतिवादी
वैवविधमसम्बद्धमनुमत्तोऽभिधीतेति ? ॥ १६ ॥

३७. तत्रासिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह—

नासन्ननिश्चितसत्त्वो वाऽन्यथानुपपन्न इति सत्त्वस्यासिद्धौ

सन्देहे वाऽसिद्धः ॥ १७ ॥

३८. 'असन्' अविद्यमानो 'नान्यथानुपपन्नः' इति सत्त्वस्यासिद्धौ
'असिद्धः' हेत्वाभासः स्वरूपासिद्ध इत्यर्थः । यथा अन्तयः शब्दश्चा-
क्षुषत्वादिति । अपक्षधर्मत्वादयमसिद्ध इति न मन्तव्यमित्याह 'नान्य-
थानुपपन्नः' इति । अन्यथानुपपत्तिरूपदेतुल्लक्षणविरहादयमसिद्धो नाप-

क्षधर्मत्वात् । नहि पक्षधर्मत्वं हेतुर्लक्षणं तदभावेऽप्यन्यथानुपपत्तिबला-
द्धेतुत्वोपपत्तेरित्युक्तप्रायम् । भट्टोऽप्याह—

“पित्रोश्च ब्राह्मणत्वेन पुत्रब्राह्मणतानुमा ।

सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धा न पक्षधर्ममपेक्षते ॥”

इति ।

३९. तथा ‘अनिश्चितसत्त्वः’ सन्दिग्धसत्त्वः ‘नान्यथानुपपन्नः’ इति
सत्त्वस्य सन्देहेऽप्यसिद्धो हेत्वाभासः सन्दिग्धासिद्ध इत्यर्थः । यथा
वाष्पादिभावेन सन्दिह्यमाना धूमलताग्निसिद्धावुपदिश्यमाना, यथा
चात्मनः सिद्धावपि सवंगतत्वे साध्ये सर्वत्रोपलभ्यमानगुणत्वम्, प्रमाणा-
भावादिति ॥ १७ ॥

४०. असिद्धप्रभेदानाह—

वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयभेदाच्चैतद्भेदः ॥ १८ ॥

४१. ‘वादी’ पूर्वपक्षस्थितः ‘प्रतिवादी’ उत्तरपक्षस्थितः उभयं द्वावेव
वादिप्रतिवादिनौ । तद्भेदादसिद्धस्य ‘भेदः’ । तत्र वाद्यसिद्धो यथा परि-
णामी शब्द उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् । अयं साङ्ख्यस्य स्वयं वादिनोऽसिद्धः, तन्मते
उत्पत्तिमत्त्वस्यानभ्युपेतत्वात्, नासदुत्पद्यते नापि सद्भिन्नश्चतुत्पादवि-
नाशयोराविर्भावतिरोभावरूपत्वादिति तत्सिद्धान्तात् । चेतनास्तरवः सर्व-
त्वगपहरणे मरणात् । अत्र मरणं विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुनिरोधलक्षणं तरुषु बौद्धस्य
प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धम् । उभयासिद्धस्त्वाक्षुषत्वमुक्तमेव । एवं सन्दिग्धा-
सिद्धोऽपि वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयभेदात् त्रिविधो बोद्धव्यः ॥ १८ ॥

४२. नन्वन्येऽपि विशेष्यासिद्धादयो हेत्वाभासाः कैश्चिद्विध्यन्ते
ते कस्मान्नोक्ता इत्याह—

विशेष्यासिद्धादीनामेष्वेवान्तर्भावः ॥ १९ ॥

४३. ‘एष्वेव’ वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयासिद्धेष्वेव । तत्र विशेष्यासिद्धादय
उदाह्रियन्ते । विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा अनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति
चाक्षुषत्वात् । विशेषणासिद्धो यथा अनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति
सामान्यविशेषवत्त्वात् । भागासिद्धो यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्त-
रीयकत्वात् । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा अस्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् ।
आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा नित्यः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराः अकृतकत्वात् । व्यर्थ-

विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् ।
 व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथा अनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति कृतकत्वात् ।
 सन्दिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः पुरुषत्वे सत्य-
 द्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानत्वात् । सन्दिग्धविशेषणासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागा-
 दियुक्तः कपिलः सर्वदा तत्त्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुषत्वादित्यादि । एतेऽ-
 सिद्धभेदा यदान्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदावाद्यसिद्धाः प्रतिवाद्य-
 सिद्धा वा भवन्ति । यदोभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदोभयासिद्धा
 भवन्ति ॥ १९ ॥

४४. निरुद्धस्य लक्षणमाह—

विपरीतनियमोऽन्यथैवोपपद्यमानो विरुद्धः ॥ २० ॥

४५. 'विपरीतः' यथोक्ताद्विपर्यस्तो 'नियमः' अविनाभावो यस्य स
 तथा, तस्यैवोपदर्शनम् 'अन्यथैवोपपद्यमानः' इति । यथा नित्यः शब्दः
 कार्यत्वात्, परार्थाश्चक्षुरादयः सङ्घातत्वाच्छयनाशनाद्यङ्गवदित्यत्रासंहत-
 पारार्थ्ये साध्ये चक्षुरादीनां संहतत्वं विरुद्धम् । बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं क्षित्यादि
 कार्यत्वादित्यत्राशरीरसर्वज्ञकर्तृपूर्वकत्वे साध्ये कार्यत्वं विरुद्धसाधना-
 द्विरुद्धम् ।

४६. अनेन येऽन्यैरन्ये विरुद्धा उदाहृतास्तेऽपि सङ्गृहीताः । यथा
 सति सपक्षे चत्वारो भेदाः । पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्यः शब्दः कार्य-
 त्वात् । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे-
 सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा
 अनित्या पृथ्वी कृतकत्वात् । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रय-
 त्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः । पक्षविपक्षव्यापको
 यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेश-
 वृत्तिर्यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दो बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । पक्षैकदेशवृत्ति-
 र्विपक्षव्यापको यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दोऽपदात्मकत्वात् । पक्ष-
 विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् ।
 एषु च चतुर्षु विरुद्धता, पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिषु चतुर्षु पुनरसिद्धता विरुद्धता
 चेत्युभयसमावेश इति ॥ २० ॥

४७. अनैकान्तिकस्य लक्षणमाह—

नियमस्यासिद्धौ सन्देहे वाऽन्यथाप्युपपद्यमा—

नोऽनैकान्तिकः ॥ २१ ॥

४८. 'नियमः' अविनाभावस्तस्य 'असिद्धौ' 'अनैकान्तिकः' यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात्, प्रमेयत्वं नित्येऽप्याकाशादावस्तीति । सन्देहे यथा असर्वज्ञः कश्चिद् रागादिमान् वा वक्तृत्वात् । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां हि सर्वज्ञत्ववीतरागत्वाभ्यां न वक्तृत्वस्य विरोधः सिद्धः, न च रागादि-कार्यं वचनमिति सन्दिग्धोऽन्वयः । ये चान्येऽन्यैरनैकान्तिकभेदा उदा-हृतास्त उत्तलक्षण एवान्तर्भवन्ति । पक्षत्रयव्यापको यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा गौरयं विषाणित्वात् । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नायं गौः विषाणित्वात् । पक्ष-व्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । पक्षै-कदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथा न द्रव्याण्याकाशकालदिगात्मम-नांसि क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् । पक्षविषक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापी यथा न द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांसि अमूर्तत्वात् । पक्षसपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति-र्विपक्षव्यापी यथा द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांसि अमूर्तत्वात् । पक्षत्रयैकदेशः वृत्तिर्यथा अनित्या पृथ्वी प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति ॥ २१ ॥

४९. उदाहरणदोषानाह—

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामष्टावष्टौ दृष्टान्ताभासाः ॥ २२ ॥

५०. परार्थानुमानप्रस्तावादुदाहरणदोषा एवैते दृष्टान्तप्रभवत्वात् तु दृष्टान्तदोषा इत्युच्यन्ते । दृष्टान्तस्य च साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभेदेन द्विविध-त्वात् प्रत्येकम् 'अष्टावष्टौ' दृष्टान्तवदाभासमानाः 'दृष्टान्ताभासाः' भवन्ति ॥ २२ ॥

५१. तानेवोदाहरति विभजति च—

अमूर्तत्वेन नित्ये शब्दे साध्ये कर्म-परमाणु-घटाः

साध्यसाधनोभयविकलाः ॥ २३ ॥

५२. नित्यः शब्दः अमूर्तत्वादित्यस्मिन् प्रयोगे कर्मादयो यथा-सङ्ख्यं साध्यादिविकलाः । तत्र कर्मवदिति साध्यविकलः, अनित्यत्वात् कर्मणः । परमाणुवदिति साधनविकलः, मूर्तत्वात् परमाणूनाम् । घटवदिति साध्यसाधनोभयविकलः, अनित्यत्वान्मूर्तत्वाच्च घटस्येति । इति त्रयः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभासाः ॥ २३ ॥

वैधर्म्येण परमाणुकर्माकाशाः साध्याद्यव्यतिरेकिणः ॥ २४ ॥

५३. नित्यः शब्दः अमूर्तत्वादित्यस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे 'परमाणुकर्माकाशाः' साध्यसाधनोभयाव्यतिरेकिणो दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति । यन्नित्यं न भवति तदमूर्तमपि न भवति यथा परमाणुरिति साध्याव्यतिरेकी, नित्यत्वात् परमाणूनाम् । यथा कर्मेति साधनाव्यावृत्तः, अमूर्तत्वात् कर्मणः । यथाकाशमित्युभयाव्यावृत्तः, नित्यत्वादमूर्तत्वाच्चाकाशस्येति त्रय एव वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभासाः ॥ २४ ॥

५४. तथा—

वचनाद्रागे रागान्मरणधर्मकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोः सन्दिग्धसाध्याद्य-
न्यव्यतिरेका रथ्यापुरुषादयः ॥ २५ ॥

५५. सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनोभयान्वयाः सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनोभय-
व्यतिरेकाश्च त्रयस्त्रयो दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति । के इत्याह -- 'रथ्या-
पुरुषादयः' । कस्मिन् साध्ये ? 'रागे' 'मरणधर्मकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोः' च ।
कस्मादित्याह—'वचनात्' 'रागात्' च । तत्र सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मान्वयो
यथा विवक्षितः पुरुषविशेषो रागी वचनाद् रथ्यापुरुषवत् । सन्दिग्ध-
साधनधर्मान्वयो यथा मरणधर्माऽयं रागात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् । सन्दिग्धो-
भयधर्मान्वयो यथा किञ्चिज्ज्ञोऽयं रागात् रथ्यापुरुषवर्द्धित । एषु पर-
चेतोवृत्तीनां दुरधिगमैत्वेन साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते रथ्यापुरुषे रागकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोः
सत्त्वं सन्दिग्धम् । तथा सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेको यथा रागी वचनात्
रथ्यापुरुषवत् । सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा मरणधर्माऽयं रागात्
रथ्यापुरुषवत् । सन्दिग्धोभयव्यतिरेको यथा किञ्चिज्ज्ञोऽयं रागात्
रथ्यापुरुषवत् । एषु पूर्ववत् परचेतोवृत्तेर्दुरन्त्यत्वाद्द्वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते रथ्या-
पुरुषे रागकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोरसत्त्वं सन्दिग्धमिति ॥ २५ ॥

५६. तथा—

विपरीतान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥ २६ ॥

५७. 'विपरीतान्वयः' 'विपरीतव्यतिरेकः' च दृष्टान्ताभासौ भवतः ।
तत्र विपरीतान्वयो यथा यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमिति वक्तव्ये यदनित्यं तत्
कृतकं यथा घट इत्याह । विपरीतव्यतिरेको यथा अनित्यत्वाभावे न
भवत्येव कृतकत्वमिति वक्तव्ये कृतकत्वाभावे न भवत्येवानित्यत्वं यथा-
काश इत्याह । साधनधर्मानुवादेन साध्यधर्मस्य विधानमित्यन्वयः । साध्य-

धर्मव्यावृत्त्यनुवादेन साधनधर्मव्यावृत्तिविधानमिति व्यतिरेकः । तयोर-
न्यथाभावे विपरीतत्वम् । यदाह—

“साध्यानुवादाल्लिङ्गस्य विपरीतान्वयो विधिः ।

हेत्वभावे त्वसत्साध्यं व्यतिरेकविपर्यये ॥”

इति ॥ २६ ॥

अप्रदर्शितान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥ २७ ॥

५८. ‘अप्रदर्शितान्वयः’ ‘अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकः’ च दृष्टान्ताभासौ ।
एतौ च प्रमाणस्यानुपदर्शनाद्भवतो न तु वीप्सासर्वावधारणपदानामप्रयो-
गात्; सत्स्वपि तेष्वसति प्रमाणे तयोरसिद्धेरिति । साध्यविकलसाधन-
विकलेभ्यविकलाः, सन्दिग्धसाध्यान्वयसन्दिग्धसाधनान्वयसन्दिग्धो-
भयान्वयाः, विपरीतान्वयः, अप्रदर्शितान्वयश्चेत्यष्टौ साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ता-
भासाः । साध्याव्यावृत्तसाधनाव्यावृत्तोभयाव्यावृत्ताः, सन्दिग्धसाध्य-
व्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धसाधनव्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धोभयव्यावृत्तयः, विपरीतव्यति-
रेकः, अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकश्चेत्यष्टावेव वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति ।

५९. नन्वनन्वयाव्यतिरेकावपि कैश्चिद् दृष्टान्ताभासावुक्तौ, यथा
रागादिमानयं वचनात् । अत्र साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते आत्मनि रागवचनयोः
सत्यपि साहित्ये, वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते चोपलखण्डे सत्यामपि सह निवृत्तौ
प्रतिबन्धाभावेनान्वयव्यतिरेकयोरभाव इत्यनन्वयाव्यतिरेकौ । तौ कस्मा-
दिह नोक्तौ ? उच्यते—ताभ्यां पूर्वे न भिद्यन्त इति साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां
प्रत्येकमष्टावेव दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति । यदाहुः—

“लिङ्गस्यानन्वया अष्टावष्टावव्यतिरेकिणः ।

नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं कथंचित् ख्यापयन्त्यमी ॥”

इति ॥ २७ ॥

६०. अवसितं परार्थानुमानमिदानीं तन्नान्तरीयकं दूषणं लक्षयति—

साधनदोषोद्भावनं दूषणम् ॥ २८ ॥

६१. ‘साधनस्य’ परार्थानुमानस्य ये असिद्धविरुद्धादयो ‘दोषाः’
पूर्वमुक्तास्तेषामुद्भाव्यते प्रकाश्यतेऽनेनेति ‘उद्भावनम्’ साधनदोषोद्भावकं
वचनं ‘दूषणम्’ । उत्तरत्राभूतग्रहणादिह भूतदोषोद्भावना दूषणेति
सिद्धम् ॥ २८ ॥

६२. दूषणलक्षणे दूषणाभासलक्षणं सुज्ञानमेव भेदप्रतिपादनार्थं तु तल्लक्षणमाह—

अभूतदोषोद्भावनानि दूषणाभासा जात्युत्तराणि ॥ २९ ॥

६३. अविद्यमानानां साधनदोषाणां प्रतिपादनान्यदूषणान्यपि दूषण-
वदाभासमानानि 'दूषणाभासाः' । तानि च 'जात्युत्तराणि' । जाति-
शब्दः सादृश्यवचनः । उत्तरसदृशानि जात्युत्तराणि उत्तरस्थानप्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
उत्तरसदृशानि जात्युत्तराणि । जात्या सादृश्येनोत्तराणि जात्युत्तराणि ।
तानि च सम्यग्घेतौ हेत्वाभासे वा वादिना प्रयुक्ते झटिति तद्दोषतत्त्वा-
प्रतिभासे हेतुप्रतिबिम्बनप्रायाणि प्रत्यवस्थानान्यनन्तत्वात्पसरिङ्ख्यां न
शक्यन्ते, तथाप्यक्षपाददर्शितदिशा साधर्म्यादिप्रत्यवस्थानभेदेन साधर्म्य-
वैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिवृष्टान्तानु-
त्पत्तिरसंशयप्रकरणाद्देवार्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यान्त्य-
कार्यसमरूपतया चतुर्विंशतिरूपदर्शयेन्ते ।

६४. तत्र साधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानं साधर्म्यसमा जातिः । यथा अनित्यः
शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवदिति प्रयोगे कृते साधर्म्यप्रयोगेणैव प्रत्यवस्थानम-
नित्यः शब्दो निरवयवत्वादाकाशवत् । न चास्ति विशेषहेतुर्घटसाधर्म्यात्
कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो न पुनराकाशसाधर्म्यान्निरवयवत्वान्नित्य इति १ ।
वैधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानं वैधर्म्यसमा जातिः । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वा-
दित्यत्रैव प्रयोगे स एव प्रतिहेतुवैधर्म्येण प्रयुज्यते—नित्यः शब्दो निर-
वयवत्वात् ; अनित्यं हि सावयवं दृष्टं घटादीति । न चास्ति विशेषहेतुर्घ-
टसाधर्म्यात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो न पुनस्तद्वैधर्म्यान्निरवयवत्वान्नित्य
इति २ । उत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानमुत्कर्षापकर्षसमे जाती । तत्रैव
प्रयोगे दृष्टान्तधर्मं कञ्चित् साध्यधर्मिण्यापादयन्नुत्कर्षसमां जातिं प्रयु-
ङ्क्ते—यदि घटवत् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो घटवदेव मूर्तोऽपि भवतु ।
न चेन्मूर्तो घटवदनित्योऽपि मा भूदिति शब्दे धर्मान्तरोत्कर्षमापादयति
३ । अपकर्षस्तु घटः कृतकः सन्नश्रावणो दृष्ट एव शब्दोऽप्यस्तु । नो चेद्
घटवदनित्योऽपि माभूदिति शब्दे श्रावणत्वधर्ममपकर्षतीति ४ । वर्ण्या-
वर्ण्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं वर्ण्यावर्ण्यसमे जाती । ख्यापनीयो वर्ण्यस्तद्विप-
रीतोऽवर्ण्यः । तावेतौ वर्ण्यावर्ण्याौ साध्यदृष्टान्तधर्मौ विपर्यस्यन् वर्ण्या-
वर्ण्यसमे जाती प्रयुङ्क्ते—यथाविधः शब्दधर्मः कृतकत्वादिनं तादृघटधर्मो
यादृघटधर्मो न तादृक् शब्दधर्म इति ५-६ । धर्मान्तरविकल्पेन प्रत्यव-

स्थानं विकल्पसमा जातिः । यथा कृतकं किञ्चिन्मृदु दृष्टं राङ्गवशय्यादि, किञ्चित्कठिनं कुठारादि, एवं कृतकं किञ्चिदनित्यं भविष्यति घटादि किञ्चिन्नित्यं शब्दादीति ७ । साध्यसाम्यापादनेन प्रत्यवस्थानं साध्यसमा जातिः । यथा—यदि यथा घटस्तथा शब्दः, प्राप्तं तर्हि यथा शब्दस्तथा घट इति । शब्दश्च साध्य इति घटोऽपि साध्यो भवतु । ततश्च न साध्यः साध्यस्य दृष्टान्तः स्यात् । न चेदेवं तथापि वैलक्षण्यात्सुतरामदृष्टान्त इति ८ । प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिविकल्पाभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमे जाती । यथा यदेतत् कृतकत्वं त्वया साधनमुपन्यस्तं तत्किं प्राप्य साध्यतयप्राप्य वा ? प्राप्य चेत् ; द्वयोर्विद्यमानयोरेव प्राप्तिर्भवति, न सदसत्तोरिति । द्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् किं कस्य साध्यं साधनं वा ? ९ अप्राप्य तु साधनत्वमयुक्तमतिप्रसङ्गादिति १० । अतिप्रसङ्गापादनेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रसङ्गसमा जातिः । यथा यद्यनित्यत्वे कृतकत्वं साधनं कृतकत्व इदानीं किं साधनम् ? तत्साधनेऽपि किं साधनमिति ११ । प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमा जातिः । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् घटवदित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह—यथा घटः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकोऽनित्यो दृष्ट एवं प्रतिदृष्टान्त आकाशं नित्यमपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकं दृष्टम्, कूपखनन-प्रयत्नानन्तरमुपलम्भादिति । न चेदमनैकान्तिकत्वेद्भावनम्, भङ्ग्यन्तरेण प्रत्यवस्थानात् १२ । अनुत्पत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमनुत्पत्तिसमा जातिः । यथा अनुत्पन्ने शब्दाख्ये धर्मिणि कृतकत्वं धर्मः क्व वर्तते ? तदेवं हेत्वभावाद-सिद्धिरनित्यत्वस्येति १३ । साधर्म्यसमा वैधर्म्यसमा वा या जातिः पूर्वमुदाहृता सैव संशयेनोपसंहियमाणा संशयसमा जातिर्भवति । यथा किं घटसाधर्म्यात् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्द उत तद्वैधर्म्यादाकाशसाधर्म्याद्वा निरवयवत्वान्नित्य इति ? १४ । द्वितीयपक्षोत्थापनबुद्ध्या प्रयुज्यमाना सैव साधर्म्यसमा वैधर्म्यसमा वा जातिः प्रकरणसमा भवति । तत्रैव अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवदिति प्रयोगे—नित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति उद्भावनप्रकारभेदमात्रे सति नानात्वं द्रष्टव्यम् १५ । त्रैकाल्यानुपत्त्या हेतोः प्रत्यवस्थानमहेतुसमा जातिः । यथा हेतुः साधनम् । तत् साध्यात्पूर्वं पश्चात् सह वा भवेत् ? यदि पूर्वम् ; असति साध्ये तत् कस्य साधनम् ? अथ पश्चात्साधनम्, पूर्वं तर्हि साध्यम्, तस्मिन् पूर्वसिद्धे किं साधनेन ? अथ युगपत्साध्यसाधने; तर्हि तयोः सव्येतरगो-विषाणयोरिव साध्यसाधनभाव एव न भवेदिति १६ । अर्थापत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमर्थापत्तिसमा जातिः । यद्यनित्यसाधर्म्यात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दः,

अर्थादापद्यते नित्यसाधर्म्यान्नित्य इति । अस्ति चास्य नित्येनाकाशादिना साधर्म्यं निरवयवत्वमित्युद्भावनप्रकारभेद एवायमिति १७ । अविशेषा-
पादनेन प्रत्यवस्थानमविशेषसमा जातिः । यथा यदि शब्दघटयोरेको
धर्मः कृतकत्वमिष्यते तर्हि समानधर्मयोगात्तयोरविशेषे तद्वदेव सर्व-
पदार्थानामविशेषः प्रसज्यत इति १८ । उपपत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमुपपत्तिसमा
जातिः । यथा यदि कृतकत्वोपपत्त्या शब्दस्यानित्यत्वम्; निरवयवत्वो-
पपत्त्या नित्यत्वमपि कस्मान्न भवति ? पक्षद्वयोपपत्त्याऽनध्यवसायपर्यव-
सानत्वं विवक्षितमित्युद्भावनप्रकारभेद एवायम् १९ । उपलब्ध्या प्रत्यव-
स्थानमुपलब्धिसमा जातिः । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वा-
दिति प्रयुक्ते प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—न खलु प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वमनित्यत्वे साध-
नम्; साधनं हि तदुच्यते येन विना न साध्यमुपलभ्यते । उपलभ्यते
च प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वेन विनाऽपि विद्युदादावनित्यत्वम् । शब्देऽपि
कचिद्वायुवेगभज्यमानवनस्पत्यादिजन्ये तथैवेति २० । अनुपलब्ध्या प्रत्यव-
स्थानमनुपलब्धिसमा जातिः । यथा तत्रैव प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वहेतावुपपन्न्यस्तं
सत्याह जातिवादी—न प्रयत्नकार्यः शब्दः प्रागुच्चारणादस्त्येवासावावरण-
योगात्तु नोपलभ्यते । आवरणानुपलम्भेऽप्यनुपलम्भभात्रास्त्येव शब्द इति
चेत्; न, आवरणानुपलम्भेऽप्यनुपलम्भसद्भावात् । आवरणानुपलब्धे-
श्चानुपलम्भादभावः । तदभावे चावरणोपलब्धेर्भावो भवति । ततश्च
सुदन्तरितमूलक्रीलेदकादिवदावरणोपलब्धिकृतमेव शब्दस्य प्रागुच्चारणाद-
ग्रहणमिति प्रयत्नकार्यत्वाभावाच्चित्यः शब्द इति २१ । साध्यधर्मनित्या-
नित्यत्वविकल्पेन शब्दनित्यत्वापादनं नित्यसमा जातिः । यथा अनित्यः
शब्द इति प्रतिज्ञाते जातिवादी विकल्पयति—येयमनित्यता शब्दस्योच्यते
सा किमनित्या नित्या वेति ? । यद्यनित्या; तदियमवश्यमपायिनीत्य-
नित्यताया अपायान्नित्यः शब्दः । अथानित्यता नित्यैव; तथापि धर्मस्य
नित्यत्वात्तस्य च निराश्रयस्थानुपपत्तेस्तदाश्रयभूतः शब्दोऽपि नित्यो
भवेत्, तदनित्यत्वे तद्धर्मनित्यत्वायोगादित्युभयथापि नित्यः शब्द इति
२२ । सर्वभावान्नित्यत्वोपपादनेन प्रत्यवस्थानमनित्यसमा जातिः । यथा
घटेन साधर्म्यमनित्येन शब्दस्यास्तीति तस्यानित्यत्वं यदि प्रतिपाद्यते,
तद् घटेन सर्वपदार्थानामस्त्येव किमपि साधर्म्यमिति तेषामप्यनित्यत्वं
स्यात् । अथ पदार्थान्तराणां तथा भावेऽपि नानित्यत्वम्; तर्हि शब्दस्यापि
तन्मा भूदिति । अनित्यत्वमात्रापादनपूर्वकविशेषोद्भावनाच्चाविशेषसमातो
भिन्नैयं जातिः २३ । प्रयत्नकार्यतात्त्विकोपपत्त्यासेन प्रत्यवस्थानं कार्यसमा

जातिः । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह—
प्रयत्नस्य द्वैरूप्यं दृष्टम्—किञ्चिदसदेव तेन जन्यते यथा घटादि,
किञ्चित्सदेवावरणव्युदासादिनाऽभिव्यज्यते यथा मृदन्तरितमूलक्रीलादि,
एवं प्रयत्नकार्यनानात्वादेव प्रयत्नेन शब्दो व्यज्यते जन्यते वेति संशय
इति । संशयापादनप्रकारभेदाच्च संशयसमातः कार्यसमा जाति-
भिद्यते २४ ।

६५. तदेवमुद्भावनविषयविकल्पभेदेन जातीनामानन्त्येऽप्यसङ्की-
र्णोदाहरणविवक्षया चतुर्विंशतिर्जातिभेदा एते दर्शिताः । प्रतिस्माधानं
तु सर्वजातीनामन्यथानुपपत्तिलक्षणानुमानलक्षणपरीक्षणमेव । न
ह्यविप्लुतलक्षणे हेतावेवंप्रायाः पांशुपाताः प्रभवन्ति । कृतकत्वप्रयत्ना-
नन्तरीयकत्वयोश्च दृढप्रतिबन्धत्वान्नावरणादिकृतं शब्दानुपलम्भनमपि
त्वनित्यत्वकृतमेव । जातिप्रयोगे च परेण कृते सम्यगुत्तरमेव वक्तव्यं न
प्रतीपं जात्युत्तरैरेव प्रत्यवस्थेयमासमञ्जस्य प्रसङ्गादिति ।

६६. छलमपि च सम्यगुत्तरत्वाभावाज्जात्युत्तरमेव । उक्तं ह्येतदु-
द्भावनप्रकारभेदेनानन्तानि जात्युत्तराणीति । तत्र परस्य ब्रूतोऽर्थविकल्पो-
पपादनेन वचनविधातश्छलम् । तत्त्रिधा वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुप-
चारच्छलं चेति । तत्र साधारणे शब्दे प्रयुक्ते वक्तुरभिप्रेतादर्थान्तर-
कल्पनया तन्निषेधो वाक्छलम् । यथा नवकम्बलोऽयं माणवक इति
नूतनविवक्षया कथिते परः सङ्ख्यामारोप्य निषेधति—कुतोऽस्य नव
कम्बला इति ? । सम्भावनयातिप्रसङ्गिनोऽपि सामान्यस्योपन्यासे
हेतुत्वारोपणेन तन्निषेधः सामान्यच्छलम् । यथा अहो नु खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणो
विद्याचरणसम्पन्न इति ब्राह्मणस्तुतिप्रसङ्गे कश्चिद्वदति—सम्भवति ब्राह्मणे
विद्याचरणसम्पदिति । तत् छलवादी ब्राह्मणत्वस्य हेतुतामारोप्य निरा-
कुर्वन्नभियुङ्क्तं—यदि ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसम्पद् भवति, ब्राह्मणेऽपि सा
भवेत् ब्राह्मणेऽपि ब्राह्मण एवेति । औपचारिके प्रयोगे मुख्यप्रतिषेधेन
प्रत्यवस्थानमुपचारच्छलम् । यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति उक्ते परः प्रत्यव-
तिष्ठते—कथमचेतनाः मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति मञ्चस्थास्तु पुरुषाः क्रोशन्तीति ।
तदत्र छलत्रयेऽपि वृद्धव्यवहारप्रसिद्धशब्दसामर्थ्यपरीक्षणमेव समाधानं
वेदितव्यमिति ॥२६॥

६७. साधनदूषणाद्यभिधानं च प्रायो वादे भवतीति वादस्य
लक्षणमाह—

तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थं प्राश्निकादिसमक्षं साधनदूषणवदनं वादः ॥३०॥

६८. स्वपक्षसिद्धये वादिनः 'साधनम्' तत्प्रतिषेधाय प्रतिवादिनो 'दूषणम्' । प्रतिवादिनोऽपि स्वपक्षसिद्धये 'साधनम्' तत्प्रतिषेधाय वादिनो 'दूषणम्' । तदेवं वादिनः साधनदूषणे प्रतिवादिनोऽपि साधनदूषणे द्वयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिभ्याम् 'वदनम्' अभिधानम् 'वादः' । कथमित्याह—'प्राश्निकादिसमक्षम्' । प्राश्निकाः सभ्याः—

“स्वसमयपरसमयज्ञाः कुलजाः पक्षद्वयेप्सिताः क्षमिणः ।

वादपथेऽवभियुक्तास्तुलासमाः प्राश्निकाः प्रोक्ताः ॥”

इत्येवंलक्षणाः । 'आदि' ग्रहणेन सभापतिवादिप्रतिवादिपरिग्रहः, सेयं चतुरङ्गा कथा, एकस्याप्यङ्गस्य वैकल्ये कथात्वानुपपत्तेः । नहि वर्णाश्रमपालनक्षमं न्यायान्यायव्यवस्थापकं पक्षपातरहितत्वेन समदृष्टि सभापतिं यथोक्तलक्षणांश्च प्राश्निकान् विना वादिप्रतिवादिनौ स्वाभिमतसाधनदूषणसरणिमाराधयितुं क्षमौ । नापि दुःशिक्षितकुतर्कलेशवाचालबालिशजनविप्लावितो गतानुगतिको जनः सन्मार्गं प्रतिपद्येतेति । तस्य फलमाह—'तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थम्' । 'तत्त्व' शब्देन तत्त्वनिश्चयः साधुजनहृदयविपरिवर्ति गृह्यते, तस्य रक्षणं दुर्विदग्धजनजनितविकल्पकल्पनात् इति ।

६९. ननु तत्त्वरक्षणं जल्पस्य वितण्डाया वा प्रयोजनम् । यदाह—'तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखापरिचरणवत्' (न्यायसू० ४.२.५०) इति; न, वादस्यापि निग्रहस्थानवत्त्वेन तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थत्वात् । न चास्य निग्रहस्थानवत्त्वमसिद्धम् । “प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः” (न्यायसू० १.२.१) इति वादलक्षणे सिद्धान्ताविरुद्ध इत्यनेनापसिद्धान्तस्य, पञ्चावयवोपपन्न इत्यनेन न्यूनाधिकयोर्हेत्वाभासपञ्चकस्य चेत्यष्टानां निग्रहस्थानानामनुज्ञानात्, तेषां च निग्रहस्थानान्तरोपलक्षणत्वात् । अत एव न जल्पवितण्डे कथे, वादस्यैव तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थत्वात् ।

७०. ननु “यथोक्तोपपन्नच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भोजल्पः” (न्या० १.२.२), “सप्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा” (न्या० १.२.३) इति लक्षणे भेदाज्जल्पवितण्डे अपि कथे विद्येते एव; न; प्रतिपक्षस्थापना-

हीनाया वितण्डायाः कथात्वायोगात् । वैतण्डिको हि स्वपक्षमभ्युपगम्या-
स्थापयन् यत्किञ्चिद्वादेन परपक्षमेव दूषयन् कथमवधेयवचनः ?
जल्पस्तु यद्यपि द्वयोरपि वादिप्रतिवादिनोः साधनोपालम्भसम्भावनाया
कथात्वं लभते तथापि न वादादर्थान्तरम्, वादेनैव चरितार्थत्वात् ।
छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानभूयस्त्वयोगादचरितार्थ इति चेत् ; न, छलजाति-
प्रयोगस्य दूषणाभासत्वेनाप्रयोज्यत्वात्, निग्रहस्थानानां च वादेऽप्य-
विरुद्धत्वात् । न खलु खटचपेटामुखबन्धादयोऽनुचिता निग्रहा जल्पेऽ-
प्युपयुज्यन्ते । उचितानां च निग्रहस्थानानां वादेऽपि न विरोधोऽस्ति ।
तन्न वादात् जल्पस्य कश्चिद् विशेषोऽस्ति । लाभपूजाख्यातिकामितादीनि
तु प्रयोजनानि तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणलक्षणप्रधानफलानुबन्धीनि पुरुषधर्म-
त्वाद्वादेऽपि न निवारयितुं पार्यन्ते ।

७१. ननु छलजातिप्रयोगोऽसदुत्तरत्वाद्वादे न भवति, जल्पे तु
तस्यानुज्ञानादास्त वादजल्पयोर्विशेषः । यदाह—

“दुःशिक्षितकुतर्कशिलेशवाचालिताननाः ।

शक्याः किमन्यथा जेतुं वितण्डाटोपपण्डिताः ॥

गतानुगतिको लोकः कुमार्यं तत्प्रतारितः ।

मा गादितिच्छलादीनि प्राह कारुणिको मुनिः ॥” इति ।

नैवम् । असदुत्तरैः परप्रतिक्षेपस्य कर्तुमयुक्तत्वात् ; न ह्यन्यायेन जयं
यशो धनं वा महात्मानः समीहन्ते । अथ प्रबलप्रतिवादिदर्शनात् तज्जये
धर्मध्वंससम्भावनात्, प्रतिभाक्षयेण सम्यगुत्तरस्याप्रतिभासादसदुत्तरैरपि
पांशुभिरिवावकिरन्नेकान्तपराजयाद्वरं सन्देह इति धिया न दोषमावह-
तीति चेत् ; न, अस्यापवादिकस्य जात्युत्तरप्रयोगस्य कथान्तरसमर्थन-
सामर्थ्याभावात् । वाद एव द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावानुसारेण यद्यसदुत्तरं
कथंचन प्रयुज्यति किमेतावता कथान्तरं प्रसज्येत ? तस्माज्जल्पवितण्डा-
निराकरणेन वाद एवैकः कथाप्रथां लभत इति स्थितम् ॥ ३० ॥

७२. वादश्च जयपराजयावसानो भवतीति जयपराजयोर्लक्षण-
माह—

स्वपक्षस्य सिद्धिर्जयः ॥ ३१ ॥

७३. वादिनः प्रतिवादिनो वा या स्वपक्षस्य सिद्धिः सा जयः । सा
च स्वपक्षसाधनदोषपरिहारेण, परपक्षसाधनदोषोद्भावनेन च भवति ।

‘स्वपक्षे साधनमब्रुवन्नपि प्रतिवादी वादिसाधनस्य विरुद्धतामुद्भावयन्
वादिनं जयति, विरुद्धतोद्भावनेनैव स्वपक्षे साधनस्योक्तत्वात् । यदाह—
“विरुद्धं हेतुमुद्भाव्य वादिनं जयतीतिरः” इति ॥ ३१ ॥

असिद्धिः पराजयः ॥ ३२ ॥

७४. वादिनः प्रतिवादिनो वा या स्वपक्षस्य ‘असिद्धिः’ सा
‘पराजयः’ । सा च साधनाभासाभिधानात्, सम्यक्साधनेऽपि वा परोक्त-
दूषणानुद्धरणाद्भवति ॥ ३२ ॥

७५. ननु यद्यसिद्धिः पराजयः, स तर्हि कीदृशो निग्रहः ? निग्रहान्ता
हि कथा भवतीत्याह—

स निग्रहो वादिप्रतिवादिनोः ॥ ३३ ॥

७६. ‘सः’ पराजय एव ‘वादिप्रतिवादिनोः’ निग्रहः’ न वधबन्धादिः ।
अथवा स एव स्वपक्षासिद्धिरूपः पराजयो निग्रहहेतुत्वान्निग्रहो नान्यो
यथाहुः परे—“विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम्” (न्यायसू०
१.२.१६) इति ॥ ३३ ॥

७७. तत्राह—

न विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्तिमात्रम् ॥ ३४ ॥

७८. विपरीता कुत्सिता विगर्हणीया प्रतिपत्तिः ‘विप्रतिपत्तिः’—
साधनाभासे साधनबुद्धिर्दूषणाभासे च दूषणबुद्धिः । अप्रतिपत्तिस्त्वार-
म्भविषयेऽनारम्भः । स च साधने दूषणं दूषणे चोद्धरणं तयोरकरणम्
‘अप्रतिपत्तिः’ । द्विधा हि वादी पराजीयते—यथाकर्तव्यमप्रतिपद्यमानो
विपरीतं वा प्रतिपद्यमान इति । विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्ती एव विप्रतिपत्त्य-
प्रतिपत्तिमात्रम् ‘न’ पराजयहेतुः किन्तु स्वपक्षस्यासिद्धिरेवेति । विप्रति-
पत्त्यप्रतिपत्त्योश्च निग्रहस्थानत्वनिरासात् तद्वेदानामपि निग्रहस्थानत्वं
निरस्तम् ।

७९. ते च द्वाविंशतिर्भवन्ति । तद्यथा—१ प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, २ प्रति-
ज्ञान्तरम्, ३ प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, ४ प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः, ५ हेत्वन्तरम्, ६ अर्था-
न्तरम्, ७ निरर्थकम्, ८ अविज्ञातार्थम्, ९ अपार्थक्यम्, १० अप्राप्तकालम्,
११ न्यूनम्, १२ अधिकम्, १३ पुनरुक्तम्, १४ अननुभाषणम्, १५
अज्ञानम्, १६ अप्रतिभा, १७ विक्षेपः, १८ मतानुज्ञा, १९ पर्यनुयोज्यो-

पेक्षणम्, २० निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, २१ अपसिद्धान्तः, २२ हेत्वाभासा-
श्चेति । अत्राननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विश्लेषः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणमित्य-
प्रतिपत्तिप्रकाराः । शेषा विप्रतिपत्तिभेदाः ।

८०. तत्र प्रतिज्ञाहानेर्लक्षणम्—“प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते
प्रतिज्ञाहानिः” (न्यायसू० ५.२.२) इति सूत्रम् । अस्य भाष्यकारीयं
व्याख्यानम्—साध्यधर्मप्रयत्नीकेन धर्मेण प्रत्यवस्थितः प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्म
स्वदृष्टान्तेऽनुज्ञानन् प्रतिज्ञां जहातीति प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । यथा अनित्यः
शब्दः ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद् घटवदित्युक्ते परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं
नित्यं दृष्टं कस्मान्न तथा शब्दोऽपीत्येवं स्वप्रयुक्तहेतोरामासतामवस्यन्नपि
कथावसानमकृत्वा प्रतिज्ञात्यागं करोति—यद्येन्द्रियकं सामान्यं नित्यम्,
कामं घटोऽपि नित्योऽस्त्विति । स खल्वयं साधनस्य दृष्टान्तस्य नित्यत्वं
प्रसजन् निगमनान्तमेव पक्षं जहाति । पक्षं च परित्यजन् प्रतिज्ञां जहाती-
त्युच्यते प्रतिज्ञाश्रयत्वात् पक्षस्येति” (न्यायभा० ५.२. २) । तदेतदसङ्गतमेव,
साक्षाद् दृष्टान्तहानिरूपत्वात् तस्याः तत्रैव धर्मपरित्यागात् । परम्परया
तु हेतूपनयनिगमनानामपि त्यागः, दृष्टान्तासाधुत्वे तेष्वाप्यसाधुत्वात् ।
तथा च प्रतिज्ञाहानिरेवेत्यसङ्गतमेव । वार्तिककारस्तु व्याचष्टे—“दृष्ट्या-
सावन्ते स्थितत्वादन्तश्चेति दृष्टान्तः पक्षः । स्वदृष्टान्तः स्वपक्षः ।
प्रतिदृष्टान्तः प्रतिपक्षः । प्रतिपक्षस्य धर्मं स्वपक्षेऽभ्यनुज्ञानन् प्रतिज्ञां
जहाति—यदि सामान्यमैन्द्रियकम् नित्यं शब्दोऽप्येवमस्त्विति” (न्यायवा०
५.२.२) । तदेतदपि व्याख्यानमसङ्गतम्, इत्थमेव प्रतिज्ञाहानेरवधार-
यितुमशक्यत्वात् । न खलु प्रतिपक्षस्य धर्मं स्वपक्षेऽभ्यनुज्ञानन् एव प्रतिज्ञा-
त्यागो येनायमेक एव प्रकारः प्रतिज्ञाहानौ स्यात्, अधिक्येपादिभिराकुली-
भावात् प्रकृत्या सभाभीरुत्वादभ्यनयनस्कत्वादेर्वा निमित्ता (त्) किञ्चित्
साध्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञाय तद्विपरीतं प्रतिज्ञानानस्याप्युपलम्भात् पुरुषभ्रान्तेर-
नेककारणकत्वोपपत्तेरिति १ ।

८१. प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे परेण कृते तत्रैव धर्मिणि धर्मान्तरं साधनी-
यमभिदधतः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । अनित्यः शब्दः
ऐन्द्रियकत्वादित्युक्ते तथैव सामान्येन व्यभिचारे नोदिते यदि ब्रूयात्—
युक्तं सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं नित्यं तद्धि सर्वगतमसर्वगतस्तु शब्द इति । सोऽयम्
‘अनित्यः शब्दः’ इति पूर्वप्रतिज्ञातः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ‘असर्वगतः शब्दः’
इति कुर्वन् प्रतिज्ञान्तरेण निगृहीतो भवति । एतदपि प्रतिज्ञाहानिवन्न

युक्तम्, तस्याप्यनेकनिमित्तत्वोपपत्तेः । प्रतिज्ञाहानितश्चास्य कथं भेदः, पक्षत्यागस्योभयत्राविशेषात् ? यथैव हि प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मस्य स्वदृष्टान्तेऽभ्यनुज्ञानात् पक्षत्यागस्तथा प्रतिज्ञान्तरादपि । यथा च स्वपक्षसिद्धयर्थं प्रतिज्ञान्तरं विधीयते तथा शब्दानित्यत्वसिद्धयर्थं भ्रान्तिवशात् 'तद्वृत्तद्वेऽपि नित्योऽस्तु' इत्यनुज्ञानम्, यथा चाभ्रान्तस्येदं विरुद्ध्यते तथा प्रतिज्ञान्तरमपि । निमित्तभेदाच्च तद्भेदे अनिष्टनिग्रहस्थानान्तराणामप्यनुषङ्गः स्यात् । तेषां च तत्रान्तर्भावे प्रतिज्ञान्तरस्यापि प्रतिज्ञाहानावन्तर्भावः स्यादिति २ ।

८२. "प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः" (न्यायसू० ५.२.४.) नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । यथा गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धेरिति । सोऽयं प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः—यदि गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं कथं रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिः ?, अथ रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिः कथं गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यमिति ?, तदयं प्रतिज्ञाविरुद्धाभिधानात् पराजीयते । तदेतदसङ्गतम् । यतो हेतुना प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रतिज्ञात्वे निरस्ते प्रकारान्तरतः प्रतिज्ञाहानिरेवेयमुक्ता स्यात्, हेतुदोषो वा विरुद्धतालक्षणः, न प्रतिज्ञादोष इति ३ ।

८३; पक्षसाधने परेण दूषिते तदुद्धरणाशक्त्या प्रतिज्ञामेव निवृत्तवानस्य प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः ऐन्द्रियकत्वादित्युक्ते तथैव सामान्येनानैकान्तिकतायामुद्धावितायां यदि ब्रूयान्त-क एवमाह—अनित्यः शब्द इति—स प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासात् पस्रजितो भवतीति । एतदपि प्रतिज्ञाहानितो न भिद्यते—हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वोपलम्भेनात्रापि प्रतिज्ञायाः परित्यागाविशेषात् ४ ।

८४. अविशेषाभिहिते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे तद्विशेषणमभिदधतो हेत्वन्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे तथैव सामान्यस्य व्यभिचारेण दूषिते—'जातिमत्त्वे सति' इत्यादिविशेषणमुपाददानो हेत्वन्तरेण निगृहीतो भवति । इदमप्यतिप्रसृतम्, यतोऽविशेषोक्ते दृष्टान्ते उपनये निगमने वा प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो दृष्टान्ताद्यन्तरमपि निग्रहस्थानान्तरमनुषज्येत, तत्राप्याक्षेपसमाधानानां समानत्वादिति ५ ।

८५. प्रकृतादर्थार्थान्तरं तदनौपयिकमभिदधतोऽर्थान्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः । कृतकत्वादिति हेतुः । हेतुरिति हिनोतेर्धातोस्तुप्रत्यये कृदन्तं पदम् । पदं च नामाख्यातनिपातोपसर्गा

इति प्रस्तुत्य नामादीनि व्याचक्षाणोऽर्थान्तरेण निगृह्यते । एतदप्यर्थान्तरं निग्रहस्थानं समर्थं साधने दृषणे वा प्रोक्ते निग्रहाय कल्पेत, असमर्थं वा ? । न तावत्समर्थं; स्वसाध्यं प्रसाध्य नृत्यतोऽपि दोषाभावाल्लोकवत् । असमर्थेऽपि प्रतिवादिनः पक्षसिद्धौ तत् निग्रहाय स्यादसिद्धौ वा ? प्रथमपक्षे तत्पक्षसिद्धेरेवास्य निग्रहो न त्वतो निग्रहस्थानात् । द्वितीयपक्षेऽप्यतो न निग्रहः, पक्षसिद्धेरुभयोरप्यभावादिति ६ ।

८६. अभिधेयरहितवर्णानुपूर्वीप्रयोगमात्रं निरर्थकं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः कचटतपानां गजडदबत्वात् घमढध-भवदिति । एतदपि सर्वथार्थशून्यत्वान्निग्रहाय कल्पेत, साध्यानुपयोगाद्वा ? तत्राद्यविकल्पोऽयुक्तः, सर्वथार्थशून्यशब्दस्यैवासम्भवात्, वर्णक्रमनिर्देशस्याप्यनुकार्येणार्थेनार्थवत्त्वोपपत्तेः । द्वितीयविकल्पे तु सर्वमेव निग्रहस्थानं निरर्थकं स्यात् साध्यसिद्धावनुपयोगित्वाविशेषात् । किञ्चिद्विशेषमात्रेण भेदे वा खात्कृत-हस्तास्फालन-कक्षापिट्टितादेरपि साध्यानुपयोगिनो निग्रहस्थानान्तरत्वानुपपन्न इति ७ ।

८७. यत् साधनवाक्यं दूषणवाक्यं वा त्रिरभिहितमपि परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां बोद्धुं न शक्यते तत् अविज्ञातार्थं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । अत्रेदमुच्यते—वादिना त्रिरभिहितमपि वाक्यं परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां मन्दमतित्वादविज्ञातम्, गूढाभिधानतो वा, द्रुतोच्चारणाद्वा ? प्रथमपक्षे सत्साधनवादिनोऽप्येतान्निग्रहस्थानं स्यात्, तत्राप्यनयोर्मन्दमतित्वेनाविज्ञातत्वसम्भवात् । द्वितीयपक्षे तु पत्रवाक्यप्रयोगेऽपि तत्प्रसङ्गः, गूढाभिधानतया परिषत्प्रतिवादिनोर्महाप्राज्ञयोरप्यविज्ञातत्वोपलम्भात् । अथाभ्यामविज्ञातमप्येतत् वादी व्याचष्टेः गूढोपन्यासमप्यात्मनः स एव व्याचष्टाम्, अव्याख्याने तु जयाभाव एवास्य, न पुनर्निग्रहः, परस्य पक्षसिद्धेरभावात् । द्रुतोच्चारणप्यनयोः कथञ्चित् ज्ञानं सम्भवत्येव सिद्धान्तद्वयवेदित्वात् । साध्यानुपयोगिनि तु वादिनः प्रलापमात्रे तयोरविज्ञानं नाविज्ञातार्थं वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवत् । ततो नेदमविज्ञातार्थं निरर्थकान्निवृत्त इति ८ ।

८८. पूर्वापरासङ्गतपदसमूहप्रयोगादप्रतिष्ठितवाक्यार्थमपार्थक्यं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । यथा दश दाडिमानि पडपूपा इत्यादि । एतदपि निरर्थकान्न भिद्यते । यथैव हि गजडदबत्वादौ वर्णानां नैरर्थक्यं तथात्र पदानामिति । यदि पुनः पदनैरर्थक्यं वर्णनैरर्थक्यादन्यत्वान्निग्रहस्थानान्तरं तर्हि वाक्यनैरर्थक्यस्याप्याभ्यामन्यत्वान्निग्रहस्थानान्तरत्वं स्यात्

पदवत्पौर्वापर्येणाऽप्रयुज्यमानानां वाक्यानामप्यनेकधोपलभ्यात्—

“शङ्खः कदल्यां कदली च भेर्यां तस्यां च भेर्यां सुमहद्विमानम् ।

तच्छङ्खभेरीकदलीविमानमुन्मत्तगङ्गप्रतिमं बभूव ॥”

इत्यादिवत् ।

८९. यदि पुनः पदनैरर्थक्यमेव वाक्यनैरर्थक्यं पदसमुदायात्म-
कत्वात् तस्य; तर्हि वर्णनैरर्थक्यमेव पदनैरर्थक्यं स्यात् वर्णसमुदायात्मक-
त्वात् तस्य । वर्णानां सर्वत्र निरर्थकत्वात् पदस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गश्चेत् ;
तर्हि पदस्यापि निरर्थकत्वात् तत्समुदायात्मनो वाक्यस्यापि नैरर्थक्या-
नुषङ्गः । पदस्यार्थवत्त्वेन (वत्त्वे च) पदार्थापेक्षया; [वर्णार्थापेक्षया]
वर्णस्यापि तदस्तु प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत्; न खलु प्रकृतिः केवला पदं
प्रत्ययो वा । नाप्यनयोरनर्थकत्वम् । अभिव्यक्तार्थाभावादनर्थकत्वे;
पदस्यापि तत् स्यात् । यथैव हि प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययेनाभिव्यज्यते प्रत्ययार्थश्च
प्रकृत्या तयोः केवलयोरप्रयोगात् तथा देवदत्तस्तिष्ठतीत्यादिप्रयोगेस्या-
द्यन्तपदार्थस्य त्याद्यन्त पदार्थस्य च स्याद्यन्तपदेनाभिव्यक्तेः केवलस्या-
प्रयोगः । पदान्तरापेक्षस्य पदस्य सार्थकत्वं प्रकृत्यपेक्षस्य प्रत्ययस्य तद-
पेक्षस्य च प्रकृत्यादिवर्णस्य समानमिति ९ ।

९०. प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनवचनक्रममुल्लङ्घ्यावयवविपर्या-
सेन प्रयुज्यमानमनुमानवाक्यमप्राप्तकालं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति,
स्वप्रतिपत्तिवत् परप्रतिपत्तेर्जनने परार्थानुमाने क्रमस्याप्यङ्गत्वात् । एतद-
प्यपेशलम्, प्रेक्षावतां प्रतिपत्तृणामवयवक्रमनियमं विनाप्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यु-
पलम्भात् । ननु यथापशब्दाच्छ्रुताच्छब्दस्मरणं ततोऽर्थप्रत्यय इति
शब्दादेवार्थप्रत्ययः परस्परया तथा प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवव्युत्क्रमात् तत्क्रमस्मरणं
ततो वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययो न पुनस्तद्व्युत्क्रमात्; इत्यप्यसारम्, एवंविध-
प्रतीत्यभावात् । यस्माद्धि शब्दादुच्चरितात् यत्रार्थे प्रतीतिः स एव तस्य
वाचको नान्यः, अन्यथा शब्दात्तत्क्रमाच्चापशब्दे तद्व्यतिक्रमे च स्मरणं
ततोऽर्थप्रतीतिरित्यपि वक्तुं शक्येत । एवं शब्दान्वाख्यानवैयर्थ्यमिति
चेत्; नैवम्, वादिनोऽनिष्टमात्रापादनात् अपशब्देऽपि चान्वाख्या-
नस्योपलम्भात् । संस्कृताच्छब्दोत्सत्यात् धर्मोऽन्यस्माद्धर्म इति नियमे
चान्यधर्माधर्मोपायानुष्ठानवैयर्थ्यं धर्माधर्मयोश्चाप्रतिनियमप्रसङ्गः, अधा-
र्मिके च धार्मिके च तच्छब्दोपलम्भात् । भवतु वा तत्क्रमादर्थप्रतीतिः

स्तथाप्यर्थप्रत्ययः क्रमेण स्थितो येन वाक्येन व्युत्क्रम्यते तन्निरर्थकं न त्वप्राप्तकालमिति १० ।

११. पञ्चावयवे वाक्ये प्रयोक्तव्ये तदन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन हीनं न्यूनं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति, साधनाभावे साध्यसिद्धेरभावात्, प्रतिज्ञादीनां च पञ्चानामपि साधनत्वात्; इत्यप्यसमीचीनम्, पञ्चावयवप्रयोगमन्तरेणापि साध्यसिद्धेरभिधानात् प्रतिज्ञाहेतुप्रयोगमन्तरेणैव तत्सिद्धेरभावात् । अतस्तद्धीनमेव न्यूनं निग्रहस्थानमिति ११ ।

१२. एकेनैव हेतुनोदाहरणेन वा प्रतिपादितेऽर्थे हेत्वन्तरमुदाहरणान्तरं वा वदतोऽधिकं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति निष्प्रयोजनाभिधानात् । एतदप्युक्तम्; तथाविधाद्वाक्यात् पक्षसिद्धौ पराजयायोगात् । कथं चैवं प्रमाणसंख्येऽभ्युपगम्यते ? अभ्युपगमे वाऽधिकनिग्रहाय जायेत । प्रतिपत्तिदार्ढ्यसंवादासिद्धिप्रयोजनसद्भावान्न निग्रहः; इत्यन्यत्रापि समानम्, हेतुनोदाहरणेन चै (वै) केन प्रसाधितेऽप्यर्थे द्वितीयस्य हेतोर्दाहरणस्य वा नानर्थक्यम्, तत्प्रयोजनसद्भावात् । न चैवमनवस्था, कस्य चित् क्वचिन्निराकाङ्क्षतोपपत्तेः प्रमाणान्तरवत् । कथं चास्य कृतकत्वादौ स्वार्थिककप्रत्ययस्य वचनम्, यत्कृतकं तदन्तित्यमिति व्याप्तौ यत्तद्वचनम्, वृत्तिपदप्रयोगादेव चार्थप्रतिपत्तौ वाक्यप्रयोगः अधिकत्वान्निग्रहस्थानं न स्यात् ? तथाविधस्याप्यस्य प्रतिपत्तिविशेषोपायत्वात्तन्नेति चेत्; कथमनेकस्य हेतोर्दाहरणस्य वा तदुपायभूतस्य वचनं निग्रहाधिकरणम् ? निरर्थकस्य तु वचनं निरर्थकत्वादेव निग्रहस्थानं नाधिकत्वादिति १२ ।

१३. शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवत्यन्यत्रानुवादात् । शब्दपुनरुक्तं नाम यत्र स एव शब्दः पुनरुक्तार्थेति । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः अनित्यः शब्द इति । अर्थपुनरुक्तं तु यत्र सोऽर्थः प्रथममन्येन शब्देनोक्तः पुनः पर्यायान्तरेणोच्यते । यथा अनित्यः शब्दो विनाशी ध्वनिरिति । अनुवादे तु पुनरुक्त्यमदोषो यथा—“हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम्” (न्यायसू० १.१.३६) इति । अत्रार्थपुनरुक्तमेवानुपपन्नं न शब्दपुनरुक्तम्, अर्थभेदेन शब्दसाम्येऽप्यस्यासम्भवात् यथा—

“हसति हसति स्वामिन्युच्चैरुदत्यतिरोदिति,
कृतपरिकरं स्वेदोद्गारि प्रधावति धावति ।

गुणसमुदितं दोषापेतं प्रणिन्दति निन्दति,
घनलवपरिक्रीतं यन्त्रं प्रनृत्यति नृत्यति ॥”

(वादन्यायः पृ० १११)

इत्यादि । ततः स्पष्टार्थवाचकैस्तैरेवान्यैर्वा शब्दैः सभ्याः प्रति-
पादनीयाः । तदप्रतिपादकशब्दानां तु सङ्कृत् पुनः पुनर्वाभिधानं निरर्थकं
न तु पुनरुक्तमिति । यदपि अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्त-
मुक्तं यथा असत्सु मेघेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीत्युक्ते अर्थादापद्यते सत्सु भवतीति
तत् कण्ठेन कथ्यमानं पुनरुक्तं भवति, अर्थगत्यर्थे हि शब्दप्रयोगे
प्रतीतेऽर्थे किं तेनेति ? एतदपि प्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन वैयर्थ्या-
न्निग्रहस्थानं नान्यथा । तथा चेदं निरर्थकान्न विशिष्येतेति १३ ।

९४. पर्षदा विदितस्य वादिना त्रिरभिहितस्यापि यदप्रत्युच्चारणं
तदननुभाषणं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति, अप्रत्युच्चारयत् (न्) किमाश्रयं
दूषणमभिदधतीति (०दधीतेति) । अत्रापि किं सर्वस्य वादिनोक्तस्या-
ननुभाषणम् उत यन्नान्तरीयिका साध्यसिद्धिस्तस्येति ? । तत्राद्यः
पक्षोऽयुक्तः, परोक्तमशेषमप्रत्युच्चारयतोऽपि दूषणवचनाव्याघातात् ।
यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्त्वादित्युक्ते—सत्त्वादित्ययं हेतुर्विरुद्ध इति
हेतुमेवोच्चार्य विरुद्धतोद्भाव्यते—क्षणक्षयाद्येकान्ते सर्वार्थक्रियाविरो-
धात् सत्त्वानुपपत्तिरिति च समर्थ्यते । तावता च परोक्तहेतोर्दूषणादि-
मन्योच्चारणेन ? अतो यन्नान्तरीयिका साध्यसिद्धिस्तस्यैवाप्रत्युच्चारणमननु-
भाषणं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अथैवं दूषयितुमसमर्थः शास्त्रार्थपरिज्ञानविशेष-
विकलत्वात्; तदायमुत्तराप्रतिपत्तेरेव तिरस्कियते न पुनरननुभाषणा
दिति १४ ।

९५. पर्षदा विज्ञातस्यापि वादिवाक्यार्थस्य प्रतिवादिनो यदज्ञानं
तदज्ञानं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । अविदितोत्तरविषयो हि कोत्तरं
ब्रूयात् ? न चाननुभाषणमेवेदम्, ज्ञातेऽपि वस्तुन्यनुभाषणासामर्थ्यदर्श-
नात् । एतदप्यसाम्प्रतम्, प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादिनिग्रहस्थानानां भेदाभावानु-
षङ्गात्, तत्राप्यज्ञानस्यैव सम्भवात् । तेषां तत्प्रभेदत्वे वा निग्रहस्थान-
प्रतिनियमाभावप्रसङ्गः, परोक्तस्याऽर्थाऽज्ञानादिभेदेन निग्रहस्थानानेकत्व-
प्रसङ्गात् १५ ।

९६. परपक्षे गृहीतेऽप्यनुभाषितेऽपि तस्मिन्नुत्तराप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा
नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । एषाप्यज्ञानान्न भिद्यते १६ ।

६७. “कार्यव्यासङ्गात् कथाविच्छेनो विक्षेपः” (न्यायसू० ५.२.१६) नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । सिषाधयिषितस्यार्थस्याशक्यसाधनतामवसाय कथां विच्छिन्नन्ति—‘इदं मे करणीयं परिहीयते, पीनसेन कण्ठ उपरुद्धः’ इत्याद्यभिधाय कथां विच्छिन्नन्दन् विक्षेपेण पराजीयते । एतदप्यज्ञानतो नार्थान्तरमिति १७ ।

६८. स्वपक्षे परापादितदोषमनुद्धृत्य तमेव परपक्षे प्रतीपमापादयतो मतानुज्ञा नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति चौरो भवान् पुरुषत्वात् प्रसिद्धचौर-वदित्युक्ते—भवानपि चौरः पुरुषत्वादिति ब्रुवन्नात्मनः परापादितं चौरत्वदोषमभ्युपगतवान् भवतीति मतानुज्ञया निगृह्यते । इदमप्यज्ञानान्न भिद्यते । अनैकान्तिकता वात्र हेताः; स ह्यात्मीयहेतोरात्मनैवानैकान्तिकतां दृष्ट्वा प्राह—भवत्पक्षेऽप्ययं दोषः समानस्त्वमपि पुरुषोऽसीत्यनैकान्तिक-त्वमेवोद्भावयतीति १८ ।

६९. निग्रहप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निग्रहोपपत्त्यावश्यं नोदनीय. ‘इदं ते निग्रह-स्थानमुपनतमतो निगृहीतोऽसि’ इत्येवं वचनीयस्तमुपेक्ष्य न निगृह्णाति यः स पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणेन निगृह्यते । एतच्च ‘कस्य निग्रहः’ इत्यनुक्त्या परिषदोद्भावनीयं न त्वसावात्मनो दाषं विवृणुयात् ‘अहं निग्राह्यस्त्वयो-पेक्षितः’ इति । एतदप्यज्ञानान्न भिद्यते १९ ।

१००. अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानानुयोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः” (न्यायसू० ५.२.२२) नामनिग्रहस्थानं भवति । उपपन्नवादिनमप्रमादिनम-निग्रहाहमपि ‘निगृहीतोऽसि’ इति यो ब्रूयात्स एवाभूतदोषोद्भावनान्नि-गृह्यते । एतदपि नाज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिच्यते २० ।

१०१. “सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽसिद्धान्तः” (न्यायसू० ५.२.२३) नामनिग्रहस्थानं भवति । यः प्रथमं कञ्चित् सिद्धान्तमभ्युप-गम्य कथामुपक्रमते । तत्र च सिषाधयिषितार्थसाधनाय परोपलम्भाय वा सिद्धान्तविरुद्धमभिधत्ते सोऽपसिद्धान्तेन निगृह्यते । एतदपि प्रति-वादिनः प्रतिपक्षसाधने सत्येव निग्रहस्थानं नान्यथेति २१ ।

१०२. “हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः” (न्यायसू० ५.२.२४) असिद्धवि-रुद्धादयो निग्रहस्थानम् । अत्रापि विरुद्धहेतुद्भावनेन ऽतिपक्षसिद्धे निग्रहा-धिकरणत्वं युक्तम्, असिद्धाद्युद्भावने तु प्रतिवादिना प्रतिपक्षसाधने कृते तद्युक्तं नान्यथेति २२॥३४॥

१०३. तदेवमक्षपादोपदिष्टं पराजयाधिकरणं परीक्ष्य सौगतागमितं तत् परीक्ष्यते—

तस्याश्चानभिधाने क हेतुः साध्यं वा वर्तते ? गम्यमाने प्रतिज्ञाविषय एवेति चेत् ; तर्हि गम्यमानस्यैव हेतोरपि समर्थनं स्यान्न तूक्तस्य । अथ गम्यमानस्यापि हेतोर्मन्दमतिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं वचनम् ; तथा प्रतिज्ञावचने कोऽपरितोषः ? ।

१०७. यच्चेदमसाधनाङ्गमित्यस्य व्याख्यानान्तरम्—साधर्म्येण हेतोर्वचने वैधर्म्यवचनम्, वैधर्म्येण च प्रयोगे साधर्म्यवचनं गम्यमानत्वात् पुनरुक्तमतो न साधनाङ्गम् ; इत्यप्यसाम्प्रतम्, यतः सम्यक्साधनसामर्थ्येन स्वपक्षं साधयतो वादिनो निग्रहः स्यात्, असाधयतो वा ? । प्रथमपक्षे न साध्यसिद्धयप्रतिबन्धिवचनाधिक्योपालम्भमात्रेणास्य निग्रहः, अविरोधात् । नन्वेवं नाटकादिघोषणतोऽप्यस्य निग्रहो न स्यात्, सत्यमेतत् ; स्वसाध्यं प्रसाध्य नृत्यतोऽपि दोषाभावाल्लोकवत् अन्यथा ताम्बूलभक्षणभ्रूक्षेप-खाट्कृत-हस्तास्फालनादिभ्योऽपि सत्यसाधनवादिनोऽपि निग्रहः, स्यात् । अथ स्वपक्षमप्रसाधयतोऽस्य ततो निग्रहः, नन्वत्रापि किं प्रतिवादिना स्वपक्षे साधिते वादिनो वचनाधिक्योपालम्भो निग्रहो लक्ष्येत, असाधिते वा ? । प्रथमपक्षे स्वपक्षसिद्धयैवास्य निग्रहाद्वचनाधिक्योद्भावनमनर्थकम्, तस्मिन् सत्यपि पक्षसिद्धिमन्तरेण जयायोगात् । द्वितीयपक्षे तु युगपद्वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पराजयप्रसङ्गो जयप्रसङ्गो वा स्यात्, स्वपक्षसिद्धेरभावाविशेषात् ।

१०८. ननु न स्वपक्षसिद्धयसिद्धिनिबन्धनौ जयपराजयौ, तयोर्ज्ञानाज्ञाननिबन्धनत्वात् । साधनवा दना हि साधुसाधनं ज्ञात्वा वक्तव्यम्, दूषणवादिना च दूषणम् । तत्र साधर्म्यवचनाद्वैधर्म्यवचनाद्वाऽर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तौ तदुभयवचने वादिनः प्रतिवादिना सभायामसाधनाङ्गवचनस्योद्भावेनात् साधुसाधनाज्ञानसिद्धेः पराजयः । प्रतिवादिनस्तु तद्दूषणज्ञाननिर्णयाज्जयः स्यात् ; इत्यप्यविचारितरमणीयम्, यतः स प्रतिवादी सत्साधनवादिन साधनाभासवादिनो वा वचनाधिक्यदोषमुद्भावयेत् ? । तत्राप्यपक्षे वादिनः कथं साधुसाधनाज्ञानम्, तद्वचनेयत्ताज्ञानस्यैवाभावात् ? द्वितीयपक्षे तु न प्रतिवादिनो दूषणज्ञानमवतिष्ठते साधनाभासस्यानुद्भावेनात् । तद्वचनाधिक्यदोषस्य ज्ञानात् दूषणज्ञोऽसाविति चेत् ; साधनाभासाज्ञानाददूषणज्ञोऽपीति नैकान्ततो वादिनं जयेत्, तददोषोद्भावनलक्षणस्य पराजयस्यापि निवारयितुमशक्तेः । अथ वचनाधिक्यदोषोद्भावेनादेव प्रतिवादिनो जयसिद्धौ साधनाभासोद्भावनमनर्थकम् ; नन्वेवं साधनाभासानुद्भावेनात्तस्य पराजय-

सिद्धौ वचनाधिक्योद्भावनं कथं जयाय प्रकल्पेत ? अथवचनाधिक्यं साधनाभासं बोद्धावयतः प्रतिवादिनो जयः; कथमेवं साधर्म्यवचने वैधर्म्यवचनं वैधर्म्यवचने वा साधर्म्यवचनं पराजयाय प्रभवेत् ? कथं चैवं वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहवैयर्थ्यं न स्यात्, क्वचिदेकत्रापि पक्षे साधनसामर्थ्यज्ञानाज्ञानयोः सम्भवात् ? न खलु शब्दादौ नित्यत्वस्यानित्यत्वस्य वा परीक्षायामेकस्य साधनसामर्थ्ये ज्ञानमन्यस्य चाज्ञानं जयस्य पराजयस्य वा निबन्धनं न भवति । युगपत्साधनासामर्थ्यज्ञाने च वादिप्रतिवादिनोः कस्य जयः पराजयो वा स्याद्विशेषात् ? न कस्यचिदिति चेत्; तर्हि साधनवादिनो वचनाधिक्यकारिणः साधनसामर्थ्याज्ञानसिद्धेः प्रतिवादिनश्च वचनाधिक्यदोषोद्भावनात्तद्दोषमात्रज्ञानसिद्धेर्न कस्यचिज्जयः पराजयो वा स्यात् । न हि यो यद्दोषं वेत्ति स तद्गुणमपि, कुतश्चिन्मारणशक्तौ वेदनेऽपि विषद्रव्यस्य कुष्ठापनयनशक्तौ संवेदनानुदयात् । तन्न तत्सामर्थ्यज्ञानाज्ञाननिबन्धनौ जयपराजयौ व्यवस्थापयितुं शक्यौ, यथोक्तदोषानुपज्ञात् । स्वपक्षसिद्धयसिद्धिनिबन्धनौ तु तौ निरवद्यौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहवैयर्थ्याभावात् । कस्यचित् कुतश्चित् स्वपक्षसिद्धौ सुनिश्चितायां परस्य तत्सिद्धयभावतः सकृज्जयपराजयप्रसङ्गात् ।

१०६. यच्चेदमदोषोद्भावनमित्यस्य व्याख्यानम् प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधे दोषोद्भावनाभावमात्रम्-अदोषोद्भावनम्, पर्युदासे तु दोषाभासानामन्यदोषाणां चोद्भावनं प्रतिवादिनो निग्रहस्थानमिति—तत् वादिनाऽदांषवति साधने प्रयुक्ते सत्यनुमतमेव यदि वादी स्वपक्षं साधयेन्नान्यथा । वचनाधिक्यं तु दोषः प्रागेव प्रतिविहितः । यथैव हि पञ्चावयवप्रयोगे वचनाधिक्यं निग्रहस्थानं तथा त्र्यवयवप्रयोगे न्यूनतापि स्याद्विशेषाभावात् । प्रतिज्ञादीनि हि पञ्चाप्यनुमानाङ्गम्—“प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः” (न्यायसू० १.१.३२) इत्यभिधानात् । तेषां मध्येऽन्यतमस्याप्यनभिधाने न्यूनताख्यो दोषोऽनुषज्यत एव “हीनमन्यतमेनापि न्यूनम्” (न्यायसू० १.२.१२) इति वचनात् । ततो जयेतरव्यवस्थायां नान्यन्निमित्तमुक्तान्निमित्तादित्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ॥ ३५ ॥

११०. अयं च प्रागुक्तश्चतुरङ्गो वादः कदाचित्पत्रालम्बनमप्यपेक्षतेऽतस्तल्लक्षणमत्रावश्याभिधातव्यं यतो नाविज्ञातस्वरूपस्यास्यावलम्बनं जयाय प्रभवति न चाविज्ञातस्वरूपं परपत्रं भेत्तुं शक्यमित्याह—

A CRITIQUE OF ORGAN OF KNOWLEDGE

*(Written by Ācārya Śrī Hemacandra, the omniscient
of the Iron age, accompanied with the
commentary written by himself)*

BOOK 1 LECTURE—1

Salutation to the *Arhat* who comprises in his being infinite faith, infinite knowledge, infinite energy and infinite bliss; to the saviour who has constructed out of mercy the bridge to righteousness. (1)

In order to develop the seed of enlightenment of the intelligent ones by means of repeated exercise over ultimate truths, a commentary is being written by me on the aphorisms of Jaina doctrine composed by myself. (2)

1. (Q) Now, if these aphorisms on Jaina doctrine are your own (handiwork), then what and made by whom were the aphorisms prior to yours? (A) You have posed only a very small fragment of the question. You might as well ask: What and made by whom were the aphorisms on Grammar and other sciences prior to Pāṇini, Piṅgala, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda and so on? (The truth is:) These sciences are without any definite beginning in time, but they appear to grow ever new according as they are delivered in abridged and amplified forms and as such are said to be the handiwork of this or that person. Have you not heard (the dictum): The world has never been unlike the present? Or, if you are so inclined, you may cast a glance at the *Tattoārthasūtra* (aphorisms on the ultimate truths), the crest jewel of all *śāstras* (rational systematic works), composed by (Umāsvāti called) the foremost *Vācaka*.

2. (Q) If that be the case, why is it that you do not set out to compose a discursive treatise (*prakaraṇa*) following (the example of) *Akalanīka*, *Dharmakīrti* and the like? Why do you assume the role of a writer of aphorisms—a vainglorious pose (in all conscience)? (A) Don't be censorious. The present writer follows his own taste and there is neither public (opinion) nor a royal command to put a restraint upon the free exercise of his will. So your contention is a frivolous trifle.

3. Now the Master (*Ācārya*) has composed this *śāstra* in five Books (*adhyāyas*), each consisting of a group of Lectures (*āhnikas*); of the latter again each consists of a number of discourses (*prakaraṇas*); each discourse is made of a group of aphorisms (*sūtras*); each aphorism consists of a number of inflected words (*padas*) each of which in its turn is composed of a number of syllables (*varṇas*). The following is the first aphorism of the work, which proposes to set forth the subject matter to be dealt with, (the knowledge of which is) a necessary condition of inspiring the volitional impulse of a man of intelligence (towards the study of the work).

(*Aph.*) Now a critique of organs of knowledge. (1)

4. The word *atha* (now) means commencement and (in the present context) signifies that (the treatment of) organs of knowledge which are to be set forth in this work is being undertaken and thus by expounding the objective of the whole work serves to enlighten and induce intelligent readers (to the study of it). Or, let the word (*śabda*) stand for the idea of sequence. The meaning would thus become: organ of knowledge is being discussed subsequent to the treatment of Grammar (*śabda*), Poetics (*kāvya*) and Prosody (*chandas*). Understood in this sense the word (*atha*) serves to signify that this (work) is the product of the same author as that of Grammar, etc. Again, the word *atha*, (though used) in the sense of commencement, by the very fact of its phonetic value being apprehended, serves to promote well-being just as the sight of a garland of flowers, or a pitcher filled with

water, though carried for some other purpose, does. The promotion of well-being eliminates obstructive demerit and thus leads to the completion of the work without a hitch and hearers are blessed with long life (as a consequence). The author of the aphorisms has performed the auspicious ceremony of salutation of the (five exalted beings called) *paramēsthins*, but he does not propose to incorporate it in the work for consideration of economy (of labour).

5. [That *pramāṇa* (organ of knowledge) is the most effective instrument of the determination (*pramā*) of the nature of reality follows from the analysis of the etymological meaning of its components. The prefix *pra* means 'in excellent form', i.e., to the exclusion of doubt and the like and *√mā* means 'to determine' and the suffix *lyuṭ* means 'an instrument'. The meaning of the whole word] *Pramāṇa* (thus) comes to be what is the most effective instrument of the determination of reality in its true character through the preliminary exclusion of doubt, (error and indecision). *Mīmāṃsā* (critique) of it (organ of knowledge) consists in complete consideration (of the subject-matter) by the method of enumeration and so on. The procedure of a scientific work is threefold, viz., enumeration, definition and examination. Among these, enumeration consists in the specification of bare names, and this very aphorism is an example of the same. Definition is the statement of the peculiar characteristic of the thing enumerated. It is again of two kinds, viz., general and specific. The immediately following aphorism is an instance of general definition. Specific definition has its illustration in the aphorism (I. 1. 13) 'That which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition.' Classification is only a preliminary condition of specific definition and as such is not separately considered. Examination consists in (the application of) the logical tests to the thing defined in order to make out that the thing defined is of the nature affirmed and not otherwise. The third aphorism serves as its example.

6. The term *mīmāṃsā* (critique) means respectful disquisition. It follows from this that dissertation on organ of

knowledge alone is not undertaken in this work, but it also embraces the consideration of *nayas* (partial glimpses) which are parts of *pramāṇa* with their scope determined by means of exclusion of false *nayas*. As has been observed by the foremost *Vācaka* (Umāsvāti): Acquisition (of knowledge of ultimate truth) is by means of *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. (TS, I. 6). The work treats also of final emancipation (*mokṣa*) together with the means thereto and its opposites, it being the foremost among the ultimate values to be desired by mankind. The dissertation thus becomes entitled to respectful consideration (owing to its comprehensive scope as specified above). A dissertation on knowledge alone would on the other hand degenerate into a mere polemic since it is bound to resolve itself ultimately into the refutation of rival theories. If that (dissertation on knowledge) were the intention (of the *Sūtrakūṭa*), the introductory aphorism should have been worded as: Now an examination (instead of critique) of organ of knowledge. (PP, p. 1). To sum up the result: The Master has chosen the word critique (*māmāṇsa*) in order to make it understood that (his objective is to deal with) the problem of emancipation together with its means of realisation and its opposites, after a thorough evaluation of the objects of valid knowledge by means of *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. (I).

7. Now he propounds the general definition of organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)—

(Aph.) *An organ of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object.* (II)

8. The expression 'organ of knowledge' specifies the thing to be defined. The rest is the definition. Definition consists in the predication of an unknown (characteristic) in respect of a known fact given as the subject. In the present context the subject is the substantive which is known as 'organ of knowledge' without dispute, and of it the characteristic of 'being' 'authentic definitive cognition of an object' is predicated. [Definition being a case of purely negative inference presupposes a subject, a probandum and

a probans]. The probans thereof is the character of 'being organ of knowledge'. There is nothing repugnant in the subject, functioning as a probans. It stands to reason that where the individual is a subject, its relevant universal may serve as probans as in the following example: 'The smoke is coexistent with fire, since it has the character of being smoke just like the cases of smoke cognised before.' The absence of (a different kind of) example does not detract from its probative force as the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance alone. It will be shown (in I. 2. 18) that the case is quite on a par with the syllogism: The living body is possessed of a soul because it is possessed of vital functions.

9. The term 'definitive cognition' in the definition stands for a species of cognition which is devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition. Thus the use of the term 'definitive cognition' serves to negate the character of organ of knowledge of sense-object contact as it is not a cognition and of doubt, etc., though they are included in the category of cognition.

10. The *artha* (object) is what is attained or aimed at (by a cognition) and it is placed under (three heads, viz.,) what is to be avoided, what is to be accepted and what is to be ignored, inasmuch as the avoidable is sought to be avoided, the acceptable is sought to be accepted and the ignorable is sought to be ignored. It cannot be contended that the ignorable should be subsumed under the avoidable on the ground of its being unfit for acceptance, since (by similar logic) its inclusion under the acceptable may also be a possibility being the opposite of the avoidable. On the contrary, (the category of) the ignorable constitutes a field of overwhelming importance so far as the ascetics are concerned (the number of things ignored by them being far greater than that of what they seek to attain or to avoid). And even as regards men constituted like us, the magnitude of what is to be ignored far outweighs that of what is to be

accepted and what is to be avoided. So it does not deserve to be left out of consideration. In the expression 'the definitive cognition of object' (*arthasya nirṇayaḥ*), the genitive case-ending (in the original) has the force of an objective case, as the object is directly accessible (to cognition), the object being what is definitively cognised. The insertion of the term 'object' in the definition is made for the sake of the exclusion of self-cognition, as we will show that though it is a fact it is not an exclusive characteristic.

11. The term *samyak* (authentic) means what is not contrary to fact and is an indeclinable. Or, it may be a derivative of $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}c}$ with *sam* as its prefix. This is an adjective to 'definitive cognition', because it is this alone which is competent to be determined as authentic or unauthentic. As regards the object, it is neither authentic nor unauthentic by itself and so does not deserve this adjective to qualify it, since it lacks the conditions of possibility and contingency. The result of the qualification of 'definitive cognition of an object' by the adjective 'authentic' is the exclusion of error. So this general definition of organ of knowledge is destitute of the faults of undesirable extension, non-inclusion and absurdity.

12. Now (a problem is raised), 'cognition of (its own) self' has also been propounded by the old masters as an element of the definition of organ of knowledge just like the cognition of an object'. Compare (the definitions): 'organ of knowledge is revelatory of self and other' (NA, 1), and 'organ of knowledge is the cognition which is of the nature of determination of self and an object' (TSV, I. 10. 77). Nor is this (sc. cognition of self) unjustified, since in (the introspection) 'I know the jar' and the like, the fact of cognition is as much revealed (as a content) as (the elements of) subject and object. It is not possible that the cognition of an object can happen to a subject who does not intuit the act of cognition. It cannot be supposed that the cognition of such an act is effected by a second cognition, since the latter, too, being equally uncognised cannot amount to an intuition

of the (first) cognition in question. If a third cognition is requisitioned for the purpose, it will lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* [the third being in the same situation with the second *qua* uncognised will require a fourth and the fourth a fifth and so on if no cognition is supposed to be self-intuited]. If the cognition of the act (of cognition) be made dependent upon the cognition of object, it will give rise to the fallacy of logical see-saw. This (exposure of absurdity) is sufficient to dismiss the attempt to account for such cognition by resort to negative implication. viz., 'the realisation of the object would not be possible unless there were a cognition of the same.' [The idea is that a thing can be known only by means of a cognition and not otherwise. The fact of knownness therefore implies the presence of cognition. The reason for rejection of the aforementioned hypothesis lies in the fact that] implication being itself uncognised as the cause of cognition cannot possibly be a *causa cognoscendi* (which it is admitted to be and as such should be believed to be self-intuitive). If again the (first) implication (of the act of cognition) be supposed to be cognised by another implication, the result will be either an infinite regress or a logical see-saw [according as a series of implications is postulated or the first implication is made known by the second and *vice versa*] and this makes the discomfiture (of the opponent) inevitable as before. Thus (the conclusion is inescapable that) as cognition is (invariably) felt as self-regarding, it must be admitted that it is cognisant of its own self as well.

(Q) If cognition be an object of cognition, like a jar, it would become not-cognition (i.e. would cease to be a cognition).

(A) You cannot argue like that, since a cognition is felt as cognition just as the self is felt as self. Nor is there any logical absurdity in the fact that cognition is also cognisable, since it is a 'cognition' with reference to the object and 'cognisable' with reference to its own self (that is to say, a cognition cognises its own self just as it does an object). There is no

incompatibility in the situation just as there is none in the same person being a son and father with reference to his own father and son. Nor can an incompatibility be alleged in the action of the self upon itself, since incompatibility cannot occur in a thing attested to be true by direct experience.

The fact of self-cognisance (of a cognition) can also be proved by inference. Cognition reveals an object only while it reveals (itself), since it is revelatory just as a light. It ought not to be urged that a cognition being an object of revelation cannot logically function as an agent of revelation. For it is quite legitimate that it should be an agent of revelation by reason of effecting expulsion of ignorance and the like. It should not, however, be contended that the rule propounded breaks down in the case of sense-organs, eye and the like (which though revelatory are not self-revealed and so the probans 'revelatory' is not necessarily concomitant with self-revelation). There is no break of the rule since it is (not physical organs but) their spiritual counterparts which are revelatory and they are self-revealed as a matter of necessity. And (the truth of our contention is proved by the following syllogistic arguments): Consciousness is self-revealing, since it is cognition of an object; whatever is not self-revealing is not cognition of an object, for example—a jar (which is not cognition of an object as it is not self-revealing). Whatever is a cognition is independent of the service of another (cognition) for its own cognition, just as the last member of a series of cognitions of an object immediately preceding the cognition of another object is. The cognition of colour, etc., which is the subject-matter of dispute is certainly a cognition (and therefore must be independent for its own cognition). An entity, for instance a jar, does not require another entity of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its revelation; a cognition is such an entity; (therefore it does not require another cognition of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its own revelation).

(Q) A cognition, being an entity, must be liable to be revealed by another just like the jar.

(A) No. The probans (viz 'being an entity') is devoid of a logical sanction. (The fact of 'being an entity' has no bearing upon its revelation by itself or by another. It is a question of ultimate fact which can be decided by the verdict of experience). The fact that a jar is revealed by an other (sc. cognition) is not due to the fact that it is an entity but because it is other than cognition.

(The opponent now drives home the conclusion that) self-cognition, too, should be (included in) the definition of knowledge. Anticipating all this, he (*sūtrakāra*) observes (as follows):

(1ph.) Self-cognition, though (unavoidably) present, is not (a necessary element of) the defining characteristic, as it overlaps cases of erroneous cognition. (III)

13. By the expression 'though (unavoidably) present' the author approves of the opponent's contention. The meaning is this: It ought not to be urged that whatever attribute is present (in a thing) should be included in the definition (of it), simply because it is present therein, but only that attribute which is absent from its opposite. Self-cognition, however, is common to such erroneous cognition as doubt and the like. There is not a single instance of cognition which is not *ipso facto* self-cognised. Therefore, we have not propounded self-cognition as a defining characteristic. The old masters, however, introduced it with a view to its examination (by first learners). Hence no fault (in the definition). (III)

14. (A fresh difficulty is being raised:) If knowledge is to take note of what is already known, it would be as redundant as the act of grinding what has already been ground to dust. (If this contingency is excepted to) then a series of repeating cognitions cognisant of the pre-cognised (object) should also be accorded the status of valid knowledge. So let the definition be (as follows): • Cognition of an object previously uncognised (is knowledge). And so also has it been propounded (in the following definitions): A cognition

which is of the nature of ascertainment of itself and an organ of a previously uncognised object is knowledge (PMS, I. 1); or (simply) as 'A cognition of an object unknown before'.

To meet the difficulty, the author remarks:

(Aph.) The cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not lack the status of organ of knowledge exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. (IV)

15. This is the meaning (which can be brought out as follows): Does the repudiation of the cognition of the cognised object have reference to the substance or a mode? If it is the mode which is referred to, then even the series of repeating cognitions cannot be alleged to take stock of the same precognised object, since the modes are momentary in duration. In that case what would be the necessity of incorporating this qualifying proviso for the exclusion of the contingency (i. e., repeated cognition of the same object)? If, on the other hand, (the repeating cognition in question be supposed) to relate to the substance, that will also be (an) illegitimate (position). Substance being (the self-same) unity, being eternal (irrespective of the modes occurring in it), does not admit of any variation in either state *qua* cognised before or to be cognised hereafter. So (we do not see any reason for this distinctive treatment since the opponent) cannot point to a distinguishing circumstance in the cognition of an object to be known hereafter on the basis of which it should be accorded the rank of organ of knowledge which is denied to the cognition of a precognised object. [The Jaina cannot at any rate insist on the absence of previous cognition as a condition of valid knowledge. The commentator accordingly contends:] Further, determinate perception, speculation and the rest are acknowledged to be valid instances of knowledge in spite of the fact that the succeeding cognition takes stock of what has been cognised by the preceding ones. It cannot be contended that these cognitions are conversant with different objects. If that were the case, the object of determinate perception would not be the object of speculation and the

object of speculation would not be the object of judgment—³ a contingency which would throw out of gear (the whole apparatus of epistemology). It would not again be a sound contention to maintain that the cognitions under consideration are each conversant with an uncognised element furnished by (the ever-occurring change of) modes. This would be tantamount to admission that no cognition is possessed of a content which is cognised before.

16. As regards recollection which is acknowledged to be an organ of knowledge, its essential character consists in the cognition of a precognised object. And even those, who assert recollection to be destitute of the status of an organ of knowledge, base their conclusion on the fact that it is not directly derived from an object and not on the fact that it is cognisant of the pre-cognised object. As has been observed (by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa): "That recollection has not the status of an organ of knowledge is not due to the fact that it is cognisant of a precognised object. The reason for its invalidity, on the contrary, is found in its origination independent of an object." (NM. p. 23). (IV.)

17. Now he proposes to set forth the definitions of doubt, indecision and error which have been rebutted by the definition of an organ of knowledge:

(Aph.) *Doubt is the cognition which refers to both the extremes with reference to an object which is not possessed of such dual character.* (V)

18. The cognition, which fully touches both the (opposite) extremes with reference to an object which does not (actually) possess such a dual character, is designated as *samśaya* (doubt), inasmuch as the self, on its emergence, seems to retire into a perfectly supine state (owing to the loss of vigil). For example, we may cite the case of the cognition 'Whether it is a post or a human being', which arises on the apprehension, from a distance, of a tall object in darkness, when proofs either by way of confirmation or refutation are equally found to be wanting. The insertion (of the qualifying adjunct)

'with reference to an object which is not possessed of such a dual character' is needed for the preclusion of the definition of doubt from overlapping such cases of cognition as take note of both the extremes in objects which are really possessed of such a dual nature. As instances (of the latter category) we may cite such judgements as "The jar exists and does not exist" or, The self is both permanent and impermanent." (V)

(Aph.) A cognition which fails to take note of specific characteristic is (called) indecision. (VI)

18. A cognition which fails to grasp the specific characteristic of its object owing to distance, darkness and the like is called 'indecision', because it falls short of certitude delivering itself in the form 'What may it be.' And as regards indeterminate intuition arising at the first moment (of sense-object contact) which is regarded by others (sc. Buddhists) as perceptual knowledge, it is nothing but a case of 'indecision' inasmuch as it also lacks consideration of specific characteristics (VI)

(Aph.) Error is a cognition which definitely takes a thing to be what it is not. (VII)

20. When a cognition has for its content a characteristic, which is actually wanting in the object concerned, and still the object is definitely believed to be possessed of that (very characteristic in pursuance of the cognition), it (the cognition) is a case of error (literally a contrary cognition), being the reverse (of the objective fact). The following cases are examples of it. (1) The cognition of a substance which is sweet as bitter and such-like cases owing to the disorder of bodily humours: (2) the cognition of one self-identical moon as two owing to the affection of the eye; (3) the cognition of trees, though actually fixed and stationary, as moving owing to the (swift) movement of a boat; (4) the cognition of fire-brand and the like as circular, though they are non-circular, on account of swift rotation (By a person).

The (consideration of the) definition of organ of knowledge comes to an end here. (VII)

21. Let an organ of knowledge be as it is defined But² how is its validity determined—(is it determined) by itself or another ? It cannot certainly be (determined) by itself. A cognition being self-intuited should intuit itself as being cognition, pure and simple. It cannot be expected to take note of the element of authenticity which constitutes its validity. And so far as the (intuited) character of being cognition is concerned, it is shared in common with false knowledge. Moreover, if validity were self-intuited, there would occur no occasion of dispute among philosophers. Nor can it (validity) be supposed to be apprehended by some other (cognition). The other cognition in question may be considered to be either (1) one which has for its object the self-same object of the cognition (the validity of which is under dispute), or (2) a cognition (which verifies it) by taking note of its utility, or (3) the cognition of an object which is invariably concomitant with the object of the former cognition. All these (possibilities), having, as they do, a validity not self-certified, are themselves undetermined (in logical status) and as such how can they be expected to determine the initial cognition, which leads to activity, (as valid)? And if these latter cognitions have their validity self-certified, what is the offence of the initial cognition, that should deprive it on the right of self-validation? It has already been definitely asserted that validity of a cognition is not known by itself and if, on the other hand, it is supposed to be determined by an outsider (sc. cognition), the result would be a *regressus ad infinitum*.

Having all these considerations in view the author propounds (the following):

(Aph.) *Determination of validity is either by itself or by some other. (VIII)*

22. Determination of validity is in some cases achieved (by a cognition) by itself. Such for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm (induced by a repeated course of experience); or the direct intuition of results (by verification

afforded by) such (tests) as the acts of bathing, drinking, immersion and alleviation of thirst and like processes. To be sure, in these cases there is no demand for further verification felt by a rational mind. By way of corroboration (one may point the following analysis of a typical knowledge-situation): in the first place, there is cognition of water; in the second place, there occurs, on the part of a person affected with heat and thirst, a volitional impulse towards it; in the third place, there is eventual attainment (of the object); in the fourth place, the processes of bathing, drinking and so on take place; in the last place, there occurs cessation of heat and thirst. And this alone gives final satisfaction to the (knowing) subject. And he does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition of the cessation of heat and thirst. This establishes (the conclusion) that the validity (of the cognition) is self-determined. As regards inference, however, the intuition of self-validity in all its cases is quite obvious when all the possibility of doubt of the universal concomitance (on which the inference is based) being contingent has been entirely eliminated. For (doubt is impossible when the inference) is known to follow from a probans necessarily concomitant (with the probandum). There cannot be cognition of a probans in the absence of the probans and a (real) probans cannot exist unrelated to its probandum.

23. On some occasions the intuition of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point for instance to the (primal) perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the (relevant) object, its validity is determined by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or again by the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with it. As regards the latter, their validity is self-evident and so there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress and the like.

24. As regards verbal knowledge, its unfailing correspondence with the (relevant) object is not realisable (by itself)

and so its validity is (only) determined by the external evidence furnished by verification and the like in those cases where the object (of the verbal cognition) is capable of being directly perceived. As regards (the cases of verbal propositions that refer to) an object which is not amenable to perception, their validity is determined, irrespective of verification on the ground of their having been delivered by a trustworthy person, on the analogy of his other statements regarding such perceivable facts as the eclipse of the planets, loss of an article, secret contents of a closed fist, whose authenticity has been attested by verification. Thus all (the issues connected with the problem) find a rational explanation (in our view).

25. The Naiyāyikas assert that 'The organ of knowledge is that which is the condition of the cognition of an object'. Now if the condition of the cognition of an object referred to in the definition be only an 'efficient condition' (other than what is propounded as material and non-material cause by the Naiyāyika), then the subject, the object and so on should also be regarded as having the characteristic of being 'an organ of valid knowledge', since this (i. e. the character of 'being an efficient condition') is the common attribute of all the (conditions which are meant by the) grammatical cases. If, on the other hand, the term 'condition' is taken to stand for the instrumental case as distinct from the subject, the object and so forth, then it should logically be considered to be an act of cognition and not a sense-organ or its contact (with the object), etc. Now, that alone is the instrumental case of a cognition on the operation of which the object is immediately known. (It is a fact that) a cognition (of an object) does not occur even in the presence of such conditions as sense-organ and its contact, if (the conditioning) cognition is absent. The instrumental case is that which is the most efficient condition which is found to be immediately followed by the effect. If, on the contrary, a condition which is remotely conducive to an effect is regarded as its instrument, then even (such remote condition of the alertness of sense-organs as) 'partaking of a

'dish of curd' would also lay claim to their recognition as such. The conclusion is thus irresistible that none but a cognition can be regarded as the organ of knowledge, except by way of metaphor.

26. In (another definition propounded as) 'That which is the instrument of authentic cognition is the organ of knowledge' (NSā, p. 1), the insertion of the word 'instrument' is intended for the exclusion of the subject and the object, and thus ends in proving that the organ of knowledge is none other than the instrumental case. Such being the case, the most effective condition is certainly none else than cognition, inasmuch as it is immediately followed by the effect and so that (sc. cognition) alone should be accepted as the organ of knowledge.

27. The Buddhists assert 'It is non-discrepant cognition that is the organ of knowledge', (PV, II, 1). If the cognition referred to in the definition be regarded as indeterminate, it would not be capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. If you maintain that the definition is concerned with a conventional organ of knowledge, how can you establish its validity? The validity (of indeterminate cognition) has been supposed to be effected by a determinate cognition bringing up the rear which is capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. But this is exposed to the consequences of the maxim of decoration with borrowed ornaments. It stands to reason that the determinate cognition capable of pragmatic consequences should rather have its claim to validity recognised. The acceptance of this course would serve to eliminate the labour of resort to a roundabout procedure. Again, if determinate cognition were invalid, how could the activity inspired by it be (as a matter of universal rule) never incongruent (with fact)? If the congruence be accounted for on the ground of identification of the concept with the perceptum as is the case with the perceptual cognition of a person suffering from disorder of the eye, then the congruence in question would be a factitious one (resorted to

by way of metaphor). So if (the Buddhist) is to intend natural, as opposed to factitious, validity as the defining characteristic of (perceptual) cognition, he must accept that it is determinate cognition that is the organ of knowledge. (VIII)

28. The author has set forth the general definition of the organ of knowledge and has also subjected it to scrutiny. Now, he proposes to propound the specific definition and with this end in view he sets forth the divisions of the same, in view of the fact that the formulation of such a definition is not possible without the previous demonstration of its divisions.

(*Aph.*) *The organ of knowledge is of two kinds.* (IX)

29. The expression 'organ of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*), though included in the general definition given in the aphorism (no. II), has been intercepted by (the discourse involved in) scrutiny and so it is not referred to by the pronoun 'that' (in the aphorism as this might make it difficult to understand the reference). Hence the expression 'organ of knowledge' is bodily inserted herein. The expression 'of two kinds' has the meaning 'of two varieties *only*'—since classification implies exclusive determination as its logical upshot. The consequence of this (exclusive determination) is that the views of philosophers (of different schools), who assert the number of such organs to be more or less (than this), are to be rejected. The Cārvākas maintain that perception is the only organ of knowledge and none else. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers contend that there are three such organs, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, which is also the position of the Sāṅkhyas. The Naiyāyikas accept comparison in addition to the three. The Prābhākaras again accept the four organs and add presupposition as the fifth. The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) accept negation as an additional organ and thus assert six such organs in all. The refutation of these views will be given (in a subsequent section). (IX)

30. [But a doubt arises in this connection.] Is the twofold classification to be understood in terms of what has been propounded by the Buddhists, viz., as 'Perception and Inference' (PS, I. 2; NB, I. 3) or in a different way? [In order to set at rest all doubt,] he observes;

(Aph.) (Namely,) *Perceptual and Non-perceptual*. (X)

31. [The etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* is stated here] The word *akṣa* is derived from *√as* or *√akṣa* meaning 'to pervade'. That which pervades (i.e. embraces) all substance, space, time and mode is entitled *akṣa* which means an individual self. The word (*akṣa*) may also denote a sense-organ, since it also pervades (that is, apprehends) an object. The prefix *prati* has the sense of *pratigata* i.e. resident or dependent. (The whole word *pratyakṣa* then means) what is resident in *akṣa*. (that is to say, in the individual). The word *akṣa* also means sense-organs. And so the cognition which arises in dependence upon the sense-organs is called *pratyakṣa*, perceptual cognition, of which the definition will be stated later. *Parokṣa*, non-perceptual cognition, is that which is placed beyond the province of senses or that which is left untouched by an other, i.e., a sense-organ and the like, and its definition will be stated below. The conjunction 'and' is intended to stress the equal competence of both in their respective provinces. This serves to refute the position of those who maintain that perceptual cognition is the senior-most of all organs of knowledge. It cannot be contended that as all other organs are preceded by perceptual cognition, the latter should be regarded as the seniormost of them. It is (not infrequently) observed that perceptual cognition also follows in the wake of other organs. Thus, for example, a person having become aware of fire and so on either by means of a characteristic mark (probans) or the instruction of a trustworthy person proceeds towards it and comes to have perceptual cognition of the same. (X)

32. According to the adherents of Cārvāka, there is no other organ of knowledge than perception. In (order to refute) this position the author says:

(Aph.) That there are organs of knowledge other than perception is proved by the realisation of determination, knowledge of other men's thoughts, and negation. (XI)

33. The realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man's thought, and negation of what transcends sense-intuition is not possible without the services of other organs of knowledge such as inference. The Cārvāka positivist is also (found) to determine at a subsequent time that some cognitions are valid and some are invalid on the basis of their analogy to past experiences which he has found to be non-discrepant and discrepant (with fact) respectively according as they did correspond or failed to correspond (with reality). It is not possible that a perceptual cognition, which derives its genesis from a datum present (to the senses) and which is incapable of taking cognisance of what has preceded and what will follow, should have the capacity of discerning a characteristic capable of determining the validity and invalidity of the individual cognitions occurring before and after. And even with regard to those specific cases of cognitions of which he has direct cognisance, the Cārvāka will not be in a position to determine the validity or invalidity of them to the satisfaction of an outsider. Hence it follows that he must have recourse to a different organ of knowledge which must be of the nature of inference and as such included under the head of non-perceptual cognition, which will enable him to determine the validity and invalidity of present cases of knowledge on the basis of their analogy to cases of knowledge found to be veridical and also to convince an outsider (of the truth).

34. Moreover, a person who seeks to prove a fact which is not wanted to be known (by anybody), certainly runs the risk of being ignored with contempt like a man who has gone out of his senses, since thereby he would act neither as a man of common sense nor as a philosopher. Nor again is it possible to have acquaintance with what passes in other people's mind by means of perception. If, on the other hand, (it is asserted

that) such acquaintance (with another man's knowledge) is achieved by the study of his (outward) activity, the validity of non-perceptual cognition is established even against his will.

35. The negation of (post-mortem existence in) the other world and the like is not capable of being asserted merely on the basis of perceptual intuition which has its jurisdiction only over what is present to the senses. The behaviour of the Cārvāka, who finds no peace without the denial of (life in) the other world and so on, but still refuses to admit the validity of other organs of knowledge, reminds one of the conduct of a (perverse) child.

36. Furthermore, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the evidence of its unfailing correspondence with fact. (It passes one's understanding) why should the Cārvāka not acknowledge the validity of non-perceptual cognitions, arising either from verbal testimony or from a logical ground known to be necessarily concomitant with a fact, on the identical ground of unfailing correspondence with fact. The Cārvāka may contend that the invalidity of non-perceptual cognition is proved by the fact that there are also cases of such cognitions which are found to lack unfailing correspondence with fact. But this would make the denial of validity of every cognition inevitable, since even perceptual cognitions, arising from diseased vision and suchlike defects, are also found to be invalid [and thus should throw doubt over perceptual cognition as a class, which is the only case of valid knowledge according to the opponent. The result will be unrelieved scepticism, since neither perceptual cognition nor non-perceptual cognition, which is unreservedly declared by him to be invalid, will have indubious claim to validity]. The Cārvāka might retort: Well, it is a case of simulated perception (and so its invalidity does not affect veridical intuitions). But the case is exactly the same with the other (sc. non-perceptual cognition), but for your biased obsession. Dharmakīrti also makes similar observation:

"The existence of another organ of knowledge (viz. inference) is established by means of the community of nature

(which a subsequent cognition exhibits) with a (past) cognition of attested validity or its opposite (sc. an invalid cognition); (secondly,) by the cognisance of other people's thoughts; and (thirdly,) by the denial of a particular position. The validity of a perceptual cognition also is due to (its necessary concomitance with an objective fact, i.e.,) its impossibility without the existence of a (corresponding) object and the two cases (perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions) are exactly similar, if necessary concomitance be the ground of this (validity), (which is also present in the case of non-perceptual cognition to assure its validity) " (1-2)

37. Though the number (of organs of knowledge) as set forth is endorsed by them, yet the Buddhists insist on regarding all non-perceptual cognitions as necessarily partaking of the nature of inference. But this is an untenable position. Verbal testimony and others are also organs of knowledge and it is impossible to include them under the head of inference. Of course, there is no logical aberration in the fact that one all-comprehensive organ of knowledge should include other such organs (as particular instances). For instance, the sense-intuition, mental intuition (introspection), self-intuition and the transcendent intuition of the *yogins* are all subsumed (as species) under (the genus) perceptual intuition; and recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony are included under non-perceptual cognition, since the definitions apply to all of them without exception. As for the specific definitions of recollection and so on, they will be stated in their proper places. As regards comparison which is regarded as a case of non-perceptual cognition (by the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmāṃsā* schools), it will be shown to be included under recognition, and as for presupposition (believed to be an independent organ by the *Mīmāṃsā* school), that also will be shown to be subsumed under inference. (XI)

38. As regards (the disputed cases, for example,) negation, which is not regarded as an organ of knowledge at all, it will serve no purpose to show that it is included in or excluded

from (one of the accredited organs). Why should it be denied the status of an organ of knowledge? The answer is that it has no corresponding object. Why should it not have one? (To this query the author gives the reply):

(Aph.) *Since reality partakes of the nature of being and non-being (both), negation cannot have an object of its own.* (XII)

39. It is absolutely unthinkable that the nature of reality should be exhausted exclusively by the element of being, as in that case all things would have all the possible characteristics (and thus there would be no real diversity). Nor is it possible that reality should consist in the element of non-being alone, since that will result in denuding it of all character. In point of fact, a reality is made up of both being and non-being (as its constitutive elements), since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the nature of another and this is the invariable finding of all organs. Thus, for instance, it is manifest that a perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation its object in the following terms: It is certainly a surface of the ground and not a jar and like, and this contradicts an additional object of the nature of pure non-being. What does then remain of the objective real with reference to which negation as an organ could function? Likewise, non-perceptual organs also invariably tend to take note of such a dual reality partaking of the nature of both being and non-being. (The denial of this), on the contrary, would make the apprehension of mutually exclusive facts as their relevant objects impossible. Our position is endorsed by the following observation:

“That a positive real is determined as ‘this is exclusively of such and such a character’ is not capable of being understood without the concomitant cognisance of the negation of what is different from it.” (ŚV, *Abhāva*, śl. 15)

40. (The Mīmāṃsist might contend): Well, let reality be accepted as partaking of the nature of both being and non-being, but that does not affect our position in the least, as

we, too, have proved this very truth. (Our contention is that) only the positive element of being with which a sense-organ comes in contact is the province of perceptual cognitions and as regards the element of non-being, it cannot be so (i.e., the object of sense-contact and sense-intuition). The latter (i.e., non-being) is consequently held to be cognised by a separate organ, viz., negation. How can then it be maintained that (negation as an organ) would have no object? Thus has it been observed (by Kumārila):

“The judgement ‘a thing does not exist’ cannot be supposed to be generated by a sense-organ, since a sense-organ can have connection with the element of being alone for which it is competent. The negative judgement is due to a purely mental activity which comes into being after the presence of a real (sc. the locus of negation) is cognised and the relevant negatum is recalled independently of all the aid of sense-organ.” (ŚV, *Abhūva*, śl. 18, 27).

41. [The contention of the Mīmāṃsist is not free from objections.] If the element of non-being be not different from the element of being, why should it not be liable to apprehension by perceptual cognition (like the latter). If, again, it be different, still it has to be admitted that (the negata, viz.,) jar and the like are perceived when (a locus, e.g.,) a plot of land is perceived as bereft of the non-being of jar and the like. It is a universal rule that the non-apprehension of the non-being of anything is necessarily concomitant with the apprehension of its being. Such being the case, the organ of negation (if possible at all) would necessarily follow in its wake and thus would not be able to dislodge (the cognition of) the negata. If the situation were otherwise, a perceptual cognition would invariably be erroneous, if it cognised a non-exclusive object as exclusive.

42. Furthermore, this (so-called organ) is nothing but a fiction being of the nature of the negation of five positive organs. And thus it is the reverse of cognition and as such

how can it function as organ (which is invariably of the nature of cognition) ? So it must be admitted that such organs as perceptual cognition and the rest invariably take note of non-being while they are employed in apprehending the element of being which is somehow identical with the element of non-being. It follows, therefore, that negation as an organ has no object, since there is no (such) thing (as pure non-being) separate and distinct from the (double nature of the) real. The conclusion, therefore, stands that it cannot be an (additional organ (XII)

43. Having set forth the classification (of the organ of knowledge), the author now proposes to formulate the specific definition (of each class):

(Aph.) (*Of these, viz., perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions*
that which is immediate-cum-lucid is perceptual cognition.
 (XIII)

44. Since the predication of a specific characteristic (sic. specific definition) is made by adding (a differentia) to the general characteristic (of which it is an instance), the differentia 'immediate-cum-lucid' is predicated of what is known to be perceptual cognition, in addition to the general characteristic of an organ of knowledge, viz., 'authentic definitive cognition of an object'. [As definition is a species of inference, it consists of three terms—the subject or the minor term, the probandum or the major term and the probans or the middle term; of the terms of the present definition], '(this) perceptual cognition' is the subject, 'of the nature of immediate authentic definitive cognition of an object' is the probandum and 'quality of being a perceptual cognition' is the probans. (The cogency of the inference is based on negative concomitance, viz.,) Whatever is not of the nature of an immediate authentic definitive cognition of an object is not a case of perceptual cognition, as for instance, non-perceptual cognition, by way of opposition. It has been urged that the impossibility of logical connection would be the defect if the subject itself were made the probans. But the contingency does not arise,

since the subject is a specific individual and the probans is the universal character of the subject (typifying a class). And there is no logical incompatibility in the connection of such an attribute with the subject, since universal is always exemplified in the particular individuals. And it has already been established that a probans proves (the probandum) by virtue of its necessary absence in heterologous cases, in spite of the fact that it is not existent in the homologous instances (since such non-existence does not detract from its probative force).

45 Now, what does the attribute 'immediate-cum-lucid' consist in? If it be supposed to consist in the apprehension of its relevant object, that would make it applicable without offence to non-perceptual cognition (which) also (possesses this characteristic). Again, if it be construed as being 'transparent', that also (would not be a differentia, since it) is a common characteristic of all cognitions, as they are self-intuited. Having kept this objection in view, he defines it as follows:

(Aph.) *'Immediacy-cum-lucidity' consists in either its independence of the services of another organ, or in the apprehension of its content as 'this'.* (XIV)

46. An organ such as 'the cognition of a linguistic symbol', or, 'of the (concomitant) probans' other than the organ under consideration is here referred to as 'another organ'. 'Immediacy-cum-lucidity consists in its independence of such an organ. To be sure, a perceptual cognition does not stand in need of another organ such as the cognition of the linguistic symbol or of a probans in order to be brought into being, unlike the cases of verbal or inferential knowledge. This is one definition of 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. The other definition is 'the apprehension of its content as *this*. The apprehension by an authentic cognition of its content as *this*, that is to say, as referring to a particular existent, also gives a clue to 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. The conjunction 'either—or' (*vel*) is inserted to indicate the possibility of another definition. (XIV)

47. Now having in contemplation the twofold division of perceptual cognition as transcendent and empirical (pragmatic) the author proposes the definition of transcendent (perception):

(Aph.) *The (full) manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is called 'that' (intuition) transcendent and pure. (XV)*

48. The pronoun 'that' is advisedly employed to indicate that it refers to 'perceptual cognition'. Had it not been put in it, the word 'immediacy-cum-lucidity', which precedes it immediately, would have been syntactically construed with it. The self has consciousness as its essence and stuff, and is consequently luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the self, which is nothing but the self as manifested, is styled *mukhya*, that is transcendent, intuition. It is supreme of all cognitions, just as the face is the supreme part of the body (and so is called *mukhya*). It is characterized as 'pure' (*kevala*) in scriptures, since it is independent of the services of (an external instrument such as) sense-organs, is cognisant of all objects, and thus stands apart (in a category of its own), having nothing in common (with other modes of cognition). [The manifestation of the luminous being of the self occurs] on the disappearance of the obscuring veils which occurs on the total purging of all the destructive *karmas* that serve to obfuscate the innate knowledge, (belief and conduct). (This purgation, again,) is occasioned by the acquisition of the perfection of what is called 'triple jewel' by a course of prolonged, unremitting and reverent practice, and by the power of unflagging meditation on an aspect (of an entity conscious or unconscious), as laid down in the scripture, without change of object.

49. (Q) But how do you establish the (self—) luminous nature of the self? (A) (By the following arguments,) we reply: Firstly, "The self is of a self-luminous nature,

because its being is not susceptible to doubt. That which is not of self-luminous nature cannot but be susceptible to doubt, e.g., a jar. The self is not like (a jar) by any means. Nobody is known to doubt 'Do I exist or not' and so the probans ('not susceptible to doubt') is not non-existent (in the subject)". Secondly, "The self is of luminous nature, because it is the knower. Whatever is not of luminous nature, such as a jar for example, is not a knower. It is not a fact that the self is not a knower". Thirdly, "That which is the author of an act cannot be the object of such an act. (We may point by way of illustration to a typical instance), Caitra is the author of the act of going but is never the object of the latter. The self is the author of the act of knowing (and hence cannot be its object)".

50. (Q) If the self be luminous by nature, why should it be subject to obscuration? And if obscuration be possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. (A) The objection is groundless. It is observed that though luminous in nature, the moon, the sun and such other bodies are liable to be obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these, when it is found to be obscured by knowledge-obscuring *karmas* and the like. And the removal of the obscuration of the self is effected by (the practice of prescribed courses of) meditation and contemplation exactly as the obscuration of the sun, the moon and such other bodies is removed by a blast of wind.

51. (Q) There is nothing strange about the fact that an obscuration having a definite origin is liable to be removed by some means. (But the obscuration of the self is not a historical event, being coeval with it). (A) No, (the fact of origin is entirely irrelevant). The dross found in an ore of gold is as old as the gold, but still it is found to be removed by the action of an alkaline substance, or by calcination in a sealed vessel. Exactly like this case, the removal of knowledge-obscuring *karmas*, though without beginning, can become a

possibility by the repeated practice of the triple jewel, which is its antidote.

52. Nor is it a sound objection to say 'How can there be obscuration of an amorphous being like the self?' The power of consciousness, although immaterial and amorphous, is not infrequently found to be obscured by the consumption of spirituous liquor, intoxicating drugs and (fermented) wild grains. (So the objection has no basis).

53. (Q) But does the self undergo change by (the action of) the obscuring *karmas* and their opposites? (A) What would you deduce from this? (Q) "Well, both rainfall and sunshine leave the sky (pure space) unaffected; they produce their effects on a piece of leather. If (the self) be like leather, it would be impermanent (and perishable); if, on the other hand, it resembled space, it would be bereft of any change". (A) Not so. The alleged absurdity would be inevitable if the eternity (of the self) were held to be only static (impervious to change). In the Jaina point of view the self is a variable constant and is of the nature of a continuum running through the succession of modes in which the cessation of the predecessor is synchronous with the origination of the successor. On the contrary, the exercise of causal efficiency would be impossible in every way, if things were absolutely permanent, or absolutely momentary (which are the respective positions of The Vedāntist and the Buddhist Fluxist). So it has been observed (by Akalaṅka):

"The exercise of causal efficiency would be unaccountable in the theory of (changeless) eternity and of (discontinuous) flux, since it (i. e., exercise of causal efficiency) can be a characteristic of entities which admit of sequence and non-sequence" (L T, II. 1). (XV)

54. (Q) The determination of the reality of objects depends on the organs of knowledge. There is not an iota of proof in favour of transcendent intuition, or, of a person possessed of it. The function of perceptual cognition is entirely restricted to such (sensible) objects as colour and the

like, and hence it (i. e., perception) cannot have the capacity of extending to a super-sensible fact. Inference, too, cannot be of any help, since it unfailingly derives its genesis from the concomitance of the probans and the probandum as observed by perceptual cognition. As regards the proof afforded by authoritative texts, if they are believed to be the outcome of transcendent intuition, the argument would be a case of logical see-saw, since "It (viz., transcendent intuition) cannot be established without appeal to scriptural authority and scriptural authority would not be valid without the former (viz., transcendent intuition)" (ŚV, v. 142 *ad sūtra* 11). As for impersonal scripture (sic. the Vedas), there is not (a single sentence in it) which would prove the position. There are of course such statements as the following:

"Though without hands and feet He moves fast and catches hold of things; He sees, though without eyes, and hears, though without ears. He knows the whole universe and there is none to know Him. Him (the Seers) declare to be the supreme Male—the Great One" (ŚvU, III. 19).

But the statement is of a parasitical nature (meant to exhort the sacrificer) and hence has no validity of its own, which is acknowledged to belong exclusively to injunctive statements. The other organs of knowledge again have absolutely no jurisdiction over the present (issue). With this objection in view, the author says:

(Aph). *The proof of it follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge and other grounds.* (XVI)

55. The progressive development, that is to say, the realisation of degrees of excellence, of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere, since this is the way of all progression, as seen in the progression of magnitude. This argument proves knowledge *ne puls ultra*, which furnishes the proof of pure transcendent knowledge, since the proof of transcendent knowledge is the same as that of the former.

The mention of 'other grounds' (in the aphorism) stands for the following proofs. The objects, which are subtle (infra-, and supra-sensible), intercepted by barriers and remote, are perceived by some person, since they are knowable, as is the case with a jar. This is one further proof. And there is another more proof of this, found in the actual verification of astronomical knowledge which is unaccountable on any other hypothesis. Thus has it been observed:

"If the knowledge of absolutely imperceptible things be not possible for a person, how can the verification of astronomical knowledge be accounted for? If you account for it by appeal to scripture, that furnishes another proof" (SiV. p.413A).

56. Furthermore, the opponent too must admit that the knowledge of past and other (inconceivable) objects is possible to some person when he affirms "The Vedic injunction makes known past, present, future, subtle, intercepted, distant and suchlike objects of which none of the sense-organs is capable." (ŚB, I. 1. 2). Were it not so, for whose sake would the Veda assert things that are spread over all the three divisions of time? In the very act of such assertion, it presupposes a duly qualified subject who is certainly capable of cognising the truths which hold good for the three divisions of time. Thus has it been observed: "For whose sake does the Veda affirm truths which hold good for all the three divisions of time, if no person could comprehend them to be so, the obscuring veils being absolutely (fixed and) ineradicable?" (SiV, p. 413A). Thus is proved the possibility of pure supersensuous transcendent intuition from the assertion of facts spread over three divisions of time, which is otherwise unaccountable.

57. Moreover, the very (contents of) scriptures, which are confirmed by verification afforded by perceptual and inferential knowledge, furnish the proof of the existence of a person cognisant of supersensible reality. The doctrine of non-absolutism, which is the very subject-matter of scriptures,

is found to be as well the self-same subject-matter of perceptual cognition and the like, and this constitutes its verification. To be explicit, the doctrine of non-absolutism is established by such indubitable proof as the argument "Everything exists in its own individuality, and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent, and thus there would possibly be no individuality at all." The scripture sets forth this truth, and thus indirectly sets forth the omniscience of the *Arhat* also (who is the author of the scripture). I, too, have affirmed this in a hymn: "I offer my homage to your instruction, so that the noose of evil predispositions may meet its destruction—the instruction by realising the authenticity of which we find ourselves in the position to realise the glory of your status as the Supreme Self" (AV. 21).

Though empirical sense-intuition cannot apprehend the existence of supersensuous intuition, the intuition of ascetics, born of the force of meditation, is undoubtedly as cognisant of its own self as it is cognisant of an external object. And thus it (sic. the supersensuous intuition) is also proved by the evidence of perceptual intuition.

58. (Q) "The Lord of the world has these four (perfections) which are concomitant with his being, viz., knowledge, dispassion, power and righteousness—all untrammelled by fetters". Well, on the strength of this assertion, one may allow for omniscience in God and other divinities. But it is inconceivable in a human being, though endowed with learning and (appropriate) conduct. It has been verily contended by Kumāṛila: "Brahman, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara, of whom the Vedas are the (external) embodiment, may, for aught we know, be allowed to be omniscient. But how can omniscience be predicated of human being?" (TSa, v. 3208). (A) O thou defiled by the sin of the repudiation of an omniscient! Utterer of unutterable slander! Darest thou vilify them who are even the lords of gods on the pretext of censuring humanity? Thou might as well slander the Sumeru Mount (the abode of gods), and put it on the same level with a clod

of earth, on the ground of its earthy constitution, when thou daarest denigrate those (perfect souls), who, having enjoyed the fortune of the mastery of righteousness with its twenty-four excellences, have attained the ever blissful state of supreme Brahman, with the dissolution of all bonds of Karmic matter; who, having experienced the unparalleled happiness incident to celestial birth which they attained by dint of superabundance of merit of high order acquired in previous births, descended to the world of men with the mission of delivering the whole world of suffering souls submerged in the quagmire of misery after having scattered showers of nectar of happiness for the nonce in the hells; whose birth was celebrated (with festivities) by all the lords of gods whose thrones moved simultaneously with the birth of these blessed ones; in whose honour the gods assumed the role of menials, and vied with one another in offering their worshipful services; who discarded like a blade of grass the fortune of an empire with its superabundant glory, which automatically presented itself; who were equally impartial in their dealings with friend, foe, a gem and a blade of grass; who subdued, by their natural power, such calamities of the world as epidemics, *itis* (excess of rainfall, drought, rats, locusts, rapacious birds, the oppression of the military of the state as well as of an aggressor); who have burnt to cinders the destructive *karmas* by the fire of white (pure) meditation; who destroyed the progress of ignorance of the entire living creatures by dint of transcendent knowledge which illumined the whole order of existent and non-existent facts falling within its ken; who promulgated the path of righteousness in a language which transformed itself into the respective dialects of the peoples concerned from the preaching hall which was constructed by the gods and demons. Further, how can Brahman and the like spoil for the glorious possession of the empire of omniscience, who are vitiated by attachment, antipathy and ignorance, whose mental restraint is dependent upon such devices as the counting of a rosary, who bear arms of various descriptions and who are incessantly occupied

with the enjoyment of the persons of women and thus evince indelicate dispositions? As I have observed in a hymn: "In vain do the other divinities spoil for the highest sovereignty when they are forcibly vanquished by vanity, pride, sexual love, anger, avarice and a feeling of elation" (AV. 25).¹

If, on the other hand, Brahman and the rest be (held to be) free from the pollution of the faults of attachment and the like and be the perennial embodiment of knowledge and bliss, in that case, we will not enter a caveat against them. As I have observed (elsewhere): Whatever be thy creed, whatever be thy role, whatever be thy personality and whatever be thy name, if alone, thou, O Lord, art free from the taint of all imperfections, I offer my obeisance to thee (AV. 31). But in that case, the stories concerning the divinities such as Brahman as recorded in the *Vedas*, *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas* are to be condemned as false.

Thus the possibility of supersensuous knowledge has been established by means of positive proofs. (XV)

(*Aph.*) And also on account of the lack of contradictory proofs.
(XVII)

59. The construction is: 'it (omniscience) is established like pleasure and the like on account of the lack of well-attested contradictory grounds'. To be elaborate, let us pose the problem: What can be the proof contradictory of transcendent knowledge—perceptual cognition or some other organ? Perceptual cognition cannot furnish a contradiction as it is competent to record positive truth alone. As has been observed by (Kumārila) himself: Our senses such as the visual organ apprehend what is present and is in relation (with them) (ŚV, Sū IV, v 84).

60. Now, it is contended that the contradiction is furnished by sense-intuition not when it is in operation, but by the

1. Our author here loses all patience with the opponent and indulges in invectives which are not all parliamentary—a procedure of which we cannot approve according to our modern standards of debate.

same when it has ceased to operate. If, however, such negative evidence be supposed to have reference to a determinate sphere of space and time, we agree. If, on the contrary, it were supposed to have reference to the entire extent of space and time, it could not be effective without direct intuition of the whole race of mankind spread over all the divisions of space and time, and the admission of such possibility would only establish the position we seek to prove. Now it is not deemed possible that Jaimini or any other person should have the capacity to have intuition of all places and times on the ground of their being an ordinary human being or an ordinary animal, just like the man in the street. If, on the other hand, the superiority of those persons is inferred on the ground of their excellence of knowledge, why should not then a person having direct knowledge of all objects be inferred on that very ground? How can the opponent advance lack of perception as a proof contradictory of an omniscient when he does not admit its validity in proving his own thesis?

61. Nor again can inference be deemed to afford a contradictory proof in respect of that (an omniscient person). There can possibly be no inference without knowledge of the subject (minor term, *sic.* the omniscient person). If the knowledge of the subject be allowed, the organ of such knowledge would contradict the opposite finding of inference and thus would make the rise of such inference impossible. The contradictory inference might be put in the following syllogistic form: 'The person under dispute is not omniscient since he is a speaker, or a human being, just like the man in the street'. But this is an unsound argument. If the logical ground, *viz.*, 'speaker' be interpreted as 'the speaker of a fact known by an accredited organ' it would be a case of contradictory reason (since it will prove the very opposite conclusion) inasmuch as the quality of being a speaker of such truth is possible only in an omniscient person. If again, 'the speaker' be meant to be the speaker of a fact which does not exist in reality, the argument would be a case of proving

an admitted truth. It is admitted that a person who speaks what is contrary to the verdict of all organs of knowledge is not omniscient. The quality of being a mere speaker is inconclusive as a logical ground, since its absence from the opposite (sic. the omniscient) is a matter of doubt. It is common knowledge that the defects of the delivery of a speaker diminish in proportion to the growth of his knowledge and on the contrary the excellence of the speaker is seen to grow with the progress of knowledge. This (refutation of the logical ground, viz., 'being a speaker') would also serve to dismiss the validity of the other ground, viz., manhood. If manhood be undefiled by attachment and the like, then it would prove the opposite of the intended conclusion. Without omniscience it is not possible that a person can come into possession of knowledge, dispassion and such-like virtues. (If the denial of omniscience be based upon) manhood vitiated by such defects as attachment and the rest, it would be an instance of wasted labour as there is none to dispute its obvious truth. If the quality of manhood as such (be put forward as a contradictory ground) it is bound to fail, since the incompatibility (of manhood with omniscience)—the opposite (of what the opponent seeks to establish)—is a matter of doubt (as has been shown above that it is the speaking of untruth which is incompatible with omniscience and the speaking of truth, on the contrary, a necessary accompaniment of such perfection. This also holds good of manhood when it is absolved from the moral and intellectual limitations).

62. Nor again can a scriptural text be cited as an invalidating proof. If reliance be placed on uncreated impersonal scripture it would be to no purpose as uncreated scripture does not exist. Were (the Vedas) to be regarded as uncreated revelation, still there would be no difficulty since there is no text which is found to contradict the existence of an omniscient. As regards the scripture which owes its origin to an omniscient person how can it be supposed to contradict the possibility of omniscience (which is its very presupposition)? (The position is proved beyond

have reference to material object having shape and colour, then why should a difference be made between them? In reply to this question (the next aphorism) is stated.

(Aph). *The difference of the two consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject and object* (XIX)

67. There is a difference between the intuition called *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* owing to the difference in respect of purity and the rest, notwithstanding their community of nature in certain respects. Of these, the intuition of mental states is more lucid than visual intuition. The person possessing *avadhi* intuition cognises the mind-substances, but the person possessing the *manahparyāya* intuition knows the self-same objects in a more lucid form.

68. There is also a difference between them in reference to scope. The scope of *avadhi* intuition varies from an extremely minute part of an *aṅgula* (about $\frac{1}{4}$ of an inch) upto all the inhabited worlds. But the *manahparyāya* intuition is confined to the sphere inhabited by human beings.

69. There is difference also in reference to subject. *Avadhi* intuition is possible for living beings in all the four states (in the three different stages of spiritual progress, viz.,) restrained, unrestrained, and partially-restrained-cum-partially-unrestrained. But *manahparyāya* intuition is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of exalted conduct occupying any one of the stages of spiritual perfection ranging from the sixth to the twelfth, and even regarding these stages it is possible only for those whose spiritual development is continually on the wax; and with regard to the latter only those who are possessed of supernatural powers are entitled to this intuition and not any one else, and again it is possible only for a few and not all of them.

70. There is difference in reference to objects also. The jurisdiction of *avadhi* intuition is limited to material objects (with shape and colour) and that again not covering all their modes; but that of *manahparyāya* extends to by far the minuter parts called *ananta*. Here ends the discourse on transcendent intuition. (XIX)

71. Now we shall deal with empirical intuition.

(Aph). *Empirical intuition is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is of the nature of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, and retention. (XX)*

72. The senses are touch and the rest which will be defined later. The intuition which has for its condition the senses and the mind is called such. This clause is to be construed as an adjective to 'authentic definitive cognition of an object' which follows from the general definition (and is to be read into the present aphorism). Thus the definition of empirical intuition comes to be 'authentic definitive cognition which is conditioned by the senses and the mind'. Having stated its condition, he now states its nature as 'of the nature of determinate perception, etc'. Determinate perception and the rest will be defined. And the intuition which consists of these varieties is said to be of the nature of the same. The phrase 'of the nature of (the same)' is employed to demonstrate the fact that determinate perception and the rest do not absolutely differ from one another, but the antecedent variety only develops into the subsequent variety and thus all of them partake of the same essential nature. The term *sāṃvayavahārika* (rendered empirical) is derived from *sāṃvayavahāra* which means 'authentic activity by way of positive and negative endeavour' and thus the word *sāṃvayavahārika* comes to mean an intuition which leads to such activity as its result. The meaning of the phrase 'conditioned by a sense and the mind' is to be understood in both distributive and collective reference. It is said to be 'conditioned by a sense' when a sense plays a major part and the mind exerts influence in its generation; and it is said to be 'conditioned by the mind' when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity.

73. (Q) Now, self-cognition is a recognised variety of perceptual cognition. Why does the author omit its enumeration? (A) The objection cannot be advanced (with justification) inasmuch as the self-cognition relating to sense-perception is included in sense-perception; the self-cognition of the

perception of pleasure, etc., is conditioned by the mind and^e as such is subsumed under mental perception; the self-cognition of the transcendent perception of the ascetic is subsumed under the transcendent perception of the ascetic; as regards the self-cognition of the acts of recollection and the like, they are nothing but mental perceptions; and since there is no additional variety of perception called self-cognition, it has not been stated as a separate kind of perception (XX).

74. Senses have been referred to and the author now defines them.

(Aph.) *The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight, ear having respectively for their characteristic the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odour, coloured shape and sound. Each of these again is of two kinds, called substance and function.* (XXI)

75. The senses of touch, etc., are respectively those having the characteristic of the capacity of apprehending touch and the rest. The proof is as follows: Cognitions of touch and the like must be conditioned by relevant instruments, since they are acts like the act of cutting. *Indriyas* (senses) are so called because they have been produced by *indra* which means *karman*, since the senses are brought into being by manifestation of *nāma-karman* as their condition. The reason for their being named *indriyas* may also be due to the fact that they are the distinguishing marks of the self which is designated by the name *indra*. The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a self which is contaminated with *karman* and is thus unable to perceive things by itself.

76. (Q) The cognition of an object by the self, generated as it is by a mark. viz., a sense, should be regarded as inferential. Such being the case, the inference cannot arise if there be a lack of the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, the result would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. (A) The objection is baseless, since the

senses *qua* (spiritual) functions are intuited by themselves and so the consequence of infinite regress has no *raison d'être*. Or (an alternative explanation may be given): The senses are the marks of the self and as such they afford proof of the self's existence. It is universally seen that an instrument (and the sense is an instrument), like the carpenter's axe, is operated by an agent.

77. The senses again are divided into two categories, viz., substance and function. Of these, the sense *qua* substance is caused by the manifestation of the corresponding *nāma-karman*. The senses *qua* functions are brought into being by the subsidence and destruction of the obscuring *karman* and obstructive *karman* frustrating the relevant capacity. The present aphorism is a conglomeration of five aphorisms, viz., 'the sense of touch has the capacity of apprehending touch as its characteristic', 'the sense of taste has the capacity of apprehending taste as its characteristic' etc. The place of honour (in the order of enumeration) has been assigned to the sense of touch since it is universally present in all living beings subject to transmigration and as it pervades the whole body. And the respective positions in the order of enumeration of the senses of taste, sight and hearing are due to their incidence in progressively decreasing number of embodied beings.

78. Of these the sense of touch is born from the subsidence and destruction of the corresponding veiling *karman* and is present in such immobile creatures as earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied and air-bodied beings, and plants, which have the remaining senses veiled by obscuring *karman*. The existence of these creatures is established by the statement of authoritative scripture as follows: The earth-bodied being is stated to be animated with consciousness (DV. 4. 1). It is established by inference also. Consciousness must reach its lowest limit of diminution in some soul, since it is a determination admitting of progressive diminution, like magnitude. Now, (the living beings) in which the lowest limit of diminution is reached are immobile one-sensed creatures. It cannot be

legitimately urged that knowledge reaches its maximum diminution in burnt cinders since they lack even the sense of touch. There is absolute non-existence of consciousness in the latter and not a diminution of the same. And as magnitude which is seen to undergo diminution from the magnitude of space as its highest limit and reaches its maximum diminution in the atom, so also consciousness which is known to suffer diminution from its highest limit in perfect knowledge reaches its utmost culmination in one-sensed creatures. And it will be proved below that earth-bodied and the rest are living conscious beings. The two senses, viz. touch and taste, are present in such mobile creatures as Worms, Solecids (Vermes without lateral appendages), Annelids (ring-like vermes with unsegmented lateral appendages), Knotty-legged (Anthropoda), Conchifera, Pearl-mussel, helix, leeches and the like. The senses of touch, taste, and smell are present in ants (Formicidae) red-ants (*rohaṇikūs*), bugs and fleas (*upacikās*, *kunthus*, *tubarakas*, Hemiptera, Hemimetabola), cucumber, cotton-weevils and lice (Aptera), centipeds, *ayenakas*, Plant-lice (*tr̥ṇapatras*), *kāṣṭhāhūarakas* (Termites, white-ants), and the like. The sense of touch, taste, smell and sight are present in black-bees, *vaṭaras* (Wasps), *sāraṅgas* (Hornets), flies, gnats, gadflies mosquitoes, scorpions, spiders (*nandyāvartas*), butterflies and moths (*kīṭakas*), grasshoppers and locusts (*pataṅgas*), etc. These (four) combined with the sense of hearing are present in fish, apodal reptiles, limbed reptiles and Batrachians, birds, quadruped brutes belonging to the groups of subhuman species and in men, gods and denizens of hell without exception.

79. (Q) According to the philosophers of the Sāṅkhya school, there are five other organs, viz., the tongue, hands, feet, rectum and generative organ which are respectively the organs of speech, prehension, walking, evacuation and gratification. That being the case, why should the number of sense-organs be fixed at five only? (A) The question does not arise; only those which are the conditions of specific

"cognitions are treated of under the head of sense-organs in the present context. If the rank of sense-organs were accorded to them on the ground of their being instruments of particular varieties of physical action, the number of sense-organs would have to be extended indefinitely since no limit can be set to different kinds of action. It follows therefore from the specification of the individual senses that the number of sense-organs is only five (neither more nor less).

80. (As regards the relationship of these sense-organs) they can be regarded as mutually identical when viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity and can again be regarded as numerically different from one another if viewed from the standpoint of differential modes. If the identity (of the sense-organs) were absolute the consequence would be that the tactile organ could take cognisance of taste and the rest just as it does of touch. That again would make the postulation of other organs a superfluity. And further the perfection or partial defection of one would make the corresponding perfection and defection of others an inevitable consequence. And if, on the other hand, the mutual difference of these (organs) were absolute, they could not possibly co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgement involving reference to the identity of the different sense-data (e.g., the judgement 'I see what I touch') as is seen to be the case with reference to the organs of different persons. This (synthetic judgement in question) cannot be set down to the causality of the mind since it cannot produce such (a cognition) without the aid of sense-organs. Nor should it be contended that the mind aided by the sense-organ is the cause of this synthetic reference, since the question would arise, why should not (the mind) produce (the result) aided by the sense-organs of other subjects. (The opponent may retort that the question does not arise) since there is no relation (between the mind of one person and the sense-organ of another). But what is the kind of relation in question, if it be anything else than identity with one substance? (The

postulation of) any other kind of relation is (out of the question) since it is found to lack necessary concomitance (with synthetic judgement). The same (line of argument) would suffice to dismiss the theories of absolute difference and absolute identity of the senses with the self. If the senses were absolutely identical with the self, the former would function as the subject or the latter would function as the organs, or both would function in dual capacity, since there is no difference (in the relation of identity). If, on the other hand, the senses were absolutely different from the self, they could not be held to belong to the self as its organs, just as the senses of other subjects are not. Or, in the alternative, the reverse might be the case (i.e., the senses of A would be the senses of B and *vice versa*). It follows, therefore, that (the relation in question) should be accepted in terms of non-absolutist position (as neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical but both), which is endorsed by the verdict of experience which again is not liable to (be set aside by) an invalidating proof.

81. As regards (the relation of) the senses *qua* substance among one another and to the material atoms from which they are produced, it should also be understood in terms both of identity and difference from the same standpoint of non-absolutism, since the element of identity (of the senses) is intelligible in respect of the matter *qua* substance and the element of difference is intelligible (in respect of the same) *qua* modes.

82. The same (line of argument) would enable us to understand the dual relation of identity-cum-difference of the data of senses, e. g., touch and the rest *qua* substance and modes, as attested by experience uncontradicted by any other proof. It follows, therefore, that the datum of sense is neither a pure substance nor a pure mode, and this is corroborated by (the grammatical interpretation of the terms) *sparsā* and the like in the sense of object and act, (thus *sparsā* may mean an object of touch which is a substance and act *qua* touch which is a mode). (XXI).

83. It has been said (*sūtra* 21) that the senses are of two kinds, viz., as substance and function, and the author now propounds their respective definitions.

(*Aph.*) *The sense qua substance is material atoms as possessed of definite shape. (XXII)*

84. The singular number in the 'sense *qua* substance' has reference to the class character, the word 'definite' means 'specific' and relates to both internal and external (shape), and 'shape' means, 'particular structural arrangement', and so the whole expression 'as possessed of definite shape' comes to mean (that) 'the atoms having a specific structural arrangement' (are the sense *qua* substance). The (atoms) are called *pudgalāḥ* because they are subject to accretion (*pūraṇa*) and decomposition (*galana*). And they are possessed of the qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour. Thus, e.g., in the external combination of the atoms in the shape of an ellipse and the internal combination of the same in the globular shape of a *kaūmbaka* flower are both to be taken in their entirety as the sense *qua* substance and this is typical of the rest of the organs. The reason (of their being called substance) is that they are the same as the material substance. The term *dravya* in *dravyendriya* (rendered sense *qua* substance) may in the alternative be taken to connote inferiority as it is found in the proposition 'Aṅgāramardaka is a *dravyācārya* (inferior teacher)'. So the expression *dravyendriya* would mean 'an inferior sense-organ'. Its inferiority is due to the fact that even when it is in operation and the whole group of auxiliary conditions such as light, etc., are present intact, the cognition of touch and the like does not materialise without the arousal of the function-sense. (XXII)

(*Aph.*) *The function-sense is (of two kinds, viz.) attainment and conscious activity. (XXIII)*

85. 'Attainment' means acquisition (of the manifestation of the sense-activity) which consists in the subsidence-cum-destruction of a particular kind of *karman* which obscures knowledge. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to the former (i.e. attainment) owing to the

presence of which the self is directed to the substance-sense-organ roused to activity. Here also the singular number in the expression 'function-sense-organ' has reference to the class. The word 'function' (*bhāva*) has the sense of (actual) pre-eminence. Just as the individual who is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attribute of sovereignty (over gods and thus the predication of the attribute is not a case of false attribution by a rhetorical device) is called real functioning sovereign, so also (the changed state of the self) is called the real functioning sense when it is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attributes of 'being a sign of this self' and the like.

86. Of these (two function-senses), the sense *qua* attainment generates the capacity of the self to apprehend a relevant object and thus comes to exercise the role of a function-sense. The competence of the self for the apprehension of its object is (called) attainment, (the acquisition of which is necessary in view of the fact that) the said apprehension is not produced in a substance which is constitutionally incompetent for the same, e.g., space which is incapable of developing conscious activity). The sense *qua* conscious activity again is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. (The postulation of this conscious activity as sense is necessitated by the consideration that) the sensing of touch and the like by the tactile sense, etc., is not capable of revealing its object touch and the like unless it is appropriated by the conscious activity of the self; (otherwise) the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also would be an undeniable possibility.

87. (Q) The conscious activity (of the self) employed upon the sense-apprehension of a relevant object is rather the result, and as such cannot be regarded as an organ (which is necessarily of the nature of a condition). (A) The objection does not apply to the case since (it is a general rule that certain) attributes of the cause follow into the effect. There

is nothing repugnant in the fact that because fire has quality of illuminating things, the light of the lamp and the like which are its effects should also have the capacity. Nor is it admitted that conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result which might involve a contradiction. It becomes an organ in the capacity of the efficientmost instrument and becomes the result in the capacity of an act (both of which characters are discernible in it. (The matter becomes clear from the example of) a light which discharges the function of the efficientmost instrument in its character as an illuminator, and is the effect in its character as the act of illumination, and plays the role of an agent on account of its independent status. And all this is not at all difficult to vindicate from the position of non-absolutism and there is no necessity for further elaboration. (XXIII)

88. It has been said (in aphorism 20 that empirical intuition is) 'conditioned by the mind'. (And for its clarification the author now) proposes to give the definition of the mind.

(*Aph.*). *The mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects (of all the senses).* (XXIV)

89. All the objects (of all the senses)—and not specifically determined such as touch is of the tactile sense—are apprehended by the mind and so it is called 'the organ of apprehension of all the objects'. It is also designated as 'non-sense' (*anindriya*) or 'not-sense' (*no-indriya*). If the aphorism were worded simply as 'the mind is (cognisant of) all the objects', then this (definition of the mind) would also apply to the self, and so the phrase 'the organ of apprehension' (*grahṇam*) has been inserted in order to emphasise the instrumental character (of the mind). And thus the definition does not extend to the self which is but the agent. That the mind is cognisant of all sense-objects is a matter of common knowledge. As has been observed by Umāsvāti, the foremost of the *Vācakas*—(The object of) scriptural (cognition) is (the object) of the mind (TS. II. 22).² The term 'scriptural',

though it stands for a cognition having objective reference, here stands for object. The term 'scriptural' is typical of sensuous cognition also. Thus it comes to mean that whatever is the object of sensuous and non-sensuous cognition is also the object of the mind. It has been observed by the *Vācaka*: "The sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions have for their scope (all) substances though not with all their modes" (TS, I. 27). And it follows from this statement of the *Vācaka* that sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions jointly are cognisant of all objects, and thus *a fortiori* the mind is also proved to be cognisant of all things.

90. The mind is also of two kinds, just like the five senses, according as it differs as substance and function. The mind *qua* substance is nothing but substantive matter transformed into it (viz., the mind-substance). The mind *qua* function is the attainment (*labdhi*) consisting in the subsidence-cum-destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman* and the specific activation of the self apt to apprehend its object (*upayoga*). (XXIV)

91. (Q) Well, the statement (of the etiology of sensuous cognition) 'it is conditioned by a sense and the mind' is extremely inadequate. Thus, for instance, visual cognition has for its additional conditions (the presence of) the object and light. As has been remarked "The (visual) cognition is produced by the coloured object, light, attention and visual organ (all combined), just as fire is produced by (the combination of) the lens, the solar ray and dried cow-dung". In answer to this, (the author) says:

(Aph.) *The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference between the two.* (XXV)

92. The external object and light are not the direct cause of visual cognition, though it is not denied that they are remote conditions just as time, space and the like are. It is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of subsidence-cum-destruction of the knowledge-obscuring

karman, and also (of indirect service) by benefiting the visual organ like a collyrium-paint. (Q) But why should not they be held to be the direct cause (of the visual cognition) ? The answer is: 'because there is no concomitance in difference between them'. Certainly the method of agreement which consists in (the observation) that 'A is followed by B' is not alone competent to determine the relation of cause and effect, but it must be supplemented by the method of difference which consists in (observing) that the absence of A is followed by the absence of B. But this (concomitance in difference) is not observed so as to ensure the causality of the object and light. For example, it is observed that the cognition of water takes place in mirage in the desert in spite of the absence of water in it and cats and the like have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness. And regarding the intuition of past and future events by ascetics, how can objects have any causal efficiency ? (The admission of past and future events) exercising causal efficiency (which is a criterion of existence) as condition (of intuition) would on the contrary (invest them with existence and) make them cease to be past and future.

93. Nor can it be maintained that the capacity for illumination possessed by the illuminator is nothing but its individual being that is derived from the object to be illuminated, since it is definitely observed that light, though not engendered from the jar and the like, does actually illuminate them. And how can the opponent (sic. Naiyāyika who believes sense-intuition to be generated by an objective datum) allege that the intuition of God, which is (believed to be) eternal, is generated by an object ? And as regards ordinary human beings like us the theory that it is only the generator (of cognition) which can be the object of cognition would necessarily lead to the rejection of the validity of such organs of knowledge as memory and recognition. (The object of these cognitions is a past datum which cannot be supposed to exert its influence upon them as their generating

condition), Regarding the view (of the Buddhists) who maintain that an existent is absolutely momentary and that the cognitum is (necessarily) the generator (of the cognition in question, it would suffice to point out that) in this theory the cognition and its object which are supposed to be related as effect and cause respectively cannot possibly stand in the relation of cogniser and cognitum on account of their being separated by an interval of time. It may be maintained that the relation of cognitum and cogniser subsisting between cognition and its object is not anything distinct and different from the relation of causality unlike the relation between a pair of pincers and an iron ball, and this (position has been endorsed) by the argument (of Dharmakīrti), viz., "How can a thing occurring at a point of time different (from that of the cognition) be the object (of such a cognition) ? The answer is that the philosophers who are conversant with the rationale (of the origin of knowledge) affirm that the character of being a cognitum consists in nothing but the causal efficiency of the object to imprint its likeness on the cognition concerned" (PV. III. 247). If that (be the true position), then the intuition of an omniscient would under no circumstance be supposed to be conversant with an object present at the time. inasmuch as a present datum (synchronizing with it) cannot be its cause and what is not a cause cannot be thought (*ex hypothesi*) to be the object of the cognition. The problem again deserves the serious consideration (of the opponent) as to how can a cognition exercise its self-intuitive function, that is to say, how can a cognition become its own cogniser ungenerated as it is by itself and how again can the self of a cognition be its object (though it is not its generator) ? The conclusion, therefore, legitimately follows from the above considerations that cognition and its object derive their existence from their own causes and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated just like the light of the lamp and the jar. And this knocks down the plea that the objective datum and light are the causal conditions of (perceptual) cognition.

²⁴ 94. (O) If a cognition be not causally conditioned by its object what will be the means of determining the relation of cognition and cognitum ? The determination of this relation finds an easy explanation in the theory which holds that cognition is an effect and a copy of the object. (The opposite theory fails to explain) how can a cognition which is neither produced by nor is a copy of its object (have reference to that particular object) when (as a pure act of awareness without any intrinsic specific determination) it can unreservedly relate to all possible things. (A) The position is not so (desperate). That a cognition reveals a particular determinate object is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*, which constitutes its specific competency and the relation of causality has no bearing upon it. The postulation of competency is, on the contrary, inevitable even in the theory of causality; otherwise there would be no explanation possible of the determination that a particular cognition is generated by a particular object though an infinite number of objects is present there (to any one of which it could be affiliated). As regards the sameness of structural form (of the cognition) it cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis that it is transferred by the object to the cognition concerned, as this would deprive the physical object of its own structure. And what again can be the kind of similarity between a physical object which possesses spatial dimension and a psychical act of cognition which lacks spatial dimension? And so (the similarity of structural form) must be understood to be nothing other than the transition (of consciousness as such) into the cognition of a particular object. And so the plea (of Dharmakīrti) "Consciousness is brought into relation with a physical object by means of structural similarity and never without it" (PV. III, 305) is bereft of all substance.

95. Further, let us consider whether the two factors (causality and structural similarity) are jointly or severally the conditions of (objective) cognition. If the latter alternative (i.e., causality or structural similarity) were determinant of

the cognitive relation), then the parts of the jar in the first moment (of their origin) should be cognisant of the whole jar in the last moment, or, the moon's reflection in water should be cognition of the moon in the firmament, as (in the former case) the two phenomena stand in the relation of causality and (in the latter case) structural similarity subsists (between the two). If both of them collectively (determined the same), then the jar in the subsequent moment should be held to be cognisant of the jar in the previous moment (the former being both an effect as well as a structural facsimile of the latter). If it is held that the two factors operate as the conditions of cognition only when they relate to states of cognition (and thus the alleged consequences are ruled out), then a subsequent cognition which is homogeneous with the immediately precedent cognition which generates it should be cognisant of the latter. Thus (on the scrutiny of the opponent) we do not find anything else than competency to be the condition of cognition. (XXV)

96. It has been observed before that (empirical intuition consists) of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement and retention and now with reference thereto he defines determinate perception and the rest.

(Aph.) Determinate perception is the cognition of the object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate intuition upon the contact of the sense-organ with an object. (XXVI)

97. Sense-organ is of two kinds—the material organ and the (psychical) function. The object is a composite of substance and modes. The 'contact' between them is a relation (which in the ultimate analysis transpires to be) a sort of competency constituted by the situation (of the object) in a spatio-temporal context which is neither too far, nor too near, nor intercepted (by an obstructive barrier). And this (competency) of the sense and object is a specifically determinate (characteristic). Thus has it been observed "One hears a word when it is in conjunction (with the auditory organ) but sees a coloured shape even without

conjunction" (ĀN, 5) and so on. Now, indeterminate intuition is the cognition of an object which leaves the specific determinations out of account and it takes place (immediately) on that very sense-object contact. The expression 'which follows in the wake of that (indeterminate intuition)' serves to show the chronological order. This further elucidates the fact that indeterminate intuition is (the stuff which is) transformed into determinate perception. It is a truism that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing absolutely existent suffers destruction. Thus indeterminate intuition itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state (sic. determinate perception). (In the phrase 'the cognition of the object'), object stands for an entity which consists of substance and modes, capable of exercising causal efficiency, and 'the cognition' is to be understood as definitive cognition in pursuance of the wording of the general definition (sic.) 'authentic definitive cognition' which runs down (to the present aphorism). So determinate perception is not (to be confounded with) mere indeterminate cognition.

98. This (determinate perception) must not be held to be a mental construction, since it depends (for its existence) on the active exercise (lit. vicinity) of the sense-organ such as sight and also because it is not liable to be corrected by discursive thought. A mental construction, on the other hand, is cancelled by discursive thought. But this (determinate perception) is not so (found to be cancelled by discursive thought) and consequently it cannot be a mental construction. (XXVI)

(Aph.) Speculation is inquisitive pursuit (for the knowledge) of specific details of the perceived datum. (XXVII)

99. On the determinate perception of an objective datum, for example a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound emanates from a conch or a horn, and the mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference in the form (of the judgement) 'it is perceived as

sweet and agreeable which qualities 'belong to the sound of a conch and not as harsh and shrill which are the qualities of the sound of a horn'. The mental urge as embodied in the aforementioned consideration is called speculation. It is absolutely certain that doubt crops up in the interval between determinate perception and speculation even when the object is a matter of habitual perception. But its existence is not detected owing to the rapidity (of the succession). But it is not valid knowledge, since it lacks the (fundamental) characteristic of being authentic and definitive cognition.

100. (Q) It will be stated later on that there is a species of non-perceptual organ of knowledge called *ūha*, reasoning. What then is the difference from that (reasoning) of this speculation? (A) Reasoning is the organ competent for the realisation of universal concomitance between the probans and the probandum and has reference to all the three divisions of time (sic. past, present and future) The logicians affirm that the subject while apprehending the universal concomitance exercises this organ and appears to attain to the level of (supernatural intuition of) an ascetic. But speculation takes stock of things existing in the present time and is a species of perceptual cognition and thus there is no room for (the charge of) repetition.

101. Though speculation is said to be of the nature of conation, it appertains to the conscious self and thus must be of the nature of cognition. It stands to reason then that it should be considered as a species of perceptual cognition. One should not however call in question its title to validity on the ground that it is of the nature of indeterminate cognition, since it is a fact that it is a determinate cognition in regard to its own subject matter. If the lack of analogy with other instances of determinate cognition were the ground (of this allegation), the accepted instances of determinate cognition would be liable to be (condemned as) indeterminate in character (on the ground of difference from speculation). (XXVII)

- (Aph.) *Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation.*
(XXVIII)

102. Perceptual judgement is the (final) determination of the specific characteristic regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition 'the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn.' (XXVIII)

(Aph.) *Retention is the condition of memory.*

103. The condition is the causal stuff capable of change (into the effect) as memory which consists in the recollection of a past event. It is nothing but the latent mental trace (left over as legacy by previous experience). Retention is thus the continued existence of a cognition for an (indefinite) length of time which has been designated as *saṅkhyeya* or *asaṅkhyeya*. The trio consisting of determinate perception and the rest (viz., speculation and perceptual judgement) can exist for a period of time varying from a mathematical instant to a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes) minus one instant.

104. The latent mental trace should be deduced to be a species of cognition from the fact that it is a species of perceptual cognition. It must not, on the contrary, be supposed as has been done by a class of philosophers (Vaiśeṣikas) that it is different from cognition as such and so called (by a different name, viz.,) *bhāvanā* (a sort of psychic leaven). If it were not cognitional in character, it could not produce recollection which is a species of cognition. Certainly one kind of existence cannot be transformed into another (opposite) kind of existence. If, on the contrary, it were non-cognitive in nature, it could not possibly be an attribute of the self, since it is a truism that the characteristic of a conscious entity cannot be unconscious *per se*.

105. (Now a problem arises in this connection). The older Jaina masters assert that absence of lapse is also a case of retention. The following statement of the *Bhāṣyakāra* "absence of lapse is retention" (VĀBh, 180) (may be quoted

in support). How then (in the face of such declaration) have you stated in the aphorism that the condition of memory alone is retention? (A) True, there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention. But this is included within the fold of perceptual judgement and for this reason it has not been separately mentioned. Perceptual judgement when protracted for a length of time is entitled retention *qua* freedom from lapse. Or, as freedom from lapse is also a condition of memory, it has been included under retention (as defined by us). It is positive that mere perceptual judgement bereft of absence of lapse does not give rise to recollection. Perceptual judgements which are not subjected to attentive reflection are almost on the level of (unheeded cases of perception) as the touch of grass by a man in (hurried) motion and such cases of cognition are not found to give rise to any recollection. Thus there is no occasion for complaint as this (aphorism in question) includes both 'absence of lapse' and 'mental trace' as the conditions of recollection. Although recollection itself has been affirmed to be a species of retention in authoritative texts, it has not been mentioned in the aphorism, since it is an instance of non-perceptual knowledge (and as such is not relevant to the present context). Thus all the relevant issues have been elucidated.

106. Now, in the present context one should take clear cognisance (of the fact) that there is somehow a thread of unity which runs through the different stages of perceptual cognitions, *sic*. determinate perception and the rest in spite of their occurrence in succession. It is certain that the presence of contradictorily opposed attributes is an impediment to the knowledge of identity; but such occurrence does not operate as an impediment in the case of an object which is apprehended by an accredited organ of knowledge. It is a commonplace of experience that the self-same consciousness is felt to be vested with such (apparently) incompatible states as pleasure and pain and so on. How is it that the Buddhists who are notorious for their horror of (contradiction in) the

- the juxtaposition of opposite attributes, do admit (the validity of) the unitary cognition of variegated carpet, with its obvious reference to unity and multiplicity of the same? And how do again the Naiyāyikas and their allies admit the possibility of a diversified colour?

107. The Naiyāyikas propound the definition of perceptual cognition in the following terms: The unerring cognition that is produced by sense-object contact is perceptual and it is (both) indeterminate and determinate (NS, I. 4). Now scholars of eminence with Trilocana and Vācaspati in the vanguard have set their face against the interpretation of the *sūtra* by the previous exponents and sought to propound their interpretation in the following terms. They contend that the definition of perceptual cognition is (summed up in the clause). "That unerring cognition which is produced by sense-object contact is perceptual" (and the rest is only an elaboration). (Now these exponents propose to) read (into the aphorism the term) 'whence' as an ellipsis and on the strength (of the dictum) that (the relative and demonstrative pronouns) 'which' and 'that' stand universally and necessarily in relation (they further supply the term 'that' and they interpret the aphorism thus completed as follows): (The source) 'from which' the cognition as qualified by the aforesaid adjectives is engendered, that (source), in other words, the instrument of such cognition, be it of the nature of cognition or different from it, is the organ of cognition known as perceptual. Now the cognition resulting from it is possibly of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate. The statements of the classification (in the aphorism) as indeterminate and determinate is intended to bring home the fact that the instruments of both such cognitions are to be regarded as organs of knowledge.

108. Now, the attempt to invest such non-cognitive facts as sense-object contact with the status of organ of knowledge is (extremely) unjustifiable, particularly when it seeks to achieve this end by resort to the tortuous stratagem of supplying an ellipsis in (flagrant) disregard of the claim to

validity of both these kinds of cognition. How can sense, object contact and the like which are not of the nature of cognitions function as efficientmost instruments of the determination of object, lacking as they are in necessary concomitance, since the cognition of object fails to materialise in spite of the sense-object contact being present and is seen to emerge into being only when there is a cognition at the back of it? An instrument is what is the efficientmost condition and immediately produces the effect.

109. If, again, the sense-object contact is something different from the aptitude (of the sense-organ) and is deemed to be of the nature of relation like conjunction, then certainly no such contact with the object is possible for the organ of sight which acts from distance, aloof and out of contact. It is a matter of observation that things are perceived by sight even when they are intercepted by such transparent media as glass, mica and lens. If you contend that the organ of sight is an instrument and as such it can work only in close contact like (other instruments such as) the carpenter's axe, (it can be easily refuted by citing the case of) the magnetic stone which attracts iron, though out of touch with it—which shows that the concomitance in question is not universal. It is not possible to suppose that there is an actual contact between them in the shape of conjunction-cum-conjunction through a medium (e.g., A is in conjunction with B and B with C and so A is in mediate conjunction with C. In the present case the magnet may be supposed to be indirectly conjoined with iron through the space which connects both at the two ends). Such indirect relation is available everywhere (even as between facts which do not stand in causal connection).

110. The Buddhists again have propounded the definition (of perceptual cognition in the proposition) "Perceptual cognition (is a cognition which) is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous" (NB, 1.4). "The conceptual construction is a cognition the content of which is liable to be associated with verbal expressions. And the cognition which is untainted with such conceptual construction

is to be understood as the meaning of the clause 'which is free from conceptual construction' " (NB, 1. 5. 6). This definition of an organ of knowledge is irrational, since it has no bearing upon practical activity. In support of our position we need only observe that philosophers set about the task of evaluating the likely definitions of knowledge as an organon, with the sole object in view that persons, desirous of practical advantages, may be directed to the pursuit of objects capable of yielding such benefits and be saved from disappointment. The labour involved in the philosophical examination of the definition which is devoid of all practical consequences is as infructuous as the speculation regarding the existence or otherwise of the teeth of a crow. If, on the other hand, the practical activity is supposed to be conditioned by determinate knowledge which occurs subsequently to the indeterminate cognition, the consideration (of equity) would rather make it inevitable that all validity should be set down to the credit of determinate cognition. The postulation of indeterminate cognition (as an intermediary link), which is as inoperative as Śikhaṇḍin, is an absolute superfluity.

111. The followers of Jaimini, on the plea (of eliminating those sources of knowledge) which are not organs (of the knowledge) of religious duty set forth the definition of perceptual cognition rather by way of reproduction of a known fact (than as an original contribution) in the following terms: "The cognition which is engendered in (the mind of) a person upon the actual contact of sense-organs (*satsamprayoge*) is perceptual (awareness) and being awareness of an object existing at the present moment, it is not a competent organon (for religious duty)" (MS. I. 1. 4). So has it been observed (by Kumārila): Such being the case, it is possible to regard the definition as the reproduction of a known fact (ŚV, sū 4, 39). It has been interpreted as follows: The cognition that occurs to a subject as a sequel to the contact of sense-organs is perceptual (awareness).

112. Now the definition is too wide inasmuch as it overlaps such cognitions as doubt and illusion which also occur as

the result of sense-contact and thus should, (in terms of the definition), be accepted as instances of perceptual cognition. If the term 'actual contact' be interpreted as contact with actually existent datum, it would lead to the exclusion of the cases of hallucination alone which are unfounded on reality and come into being independently of an objective datum. It will fail to exclude doubt and illusion which are based upon real data. Again, if the phrase, 'upon actual contact' (*satsamprayoge*), be interpreted as 'upon the happening of the contact as an antecedent event' (*sati samprayoge*) and thus the locative construction (in the original Sanskrit) be not surrendered at all, the prefix 'sam' (actual) in the term *samprayoge* (contact) may be deemed competent for the exclusion of doubt and illusion. And exactly this has been proposed (by Kumāṛila in the following) : The prefix 'sam' (actual) has the sense 'authentic' and thus serves to preclude (the cases of) defective contact. (Thus for instance), the contact with shell, which gives rise to the visual preception of silver is debarred since it is vitiated by a defect (ŚV, sū 4, 38-9). [The proposed interpretation is open to grave objection]. The authenticity of contact is a supersensuous fact and so cannot be known by perceptual intuition. It must be admitted that the knowledge (in question) can be had by (inference based on) the effect. The effect here is the (perceptual) cognition and certainly it is not competent to produce the assurance of the authenticity of the contact unless it is qualified (by a restricting adjective). But as the definition stands, there is no such word present in it as can be understood as its qualifying adjective. (The term *satsamprayoge*, on the actual contact, should be analysed as *satā samprayoge* (on the contact with actually present objects) and this would serve to exclude (subjective) objectless cognitions. The construction with the term *sati* is redundant, since its purpose is served by the locative case-ending (in *samprayoge*).

113. One exponent (Śabara) seeks to make out the definition free from all faults (by proposing a change in the

syntactical construction) through the transposition of the words *tat* and *sat* (in the aphorism) as follows: *tatsamprayogesatpratyakṣam*, and he interprets the changed definition thus. The cognition which is engendered in a person upon the actual contact of the sense-organ with the fact which is the object of resulting cognition is authentic perception; the cognition, on the contrary, of an object which is different from that with which the sense is in contact is not (authentic) perception (ŚB, I. 15). But the result achieved is nothing more than a tortuous exposition (which effects no improvement), since it fails to remove the contingency of its extension to doubt. Now in doubt, the sense is certainly in contact with the objective datum which is the object of the resulting cognition. Though doubt is a cognition of two objects, yet it is undeniably a fact that the sense is in contact with one of the objects concerned. Doubt being cognisant of two alternative objects, it is absolutely positive that it has for its object that very fact with which the sense, say sight, is in actual contact. Thus the definition fails to avoid its unwarranted extension. The definition again lies exposed to the charge of being too narrow, since it fails to include visual perception which is not the result of sense-contact. That the organ of sight functions independently of actual contact with the object has been established before.

114. The older exponents of Sāṅkhya define perceptual cognition to be a modification of the sense-organ, such as the organ of hearing and to be indeterminate. Now, the sense-organs beginning with the organ of hearing are devoid of consciousness and it follows *a fortiori* that a modification of such organs must be devoid of consciousness. How can then such modification serve as an organ of knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle (sic. self), it stands to reason that the status of an organ of knowledge should rather be accorded to the conscious self. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that

indeterminate cognition is an organ of knowledge. This (definition under review) is thus found to be hollow.

115. Īśvarakṛṣṇa propounds the definition of perception in the following terms: Perception is the determinate cognition of its specific object (*protiviṣayādhyavasāyah*). This also is not a proper definition on account of its undue extension to inference. It may, however, be contended that the word 'prati' (rendered specific) here stands for 'position in the front' and thus perception is the determinate cognition of an object standing in front. But this also is on the same level with inference. Just as the perception 'this is a jar' refers to the object present in the front, so also the inference 'this hill is possessed of fire' (has reference to an object standing in front and thus there would be no difference between perception and inference). It may be held that determinate cognition of an object in the front as distinguished from inference is to be understood as perceptual cognition. But in that case there would be no necessity for setting forth the definition of perception as the proposed (definition) would be automatically known by virtue of its mere difference from the definitions of verbal and inferential cognitions.

116 Now, it follows (from the examination of) the definitions propounded by rival philosophers which have been found to be vitiated (by some defect or other) that the definition of perception (proposed by us) viz., that which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition' is (the only possible definition which is) free from censure. (XXIX)

117. (The knowledge of) reality is summed up under the four topics, viz., knowledge, the object of knowledge, the result (of knowledge) and the subject. And so the definition of organ of knowledge is bound to remain incomplete unless the definition of the object and the rest are known. Accordingly the author proposes to define the object (as follows).

(Aph.) *The object of an organ of knowledge is the real which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. (XXX)*

118. Though it is perceptual cognition that is the subject matter of consideration and accordingly such issues as the definition of the object and the result of the same should alone be considered in the present context, yet the expression 'an organ of knowledge' (in the aphorism) stands for the whole class. In consideration of the fact that there is no difference (in this respect among the several kinds of organs of knowledge) it is appropriate that the definition of the object etc. of the other kinds of organs of knowledge, as of perceptual cognition, should also be stated here and this procedure would have the further advantage of logical economy. The expression 'organ of knowledge' (in the aphorism) stands for the whole class and so includes all the varieties of knowledge, perceptual and the rest, and the object of all these is a real which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. The term *dravya* (rendered substance) is derived from √*dru* (to go) and etymologically means that which runs through the different modes—which sets forth the characteristic of persistence. It thus ultimately transpires to be the vertical universal which is revealed by the cognition of its identity running (in succession) through the antecedent and subsequent states. The term *ṣaṇyā* (rendered mode) etymologically denotes the state which has the characteristics of coming into existence and ceasing to be (in succession). The real which is of the nature of substance and mode (*dravyaṣaṇyātmakam*) thus comes to mean that which has the former (sic. identity) and the latter two (coming into existence and ceasing to be) as constitutive of its nature. The term real thus means what is truly existent as an objective fact (in its own right). This has been endorsed by *Vācākamukhya* (in the aphorism) "Real is that which is endowed with origin, cessation and persistence" (TS, V. 29) and also by the following statement of *ṣaṇyā* "Real originates, ceases and is continuous".

119. The incorporation of 'substance-cum-mode' (in the definition) serves to counteract the conception of the object of knowledge as exclusively substance and as pure mode

respectively advocated by the philosophers (of the Sāṅkhya and Buddhist schools). The insertion of the term 'nature' is intended for the refutation of the conception of the object sponsored by the adherents of Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda who maintain that substance and modes are absolutely different from one another. (The following statement of) Siddhasena lends support (to our position): Ulūka has built his system in pursuance of both *nayas* (points of view), yet it is vitiated by untruth, because he has advocated that substance and modes are mutually independent and that each is supreme in its own sphere (ST, III. 49). (XXX)

120. But what is the reason that the real which is the object of the organs of knowledge should be only a complex of substance-cum-mode and neither pure substance nor pure mode nor both independent of each other? In reply the author states:

(Aph.) Because of the capacity for the generation of practical consequences. (XXXI)

121. Practical consequences are of the nature of acceptance and avoidance and the like. 'Generation' means production. The capacity for such is possible only in a real which is a complex of substance-cum-mode. (Hence the impossibility of alternative conceptions above referred to). (XXXI)

122. Granted that this is the case; but what consequences would you deduce therefrom? In reply to such a question he states:

(Aph.) Because reality has that for its characteristic. (XXXII)

123. 'That' (in the aphorism) means capacity for generating a practical consequence. 'Characteristic' means the peculiar nature. So the expression 'has that for its characteristic' is equivalent to 'has capacity for generating a practical consequence as its peculiar nature'. The fact of having this is the reason (for the exclusion of the opposite views). What

Does it pertain to ? It pertains to the real, i.e., the fact which is possessed of independent existence. The meaning (of the whole aphorism) is this: It is invariably the case that every person engages in the pursuit of an organ of knowledge only when he is impelled by the desire for the acquisition of a practical consequence, in the hope that he will be able to satisfy his requirement by finding the object capable of yielding the (desired) consequence with the aid of such knowledge, and not wantonly (without regard for practical consequence). It is a truism that if (the subject is persuaded that) the object of an organ is not capable of satisfying a requirement he will not set any store by the pursuit of such an organ. As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti): "What will a person have to do with the examination of an object which is incapable of yielding the consequence of which he is in quest ? What can a woman in love gain from the examination of the beauty or ugliness of an impotent man ?" (PV, I. 215).

124. Now, regarding the (character of reality) it must be held that a real which is exclusively of the nature of substance cannot be possessed of causal efficiency. How can a substance, having a static identity which does not admit of lapse or growth in being, exercise any causal efficiency which is possible either in succession or in non-succession, since there is no *terium quid* in between two mutually exclusive opposites ? Of these two, the alternative of succession is out of the question. A substance will perforce discharge in the very time of executing its primal causal operation all the operations which are (as a matter of fact) due in other times, since there is no reason for an entity which is fully endowed with the relevant capacity to wait idly and let the opportunity slip. On the contrary, a thing which waits for a lapse of time is to be condemned of incapacity. It might be contended that though possessed of capacity, it actually produces its relevant consequences only when it comes to be associated with the relevant set of auxiliary conditions. But the contention is suicidal, since in that case the entity in question would have

to be denied the capacity which is admitted to be vested in an entity needing the association of other factors. Have you not heard the dictum: That which stands in need of others is incapable? (MBh, III 1.8). It might be further argued that the entity (*qua* cause) does not stand in need of the auxiliaries, but it is only the effect, which does not come into being in the absence of auxiliaries, that requires (the presence of) these (ancillary conditions). But the question arises, is the entity concerned incapable (of the effects in question)? If it is conceded to be possessed of the capacity why should it wait in indifference for the effects which are condemned to look forward in utter helplessness to the emergence of the auxiliary conditions, and not, on the contrary, produce the effects on the spur of the moment? It has been argued that the seed which is quite endowed with the causal capacity is seen to produce sprout only when it is associated with the auxiliary conditions, such as soil, water and so on and not otherwise. In that case the question pertinently arises whether the auxiliaries are of any service to the basal cause or not. If they render no service, why should it not persist in the state of neutrality as before? If they are supposed to render some service, the question has to be decided (how does the service in question relate to the basal entity)? Does the service rendered by them become identical or remain numerically different? If the relation be one of absolute identity, (the issue transpires that) it is the basal cause that is produced and this puts (the opponent in the position of a merchant) who invested his money for profit but eventually lost even the capital. If the service under consideration maintains its numerical difference, how can it (be supposed to) relate to that (main cause)? (If that is not a bar), what would prevent such a relationship between the Vindhya and Sahya (the mountain ranges of the Eastern and Western Ghats)? It may be urged that one (A) belongs to the other (B) by virtue of a definite relation in which it stands to the other. (Granted), but what is the relation between service and receiver of service? It cannot be con-

tactual conjunction, since it is possible only between two substances. Nor can it be inherence, since (*ex hypothesi*) it is present everywhere in like manner and there is no gulf of separation to cut off its incidence and thus it does not seem logically justifiable that it should function as a relation between determinate terms. And even if this were allowed to be possible, it must be admitted that the terms render some service to it (sic. inherence). Such being the case, the dilemma regarding the relation of the service in question in terms of identity or difference would emerge in the same way as before. If the service produced were regarded as identical with inherence, it would be (tantamount to the admission that it is inherence that has been brought into being. And if the service in question were to remain different and aloof, inherence could not be supposed to behave as a relation between determinate terms. It would be a poor defence to argue that relation of substantive and adjective determines its specific incidence, for the former relation also cannot function as a determinate condition unless there be a relation of benefactor and beneficiary between them at its back. And the admission of an actual benefit accruing will open the gate to the old dilemma based on difference and identity for making a fresh appearance. (The conclusion) therefore (irresistibly follows that) an entity absolutely eternal is not capable of exercising a causal activity in succession.

125. Nor again does it fare better in non-succession. It is not endorsed by experience that a self-identical entity simultaneously discharges all the functions which are due to occur in all the divisions of time. Let it be supposed that it does not do so. What will it do in the second moment? If it does anything, the difficulties incident to the alternative, viz., successive discharge of causal efficiency will reappear. And if it does not do anything (at the second moment), it would forfeit its claim to reality being destitute of causal efficiency (which is the criterion of reality). The exercise of causal activity is determined by succession and non-succession (as its determinant concomitants). The absence of these

determinant concomitants ascertained on the evidence of the non-observation of them entails as its consequence the absence of causal activity in the absolutely eternal entity, and this absence of causal activity) in its turn proves the absence of the agent of causal activity. This (lack of causal agency) necessarily involves the lack of existence which is its determinate concomitant. Thus an absolutely unchanging substance transpires to be a non-entity.

126. An entity again (supposed to be) of the nature of an absolute mode is no more capable of exercising its causal activity in succession inasmuch as it is liable to perish in the immediately succeeding moment and as such succession either in respect of time or of space is not possible (of being predicated of it). In fact, occupation of different points of space and occurrence at different moments of time which are possible only for an enduring entity, are respectively designated as spatial and temporal succession, and certainly such characteristics are not predicable of an absolutely perishable entity. As has been aptly observed (by some one): "Whatever is in a point of space is exclusively there alone and whatever is at a moment of time is also exclusively thereat. Thus it is not possible for entities to continue through different points of space and time".

127. Nor is succession possible of preceding and succeeding moments in the role of a continuum, since continuum is an unreal (abstraction). And if it were supposed to be a reality and at the same time momentary in duration, it would not have any difference from the constituent moments (and so the impossibility of historical continuity will not be transcended). If (the continuum were) not momentary, the doctrine of absolute modes would have a happy defence indeed ! As has been said (by Jayantabhaṭṭa): "If, on the other hand, you admit an absolutely real and eternal entity which you call by the name of continuum, then arise, O monk ! your hopes have indeed borne fruit. The doctrine of momentariness of things has received the finishing blow (once for all)" (NM, p.464).

128. The other alternative of the exercise of causal efficiency in non-succession is no more tenable of a momentary entity. If the selfsame moment called colour which is supposed to produce the taste-moment and others is to produce all these diverse results in and through a self-identical nature, the effects should in all logical propriety be identical being produced by a self-identical nature. If, on the contrary, the cause is thought to produce (all the diverse effects) through diverse natures according as it functions as a material cause and as an auxiliary condition (in respect of the diverse effects), then the question will arise whether these natures are integral to that (cause) or not integral. If they were not integral (to the cause), they would not constitute the nature of the latter. And if they are constitutive of the very nature of the cause, then either of these two consequences would become irresistible. This (cause) would be as diverse (as the natures) or the natures in question would become as simple an identity (as the cause would be, if it never abandoned its simplicity). If again, it is thought that what plays the role of a material cause in one context plays also the role of an auxiliary condition in another and thus diversity of nature be admitted, then there would be nothing (repugnant in the supposition) that an eternal and uniform entity also executes diverse effects in succession without undergoing change of nature and without giving rise to the consequence of the effects being identical in nature. If it is contended that the latter (hypothesis) is untenable on the ground of the impossibility of the production of successive effects simultaneously from a non-successive (cause), owing to the (palpable) contradiction involved (in the supposition) that one simple self-identical cause should simultaneously produce diverse effects which are (as a matter of fact) capable of being produced by a number of diverse causes, (the same difficulty) would make the production of diverse effects by a momentary entity all at one time equally an impossibility. Thus the determinant concomitants (of production), namely succession and non-succession, are found.

to be impossible in a real supposed to be absolutely of the nature of a (momentary) mode, and this (impossibility) makes the production of an effect which is its determinate concomitant impossible. The absence of this (productive activity) entails the absence of reality (in an absolutely momentary mode) in pursuance of the law that the lack of the evidence of the presence of the determinant (takes away the warrant of the presence of the determinate). (Thus the theory of reality) consisting entirely in a mode is found to be unsound.

129. Now the followers of Kaṇāda admit (the reality of) both substance and modes. (Of these) earth and the rest are substances, being receptacles of qualities and the like. Qualities and actions are the modes being contents thereof. Of them some are transitory, some endure as long as the substance and some are eternal. Now these philosophers cannot be regarded as exponents of the true nature of reality, since they assert that substrates and attributes are absolutely different from one another. Now by way of proof (the question may be put) whether existence is absolutely different from substance. If it be so, substance would by itself be non-existent. If it were contended that substance becomes existent by virtue of the inherence of existence in it, (the contention would be unsound). How can non-entity be made existent by participating in existence? And if entities (substance etc. were intrinsically) existent, the inherence of existence would be a superfluity. If again things are believed to be possessed of existence *per se* (as an inalienable part of their individuality), then why should a superfluous intermediary be postulated in the shape of inherence of existence? It has been contended that a thing is neither existent nor non-existent before its participation in existence as such and it becomes existent only as a consequence of its relation to existence. But this is a verbalism (and has no meaning) since a *tertium quid* different from existent and non-existent both is an impossibility. Moreover, (there is no evidence from experience) that there are felt three elements (in a real,

viz.,) the entity, existence, and a relation (between them). Again, if the relation between an entity and its existence were a case of identity, that would be contradicted by their refusal to endorse it. Regard being had to this (same very reason of denial), the relation cannot be supposed to be conjunction (which is possible only between two substances). As for inherence, it is not (believed to be) dependent (for its being upon the terms, and if such an independent fact can serve as a relation) everything can come into relation with every other thing, or no entity can be in relation with any other entity. Now all these considerations are liable to be pressed according to the nature (of the terms) against the relation posited between substance and substancehood, quality and qualityhood, action and actionhood ; between one substance and another substance, quality, action, universal, specificity; between earth and earthhood, water and waterhood, fire and firehood, air and airhood; between substances such as ether (*ākāśa*) and their relevant qualities. (It is crystal clear that) there can possibly be no relation in any way whatever between things which are absolutely different. It has become obvious that the determination of (the nature of) reals in the scheme of Kaṇāda is vitiated (by a fundamental defect).

130. Now an objection is raised. Even if a real were supposed to consist of substance and mode both, the same difficulty would persist as before. Thus, for instance, the exponents of *Syādvāda* (the doctrine of non-absolutism affirming multiple nature of things) reject the view that substance and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are somehow identical and different both. But this position cannot be legitimate inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as follows; (1) Affirmation and negation cannot coexist in one substratum like blue and not-blue (owing to their mutual opposition). (2) If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that the difference will have one locus and identity another and

thus there will be a split in the integrity of the locus. (3) The aspect in reference to which the difference is asserted and the aspect in reference to which identity is affirmed—both of these aspects are to be regarded as mutually identical and different in order to avoid the consequence of absolutism, and this would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* (the locus of the opposite predicates being placed under the necessity of bifurcation and the bifurcated aspects being again identical-cum-different would again require bifurcation in their turn and so on). (4) The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicate, and this means confusion (which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum). (5) The aspect which embodies difference will embody identity also, and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference, and this thus gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of function and attributes). (6) A real being, both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt. (7) The consequence will be absence of determination. And (8) this will result in the impossibility of determination of objective reality.

No, there is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum what is the *raison d'être* of the faintest trace of contradiction? As regards blue and not-blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction (in the situation), and thus the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not-blue in the (unitary) cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further when one single piece of linen is found to possess (in harmony) the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and not-red,

covered and not-covered, what then is the ground for allegation of doubt ? This (line of argument) would again put a quietus to the charge of the bifurcation of locus, since, in conformity with the principle set forth above, they have all been (proved to be) perceived in the same locus. As regards the charge of infinite regress, it is advanced by one who is ignorant of the position of the non-absolutist who unmistakably maintains that in a real which is the synthesis of substance and mode, the difference is not anything else than substance and modes themselves, because the term 'difference' (whenever employed) stands for these two elements alone. When it is asserted that identity is in the aspect of substance, it is to be understood that substance itself and not anything else constitutes the identity in question, and (the proposition) that a real is one and many (lends support to this truth). As regards the charges of confusion and transfusion, they are easily parried by the instance of the cognition of the multi-form colour, and the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals. If, on the contrary, it is maintained that the solution of the difficulties in the above-quoted instances is furnished by direct experience of the data, the same (experience) will also come to the aid of the opponent (sic. Jaina philosopher), since experience cannot be guilty of partiality. And there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a sort of cognition in which the mind wavers (between two conflicting alternatives). It is absolutely out of the question when the cognition is found to be unfaltering and unwavering. To say that knowledge is not possible regarding an object that is known is a bold assertion. The establishment of knowledge proves that there is no justification for the charge of lack of knowledge, and consequently for the impossibility (of such a multiform real). The conclusion follows that the conception of reality as synthesis of substance and mode is not incompatible with verdict of experience and interest (of truth).

131. But the question arises—how can even a real consisting of substance and mode exercise causal efficiency ? The

exercise of causal efficiency has been found to be a concomitant of succession and non-succession, and must be held to be incompatible also with a real of dual nature exactly in the same way as it has been found to be incompatible with pure substance or pure mode (advocated by the absolutists). It is perfectly allowable to assert that a real possessed of a dual nature is not capable of exercising causal efficiency in sequence on the ground that an efficient entity has no reason for deferring its action. (The hypothesis) that it stands in need of the auxiliaries is absolutely illegitimate for the substance which is unamenable to change is entirely independent of the service of the auxiliaries. And as for the modes, they are momentary, and so they cannot be supposed to wait for two consecutive moments (required for the reception of the service accruing from the auxiliaries and for producing the effect at the next moment). Nor (is the exercise of causal activity possible) in simultaneity because a real which simulataneously executes all its effects and ceases to do so again will forfeit its claim to reality being bereft of causal activity. And if it does produce (an effect at the next moment) the charges incidental to the theory of successive activity will come in force. Thus the defects which appertain to the theory of pure substance or pure mode are found to be equally shared by the theory of dual reality in conformity with the dictum: Why should not the defect which is inevitable in each of the alternatives be not inevitable when both the alternatives are affirmed"? In reply to this objection, the author says:

(Aph.). The realisation of causal activity by the same is warranted by its (susceptibility to) change having for its characteristics continuity, and surrender and appropriation of the antecedent and consequent determinations (respectively). (XXXIII)

132. Continuity together with the surrender and appropriation respectively of the preceding and succeeding determinations, that is to say, of the states (in due order), constitutes the defining characteristic of change, and this

would be the identity of the organ and the resultant. What is the harm if it be so ? (No). If the organ and resultant be identical it would be liable to the objection which applies to the position of non-existent (cause) and existent (effect). A non-existent can not be an organ, nor a (previous) existent be the resultant. True, this defect is really present in respect of origination and not in respect of determination. As has been said "A non-entity cannot be a cause, nor can the existent cause be itself the resultant. This charge applies if it is a case of efficient causation (origination), but a case of determination (which it is held to be) is not liable to such accusation."

[The force of the contention can be brought out as follows. The organ of knowledge being a species of efficient cause can be so only if it produces expected effect, viz., knowledge. But when the organ is said to be nothing but knowledge and knowledge again is said to be the resultant it commits the fallacy of making the cause and effect identical. It is obvious on the face of it that the cause and effect must be different and they must occur at different moments of time. If there is no difference, chronological and numerical, the assertion of causality is nothing short of non-sense. Hemacandra admits the justice of this objection *in abstracto* but he avers that the present instance does not fall within it, because the relation of organ and knowledge is not of efficient causality and hence is not temporal. It is a logical relation and it is the logical relation of determination which occurs at the same time. And there is no logical incompatibility in the same thing being its own determinant and determinate. The relation of determination as maintained here does not presuppose numerical difference, but only a difference of function. And this is going to be substantiated in the following aphorism]. (XXXIV)

136. The author is showing the nature of determination:
(*Apl.*) (*Its*) activity (*reference*) concerns the object. (XXXV)

137. The activity of knowledge having reference to the object is the resultant. (XXXV)

138. What is the organ ? In reply he states:

(Aph.) *(The same activity) as relates to the subject is the knowledge. (XXXVI)*

139. The cognition in so far as it takes note of the activity of the subject is the organ. (XXXVI)

140. But how can it be an organ of knowledge ? An organ is an instrument, and the efficientmost (of the causal conditions) is stated to be the instrument, and it is immediately attended with the effect. In answer he says:

(Bph.) *The illumination of the object is realised (immediately) upon the occurrence of that. (XXXVII)*

141. Upon the occurrence of that 'means' after the activity in the shape of knowledge which has been stated to be the organ has taken place in the subject.' Realisation of the illumination of the object means 'the determination of it as the resultant.' The organ and the resultant stand in relation of identity in so far as the two belong to the self-same cognition. Their difference is in respect of the relation of determinant and determinatum. Thus the relation of organ of knowledge and the resultant partakes of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such follows the track of the theory of non-absolutism (*syūdvāda*) which stands uncontradicted. The immediate effect which is common to all cognitive organs is thus set forth in the given discourse. (XXXVII)

142 The author now states an alternative resultant as immediate (as the previous):

(Aph.) *Or the cessation of ignorance. (XXXVIII)*

143. Others hold that the resultant is the cessation of the ignorance of the subject regarding the object in question before the application of the organ of knowledge. As has been said: The immediate effect of an organ of knowledge is the removal of ignorance; that of pure transcendent knowledge is bliss and unconcern (for everything else): that of the rest is the notion of acceptance and avoidance (NA. 28). (XXXVIII)

144. He now states the remote (resultant):

(Aph.) *Or, of determinate perception and the rest, which have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member (of the order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member is the resultant. (XXXIX)*

145. It is to be understood that of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention (disposition), memory, recognition, reasoning and inference, which occur in the order of immediate succession, each immediate antecedent is the cognitive organ and each immediate successor is the resultant. The self possessed of the determinate perception as its evolved state is transformed into the state of speculation and so determinate perception functions as organ in relation to its resultant in the shape of speculation. And subsequently to it speculation again is the organ and perceptual judgement is the resultant. Again perceptual judgement is the organ and retention (disposition) is the resultant. And speculation and retention (disposition) can be inferred as partaking of the character of cognition being derivatives of cognition. Next in order, retention (disposition) is to be regarded as the organ and memory as the resultant. Next to that, again, memory is the organ and recognition is the resultant. Next again to that, recognition is the organ and reasoning is the resultant. Lastly, reasoning is the organ and inference is the resultant. This completes the division of organ and resultant. (XXXIX)

146. Now he states a different kind of resultant:

(Aph.) *Or the judgements of avoidance and the rest (XI).*

147. The judgements of avoidance, acceptance and indifference are the resultants of a cognitive organ. The enunciation of a plurality of resultants is made with the purpose of bringing home the truth that there is no antagonism among the different resultants since they partake of one common character of 'being resultant' and the question of what is a resultant is a matter of volitional interest and point of view. (XL)

148. Now with a view to examination of the views of rival philosophers who hold that the resultant is absolutely identical with or absolutely different (from the cognitive instruments), he states :

(Aph. It is both identical with and different from its cognitive organs. XLI)

149. A cognitive organ being of the nature of an instrument and the resultant being of the nature of an effect are mutually different. If the relation be one of absolute identity, the conventional treatment of a cognitive organ and its resultant as numerically different would be logically absurd and in that case, it would be either exclusively a cognitive organ or exclusively a resultant. It might be urged that the treatment (of the self-same fact) as a cognitive organ is justified on account of its difference from what is not a cognitive organ, and also as a resultant on account of its difference from what is not a resultant. But the contention has no substance. If this were (the basis of such differentiation), the fact of one cognitive organ being numerically different from another cognitive organ should make the former liable to be treated as a non-organ. Likewise, the numerical difference of one resultant from another resultant should justify its treatment as a non-resultant. The truth is that a real is different from both what is homogeneous and what is heterogeneous (and thus difference alone cannot be made the basis of classification, as it does away with the element of identity which is the presupposition of such procedure).

150. [It has been shown that the difference between a cognitive organ and its resultant cannot be obliterated]. Now, the same (logical necessity would compel us to recognise) that a cognitive organ and its resultant are identical in so far as they relate to one individual subject, in view of the fact that the self-same self which changes into a cognitive organ transforms itself as the resultant. If (the two modes were) different absolutely, the relation (between the organ and the resultant) would be as absurd (even in the

same subject) as it is (between two such modes occurring) in two different subjects.¹ Now it has been contended (by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school) that the self in which a cognitive organ inheres is the very self in which the resultant is found to inhere and the determination of the two occurrences as organ and resultant is effected by the relation of inherence, and this prevents the occurrence of either of the events in a different self (though the two events are absolutely different and do not participate in some form of identity which the Jaina theory would have us accept). But the contention is untenable. Inherence is propounded to be eternal and ubiquitous, and is thus bound to be as existent in one self as in all other selves, and thus it fails to account for the determinate relation (of the events) to a particular subject. The conclusion, therefore, follows that the result is somehow different from and identical with the cognitive organ. (XLI)

151. Now the author is propounding the definition of the subject:

(Aph.) The subject is the self which reveals its own self as well as another and is liable to change. (XLII)

152. The self has the nature of revealing its own self as well as an object which is other than the self. That this is the case is apparent from the circumstance that the self has a

1. It is not possible that A has his cognitive organ set in activity and B comes to have the expected cognition. The absurdity is plain in the supposition that A opens his eyes and B has the vision. But what is the reason behind this absurdity. It is nothing but the fact that the two events are not absolutely isolated and unrelated as they would be if the occurrence of one were followed by the occurrence of the other in numerically different subjects. That they are possible only in the same subject proves that they are not isolated occurrences but cemented by a bond which is the index of their identity as opposed to unqualified difference. The bond of identity is not exclusive of and antagonistic to the numerical difference of the terms which are held together. Identity coinciding with numerical difference shows that neither of them is absolute. This is the non-absolutist interpretation which the Jaina philosopher offers as the solution of the apparent contradiction,

subjective and an objective reference as is unfolded in the judgement 'I know the jar' in which (the three factors) the subject, object and the act are clearly open to notice. There is absolutely no ground for repudiating the cognition of any one of them. Nor is there any incompatibility between auto-revelation and hetero-revelation, which is found to be the case with light. Certainly a light does not depend upon anything other (than its own self) when it reveals its own self. This finding constitutes the *reductio ad absurdum* of the theories sponsored by a school of thinkers that cognition only reveals its own self and also the other theory which maintains that the cognition reveals only an object.

153. In the phrase 'liable to change,' change should be understood in terms of the definition given before. Were the self an unchanging constant, such phenomena as joy, depression, pleasure, pain, enjoyment and the like which are liable to origination and cessation would not be possible attributes. Were it, on the other hand, absolutely perishable the (ethical fallacies of) loss of earned merit and acquisition of unearned deserts would become unavoidable. Furthermore, such activities, which are known to be the characteristic of every living being as memory, recognition, search for an article deposited in the past would entirely collapse. But all these facts find an easy and natural explanation in the conception of a dynamic self which necessarily owns up the characteristics of origination, cessation and persistence. As has been said:

"Just as the coiled state passes away and the state of erect posture succeeds, but the character of the serpent as serpent continues, so with regard to the self as an eternal continuous principle possessed of the nature of pure consciousness, there is neither efflux of its total nature, nor is there the continuity of its entire character. But the states such as pleasure and pain which happened to it in the past pass away and other states supervene, and consciousness continues throughout. If the self were liable to absolute destruction, there would arise the fallacy of lost deserts and unearned enjoyment, and were

it again absolutely uniform the (transitional) experiences of pleasure and pain would be absolutely unexplainable. The agent and the enjoyer both are not the changing modes of the self, but it is self which as the agent reaps these consequences being the self-same entity which owns up these states" (TS, 223-7).

This line of argument would serve to condemn the theories which posit the self to be absolutely unchanging or absolutely perishable. 'The self' (in the aphorism) dismisses the theory of not-self (of the Buddhist). The fact that the self comes to possess the same dimension as the body it inhabits has not been dealt with, because the problem has no bearing on the present topic. The definition of 'subject' is thus found to be sound and secure. (XLII)

Here ends the First Lecture of the First Book of "A Critique of Organ of Knowledge" and the Gloss thereon composed by the Ācārya Śrī Hemacandra.

LECTURE—2

1. Of the two-fold organ of knowledge, which consists of perceptual and non-perceptual varieties which were specified at the outset (as the topics of discussion), the perceptual has been defined. Now, the author proposes the definition of the non-perceptual variety as follows:

(Aph.) *The non-perceptual is what lacks immediacy-cum-lucidity.* (I)

2. Now (in pursuance of the dictum that) the predication of a specific characteristic (in the specific definition) is made by way of adding (a differentia) to the general definition, the phrase 'authentic definitive cognition' has to be read into the present aphorism (as the continuant link). Accordingly, (the full definition assumes the form): 'The non-perceptual organ of knowledge is definitive authentic cognition which lacks immediacy-cum-lucidity.' (I)

3. He sets forth the sub-divisions (of the above):

(Aph.) *The varieties of the same are recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony* (II)

4. 'The same' refers to the non-perceptual. Thus these are to be taken as the varieties of the non-perceptual cognition and not as independent organs, since (the latter alternative) would involve contradiction of the number of cognitive organs stated before.

5. (Q). But why should not recollection and the rest be affirmed as independent organs? Why is this insensate imitation of the way of feeding on gruel current in the Dravida country? (A) Do not speak like that. Now (the types of cognition), which are comprehended by the definition of non-perceptual cognition, cannot be regarded as different and distinct from non-perceptual cognition as an organ. Just as the types of intuition, viz., sense-intuition, mental intuition,

self-intuition, and transcendent intuition of the mystics, which are comprehended within the definition of perceptual intuition according to the Buddhists, are not regarded as separate from perceptual intuition (by them), so exactly recollection and the rest, which fall within the purview of the definition of non-perceptual cognition, ought not to be regarded as standing in conflict with the number of fundamental organs of knowledge. The five words beginning with *smṛti* (recollection) are to be construed as members of the *dvandva*-compound. (II)

6. Of them, he now defines Recollection.

(Aph.) *Recollection (is a cognition which) has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'.* (III)

7. A memory-impression is the disposition (deposited by past experience). Its 'stimulation' means its emergence to the surface of consciousness. The clause 'which has for its condition, etc.' means that the emergence of recollection is necessarily conditioned by it (stimulation). It is apparent from the remark "A disposition can persist for a length of time which may be calculable (*saṅkhyeya*) or incalculable (*asaṅkhyeya*)" (VB, 333) that a disposition, though it may have continued for a great length of time, does not operate as the cause of memory unless it is roused (by a stimulus). When, however, the requisite conditions such as the exhaustion and subsidence of the obstructive veils, observation of similar objects and the like are at work to bring it to maturation, it produces recollection. And so the clause 'which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression' has been stated. The clause "which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'" is inserted for setting forth its mode of deliverance. The word *tat* (in the original aphorism) is given in the neuter gender in order to bring out that no specific gender is implied. Thus all these cognitions which deliver their content as 'that' (*sah*, mascu-

line) jar (*ghaṭaḥ*), that (*sā*, feminine) cloth (*patī*), 'that (*tat*, neuter) ear-ring (*kuṇḍaḥ*)' are cases of recollection.

8. It is an organ of knowledge since it is never found to be discrepant with fact which is further attested by such (successful) activities as search for thing deposited by one's own self. But how can recollection be an organ when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at the present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis? No. It is certainly possessed of an object that has been experienced in the past. [The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition. If it be contended, on the analogy of perception, that the object must be felt as present in order that the cognition may be valid, one might with equal propriety contend that] perceptual cognition is invalid since it is found to lack the criterion of referring to a fact that has been experienced in the past. If revelation of the relevant object (be the criterion of validity), it is found to be equally present in the case of memory also. (Q). But how can a defunct object be the generating condition of recollection? Hence it cannot lay claim to validity as it is not generated by an object. (A) [The doubt raised has no substance]. Are you deluded to think that the condition of lack of discrepancy in other organs of knowledge consists in their being generated by an object? You ought not to be led away by such delusion (as the situation has no concern with causation). Thus as, for instance, light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions reveals the objects, jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also does a cognition reveal its object, if it is brought into existence by its requisite conditions, viz., sense-organ, or the mind accompanied by the elimination and subsidence of the obscuring veil. The statement that "Nothing is the cause which is not followed in agreement and in difference (by an event) and nothing is the object which is not the cause (of its cognition)" is only nonsensical utterance, since there is no dispute regarding the validity of the mystic's intuition of the past and unborn objects, though it is not generated by the

latter. Moreover, if recollection be convicted of invalidity one must offer oblation of water to inference (that is to say, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference), since there is no possibility of inference being realised unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. It is universally accepted by all logicians that inference is conditioned by apprehension of the probans and recollection of its necessary concomitance (with the probandum). It is established, therefore, that recollection is to be accepted as an organ of knowledge, as otherwise the validity of inference would become unaccountable. (III)

9. Now the author sets forth the definition of Recognition.

(Aph). *Recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it' (judgement of identity), 'it is like that' (judgement of similarity), 'that is dissimilar to that' (judgement of dissimilarity), 'this is different from that' (judgement of difference), and the like. (IV)*

10. 'Observation' is perceptual cognition. 'Recollection' is an act of memory. These two (separately and jointly) are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgement. The author exhibits the form in which it delivers the contents: 'That necessarily is it.' The neuter gender in the original is given in order to bring out that no special gender is implied. Thus all such judgements as 'this (masc.) is necessarily that jar,' 'this (fem.) is necessarily that cloth,' 'this (neut.) is necessarily that water-pot' are the cases (of judgement of identity); 'this is like that,' e.g., 'the cow is like the gayal' (judgement of similarity). (The judgement of dissimilarity, viz.,) 'this is dissimilar to that' is (illustrated by the proposition) 'the buffalo is different from the cow.' As for the judgement of difference, it is exemplified in the following : 'this is less than, greater than, farther than, nearer than that, etc.' The employment of the words 'and the like' (in the aphorism) is for (the inclusion of such cases as (the following :

“Know him to be Caitra who is shaggy all over the body, has protruding teeth, is swarthy, dwarfish, possessed of broad eyes and a snub nose” (NMI. p. 143). “The swan is (an aquatic fowl which is) capable of separating milk from water (in a solution). The bee is (the fly) possessed of six feet. The seven-leaved tree is to be known by the learned as one that possesses an odd number of leaves in each stem. A jewel with five colours is called multicoloured. A young dainsel is one who possesses swelling breasts. The one-horned animal is said to be the rhinoceros.”

When, on hearing such descriptions, one finds out Caitra, swan and the rest, and vouches them for the objects as described, all these instances of synthetic judgements are to be classed under recognition, since (they satisfy the terms of the definition), being generated by observation and recollection. The following is also an instance in point. Suppose a Northerner happens to censure a camel in the following terms : Cursed be the camel, the worst of the brutes, with its long crooked neck, with its elongated upper lip, with its ugly disposition of limbs, addicted as it is to feeding on hard and sharp bramble. Suppose a Southerner who has heard all these, and happens to see, on a visit to North India a thing of the above description, he would naturally judge—‘the object ahead is certainly what is meant by the word camel.’ Now this synthetic judgement is to be accepted as a case of recognition, since it is derived from observation and recollection as its conditions.

11. Now, those philosophers who acknowledge a judgement of similarity to be an independent organ called ‘comparison’ cannot decline to regard judgements of dissimilarity and the rest as separate cognitive organs :

“Comparison is (regarded as) the organ of knowledge of the relation of similarity to a known object. If so, why not cognition of the name-relation based on diversity be regarded as a (separate) organ of knowledge ?” (LT, III, 10). “Moreover, the following judgements, on the basis of the relation between perceived data, should be regarded as independent

organs also : "This is less, greater, farther, nearer, taller or otherwise than the other" (LT, III. 12).

12. If, however, the term 'similarity' be regarded as a typical illustration (and not an exhaustive enumeration), or if you resort to the stratagem of splitting the aphorism (in order to add the predicate 'dissimilarity' in a resultant aphorism), your procedure will show that the author of the aphorism is an unskilled craftsman, since his aphorism is found to lack in the essential characteristics (of an aphorism). As has been observed—"Those who are acquainted with the nature of an aphorism lay it down that an aphorism is one which consists of the minimum of syllables, is indubious (in significance), states only the essential elements, is comprehensive of all issues, is devoid of superfluity, and is not liable to censure." 'Devoid of superfluity' means devoid of an excess.

13. [Now the scholiast records the objections of the Buddhist who denies that recognition is a unitary cognition, far less an organ. The Buddhist observes] : "We do not find any phenomenon called recognition, which is given out as a separate organ, as anything different from the two cognitive acts, viz., recollection indicated by the word 'that' and perception indicated by 'this'." This is certainly not a sound contention (A little reflection will show that) the object which is envisaged by recognition cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception combined together. The province of recognition is the substance which stands out as the identity in and through its antecedent and subsequent modes. Certainly, this identity cannot be the content of recollection which is cognisant only of what has been experienced before. As has been said; "Now, recollection comes to cognise only what has been known before and refers to its content as 'that' (a past event). As for recognition (which envisages the identity of a past datum with a present one) in the form 'that is this' it is certainly different from it" (TS, 453). Nor can this (identity) possibly be the content of perception which is constrained to take stock of a present mode alone. Nor is it a sound contention that there is no cognition different from

perception and recollection, inasmuch as it (recognition) is a different cognition which is distinctly felt to emerge subsequently to perception. It is certainly not a justifiable attitude to deny what is felt, since this (habit of disregarding the plain testimony of experience) may lead to unwholesome consequences (denial of what the opponent rightly believes to be true).

14. (The scholiast now proposes to take up the issue with the Naiyāyikas) who maintain that recognition is nothing but a species of perception. But this view cannot be accepted to be true. For the province of perceptual cognition is limited to what is actually present and given to the sense. You (Naiyāyika) ought not to forget the dictum. "That which is in direct contact with senses and actually present is directly apprehended by the senses of sight and the like" (SV. sū. IV. 84). Hence the identity of a past and a present datum cannot lie within the jurisdiction of perception. It has been urged that a sense-organ as aided and reinforced by memory does give rise to the perception of such an identity, and so recognition is asserted to be a species of perceptual cognition. But this is an impossibility. A sense-organ, which is entirely delimited to its own relevant sphere, cannot be supposed to proceed to another object (which is beyond its jurisdiction), in spite of the aid rendered by a hundred of auxiliary factors. It is a truism that the sense of sight cannot take stock of odour and the like which transcend its province, though it may be aided by a memory of its fragrance. A substance *qua* the identity which embraces the past and the present states does certainly fall outside the scope of senses. Nor will it be a sound argument, for the reasons set forth above, to maintain that a sense-organ aided by an unseen potency can apprehend this identity. On the other hand, it will be more appropriate to assert that this cognition of identity directly eventuates from the self as reinforced by such unseen potency. It is seen that a self reinforced and strengthened by the knowledge of a secret science, acquired in dream, comes to have a distinct kind of knowledge

even in regard to objects which are beyond its ken. It has, been contended that just as the organ of vision acquires additional efficiency when it is anointed with the paint of a collyrium, so likewise it might acquire efficiency regarding identity when it is in alliance with recollection. But this (analogical) argument overreaches itself. The additional efficiency that might be acquired by a sense-organ is never found to overstep its proper jurisdiction. It is never found to operate in the way of apprehending an object which lies within the jurisdiction of another sense. We may quote (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa in support: "Where an additional efficiency is seen to materialise (in a sense-organ), it is found to manifest itself in the apprehension of such objects as are distant and infra-sensible, and is never found to transgress the limits of its proper jurisdiction which would be the case if the auditory organ were to operate on colour" (SV, sū II, 114). The conclusion must be taken to be established that recognition, which has an object of a different kind from that of perception, is different from the latter, and falls within the category of indirect non-perceptual cognitions as organs.

15. It (recognition) cannot be regarded as lacking in validity, since the lack of discrepancy (which is the criterion of validity) is present in it. If an occasional occurrence of discrepancy (e. g., in the case of growing hair, nail, flame, etc.,) were to condemn it as a whole kind to invalidity, the same issue would be unavoidable in the case of perception also. Moreover, if the identity of the self and the like, as determined by the evidence of recognition, were to lack objective reality (as a rule), the logical justification of bondage and emancipation (as states of the same ethico-religious aspirant) would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self-same person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person in bondage feeling himself to be subject to the misery (of bondage) can be expected to put forth the requisite labour to achieve the joy of freedom. If, on the other hand, there was no personal identity and one is unhappy and another achieves happiness,

- who will labour and for what end ? It follows, therefore that recognition is a valid organ since the sense of identity can have a lease of life only if there is recognition to validate its claim, and it is this sense of identity, again, which is at the root of all secular and spiritual activity. (IV)

16. Now the author is propounding definition of Inductive Reasoning:

(Aph) Inductive Reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation.
(IV)

1. 'Observation' in this context stands for valid cognition as such, and not for perceptual cognition alone, since the middle term (probans) may be an object of inference also, and there is no incompatibility in the fact of universal concomitance obtaining between terms known by inference as (between terms known) by perception. 'Universal concomitance' will be explained subsequently and the knowledge of it is a specific kind of determinate cognition taking stock of the same. Such (determinate cognition) is Inductive Reasoning.

18. Now, it cannot be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual evidence. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations (that are involved in the knowledge that) 'Whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else'. The reason is that it (sic. perception) is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present.

19. Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference inasmuch as this too is quite unequal to the stupendous burden imposed by the knowledge of universal concomitance, when, on the occasion, the subject becomes (as omniscient as) a *yogin* (mystic). Even were its competency (for such a task) conceded, it remains to be thrashed out—which of the inferences, the present one or

another, is cognisant of this universal concomitance ? If the knowledge of concomitance were supposed to be secured by the present inference, the result would be a logical see-saw. Inference comes into being only after universal concomitance has been ascertained, and the knowledge of universal concomitance will again be secured just on the emergence of this very inference. If it was supposed that the knowledge of universal concomitance were to be secured by another act of inference, the result would be a vicious infinite series. The latter inference, which is supposed to yield the knowledge of universal concomitance which is the condition of the contemplated inference, is possible only if the universal concomitance (which makes it possible) has been already apprehended (as an antecedent condition). If the apprehension of this universal concomitance were thought to be secured by its own self (that is to say, if it were self-evident) then why should the previous cognition of universal concomitance be condemned (of incompetency) and why again a second inference be held in request for the purpose ? If, however, (the universal concomitance underlying the validating inference were sought to be secured) by means of another inference, the apprehension of universal concomitance would not be possible of realisation even in thousands of epochs.

20. (Q) Even conceding that indeterminate perception is undiscursive (and hence incompetent for universal concomitance), there is no reason (for doubt) that determinate reflection which follows in its wake should seize hold of universal concomitance. (A) But this is not possible. If indeterminate perception were not competent to apprehend universal concomitance, the determinate reflection would not succeed in comprehending the same for the reason that reflection has for its contents the same data as are apprehended by indeterminate perception. If, however, reflective thought were supposed to be conversant with a different datum and were not in any way dependent upon the contents of indeterminate perception, (the initial objection of equal incompetency would be avoided, no doubt, but this would

give rise to another difficulty, viz.,) whether this reflective thought were an organ of knowledge or otherwise. If it be considered to be an organ, you are compelled to tolerate an additional organ in excess of perception and inference. And if it be regarded as invalid, expectation of the knowledge of universal noncomitance therefrom would only be as absurd as the expectation of a child from an impotent husband). This very consideration will demolish the contention (of the Buddhist). "The relation of necessary concomitance and that of causality are known from the non-observation (of the effect and of the determinate concomitant) following upon the non-observation of the cause and the determinant concomitant." Non-observation of the effect and of the determinate concomitant is a species of perceptual cognition, and non-observation of the cause and that of the determinant concomitant being nothing but the logical ground, the knowledge resulting from it would be nothing but inference. And we have already set forth the objections that lie against the capacity of perception and inference for apprehension of universal concomitance.

21. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers, on the other hand, hold that reflective thought, which works by way of elimination and assimilation, is the effect of perceptual cognition and the knowledge of universal concomitance is secured by this (reflective thought. If (this reflection which is) the result of perception falls under the head either of perception or of inference, the old difficulty of incompetency (of perception or of inference) for the realisation of universal concomitance would remain (unresolved). And if, again, be it different from both of them, it would be tantamount to the admission of an additional organ of knowledge. It will not be a valid contention to say that the knowledge of universal concomitance is only the result, and as such the question of its being an organ does not simply arise. The fact is that though it is a result (of perceptual cognition), it is a condition of a subsequent result in the shape of inference, and as such there is no inherent incompatibility of its serving as an organ

(regarding inference). The case is exactly on a par with the knowledge of the adjectival determination which, though itself the result of sense-object contact, serves as an organ of the knowledge of the substantive (in the judgment).

22. As regards the Naiyāyikas, they hold that the apprehension of universal concomitance results from perceptual cognition when aided and reinforced by inductive reasoning. When it is admitted even by them that apprehension of universal concomitance is effected by perception not in isolation but only when it is aided by reasoning, it is quite proper to acknowledge that the apprehension of such concomitance should be set down to the credit of reasoning alone. What is sought to be gained by this attempt at obliterating the credit of reasoning (the poor victim of injustice), and by exposing perception to the charge of ingratitude which is involved in the repudiation of the favour of reasoning which alone makes the former capable of the knowledge of universal concomitance? It may be urged that reasoning can not be an organ of knowledge and so it is not regarded as the instrument of the knowledge of universal concomitance. But we do not see any valid ground why reasoning should not be regarded as an organ of knowledge, (particularly when it fulfils all the criteria that an organ of knowledge possesses). As for the criterion of lack of discrepancy (between knowledge and its object), it does share it with all acknowledged organs of knowledge, and it is not a truth that it does not possess a distinctive object of its own, since its object is nothing but universal concomitance itself. It follows, therefore, that reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge of universal concomitance which is not apprehended by any other accepted organ. (V)

23. Now the author sets forth the definition of necessary concomitance in the following terms :

(Aph.) *Necessary concomitance consists in the 'occurrence necessarily' (bhāva eva) of the determinant concomitant (major term) on the occurrence of the determinate con-*

comitant (*middle term*), or, the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*middle term*) 'exclusively in the locus', *tatraiva*, (where the major term occurs). (VI)

24. 'Necessary concomitance' (the relation of determination) is the property of both the terms—that which determines (the occurrence) and that (the occurrence of) which is determined. Now, in so far as it is considered as the property of the determinant (major term), the necessary occurrence (*bhāva eva*) of the determinant, that is, of the inferable predicate, on the occurrence of the determinate (*middle*), in other words, in all the cases where the determinate (*middle*) exists, is an illustration of necessary concomitance *qua* the intrinsic property of the determinant (major). Such being the case, the determinate alone is described as the concomitant (and not the determinant, notwithstanding the fact that the determinant equally with the determinate is the locus of necessary concomitance), and this characterisation of the determinate as 'concomitant' is to be understood only with reference to quality *qua* determinate (and thus in conformity with linguistic usage, the term 'concomitant', *vyūpta*, is to be taken as the equivalent of 'determinate concomitant' and not of 'determinant concomitant').

[The employment of the adverb 'necessarily' in the aphorism is intended for conveying restrictive qualification and its construction cannot be reversed]. The restrictive qualification 'necessarily' is thus not to be construed with 'determinant concomitant' (but with the word 'occurrence'. Were it to be so construed, it would mean the occurrence of the major exclusively and thus the occurrence of the middle would be excluded and this would mean that the middle term is not concomitant with the major) and would thus cease to function as the logical ground, (and it would further involve contradiction of the actual truth), since there is also present such attribute as 'limited magnitude' which is other than the major term in the same locus with it. Nor can again the restrictive adverb 'necessarily' be construed with the phrase 'on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant' (which

would come to mean that the occurrence of the determinant, is necessarily bound up with the occurrence of the determinate, in other words, nothing would be the determinant major term, which is not necessarily concomitant with the determinate middle). Were it so, such a fact as the quality of 'being' produced by an exertion' would not function as a logical ground (of the inference of impermanence, since the latter is not necessarily coincident with the former as is found to be the case with a flash of lightning which is impermanent though not a product of exertion). Furthermore, this would involve the admission of a common (inconclusive) attribute as a logical ground, inasmuch as permanence is found to be coincident with the attribute of being cognisable; (if one were to argue 'Sound is permanent, since it is cognisable', the argument, though fallacious, would pass muster as valid if necessary concomitance were defined as the occurrence of the major on the occurrence 'necessarily of the middle'. In the case cited above 'permanence', which is the major, necessarily coincides with the attribute 'cognisability'. In other words, a permanent is necessarily cognisable and nothing is permanent which is not cognisable. In order to obviate such a contingency, the proposed construction of the definition of necessary concomitance as the 'occurrence necessarily' of the major on the occurrence of the middle should be regarded as the only legitimate interpretation).

25. When necessary concomitance is viewed as the property of the determinate concomitant, it should be construed as the occurrence of the determinate—that is, of the logical ground—exclusively in the locus (*tatraiva*) in which the determinant—that is, the inferable predicate—exists, and not in a locus where the determinant is non-existent. Here, too, the restrictive qualification is not to be construed as the occurrence of the 'determinate exclusively' (*vyūpyasya eva*), since such construction would be tantamount to the stultification of the middle term (for it would not be concomitant with the major and thus would fail to prove the existence of the major term, for which a middle term is requisitioned). And (further

such assertion would be incorrect) since things other than the middle term are also present. Nor again can the construction be as follows: the middle term 'exists necessarily' (*bhūva eva*) in the locus of the major (and is thus co-extensive with the latter). For this would result in the repudiation of a middle term which exists in a part of locus of the major, and would lead to the acceptance of an (inconclusive) common term as a true middle. Thus the quality of 'being cognisable' would be vested with the title of a sound middle term, since it necessarily occurs in all things which are eternal. [The argument in view is, for example, 'sound is eternal because it is cognisable'. Here the middle term 'cognisable' is invariably present in all eternal things, and thus would satisfy the criterion involved in the proposed construction. The absurdity which necessarily results from all the hypothetical constructions shows that the construction of the restrictive qualification in the definition of necessary concomitance cannot be other than what is set forth in the aphorism].

26. The characterisation of the middle and the major as determinate and determinant respectively is deliberately undertaken to guard against the possibility of the relation of necessary concomitance being understood in a uniform fashion on the ground that it is the common attribute of both the terms. Thus, in reference to the former alternative (as given in the aphorism), the restrictive qualification has the force of excluding the contingent occurrence (of the major term in the locus of the middle), and in reference to the middle, it has the force of excluding the occurrence (of the middle) in a locus other than that (of the major). Thus how can there be the possibility of necessary concomitance being regarded as the uniform characteristic of both the middle and the major? As has been said: "The major 'necessarily exists' (*bhavati eva*) in the locus in which the middle occurs, and as for the latter (the middle), it occurs 'exclusively in a locus where the major exists' (*līṅgi eva*). If this necessary restriction were reversed, the concomitance between the middle and the major term will not be necessary". (VI)

27. Now the author defines Inference which comes next in order.

(Aph.) *Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (major term) on the strength of the probans (middle term).* (VII)

28. The probans and the probandum are (to be understood) in terms of the definitions propounded below. The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact, and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated, is called Inference (*anumāna*), literally, a cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the probans and recollection of the necessary relation (between the probans and the probandum). It is called *anumāna*, being an organ of subsequent (*anu*) cognition (*māna*).

(Aph.) *It is of two kinds—for one's own self (subjective) and for others (syllogistic).* (VIII)

29. It, that is, inference is of two varieties according as it is subjective or syllogistic. Subjective inference is what is calculated to remove personal misconception and syllogistic inference is competent to remove the misconception of another person. (VIII)

30. Of these, the author defines subjective inference as follows:

(Aph.) *Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained, by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum.* (IX)

31. Necessary concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. And the knowledge of the probandum from such a probans definitely cognised by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic this inseparable relation with the probandum is called subjective inference. The probans is also designated as the sign (*liṅga*) and the probandum as the signet (content, *liṅga*). It is to be understood in this context that the probans or the sign is the condition of the cognition

of an unperceived datum not by virtue of its causal efficiency as a seed is of sprout. The knowledge of fire does not arise from the mere presence of smoke unobserved. Nor again does such knowledge materialise from the cognition of the probans as such as is found to be the case with light revealing a jar. It is never found that a probans though observed but not known as having a necessary concomitance leads to the knowledge of anything beyond itself. The operation of the sign or probans, therefore, consists in the definite knowledge of its impossibility independent of the unperceived datum, and it is for this reason that the word 'ascertained' has been inserted in the aphorism.

32. [The Buddhist position]. The Buddhist monks assert, in order to rebut the fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probantia, the triple characteristic of the (valid) probans, viz., its subsistence in the subject (the minor term), its subsistence in the homologue, and the absence of the same in a heterologue. Thus the first characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is 'subsistence necessarily' (*sattvam eva*) of the probans in the subject (minor term) of inference. The assertion of subsistence serves to exclude the nonexistent middle term such as visibility (e.g., in the inference: Sound is perishable since it is visible—the probans 'visible' is invalid since it does not belong to sound). The insertion of the word 'necessarily' serves to exclude the fallacy of non-existence (of the probans) in a part of the subject (minor term), which is illustrated in the following case: Earth and the other elements are impermanent since they are possessed of smell. In this instance, the attribute of smell subsists only in earth out of the four elements which are all made the subject. The insertion of the particle 'necessarily' subsequent to the word 'subsistence' is intended to exclude an uncommon attribute. If the position were stated in the order 'the subsistence in the subject alone', the quality 'audibility' alone would serve as the probans (as the quality of 'being audible' belongs to word alone and nothing else). The expression 'definitely

known' serves to exclude all cases of middle terms whose subsistence is a matter of doubt. The second characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is subsistence (of the probans) in the homologue alone. The insertion of the word 'subsistence' in this (definition) is calculated to dismiss the contradictory (probans), which certainly does not occur in a homologue. The insertion of the word 'alone' rebuts (the fallacy of) the common inconclusive probans, since the latter does not subsist in the homologue alone but in the heterologue also. The employment of the restrictive particle 'alone' after the homologue (in the English rendering) is intended to assert that such attributes as 'being the outcome of exertion' are instances of valid probans, notwithstanding the fact that they do not embrace the whole extent of the homologue.¹ If, on the other hand, restrictive particle were put after 'subsistence' the meaning be this: 'the (valid) probans is one whose subsistence in the homologue is necessary and universal' and in that case 'the outcome of exertion' would not be reckoned as a valid probans. The insertion of the clause 'it is definitely known' is made for the purpose of excluding the inconclusive reason whose concomitance in agreement is a matter of doubt. Thus, for instance, in the inference 'X is omnis-

1. The reference is to the following inference: Word is impermanent, because it is an outcome of exertion, as a jar is. Herein the probans belongs to the jar, no doubt, but does not belong to a lightning flash which though impermanent is not the outcome of exertion. The inference is valid, since there is necessary relation between impermanence and the attribute of 'being' the outcome of exertion.' It is universally true that all that is produced by exertion is impermanent, though not the converse, i. e. all impermanent things are products of exertion. This restrictive interpretation of the second characteristic is intended to prove the fact that the necessary connection of the probans and the probandum is not necessarily a case of equipollence. Thus there are two possible cases of necessary concomitance. One is found in the case when the two terms are co-extensive and thus the universal proposition becomes convertible (*samavyāpti*) and the other is a case of unequal extension when the proposition is not convertible as in "All men are mortal."

cient, because he is a speaker,' the attribute of 'being speaker' is of doubtful occurrence in the homologue 'omniscient.' (It is not necessary that an omniscient person must always speak and, on the contrary, it is quite possible that there may have been an omniscient person who has not made a single utterance in his life-time. So the attribute of 'being speaker' is not necessarily concomitant with omniscience.] The third characteristic is that the valid probans must be definitely known as having 'non-existence necessarily' (*asattvam eva*) in the heterologue. The term 'non-existence' serves to exclude the contradictory. The contradictory necessarily occurs in the heterologue. The term necessarily' serves to exclude an attribute which occurs in a part of the heterologue, and is thus common (both to the homologue and to the heterologue). Thus the attribute 'impermanence' is incompetent probans with regard to the probandum 'being the outcome of exertion' since the former occurs in a part of the heterologue, viz., a flash of lightning, and does not occur in space and the like (which are instances of the heterologue). So this type of attribute is of necessity excluded by the employment of the term 'non-existence'. If the restrictive adverb 'necessarily' were placed after (the term 'heterologue' in the translation) the meaning would be as follows: The valid probans is that which does not exist in heterologue alone (with the implication that its non-existence is necessarily confined to the heterologue and its existence in the homologue is a matter of universal necessity). The result would be that the attribute 'being the outcome of exertion which does not occur even in certain homologous instances could not be regarded as a valid probans. In order to preclude this (confusion, the adverb 'alone') was not placed after (the heterologue). The insertion of the expression 'must be definitely known' is intended for the rejection of the inconclusive reason whose non-existence in the heterologue is a matter of doubt. [Thus the inference 'X must be non-omniscient, since he is a speaker' is invalid, because the absence of the probans in an omniscient

person (heterologue) is a matter of doubt. There is no inherent impossibility for an omniscient person to be capable of giving instruction by speech]. The conclusion irresistibly follows that the triple characteristic alone is capable of excluding the fallacies of impossibility and the rest from the purview of valid probans and it is proper that we should accept this as the necessary condition and not the unitary characteristic (insisted upon by the Jaina logician).

33. The contention is devoid of substance. The knowledge of the necessity of the universal concomitance alone is calculated to prevent the triple fallacies. 'Necessary universal concomitance' consists in the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory (of the probandum). This incompatibility with the contradictory cannot be brought home in regard to a reason which is impossible, contradictory or inconclusive. With regard to the triple characteristic, on the other hand, a reason is found to lack all cogency in spite of its triple characteristic, if the condition of universal concomitance be not present in it. The inference 'X must be swarthy in complexion, like other sons of Maitra, since he is the son of Maitra (a man of swarthy complexion)' is an instance in point. It may be contended that the necessity of absence in the heterologue is not satisfied by the probans (in the above inference) and the lack of cogency is due to this defect. That being the case, this element of the 'necessity of absence in the heterologue' should be alone reckoned as the necessary factor of universal concomitance, since the absence of this condition in spite of the presence of other characteristics is responsible for the incapacity of a probans to prove a probandum. It is legitimate that this alone should be regarded as the dominant characteristic (of a valid probans). Furthermore, the presence of this condition alone, irrespective of the other two characteristics, is found to invest a probans with full cogency. Thus the following inference may be cited as an example: (The admission of) organs of valid knowledge is necessary for the monist also, as the proof of the desired conclusion and disproof of the undesired positions become otherwise absurd. In

this instance of inference, there is neither subsistence of the probans in the subject (minor term), nor in the homologue. But still the probans is found to be conclusive, only on the ground of the presence of universal concomitance (proved by the necessity of the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory possibility). It has been contended that if subsistence in the subject (minor term) be not a necessary condition, the probans in such inferences as "The palace is white, because the crow is black" would pass for a valid one. No, this is not possible. Even the probantia which do not subsist in the subject (minor term) are admitted to be perfectly cogent only because they possess universal concomitance. In the present case this universal concomitance is not present (and so the inference is not valid). Thus universal concomitance alone should be regarded as the principal characteristic of a probans, the presence of which even in the absence of the triple characteristic makes the probans valid and cogent. The triple characteristic, furthermore, is not a necessary feature of a valid probans, since it is not universal. Thus in the following case of inference—All is momentary, since existent—which is the most predominant argument of the Buddhist (being the corner-stone of his whole metaphysical edifice), the probans 'existent' is held by them to be valid, though it does not occur in a homologue (since every existent is included in the subject and there is nothing outside which can serve as an example). Thus has it been said:

"What does the triple characteristic serve, if incompatibility with the contradictory be present? And what would again this triple characteristic avail, if incompatibility with the contradictory is absent?"

34. The aforesaid consideration will also serve to dispose of the quadruple characteristic maintained by the Naiyāyika, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Thus the aforesaid triple characteristic plus the absence of contradiction of the probandum and the absence of a countervailing probans constitute the five characteristics. Of them, the inference with the contradicted probandum

consists in the employment of a probans subsequent to the assertion of the probandum contradicted by perceptual cognition or verbal testimony. "A body of fire is unhot being a product, like a jar" is an example of the same (contradicted by perceptual cognition). "Wine may be drunk, as it is a liquid substance, like milk" is an example (of contradiction by verbal testimony). The negation of this possibility gives rise to (the fourth characteristic of) a probans having an uncontradicted probandum. A probans which is assailed by a counter-probans is an instance of countervailing probans. "Sound is impermanent, as no characteristic of a permanent entity is found to be present therein" (is an inference the probans of which is offset by) a countervailing probans (in the inference) "Sound is eternal, as no characteristic of an impermanent entity is found to be present therein". The negation of this possibility gives out (the fifth characteristic, viz.,) the absence of a countervailing probans. Now, the two cases of contradicted probandum and countervailing probans lack universal concomitance and so the necessity of universal concomitance includes (within its ambit) the two latter characteristics also (and hence their addition is a superfluity). As has been observed: "The opposition between contradiction and universal concomitance (is irreconcilable" (HB, ch, IV). Moreover, these two fallacies are accounted for by the default of the characteristics which are asserted by (the Naiyāyika) himself to be the defining attributes of the subject-matter of inference and hence they ought to be regarded as defects of the latter. What is sought to be gained by this explicit formulation? Thus it is established that a probans having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary relation with the probandum (is alone sufficient to make inference possible). (IX)

35. Now the author is propounding the definition of universal concomitance:

(Aph.) *Universal concomitance consists in the universal necessity*

of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. (X)

36, Synchronous events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions such as colour and taste of a fruit, or which stand in the relation of determinate concomitant (included) and determinant concomitant (includent) such as genus and species, e. g., tree (genus) and *śimśapā* (species). Successive events are those which occur in succession, as for instance, the appearance of *kṛttikā*¹ and *śakata*²; or, which are related as effect and cause, e. g., smoke and fire. The universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence respectively of those two sets of facts, that is to say, the necessity of synchronism of synchronous events and the necessity of succession of successive events, is what is meant by universal concomitance. It is gathered from the context that the terms of the relation function as probans and probandum. (X)

37. Now it has been observed that universal concomitance of the aforesaid type is the condition of the knowledge of the probandum, when understood (as such). But what is this organ by which such understanding is achieved? Certainly it is not by perceptual cognition, since being sensuous its operation is confined to an object standing in close proximity (to the senses). Nor can the mind (be the organ) which, though it is capable of cognising all possible objects, is subject to the limitation that it can operate only in the sphere of the objects which have been apprehended by the senses. Otherwise (if there was no such limitation), there would be no case of a person subject to blindness or deafness. As regards the capacity of mind for the apprehension of all possible objects, it should be understood as having reference to the objects which are cognisable by all the senses taken together, and not in its independent capacity. If mystic

1. The pleiades. The third of the 7 lunar mansions or asterisms (consisting of six stars).

2. Also called *rohini*. Name of the fourth lunar mansion (containing five stars) figured by a cart.

intuition (were to be posited as the organ) for the comprehension of universal concomitance, what would be the necessity of inference, perfectly unavailing, as the knowledge of the probandum to be inferred would be easily secured by the former? Were knowledge of universal concomitance supposed to be secured by inference, it has been shown that it would give rise to the consequences of *regressus ad infinitum* or a logical see-saw. Nor is again an additional organ available, which can be credited with the capacity for the apprehension of such (a relation as its) object. With this consideration in view, the author observes:

(Aph.) *The knowledge of the same is (achieved) by means of Inductive Reasoning. (XI)*

38. Inductive Reasoning is *reductio ad absurdum*, which has already been defined (I. 2. IV). The knowledge of the same, i.e., universal concomitance is secured by its aid.

39. The probans has been defined and examined. Now the author propounds its classification:

(Aph.) *The probans is of five types, viz.,⁹ essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite. (XII)*

40. The first four beginning with essential identity are the probantia for a positive probandum. The last, viz., the opposite, is the probans for a negative one. Thus we have five types of probantia. Of these, essential identity is illustrated by the attribute of 'being a product' or 'audible' with regard to the inference of impermanence in a word—(word is impermanent, because it is a product or because it is audible).

41. Here a difficulty arises: Audibility is an uncommon attribute. How can universal concomitance between it (and impermanence) be established? Our answer is that it is established by the evidence of the organ of *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility. The case is exactly on a par with that of the attribute 'existence' (which is made the ground of the proof of impermanence by the Buddhist). It

would not be a tenable contention to urge that existence alone is the legitimate probans in the case under consideration (and audibility is only a case of existence and as such cannot be looked upon as an independent probans in its own right). Were it so, such probantia as 'having an origin', 'being a product', 'being a consequent to exertion', 'being variable with the variation of causal factors', which are the derivative species of existence, would cease to be legitimate grounds of inference. Moreover, what is this concept of uncommon attribute thought to consist in? If it is supposed to consist in the fact that an attribute is present exclusively in the subject (minor term), the situation is exactly the same in the case of existence (put forward as the probans) in order to prove that all entities are momentary. If it be maintained that the subject may also serve as the homologue, if known to be possessed of the attribute which is the probandum, then what is the ground for aversion against the present case (audibility)? If, on the other hand, any term entirely other than the subject be regarded as (a legitimate) homologue, then the inference 'diamond is inscribable by iron, being a derivative product of the element of earth, just like a piece of wood' would be valid as the probans 'being an earthy substance' would be competent to bring home the probandum 'being inscribable by iron' in the diamond. If you seek to escape the fallacy under the contention that there is not the inherent incompatibility (of the probans 'being an earthy substance') with the contradictory (of the probandum 'inscribable by iron')—in other words, the possibility that an earthy substance may be uninscribable by iron is not shown to be absurd), then it is quite proper that the latter condition alone should be regarded as the only characteristic of a probans. But this would make even what is not an attribute of the subject a ground of inference, (so may the opponent contend). We answer: Let it be so, provided necessary concomitance is at its back. It is common experience that the emergence of the star *kṛttikā* (pleiades)⁶ serves as the ground of inference of the emergence of *śakaṭa* (*rohini*), and instruction found to

be congruent with fact serves as the ground of inference of the speaker being omniscient. The blackness of the crow, on the contrary, is not a valid ground, as it is inconclusive (for the proof of the whiteness of the palace), since the blackness of the crow is not logically impossible without the whiteness of the palace. Likewise, the attribute of the jar 'being visible' is intelligible even without reference to the impermanence of word; (hence the former is not the probans of the latter.) It follows, therefore, that such attributes as 'audibility', though uncommon, are not contingent to impermanence (but, on the contrary, necessarily concomitant with it).

(Q) Now, if the impermanence of word is to be established on the ground of its being product, will it not establish impermanence of substance as it does in the case of modes ?

(A) Certainly not so. It is impermanence of the modes only that is sought to be proved. How do you forget that the probandum is what is intended to be established though not expressly stated ? A problem is again raised—If the quality of 'being a product' and 'impermanence' are essentially identical, the probandum is as much a proved fact as the probans, or the probans will be accounted unproved like the probandum. The answer is—This (your contention) has truth in it. But the syllogistic argument is employed in order to remove a delusion; as has been observed: "For a person who does not realise through delusion that a thing which has a definite beginning must have a definite end, the self-same entity used as probans and probandum is not liable to objection."

42. The cause (as probans is illustrated in the following situations). For example, fire serves as the probans of smoke when the latter becomes the subject-matter of doubt as to whether it is a volume of vapour or an assemblage of mosquitoes; or upsurge of a special variety of cloud as the probans of impending rain-fall. It is passing strange how it has escaped the notice of the Buddhist logician who plumes himself upon his minute observation although it is a matter

of common knowledge among such ignorant persons as children, cowherds, shepherds and women and the like. It is a truism that all persons who are interested in the effect set to work after the observation of a special kind of cause. The special kind that is to be known is what is an invariable concomitant (of the effect in question). (Q) Is not the activity due to the knowledge of causality alone (A) Yes, it may be granted that the knowledge of (the cause as) the special kind of probans is derived from perceptual cognition, but with regard to the effect which is yet to come into being, we cannot imagine anything as the source of its knowledge save and except inference. If all causes are to be condemned to be destitute of the character of valid probans on the ground of the fallibility of some individual cases, the same contingency will be inevitable in the case of (such recognised probantia as) the effect also. It may be urged that the contingency does not arise inasmuch as (such pseudo-effects as) vapour and the like are not effects proper. But then in the present case also there is no room for objection, since the formula of causality is: If A is not the outcome of B, B is not the cause of A. (The causal relation is to be understood in a specific reference). Thus as a particular effect is affiliated to a particular cause, so exactly a particular cause, is to be affiliated to a particular effect. Just as the relation of 'being an effect' is not understood with reference to what is not its *causa essendi*, so also the relation of 'being a cause' is not to be understood with reference to what is not its effect. Thus there is no material difference between the two situations. Furthermore, the Buddhist logician also endorses the position that the cause may function as a probans while he advocates the inference of colour from the presence of taste mediated by the inference of the self-same set of causal conditions (of which the two are the common effects). As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti): "The knowledge of colour which is the co-product (with taste) of the self-same set of causal conditions from the presence of taste is made possible through the inference of causal efficiency (of the cause of taste with regard to colour). The case is on a par

with smoke (serving as the probans of) transformation of fuel" (PV,I 11)

43. We, too, affirm the character of logical ground (probans) not of any and every cause, but only of that which has not suffered from obstruction of its (causal) energy by means of spells and the like., or from inadequacy owing to the diminution of any causal condition. But how can this be ascertained ? Well, there is a (clear) difference between what is deficient and what is other than it (adequate). And the knowledge of this is found to arise even among common folk with no education. As has been said, "Such types of cloud do not fail to be attended with shower of rain which make the caves and ravines of mountains reverberate with their thundering roars, with their upraised bodies rendered yellow by the flashes of lightning entwining like creepers, as black as black-bees, horn of buffalos, black snakes and *tamāla* trees" (NM, P. 129).

44 The effect as probans is illustrated by such instances as the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the probans of rainfall, smoke serving as the probans of fire, vital function of consciousness. But how can this special nature of the flood be known ? The Naiyāyikas have given the answer to this in the following words: "It is not a fact that the special nature of the flood is not capable of being known with its enormous volume of muddy water exhibiting eddies and whirlpools, marked with conspicuous lines of foam, swirling with mighty waves, littered with the floating masses of moss, fruits, and patches of green grass" (NM. p. 130). As regards smoke and vital functions also, it is not difficult to ascertain that they are effects. As has been observed: "Smoke is the effect of fire, as the characteristics of effect are observed to be present in it. If it were to come into existence even when it (the cause) were absent, it would forfeit the character of being conditioned by a cause" (PV, I.35).

45. If the effect were to come into existence even in the absence of a cause the former (the effect) would either

be destitute of a cause or have a cause other than the recognised one. If it (the effect) were destitute of a cause, it must have either existence or non-existence for all time (neither of which is warranted by experience). If it were supposed to be conditioned by some other cause, then being the consequence of a condition other than the observed datum, it could not be regarded as the product of the observed datum. Again, on the other hand, being perceived to follow upon the observed datum even in absence of any other (antecedent condition), the effect in question cannot be regarded as the effect of another cause. And thus the effect would be destitute of every possible cause (both the observed and the unobserved data being ruled out of court). As has been said in this connection "What has been apprehended to emerge into existence from some other (cause) cannot have the properties of smoke just because of the difference of causes. It has been asserted that fire is the cause of smoke." Moreover, "If the head of Śakra (king of gods) were of the nature of fire, it would be nothing but natural fire (capable of producing smoke). If, on the other hand, it were of a nature different from that of fire, how can smoke be possibly there?" (PV, I. 37).

46. Likewise, vital function *qua* effect serves as the ground of the inference of consciousness without which it is impossible, even as audibility is the ground of inference of impermanence. As regards its universal concomitance (with the probandum) it has already been asserted almost in so many words that the former is established by the *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility as is the case with existence (as the probans of momentariness). Thus vital function, though it is the uncommon peculiar attribute (serves as a legitimate ground of inference, since) it does not lack necessary concomitance with consciousness.

47. Furthermore, concomitance in agreement is not a characteristic of a probans, since its default does not entail a fallacy. A probans which exists exclusively in the heterologue, is (dubbed as the fallacy of the type called) the

contradictory. What exists also in the heterologue (as well as in the homologue) is known as inconclusive. As regards the attribute 'speakerhood' advanced to prove omniscience, (it is regarded as fallacious and) the reason of its being a fallacy is due to its absence of concomitance in difference and not doubt of its concomitance in agreement—by this observation the Buddhist logician also has affirmed the two types of fallacy to be due exclusively to the absence of concomitance in difference. As regards the uncommon attribute again, it cannot be deemed inconclusive, if it can be ascertained to cease to exist in the absence of the probandum, and thus in default of an alternative possibility, it perforce establishes the probandum. Moreover, if concomitance in agreement were a characteristic (of a valid probans), then a probans which exists only in a part of the homologue should also be regarded as devoid of probative force on the ground of its partial lack of concomitance in agreement, exactly on the analogy of an attribute which exists only in a part of the heterologue and is thus deemed incompetent on account of its partial lack of concomitance in difference. As has been aptly observed: If concomitance in agreement were deemed a characteristic of a probans, just as the concomitance in difference is, then it could not have both (existence and non-existence) in the homologue, just as it cannot have both (existence and non-existence) in the heterologue. (The Buddhists may urge that) concomitance in agreement means the existence of the probans exclusively in the homologue and not universal and necessary existence in the same. Granted, but this is indeed tantamount to concomitance in difference. And thus you would endorse the position which is maintained by us. It is we who have been at pains to establish that a valid probans has incompatibility with the contradictory as its sole and solitary characteristic.

48. [As for the coinherent in the same substratum, it is illustrated by the situation in which] an attribute inheres, that is to say, subsists along with the probandum in one and the same substratum whether perceived or-unperceived. Now,

the probandum, and so it is not a case of two attributes subsisting in a common substratum."

50. The four probantia beginning with essential identity are instruments for proving positive conclusions; the opposite, however, is the instrument for establishing a negative conclusion. The latter establishes the negation of the other by its presence; were it otherwise, the relation of opposition (between them) would not be established.

51. The implication of the word 'and' is: since essential identity, cause, effect and determinant concomitant (as the grounds of inference) lead to the establishment of their respective probandum by virtue of their incompatibility with their opposites, it follows that they cannot possibly come into being in the absence of the probanda concerned, and so the non-cognition of these (grounds of inference) is also valid ground for the establishment of relevant non-existence. Of them, the non-cognition of essential identity is illustrated by the case "The jar is not here, since it is not perceived though competent to perception." The non-cognition of the cause, is illustrated by the case "There is no smoke here,, as there is no fire". The case of the non-cognition of the effect is: "The causes of smoke with their powers unfrustrated are not present here, since there is absence of smoke". The case of the non-cognition of the determinant concomitant is: "The existence of the *śiśu* tree is out of the question, since the existence of trees (as a class) is impossible (in the place)".

52. As regards the opposite, it is what is opposed to the negatum or to the effect, cause or determinant concomitant thereof, or to the effect of its opposite. The respective examples of the above are as follows: There is no touch of cold (herein, as fire is present); the causal conditions of cold with their powers unfrustrated cannot be present (here, as fire is present in this place); there can be no case of horripilation of the kind (due to cold, as there is fire in the place); there is no possibility of the feel of snow (here, as there is fire in the place). If smoke is substituted for fire in the instances cited

above, it will give rise to cases of inference on the basis of the effect of the opposite. Thus the syllogistic forms of inference on the basis of the opposite as probans are of various types.¹ (XII)

1. The fundamental ground of inference of negation is nothing but the relation of opposition in which the probans stands to the probandum. And this opposition may be direct and indirect. Fire is directly opposed to cold and thus on the perception of fire one can naturally and legitimately infer the absence of cold. The indirect types of opposition are based on the indirect opposition between the probans and the probandum which is necessarily related to the negatum either as cause or condition. Thus the presence of fire being opposed to the presence of cold ensures the absence of the cause of cold, since the presence of the latter would make the presence of cold inevitable, and thus the absence of cold is the ground for inference of the absence of the requisite causal conditions of cold. The fact of the matter is that fire and cold being related as opposites, the presence of fire is the immediate ground of the inference of the absence of cold. The absence of cold again is the ground of inference of the absence of the requisite causal condition of cold. The dictum is that the effect proves the cause and the absence of the effect proves the absence of the requisite causal conditions of the same. The inferences based on these indirect types of opposition are rather cases of plurality of inference and it is only due to the facility induced by constant practice that they are regarded as unitary processes of inference. The point to be considered in all these types of inference is the relative position of the negatum concerned in its relation to the direct opposite of the probans. Thus in the first instance the negatum is the cause of cold, the effect of which is the direct opposite of the probans fire. The opposition really subsists between fire and cold and the derivative opposition between fire and all that is necessarily related with cold either as its cause or its effect or as its concomitant is indirect as the probans immediately leads to the inference of its opposite which in its turn leads to the inference of the facts necessarily related with it. The absence of shivering is directly inferable from the absence of cold which is inferred from the presence of fire. The absence of a particular species of cold is inferred from the absence of the genus cold. Thus fire is the direct ground of inference of absence of cold and the latter is the ground of inference of the absence of its effect, or its particular species. So, at bottom all these inferences are multiple in character and hence they are regarded as cases of indirect inference. The indirectness of inference based on the opposition between the probans and the necessary correlates of the probandum has been illustrated in all the

53. After having defined and classified probans, the author now sets forth the definition of the probandum:

(Aph.) *The probandum, (otherwise called) the thesis, is what is intended to be proved, unproved (before) and incapable of being contradicted. (XIII)*

54. The phrase 'intended to be proved' (is significant and) serves to rebut the possibility of what is not intended (by the arguer) to be established, being [regarded as the probandum. For instance, the proposition "Word is eternal" cannot be regarded as the probandum of the Vaiśeṣika, nor again the fact of it (word) being a quality of ether be regarded as a probandum, though it is set forth in the system (of Vaiśeṣika philosophy as a valid conclusion) and hence endorsed by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher, because that is not intended to be proved (and hence is irrelevant to the discourse in question). A probandum may be what is desired (to be established) though it may not be expressed. Thus, for instance, (in the argument of the Sāṅkhya) 'visual organ and the like are subservient to an other, since they are composite bodies like bed, articles of food and such other subservient things,' the phrase 'subservient to an other' means 'subservient to the self' (and this is the probandum). Again, (in the argument of the Vaiśeṣika) 'earth and the like have for its antecedent an intelligent agent, as they are products,' the probandum is to be understood to 'have for its antecedent a disembodied omniscient being'.

cases cited above. But the same may be due to the character of the probans also according as it is a necessary correlate of the opposite. Thus smoke is opposed to cold only because it being the effect of fire leads to the inference of fire which in its turn leads to the inference of the absence of cold. Thus the inference of the absence of cold is not directly capable of being reached from the presence of smoke but only because the presence of fire is inferred as the intermediate stage in the process. The enumeration of the types of syllogism serve rather the useful purpose of exercises for a student of logic and it is imperative that one must not lose sight of the fact that these are not cases of inference based on opposition proper, but rather of that between facts with which the probans and the probandum are necessarily related.

55. The word 'unproved' (in the aphorism) means that the probandum is always a fact which is the object of indecision, doubt and erroneous judgement and not a proved fact, as in the example 'Word is audible'. The dictum "A logical discourse does not come into play in regard to a matter which is unknown or definitely established" is universally acknowledged by all schools of thought.

56. The phrase 'incapable of being contradicted' means that the probandum cannot be what is contradicted by perception and the rest. This (aphorism) sets forth the definition of the probandum. The word 'thesis' is only another synonym of what is called the probandum and not anything else. (XIII)

57. Now the author sets forth contradiction which is sought to be eliminated by the employment of the expression 'incapable of being contradicted'.

(Aph.) *Contradiction is constituted by perceptual cognition, inference scriptural evidence, popular opinion, one's own statement and (linguistic) convention* (XIV)

58. Perceptual cognition and the rest are regarded as evidence of contradiction since they serve to contradict (the alleged statements) by presenting facts which are contradictorily opposed to the propositions asserted. Contradiction by perceptual cognition is illustrated by the following cases: Fire is not hot, honey is not sweet, the blooming jasmine bud is not fragrant, the jar is not visible, sound is not audible, there is no extra-mental object, and so on and so forth. [All these assertions are contradicted by evidence of direct experience]. Contradiction by inference is illustrated in the following cases; The palm of the hand is overgrown with hair; or, word is eternal. Now, these assertions are respectively contradicted by inference based on 'non-perception' and 'being a product' as their logical grounds. Contradiction by scriptural evidence is illustrated by the statement 'a pious act results in unhappiness in the next world'. That a pious act is the cause of happiness in the next world is endorsed by scriptures (of all schools of religion). Contradiction by popular opinion

is exemplified in the assertion "Human skulls are ceremonially clean". That human skull and the like are ceremonially unclean is much too well-established by popular opinion. Contradiction of one's own statement is exemplified by such assertion as "My mother is barren". Contradiction by (linguistic) convention (is illustrated in the case): "The rabbit-bearing luminary is not the moon". This assertion is contradicted by linguistic convention which sanctions the usage that the rabbit-bearing luminary is also designated by the term 'moon'. (XIV)

59. The author propounds (the next aphorism) with a view to the elimination of the doubt whether the probandum consists in an attribute or a synthetic whole composed of the attribute and the substantive

(Aph) The probandum is a substantive qualified by an attribute sought to be proved; but in some cases an attribute alone is considered as the probandum. (XV)

60. The term 'probandum' stands for 'what is designated by the word 'probandum' and is the same thing as is also designated by the term 'thesis'. But what is designated by this term? Well, it is the substantive qualified by the attribute sought to be proved, as for example, 'word' as the substantive qualified by the attribute 'impermanent' ('word is impermanent') is a probandum. This meaning of the term 'probandum' is denoted when it is used to designate a member of a syllogism. The phrase 'but in some cases' means 'at the time of the comprehension of universal concomitance' and in such situation the term 'probandum' is employed to designate an attribute. Were the meaning to be understood otherwise, there would be no comprehension of universal concomitance. Certainly one cannot comprehend in all cases on the observation of smoke, the universal proposition that the hill is possessed of fire, since this is in direct conflict with valid knowledge.¹ (XV)

1. The necessary concomitance of smoke can be comprehended with fire as such and the occurrence of the latter in a hill is only accidental.

61. The author introduces the next aphorism in order to expound the nature of the subject.

(Aph.) The subject is what is endorsed by valid knowledge.
(XVI)

62. The subject is what is established by such organs of valid knowledge as perception, as for example, 'this locality is possessed of fire'. In this case, the locality is established by perception. By this assertion the author refutes the Buddhist doctrine "All this assertion of probans (ground of inference) and probandum (object of inference) is due to the conception of subject and predicate which has its genesis in our understanding and does not presuppose existence and non-existence in the external world". It is not possible that conceptual knowledge unrelated to an object either inside or outside can establish a subject. And with the unreality of the subject, the reality of probans and probandum which have their seat in the subject, cannot be logically tenable. Thus conceptual knowledge cannot lay claim to establish the nature of reality even in a remote fashion. So it must be admitted that a hill and the like can assume the character of the logical subject (only) when it becomes the object of and as such is determined by conceptual or non-conceptual cognition. Such being the case, it is quite reasonable to assert that what is established by an accredited cognitive organ ought to be accepted as the subject. (XVI)

63. Now he states an exception:

(Aph.) It (subject) is also established by conceptual knowledge.
(XVII)

64. The subject is not exclusively established by an organ of knowledge. The subject can be one which is affirmed by conceptual knowledge also. The particle 'also' (in the

So when it is said that the probans and the probandum ought to be understood as related by way of universal concomitance, the term 'probandum' can mean exclusively an attribute and the introduction of the subject as the substantive is illegitimate, as there can be no universal relation with the subject which may be variable.

aphorism) indicates that there may be a subject which is established both by an organ of knowledge as well as by conceptual knowledge. Now with regard to the subject affirmed by conceptual knowledge, the probandum, that is the predicate to be proved, e.g., existence or non-existence, is established on the strength of (the verdict of) an organ of knowledge, for instance, 'There exists an omniscient person', 'A sixth element is not in existence'; (the subjects are affirmed as ideally possible, but the predicate is established by the application of the organs of knowledge).

65. But how is it possible, it may be urged, to establish existence or non-existence as the predicates regarding a subject which is not directly cognised to exist—particularly when the predicates cannot be legitimate objects of inference in view of the fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probans involved in the assertion of a probans positive, negative and neutral (common to both) in character? As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti): "How can existence be proved? If the subject is not known to be existent, an attribute pertaining to existents cannot belong to it (as probans); if the probans again be equally affirmable of both (existent and non-existent) it is bound to be inconclusive. If again, it (the probans) be a characteristic of the non-existent, it will transpire to be contradictory (since it will end in proving the non-existence of the subject)" (PV, I. 192-3).

66. No such contingency arises in our position. The subject envisaged in conceptual intuition is undoubtedly positive in character. But it may be urged that if a positive subject is envisaged, it follows that its existence is also envisaged by the same cognition, and so inference (called in request to prove existence) is superfluous. The answer is that inference is necessarily fruitful for compelling recognition of the truth by a person who refuses to accept truth, though realised by him, out of perversity. It cannot be urged that if mental intuition (is to be banked upon as an organ of knowledge) it

may lead to the establishment of such fictions as an ass's horn (and thus reliance upon such intuition will inevitably) result in (the obliteration of all distinction between truth and falsehood)—the fallacy called over-extension. But no such consequence arises. The alleged intuition (of fictions like ass's horn) is not an intuition proper, but only a deceptive appearance, since the existence of the object of such intuition is clearly set aside by the sense of contradiction involved in it. But how can then fictions like the sixth element be made a logical subject? The answer is that when the subject is asserted, the cognition of contradiction does not arise and hence its possibility is presumed. It cannot, however, be contended (on the analogy of the aforesaid cases) that the existence of omniscient being is liable to be called in question owing to the absence of all proofs in its support. The truth is that the existence of such a being is asserted as pleasure and pain, and more so on account of unimpeachable realisation of the impossibility of any evidence contradicting its possibility and so there is no reasonable ground for doubt regarding this.

67. The subject established by both (an accredited organ of knowledge and mental intuition) is illustrated by such propositions as 'Word (as a class) is perishable.' The subject 'word' is established both by valid knowledge and mental intuition, since all the individual words spread over infinite time and space are not capable of being cognised through perceptual cognition by persons whose power of vision is limited within a narrow sphere. (But it is the entire class of words that is made the subject and hence the necessity of resort to mental intuition over and above empirical intuition). The predicate 'perishable' and the like are established (of this indefinite number of individuals for which the subject stands). (XVII)

68. A question is raised (by the opponent). It is established by tradition that example is a necessary factor of inference. Such being the case why have the probans and probandum exclusively been asserted as factors of inference and

not example also ? In anticipation of such a contention the author says :

(*Aph.*) *Example is not a factor of inference.* (XVIII)

69. 'Example' is to be understood in terms of the definition to be propounded hereafter. It is not a factor, that is a condition, of inference. (XVIII)

70 Why should it not be so ? He answers :

(*Aph.*) *Because it (inference) is realised by means of the probans alone.* (XIX)

71. Because inference which consists in the knowledge of the probandum is made possible from a probans which is by its inherent character known to be incompatible with the opposite of the probandum and for this no reference to an example is felt to be necessary. It is for this reason that an example is not regarded as a factor of inference.

72. Would it be of service in the knowledge of the probandum, or in the apprehension of necessary concomitance, or in the recollection of necessary concomitance ? The first alternative is not tenable, since the knowledge of the probandum quite naturally and legitimately follows from the probans as specified before. Nor does the second alternative stand (a better chance) for the reason that the apprehension of necessary concomitance is achieved by proof of the contradiction of the opposite possibility (in other words, *reductio ad absurdum*). Moreover, example is nothing but the statement of an individual instance. How can such an individual case be of help in the knowledge of necessary concomitance which is necessarily universal in reference ? It would be necessary to ferret out another example in order to understand the extension of the concomitance to another individual case. But the latter (example), again, being nothing more than an individual, there would be no ground for the determination of necessary concomitance in its universal reference, and the search for examples one after another would only lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. The third alternative, again, will equally prove to be abortive. Recollection of necessary concomitance is possible on the apprehension of the probans

for a person who has apprehended the relation (between the probans and the probandum). And if the person concerned is not previously aware of the relation in question, no amount of example would enable him to recollect the concomitance, since recollection is necessarily conditioned by an antecedent apprehension. (XIX)

73. The author now propounds the definition of example: (Aph.) *That is the locus of the apprehension of necessary concomitance.* (XX)

74. 'That' stands for the example which is the subject-matter of definition. 'Necessary concomitance' is to be understood in terms of the definition given before. 'Apprehension' (here means) communication to another person (of the truth of the concomitance which an example serves to drive home to the other party). The locus, that is the objective substratum of such communication, (in the example). This is the definition (of the example).

75. Now it may be urged if example is not a condition of inference (in your view), why should you take the trouble of propounding definition of the same. The answer is: (It is in pursuance of the recognition of) illustration which will be allowed for as a case of exception out of deference to a pupil (of slow understanding) in syllogistic argument (employed for the conviction of the other party to a debate). And even in the field of subjective inference (for arriving at subjective conviction) the definition of example is not entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that there may be a person who is helped to arrive at the knowledge of internal concomitance from the observation of external concomitance in an example. (XX)

76. The author now sets forth the divisions (of the example):

(Aph.) *That is of two kinds according as it is based on similarity and dissimilarity.* †(XXI)

77. 'That', i.e., example is of two different kinds according as it is based on 'similarity', i. e., concomitance in

agreement, and on 'dissimilarity', i. e., concomitance in, difference. (XXI)

78. The author now expounds the example based on similarity:

(Aph.) The example based on similarity is an individual possessed of the probandum logically entailed by the possession of probans (XXII)

79. The example based on similarity is an individual which is endowed with the probandum logically enforced by the nature of a probans and not as a matter of accident as illustrated by the maxim of 'fall of palm-fruit and death of the crow'. Thus, for instance, jar and the like serve as examples in relation to word which is sought to be proved to be perishable on the ground of its being a product. (XXII)

80. The author now sets forth the example based on dissimilarity:

(Aph.) The example based on dissimilarity is an individual which is shown to be characterised by the default of the probans which is entailed as a necessary consequence by the default of the probandum. (XXIII)

81. The example based on dissimilarity is an individual which exhibits the destitution of the probans logically entailed by the destitution of the probandum and not by way of accident. Thus ether and the like serve as such examples in relation to word which is sought to be proved to be perishable on the ground of its being a product. (XXIII)

Here ends the Second Lecture of the First Book of 'A Critique of Organ of Knowledge' and the Gloss thereon composed by the Master Śrī Hemacandra.

BOOK II

LECTURE 1

1. Subjective inference has been defined and now the author proposes to give the definition of syllogistic inference which comes next in order.

(Aph.) Syllogistic inference is (definite cognition) resulting from statement of a probans having the characteristics set forth before. (I)

2. 'Having the characteristics set forth before' means having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum, ascertained by one's own self. (The probans in question must have this qualification, and) the statement of such a probans (implies that it is) an assertion which is the instrument of communication to another person (of this fact) and the definite authentic cognition of fact that arises from such (assertion) is designated as 'syllogistic inference' which means, in other words, knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person. (I)

3. A question is raised. Syllogistic inference is (customarily) stated to consist in verbal assertion. But how does it accord (with the definition of inference) ? In reply to this (the author) says:

(Aph.) 'Statement' is called inference by way of metaphor. (II)

4. A statement being a non-mental fact cannot be the direct condition of valid knowledge as its result, and as such cannot possess the character of a cognitive organ in its own right and without resort to a metaphor. But it comes to be designated by the appellation 'inference' by transference of epithet, being the condition of inference proper. The transference in the present case consists in the ascription of the nature of effect to its condition. There arises a recollection of it (probans) from the statement of the probans as set

forth before, and this recollection gives rise to inference. Thus the statement of the probans as defined before is the indirect condition of inference. Now, (by a recognised rhetorical device) the character of the effect, here inference, is transferred to, that is to say, super-imposed upon the condition, i.e., statement. It is by virtue of this transference that the statement, that is the condition (of inference), is designated by the term 'inference'. Or (viewed from the other side), it may be considered to be a case of superimposition of the condition, viz., inference, on the effect, viz., statement, which is the result of the inference made by the arguer. The statement is thus designated as inference by (the rhetorical device of) transference of epithet, and is not 'inference' proper in the conventional sense of the term.

5. Now transference of epithet is a warranted procedure if there are contradictions of the primary conventional meaning, a purpose (that is, a result to be achieved) and a legitimate ground (that is, recognised relation between the primary and secondary meaning. And all these conditions are present in the present context). The primary meaning of the term 'syllogistic inference' which is in apposition with the term 'organ of knowledge' (which follows from the aphorism I. 1. II. and is to be construed in apposition with the term 'statement' in II. 1. II) is authentic definitive knowledge having direct knowledge as its result. This primary meaning is contradicted because a statement cannot be the same thing as cognition. The purpose (of this tortuous procedure) is (for validating) the usage, in standard works on logic, of thesis and the rest as members of inference, which usage would not be possible if the meaning 'cognition' were adhered to, since a cognition has no parts or members. The ground (of this transference of epithet) is that statement is the condition of inference which is a case of cognition (and thus there is a recognised relation between the primary and the secondary meaning). (II)

(Aph.) *That is twofold.* (III)

6. 'That' stands for syllogistic inference which consists

in statement. The term 'twofold' means that it has two different types (III)

7. The author now states the (ground of) difference of types:

(Aph.) *The difference is due to (the consideration of firstly) the logical possibility on the occurrence of the other and (secondly) of logical impossibility in the absence of the other.* (IV)

8. 'On the occurrence of the other' means on the necessary occurrence of the probandum. 'Logical possibility' is to be understood in relation to the probans (in other words, when the possibility of probans is understood to be necessarily dependent on the occurrence of the probandum). This is one type. The second type arises from the consideration of the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the other, that is to say, of the probandum. To cite concrete examples: The hill is on fire, because the logical possibility of its being possessed of smoke is intelligible only on that condition (that is, on the necessary occurrence of fire); or, because the fact of its possession of smoke would become logically impossible in the absence of the other (fire). The difference of syllogistic inference is conditioned merely by this (difference of form) and not a real difference and this is indicated by the term 'difference' (in the aphorism), (IV)

9. That this alone is the case (i.e. that the difference is merely formal) is expressly stated (in the aphorism following):

(Aph.) *The difference between these two is not in respect of ultimate intention.*

10. 'Between these two' that is, between logical possibility and impossibility as exhibited in the difference of verbal form there is no difference, i. e. opposition, so far as the ultimate intention is taken into account. Ultimate intention is ultimate meaning as understood in terms of the definition. The meaning of a word is that which is ultimately intended by it. What is implied by it is this : The primary meaning expressed by a word is one thing and the ultimate meaning (i.e. logical content) intended as the result is quite another.

In the present context there is difference (between the verbal propositions), so far as they are expressive of different primary meanings, but the logical content intended by them is identical. When concomitance in agreement is stated (in a propositional form), the concomitance in difference is understood by implication, and when, on the other hand, concomitance in difference is stated (in a propositional form) the concomitance in agreement is understood by implication. But both these propositions imply the same logical content, viz., the necessary concomitance of the probandum. It is not necessarily true that there is difference of logical meaning with the difference of primary meaning. The two propositions, viz., "Devadatta is stout, but does not take his meals in daytime" and "Devadatta is stout, and takes his meals at night" have different expressed meaning, but it does not follow that their logical meaning should differ on that account. This is the upshot. (V)

11. The consequence of the identity of logical content is set forth (in the following aphorism):

(Aph.) For this very reason, the statement of both (the propositions) is not (necessary). (VI)

12. Since there is no difference in logical content, the simultaneous employment of both the propositions stating positive and negative concomitance respectively is not warranted. The statement of the probans with its logical possibility and impossibility respectively with and without the probandum (that is to say, with positive and negative concomitance) is made for the demonstration of necessary concomitance. And when the demonstration of necessary concomitance is accomplished by one of them, the employment of both the propositions is superfluous. As has been observed: The employment of the probans may be twofold, viz., in a proposition showing its logical possibility (in connection) with the probandum (i. e. positive concomitance), and its impossibility when out of connection with the probandum (i.e. negative concomitance) in another proposition. But so far as the question of the knowledge of (necessary, concomitance of the

probans with) the probandum is concerned, it is achieved by either of them" (NA, 17).

13. Now, a question is raised : If the demonstration of necessary concomitance of the probans is achieved by either of the propositions, the employment of the second proposition is superfluous and as such is to be dispensed with. But (parity of reasoning requires that) the statement of thesis should be (as a member of syllogism) dispensed with on the ground of its superfluity. It is certainly not a fact that a person comes to understand a conclusion from the thesis alone. Were it true, there would be no room for divergence of views. In order to rebut this contention, the author states (the next aphorism):

(Aph.) *But the thesis is intended for demonstrating the subject.*
(VII)

14. 'The subject' is that with reference to which the probans with its positive or negative concomitance is requisitioned for establishing its relevant probandum. The demonstration of it means communication of the same to another person. It is for this reason that thesis is *to be stated* (the italicised expression supplies an ellipsis).

15. This is the implication. When a sane person utters a sentence for the enlightenment of another person, he ought to take care to communicate only that which the persons intended to be enlightened desire to know. It is only by following this procedure that a person who states only what is desired to be known succeeds in enlightening others. It is a truism that a person who speaks of gayals when asked about horses cannot expect to enlist respectful attention to his assertion from the interrogator. And how can a person succeed in enlightening others when his assertion is not even entitled to serious consideration ? To give a concrete illustration : Suppose a monk commands his acolyte "O acolyte ! serve food." Suppose, again, the acolyte does not return an answer (in some such words) "I'm doing so, O Sir !" but actually sets about for it. The monk thereupon takes offence and rebukes him "Ah ! False pupil, a rascal of a monk, thou

silghtest me!" Similarly, when a person desires to know (how) a word is impermanent and another person seeks to convince him by stating whatever reason comes handy, e. g., 'because it is a product', or 'whatever is a product is perishable', or the fact of being product is logically possible on that ground alone', or 'the fact of its being a product would be logically impossible were it otherwise'—without caring to state the subject in some such proposition as 'word is perishable'—all these assertions fail to receive audience from the person addressed who would take them to be irrelevant statements. Thus all these assertions fall flat upon him and he does not succeed in understanding anything for want of attention.

16. It might be contended that 'Whatever is a product is perishable, e.g., a jar. Sound is a product' is a (perfect) syllogism which will by the mere logical implication of its meaning drive home the intended conclusion "Sound is perishable" and so it will (not fail to) enlist proper attention. No, since the contention involves a vicious circle. There would arise knowledge of the conclusion from it (i.e., the syllogism), if attention were directed to it, and the direction of attention again would be possible if there were such (knowledge at its back). Nor could it be supposed that both the council (of umpires) and the opponent would have unquestioning faith in the authority of the proponent, and as such would endeavour to bring out the logical relation of the premises stated by him (and thus there would be no room for suspicion of the lack of proper attention). Were it so, the parties concerned would not demand the statement of the probans and the rest, since they would be persuaded of the truth of his contention in spite of his omission of the statement (of reasons etc.). [But the situation becomes entirely different] when the contemplated conclusion "Sound is perishable." is propounded as the thesis, and in anticipation of the query 'What is the ground (of this assertion) ?' the statement—'the fact of its being a product is logically possible only on the condition (of its being perishable)', or 'the fact of its being a product is logically impossible without implication (of its perishability)',

appropriately presents itself (as the answer to the query). This constitutes the logical justification of the thesis for the purpose of demonstrating the subject. (VII)

17. It has been further contended that when a syllogism is stated in the typical form, e.g., "Whatever is a product is perishable just as a jar, and sound is a-product", the conclusion necessarily follows that "Sound is perishable". It (the conclusion) is derived from logical implication. And if in disregard of this consideration, an express statement of the same is made, the consequence would be a case of superfluous tautology which has been defined as follows: "The statement of a fact, derived by implication, again by means of explicit language constitutes tautology". It has been observed (facetiously by Dharmakīrti): Dismiss this fascination for the way of dunderheads (who love to kick a row from the very start of any procedure), shut up your eyes and (calmly) contemplate whether the syllogism (proposed) gives rise to knowledge (of the conclusion). If it does so, what purpose would this (uncalled for) elaboration serve?" With this objection in view, the author says:

(Aph.) Though (the conclusion is) known by implication, (the advance statement of) it (as thesis) has justification in order to rebut a possible doubt about the locus of the attribute to be proved (major term), just as is the case with the assertion of the probans in the subject (minor premise). (VIII)

18. When a person asserts a proposition, viz., "What is a product is perishable", it is absolutely certain that a doubt will arise regarding the subject—Is it sound or a jar that is asserted to be perishable? In order to rebut such a doubt about the locus of the attribute sought to be proved, it is necessary and legitimate that a statement of the thesis ('Sound is perishable') should be made. It is exactly on a par with the statement of the minor premise which is employed for imparting knowledge of the incidence of the probans in the subject. (To be explicit), though it is a fact that when the probans is stated to be necessarily concomitant with the probandum, the locus of such a probans is known (in the

generality of cases), it is felt to be necessary that the minor premise, viz., 'Sound is a product' should be expressly stated for demonstrating the factual relation of the probans with a definite subject. Likewise, the statement of the thesis equally answers a logical necessity in that it serves to generate knowledge of the factual relation of the major term with a definite subject. (VIII)

19. Now a problem arises from the fact that philosophers (of different schools) hold different views with regard to the constitution of syllogism. Thus, for instance, the Sāṅkhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three members, viz., thesis, logical ground and example. The Mīmāṃsakas assert four members with the addition of application (to the three mentioned above). The Naiyāyikas (assert) five members with the addition of conclusion (to the four mentioned above). In view of such divergence of opinion, the question naturally arises: What is the proper form of a syllogism? The author answers:

(Aph.) *This much constitutes a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person.* (IX)

20. 'This much' means the thesis and also the probans endowed with positive or negative concomitance. It is the syllogism (adequate) for the conviction of an intelligent person. And it is neither more as the Sāṅkhyas maintain, nor less as the Buddhists affirm in the following proposition. "The probans alone is to be stated for (the conviction of) a knowledgeable person" (PV, I. 28). (IX)

21. It may be legitimately urged that persons of charitable disposition, who have taken up the mission of service of people at large, should endeavour to enlighten others by whatever method they would find it to be convenient. It is not proper that one should produce confusion of understanding in the public mind by promulgation of questionable theories. That being the case, how can it be said that this much is the syllogism for a knowledgeable person? Anticipating such an objection, the author endorses a second form of syllogism (out of concession).

(Aph.) *In deference to (the calibre of) the person to be edified (the syllogism may have) five propositions also, viz., thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion. (X)*

22. 'The person to be edified' means a pupil and 'deference to him' means obligation to the pledge of edification of the same (pupil). It is in pursuance of such obligation that the five propositions also, beginning with thesis, ought to be affirmed. These propositions are designated by the name of members, as has been observed by Akṣapāda : Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion are the members (NS, I. I. 32). The particle 'also' (in the aphorism) is significant and implies that each of the five members, thesis and the rest, should be supplemented by a corroborative statement, totalling five in all out of deference to (the requirement of) the pupil. As has been remarked by His Holiness Bhadrabāhusvāmin of adorable feet : "(The syllogism) is said to consist of five members, or of ten members in the alternative, We denounce neither (but accept both as legitimate)". (DV, Nir. 50).

23. Now he sets forth the definition of the proposition:

(Aph.) *The thesis is the statement of the theme to be proved. (XI)*

24. The theme-to-be-proved is the subject with the predicative attribute contemplated to be established. Statement here means a sentence which states a fact. The statement of the theme-to-be-proved is called the thesis (*pratijñā*) which sets forth a pledge (or undertaking to be logically established). "This locality is possessed of fire" is a typical illustration. (XI)

25. The author now defines the reason (as follows):

(Aph.) *Statement of a probans ending in an inflexion unfolding the character of probans is (called) the reason. (XII)*

26. The 'inflexion unfolding the character of probans' is either the fifth or the third case-ending (in Sanskrit). The statement of a probans⁶ as defined before with the proper case-ending is what is called reason. The phrase 'ending in an inflexion, etc.' serves to rebut the role of probans of a

word with the first case-ending, e. g., (the unqualified statement of it as) smoke (without the relevant case-ending in Sanskrit and such words as 'because' or 'since' prefixed to it in English). The expression (second in order in the Sanskrit original) 'statement of a probans' serves to repudiate the character of reason to the statement of an attribute lacking in necessary concomitance. This (statement) is twofold according as its concomitance is shown affirmatively or negatively. (The proposition) 'the existence of smoke is logically justifiable only on the condition of its positive concomitance (with fire)' or 'the existence of smoke is logically impossible unless the said concomitance be a fact' are typical examples, (XII)

27. Now he defines the illustration:

(Aph.) *Illustration is the statement of an example.* (XIII)

28. Illustration is the statement which sets forth the example in conformity with the definition given before. It is also of two kinds on account of the difference of examples. The statement of an example based upon similarity of attribute is called illustration in agreement—the example found to have the attribute to be proved (the probandum) entailed as a consequence of the attribute adduced as the logical ground (probans). "Whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example, the kitchen" is a typical instance (of illustration in agreement). Illustration in difference is the statement of an example in dissimilarity in which the absence of the attribute *qua* probans is logically entailed by the absence of the attribute *qua* probandum. "Whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, e. g., a lake" may be cited as a typical case. (XIII)

29. He now propounds the definition of application:

(Aph.) *Application is the act of bringing the probans into connection with the subject.* (XIV)

30. The probans is the attribute which was found in the example (subject of the illustration—as concomitant with the probandum) and the predication of the same (probans) in

respect of the subject is called application (*upanaya*), an act by which the probans is brought into connection (*upsamhriyate*) with the subject.¹ It is of the nature of a proposition. The proposition "It is possessed of smoke" is a typical example of the same. (XIV)

31. He now defines the conclusion.

(*Aph.*) Conclusion is (the predication) of the probandum.
(XV)

32. The predication of probandum as an attribute of the subject is called conclusion which consists in a proposition that unfolds the logical intention of the foregoing members (premises). The proposition 'Therefore it is possessed of fire' is an illustration of it.

33. These five members are rather parts of one (self-contained) proposition, each member contributing a quota of meaning which stands in necessary relation (with what is conveyed by others). The five corroborative statements alluded to in II, i, X.) relate to these five members respectively. None of the five members can generate an unexceptionable conviction of the truth of their meaning, if they happen to be subject to defects, either suspected or erroneously superimposed. It is, therefore, necessary that each of these members—thesis and the rest should be supplemented by corroborative statements in which the likely charges should be anticipated

1. *dharmīṣi sūdhanaśyo' pasamhāra upanayaḥ* The word *upsamhāra* is derived by Hemacandra in the sense of the instrumental case. *upa* means 'proximity', i.e., connection, *saṃ*, with and *hr* to carry forward, and the word *upanaya* which consists of *upa* and *nā* which also means 'carrying' has the same etymological meaning with *upsamhāra*. The etymological meaning of both the words thus comes to be that proposition which carries forward an attribute into connection with the subject. The *upanaya* rendered 'application' is the logical equivalent of the minor premise in which the middle term is predicated of the minor term i.e. the subject. Literally, the word *upasamhāra* and *upanaya* mean simply an instrument of predication and in terms of the definition given, it stands for a proposition in which the probans (i.e., the middle term) is predicated of the subject, the minor term.

and resolved. It follows, therefore, that in pursuance of the requirement of the pupils, a syllogism consisting of ten members should be employed (in order to disarm even the faintest suggestion of doubt). (XV)

34. The topics which have been defined in this treatise (should be understood and used in terms of their respective definitions). In the default of any constituent element of these definitions, they are customarily regarded as sham simulations. Thus, for example, on account of the lack of the characteristics of valid cognition in general, doubt, error, and indecision are called sham simulations of valid cognition, in the absence of the characteristic of doubt and the like, the cognitions in question are called sham simulations of doubt, etc.: in the absence of the characteristic of perceptual cognition, it is called a sham simulation of perceptual cognition; likewise, in the defection of the relevant characteristics, memory and the like included under the head of the indirect cognitions are designated as sham simulations. Similarly, when a probans lacks in its essential characteristic, it can be easily detected as sham dissembler of the same, i.e., as a fallacy. In view of the consideration that the determinate number and the characteristics of individual fallacies in particular do not lend themselves to easy apprehension, the author gives (a list of) the fallacies with a view to the formulation of their definitions.

(Aph.) The fallacies of reasons are three, viz, non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive. 'XVI)

35. The reasons which are not probantia proper, but which do have the deceptive appearance of real probantia are called fallacious reasons, such as non-existent and the rest. Though the defects actually belong to probantia (and not to reasons) because they do not occur if the probantia are valid, yet these defects are transferred by extension of meaning to the reasons which are but statements of probantia and they have been designated by previous writers as defects of reasons. We have not thought fit to make a break with the tradition

and have also designated them as defects of reason (as a tribute to the custom).

36. The number 'three' is expressly stated for rebutting any other possible number. It is for this reason that the so-called fallacies viz., contradictory and countervailed reasons are excluded from the category of fallacy of reason. Of these two, the contradicted reason is easily subsumed under defects of thesis—(a fact which is apparent from the definition and illustration given as follows): The reason employed after the assertion of a predicate which is contradicted by perception or verbal evidence is called contradicted (literally mistimed on account of the absence of the predicate at the time of the assertion of the reason). This is the definition, and it is illustrated by the following argument: The mass of fire is unwarm, since it is a product, just like a jar (which is unwarm). As regards countervailed reason, it is not possible at all. There is not the remotest possibility of another inference, so long as the inference as defined before stands as employed or unrefuted. An illustration is given of it as follows: Suppose one asserts "Sound is impermanent, being either a subject or a homologue" and immediately the second man retorts "Sound is eternal being either a subject or a homologue". But this is the height of impropriety. Who can make such incoherent assertions in a council consisting of four parties (the president, the umpire, the proponent and the opponent)—be he the proponent or the opponent—unless he has taken leave of his senses? (XVI)

37. Now the definition of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' is stated below:

(Aph.) The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof, or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be non-existent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance. (XVII)

38. The fallacy called 'non-existent probans' arises when there is no proof of its existence. that is to say, when

the reason is found to be non-existent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent *eo ipso*. "Word is perishable, since it is visible" is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase 'found to lack in necessary concomitance' (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is 'non-existent' not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the (sole and sufficient) characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) also: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a Brāhmaṇa on the ground of the Brāhmaṇahood of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required."

39. Likewise, a reason 'which is lacking in definite proof of its existence', that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and (also is 'lacking in necessary concomitance' is also a case of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called 'doubted-cum-non-existent'. Thus for instance, (this fallacy occurs when) a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour it adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of 'its having a quality perceived everywhere', (the fallacy being) due to the fact that there is no proof (in support of the truth of the reasons advanced). (XVII)

40. The author now enunciates the varieties of non-existent reasons.

(Aph.) *The different varieties of this fallacy arise from the difference of the proponent, opponent, and both (combined).* (XVIII)

41. The proponent is one who propounds a thesis. The opponent is the party that gives the reply (in opposition) and 'both' stands for the proponent and the opponent combined. The difference of non-existent reason arises from the difference of the parties concerned (from whose standpoint the lack of evidence is judged). The instance of non-existent from the point of view of the proponent is furnished by the proposition: Sound is liable to change since it has origination. The reason is non-existent when the Sāṅkhya himself is its proponent, inasmuch as he does not admit the truth of origination. His philosophical position is that a non-entity does not come into being and an entity does not cease to be, and origination and cessation are cases of manifestation and unmanifestation (and so origination and cessation in their ordinary acceptation are impossible phenomena). Or, take the proposition (asserted by the Jaina): "Trees are animate beings, since they meet with death if they are stripped of the whole of their bark". The reason (assigned here, viz.) 'death' which connotes "interception of life, sense organ, and consciousness is non-existent in trees with regard to a Buddhist (who is the) opponent here. As for the case of reason with regard to both, the instance of 'visibility' that has been cited before will serve as an illustration. (The consideration of the first type of 'non-existent' based on definite lack of proof is now finished). And as for the doubted-cum-non-existent variety, it too should be understood to be threefold on the basis of the difference of proponent, opponent and both (as explained before). (XVIII)

42. (But a question may be raised). There are other cases of fallacies called non-existent in respect of the substantive and the like which are endorsed by some logicians, but why are they not specified here? In reply to this (charge of omission), the author observes:

(Aph.) *The so-called fallacies 'non-existent in respect of the substantive' and the like are included necessarily in these (varieties noticed above). (XIX)*

43. 'Necessarily in these (varieties)' means 'in the non-existent in respect of the proponent, opponent and both'. Now, the cases of non-existent substantive and the like are being illustrated here. "Sound is perishable, since it has visibility while possessed of a universal" is a case of non-existent substantive (since the attribute of visibility used as the substantive is non-existent). The case of non-existent adjective is illustrated by the following proposition: "Sound is perishable being possessed of a specific universal accompanied with visibility" (the adjective 'accompanied, etc.' is non-existent). The variety called 'non-existent in respect of a part (of the subject)' is illustrated in the syllogism: "Sound is perishable, being the product of an effort", (there being cases of sound such as a clap of thunder which is not the product of a volitional effort, and thus the reason is true only of a part and not of the other part). The following is a case of 'non-existent subject'. Primordial matter is existent, since it is the prius of the evolution of the whole world (since the existence of such principle is not endorsed by philosophers other than the Sāṅkhyas). The case of 'non-existent part of a subject' is the following argument (when advanced by a Sāṅkhya or a Naiyāyika as the former does not believe in God and the latter in Primordial Matter): Primordial Matter, Self and God are eternal verities being ungenerated. The case of non-existent because of a superfluous substantive is the following: "Sound is perishable being produced-cum-possessed-of-universal" (since the substantive element of 'being possessed of universal' is a superfluity as the probandum is proved even without it). The case of non-existent because of a superfluous adjective is as follows: "Sound is perishable being possessed-of-universal-cum-produced" (since the adjectival element 'being possessed of universal' is superfluous inasmuch as the substantive alone establishes the probandum). The fallacy called 'non-existent because of doubtful substantive' is illustrated as follows; "Kapila is still subject to attachment and the like, because he is a human being and still unblessed with the knowledge of

ultimate reality" (since the clause 'still unblessed etc.' is not true from the point of view of the proponent who is a Sāṅkhya). The case of non-existent because of a doubtful adjective is the following argument: "Kapila is still subject to attachment, etc.' since he is a human being destitute of the ultimate truth for all the time" (since the adjectival phrase 'destitute etc.' is an object of doubt). These varieties of non-existent reason turn out to be cases of non-existent from the point of view of the proponent or the opponent according as the reasons concerned happen to be non-existent with regard to the proponent or the opponent. When they are so asserted to be non-existent by both the parties, they transpire to be cases of non-existent with regard to both. (XIX)

44. The author next enunciates the fallacy called contradictory.

(Aph.) *The contradictory is a reason which is necessarily of the opposite concomitance and is thus possible in the absence (of "the probandum) as a matter of necessity.*
(XX)

45. 'Opposite' means contrary to what has been stated (to be the nature of necessary concomitance). 'Concomitance' means necessary relation. The reason which has this (opposite concomitance is called contradictory). The phrase 'possible in the absence' is only an explication of this (characteristic). For instance, "Sound is eternal because it is a product" (is an illustration of the contradictory since the reason 'being a product' is concomitant with the opposite of the probandum, viz., eternal. A product is necessarily perishable and so can never be eternal). Another instance (of the fallacy is found in the argument of Sāṅkhya, viz.) "The organ of vision, and the like exist for the purpose of an other since they are composite bodies, like bed, articles of food and such other subservient things." Now in this argument 'subservience to a "non-composite entity' is what is sought to be proved. But (the reason advanced, viz.,) the composite constitution of the visual organ, etc., transpires to

be contradictory (of the intended probandum since it proves the opposite of it, viz., that it is subservient to another composite thing, viz., the embodied person). 'Earth and the like have an intelligent agent as their cause since they are products' (is an argument of the Naiyāyika which is another instance of) the contradictory reason because 'being a product' proves the very opposite of the intended probandum, viz., the fact of being created by a disembodied omniscient agent (in view of the fact that all intelligent agents are found to be embodied persons and we have no experience of a single instance of a pure disembodied spirit functioning as the creator of any thing).

46. The other varieties of the contradictory which have been (set forth and) illustrated by other logicians are also comprehended by this (definition within its scope). Thus there are four varieties when a homologue is available. (1) When the reason is includent of the subject and the heterologue, e.g., "Word is eternal, since it is a product" (the reason 'being a product' occurs in the subject 'word' and perishable entities such as a jar—constituting the entire sphere of the heterologue). (2) One which covers (the whole of) the subject and a part of the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is eternal being possessed of a universal and being cognisable by an external sense-organ possessed by us" (as the reason occurs in the subject 'sound' and also in such perishable entities as the jar, though not in subtle composite substances like diads which are not cognisable by an external sense-organ). (3) One which exists in a part of the subject but in the whole of the heterologue, e. g., "Earth is eternal since it is a product" (here the reason 'being a product' exists in all composite bodies of earth but not in the atoms of earth and thus is found to exist only in a part of the denotation of the subject. It embraces, on the other hand, the whole extension of the heterologue and is thus contradictory.) (4) One which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is eternal being a consequence of effort" (the reason here applies to such

sounds as produced by animal agency but not to natural phenomena like the noise of a river current or thunder and so the reason is partially true of the subject. It is, again, partially true of the heterologue, since not all produced phenomena are consequences of volitional effort, viz., a lightning-flash which though perishable is a purely natural occurrence). There are four varieties of the contradictory in the absence of the homologue. (1) A reason which occurs in the whole of the subject and the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, since it is knowable (an attribute which belongs to the subject in its entire denotation and to the whole extent of the heterologue which in the present case is everything other than the specific quality of ether). (2) Which belongs to the whole of the subject, but to the part of the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether being cognisable by an external sense-organ" (since 'sound' as a class is certainly audible and hence the reason belongs to the whole of the subject without exception, but as regards the heterologues represented by everything other than sound which is exclusively specific quality of ether, they are not all cognisable by an external organ such, for instance, as the magnitude of ether). (3) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and the whole of the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, since it is not an inflected word" (that is, a sound which has a meaning. The reason holds good only of a part of the subject, viz., unmeaning sounds only but belongs to the whole of the heterologue which is not sound). (4) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e. g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, being a consequence of effort" (since all sounds are not consequence of effort, the reason is partially true of the subject, and since also whatever is not a specific quality of ether, that is to say, the whole class of the heterologue, is not the consequence of effort, the reason exists only in a part of the latter). In four cases (out of these eight) the contradictory is the exclusive fallacy. But in the other four cases where the reason belongs

to a part of the subject there is a combination of both the fallacies, viz., the non-existent and the contradictory. (XX)

47. The author now states the definition of the 'inconclusive'.

(Aph.) *The inconclusive reason is one which is possible even in the absence of the probandum and occurs when the necessary concomitance is either non-existent or subject to doubt.* (XXI)

48. 'Necessary concomitance' means absence of existence of the probans without (the probandum) and when it is non-existent, the reason is 'inconclusive'. For instance, in the proposition "Sound is perishable, since it is knowable", the reason 'to be knowable' (is inconclusive since it) exists even in such eternal entities as ether. The same fallacy, again, occurs when necessary concomitance is subject to doubt. The proposition "X is non-omniscient, or possessed of attachment and the like, since he is a speaker" may be (cited as) an example of the above. The concomitance in agreement (between speakerhood and non-omniscience, etc.,) is subject to doubt inasmuch as the incompatibility of 'being a speaker' with 'omniscience' or 'absence of attachment' which are by their nature placed beyond (the range of perceptual cognition) cannot be established (by intuition or by inference since) speech is not the effect of attachment and the like. The other varieties of the 'inconclusive reason' which have been cited by some logicians are necessarily included under the 'Inconclusive' as defined by us. Thus, for instance, (1) the reason which covers the three terms (viz., the subject, the homologue and the heterologue), e. g., "Sound is perishable since it is knowable" (the quality of 'being knowable' which is the reason adduced belongs to the subject 'sound', the homologue 'jar', and the heterologue 'space', 'time', etc.). (2) Which covers the subject and the homologue and belongs to a part of the heterologue, e. g., "It is a cow, since it is possessed of horns" (the reason 'possession of horns' is a quality of the subject, of the homologue other cows', and of a part of the heterologue 'a buffalo',

though not of the 'horse' which is another part of the same).

(3) Which covers the subject and the heterologue and belongs to part of the homologue, e.g., "It (the goat) is not a cow, since it is possessed of horns," (here 'possession of horns' is a quality of the subject—the goat as a class, and of the heterologue, not-not-cow, i.e., the cow as a class, and it belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., not-cow, i.e., horse, buffalo and the like of which buffalo and the like are possessed of horns while the horse and the like are not).

(4) That which exists in the whole of the subject and in a part only of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is perishable since it is perceivable" (here the quality of 'being perceivable' exists in the whole of the subject—sound as a class, but belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., the jar, though not to diads which are also included in the homologue 'being perishable.' It is also found in a part of the heterologue—eternal entities such as universal which is perceived in a perceivable substratum, and not to space, etc., which are also included in the heterologue 'being eternal').

(5) That which belongs to only a part of the subject and to the whole of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., "Ether, time, space, self and mind are not substances, since they are destitute of specific qualities which are momentary." (Here the reason belongs only to a part of the subject, that is, to all the terms barring the self and ether which are possessed of momentary specific qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, etc., and sound respectively. It covers the whole of the homologue, viz., non-substances, that is, all the categories other than substance, which do not possess any quality—specific or generic. The reason also belongs to all cases of the heterologue, viz., the four substances—earth, water, air and fire which are possessed of specific qualities but not momentary specific qualities).

(5) That which exists in a part of the subject and the heterologue, but in the whole of the homologue, e.g., "Space, time and mind are not substances since they are destitute of limited dimensions." (Here the quality, viz., 'being destitute of limited dimension' belongs only to a

part of the subject, viz., space and time and not mind which is possessed of atomic dimension according to the Naiyāyika. It again belongs only to a part of the heterologue, viz., earth, water, etc., though not to self. The reason covers the whole of the homologue, that is, non-substances, such as quality, action, etc.) (7) That which exists in the whole of the heterologue, but only in a part of the subject and the homologue, e.g., "Space, time and mind are substances, since they are destitute of limited dimension." (Here the reason belongs to space and time but not mind—the subject. It again belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., self and ether, though not to earth and the rest. The reason covers the whole of the heterologue, viz., non-substances such as quality and the like). (8) That which exists only in a part of all the terms, e.g., "Earth is perishable, being an object of perception." (Here the reason belongs to earth which is not atomic, only to a part of the homologue—water and the like other than atomic, and to a part of the heterologue, such as universal, though not to ether, space and the like). (XXI)

49. The author now states the defects of illustration :

(Aph.) *False examples are eight in number in each class according as it is based upon similarity and dissimilarity.*
(XXII)

50. Though in conformity with the context of syllogistic inference they should be necessarily designated as the defects of illustration, yet they are called defects of example, since they are derived from the examples (proper). Examples again are of two kinds according as they are based upon similarity and dissimilarity and each one of these (two classes) has got eight false examples which have merely the semblance of examples proper.

51. He now illustrates and classifies these very (false examples).

(Aph.) *When sound is sought to be proved to be eternal on the ground of the lack of finite magnitude, action, atom and jar (would be false examples) being destitute of probandum, probans and both respectively. (XXIII)*

52. In the syllogism "Sound is eternal, since it is destitute of definite magnitude", action and the rest (i.e. atom and jar) as examples will be found to be destitute of the probandum and the rest (i.e., probans, and both probans and probandum) respectively. Thus 'like action' (if stated as an example) would be one destitute of the probandum since action is non-eternal; (if the example be stated as) 'like an atom,' it would be one without probans, since atoms are possessed of a finite magnitude; the example 'like a jar' would be destitute of both probans and probandum, since a jar is both non-eternal and possessed of finite magnitude. These three are typical cases of false examples in agreement. (XXIII)

(Aph.) *In respect of opposition (concomitance in difference) atom, action and ether are false examples, being not in opposition with the probandum and the rest (viz., probans and both). (XXIV)*

53. In the very syllogism (cited also before) "Sound is eternal being destitute of finite magnitude. atom, action and ether are false examples being not in opposition with the probandum, probans and both. Whatever is not destitute of finite magnitude (to put it in the positive form: "Whatever is perishable is possessed of finite magnitude"), for instance (in opposition), an atom." The example (viz., atom) is not possessed of concomitance in opposition with the probandum (in other words, is not concomitant with the opposite of the probandum), in as much as atoms are eternal. Were action cited (as the opposite example) it would be one lacking the absence of the probans since action is destitute of finite magnitude (and not lacking in the probans as it should have been). Were ether (cited as an example in opposition

it would be one) lacking the absence of both (the probans and probandum), for either is both eternal and bereft of finite magnitude. Thus these three are the types of false examples in opposition. (XXIV)

54. Likewise,

(Aph.) *When attachment is sought to be established on the ground of speech, and 'mortality' and 'limitation of knowledge' on the ground of attachment, the man-in-the-street and the like will be examples of doubtful concomitance in agreement and in difference in respect of the probandum and the rest (viz., the probans and both). (XXV)*

55. Three types of false examples are possible in each case according as the presence of the probandum, probans or both is subject to doubt or the absence of the probandum, probans and both is subject to doubt (in the examples concerned). What are examples, pray? (The answer is) the man-in-the-street and the like. In respect of what probandum? (The answer is) in respect of attachment on the one hand and 'mortality' and 'limitation of knowledge' on the other. On what logical grounds, pray? (The answer is) on the ground of speech and on the ground of attachment (respectively). Of these, the example of doubtful concomitance with the probandum in agreement is "The person under contemplation is subject to attachment (to worldly things), as he makes a speech like the man-in-the-street". (Here it is doubtful whether the man-in-the-street is actually possessed of attachment because speech is not necessarily concomitance with attachment). The example of doubtful concomitance of the probans in agreement is "The person in question is subject to mortality being possessed of attachment like the man-in-the-street." (It is doubtful whether the man-in-the-street is possessed of attachment). The example of doubtful concomitance of both in agreement is "The person concerned possesses limited knowledge since he is possessed of attachment like the man-in-the-street". In all these arguments the example in agreement is the man-in-the-street, but the

presence of attachment and limited knowledge is a matter of doubt since the mental condition of another person is not easily accessible to an outsider. Similarly, the example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the probandum is "X is a prey to attachment since he makes a speech, unlike the man-in-the-street (who happens to be mute)", The example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the probans is "X is subject to mortality since he is possessed of attachment, unlike the man-in-the-street". The example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the both (the probans and the probandum) is "X is a man of limited knowledge, since he is subject to attachment unlike the man-in-the-street". In all the latter syllogisms just as in the previous ones, the non-existence of attachment and limited knowledge in the man-in-the-street--an example in opposition--is a matter of doubt because of the inaccessibility of the mind of another person. (XXV)

56. Likewise,

(Aph.) *The two cases of reversed concomitance in agreement and difference.* (XXVI)

57. There are again two false examples, viz., of reversed concomitance in agreement and reversed concomitance in difference. Of these, the reversed concomitance in agreement is illustrated in the following situation: when the concomitance in agreement is stated (inversely) in the form "Whatever is perishable is a product such as a jar" instead of the legitimate form "Whatever is a product is perishable". (The fact is that the proposition "All products are perishable" is true, but the converse is false). The case of reversed concomitance in difference is illustrated when the universal proposition is stated as "Whatever is not a product is not perishable, for example, ether" instead of the legitimate form "Whatever is not perishable is not a product". Legitimate form of the statement of concomitance in agreement is one in which the probans is given as the subject and the probandum as the predicate, Legitimate form of the

statement of concomitance in difference is one in which the absence of the probandum is the subject and the absence of the probans is the predicate. The fallacy of the reversed example occurs when the order of assertion is reversed. As has been observed: "When the probandum is made the subject and the probans the predicate, it gives rise to the fallacy of example called reversal of concomitance in agreement. And the fallacy of reversal of concomitance in difference occurs when the absence of the probans is made the subject and the absence of the probandum is made the predicate. (XXI)

(Aph) *The other two cases of undemonstrated concomitance in agreement and in difference. (XXVII)*

58. The other two cases of false example are (1) one of "undemonstrated concomitance in agreement" and (2) one of "undemonstrated concomitance in difference." These two (fallacies of example) arise when the proof (of universal concomitance) is not demonstrated and not merely from the omission of expressions connoting unqualified extension, such as whatever¹, all, and such adverbs as exclusively

1. For example the universal concomitance may be stated in the form 'Whatever is a product is perishable' (*yad yat kṛtakam tadanityam*) this form of assertion connotes indefinite extension (*vīpsū*); secondly 'All that are products are perishable'. The word 'all' signifies that the subject is taken in its entire denotation. Thirdly, it may be expressed as "That which is a product is necessarily perishable" (*yat kṛtakam tadanityameva*). The adverb 'necessarily' (*eva*, in the original Sanskrit) signifies necessity (*Avadhāraṇa*). All these verbal forms do not differ in their ultimate import which consists in the assertion of the universal proposition. What Hemacandra seeks to emphasise is the truth that the universal proposition, however variously it may be expressed, does not by itself warrant a valid inference unless it be materially true. Indian logicians have not recognised mere formal validity as the criterion of logical validity. In the Aristotelian syllogism the universal proposition is introduced by the word, 'All'. Hemacandra admits the justice of this formal procedure, but does not restrict the expression universal concomitance to this particular mode. There are other equally valid modes of statement also. But the validity is bound to

comitance of the two (speech and passion) is not enforced by necessity. Thus (the two examples) are cases of the fallacies called 'non-concomitance in agreement' and 'non-concomitance in difference'. Why are they not mentioned here (by the author)? The aforesaid cases (of fallacious examples) are not in any wise different from these two, (in other words, they are included in the cases cited above). Thus the number of false examples in agreement and in opposition do not exceed eight in each case. As has been observed: There are eight (examples) of non-concomitance in agreement and eight (examples) of non-concomitance in difference. These serve to demonstrate in a manner the absence of necessary concomitance of the probans employed." (XXVII)

60. The treatment of syllogistic inference is concluded. Now, the author gives the definition of confutation connected with the same.

(Aph.) *Confutation consists in the exposure of the fallacies inherent in an argument.* (XXVIII)

61. 'Argument' stands for syllogistic inference. The fallacies are the defects styled non-existent, contradictory and so on as said before. Exposure means that which serves to expose, that is, to drive home and consists in a statement directly revealing the aforesaid fallacies. Such statement is entitled confutation. It follows, however, from the employment of the adjective 'untrue' in the next (aphorism), that confutation in the present (aphorism) stands for the exposure of fallacies truly present (in the argument advanced by the opponent. (XXVIII)

62. When one has the knowledge of the true nature of a confutation, one can easily divine the character of a false confutation (that is, which has an outward semblance of the same). But the author propounds the characteristic of the same with a view to demonstration of its different varieties.

(Aph.) *False confutations consist in the allegations of nonexistent defects and are called counterfeit rejoinders (or sophisms).* (XXIX)

63. The allegations of defect which do not really exist in the arguments (advanced by the proponent) constitute false confutations, since they only have the appearance of confutation, though in reality they are innocuous charges. These are called counterfeit rejoinders or sophisms (*jāti*). The word '*jāti*' (sophism) connotes analogy. Because they resemble true rejoinders being employed in the place of legitimate replies they are called counterfeit rejoinders (sophisms). Thus the meaning of the term 'counterfeit rejoinders' is analogous rejoinders, that is to say, counterfeit rejoinders are rejoinders by analogy. They are as it were reflections of true reasons, and are employed in opposition to a legitimate or false reason advanced by the proponent in case the true nature of the defects in the reasons is not realised. And though as a matter of fact there is no limit to these cases of opposition and hence it is not possible to count their number, yet in consonance with the plan adopted by Akṣapāda they are demonstrated to be of twenty-four types according as the basis of opposition is variously considered to be similarity and the like, and they are called (1) Parity per Similarity, (2) per Dissimilarity ? (3) per Augmentation, (4) per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainty, (6) per Certainty, (7) per Contingency, (8) per Probandum, (9) per Contact, (10) per Non-contact, (11) per Interrogation, (12) per Counter-instance, (13) per Non-generation, (14) per Doubt, (15) per Neutralisation, (16) per Non-probateness, (17) per Implication, (18) per Non-difference, (19) per Logical Ground, (20) per Apprehension, (21) per Non-apprehension, (22) per Eternality, (23) per Non-eternality and (24) per Character of Outcome.

64. Now, among these, when the opposition is based on similarity, the sophism is an instance of Parity per Similarity. For instance, (1) when the proponent argues 'Sound is non-eternal since it is a product, like a jar,' and the opposition is set up, on the same basis of similarity, in the counter-argument as follows : 'Sound is eternal being devoid of

parts like space', there is no reason for discriminating as to why sound should be non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar being a product, and not eternal on the ground its similarity to space being devoid of parts. (2) When the opposition is based on dissimilarity, the sophism is called Parity per Dissimilarity. For example, 'Sound is non-eternal being a product' is the original syllogism and the counter-argument is propounded on the basis of dissimilarity as follows: "Sound is eternal being devoid of parts. What is non-eternal is found to be possessed of parts, just as a jar". There is no reason for discrimination that sound should be regarded as non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar in respect of being a product, and not eternal on the ground of its dissimilarity from jar in respect of possession of parts. (3) The opposition based on augmentation and subtraction respectively gives rise to the sophism called Parity per Augmentation and Parity per Subtraction. Thus in the self-same syllogism, the opponent may use the sophism called Parity per Augmentation by insisting on the occurrence of some additional attribute of the example in the subject (in which it is non-existent), e.g., "If sound be held non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar in respect of the attribute of being product, It should be possessed of such dimension equally with the jar. If it be not possessed of such dimension it should not be regarded as non-eternal like jar". (In the argument in opposition the opponent) seeks to enforce the admission of an additional attribute in excess in sound. (4) Parity per Subtraction (is illustrated in the following): "The jar being a product is found to be inaudible; by parity (of reasoning) sound should also be so (inaudible). If it be not so, it ought not to be also non-eternal like the jar". (The opponent here) seeks to subtract the attribute of 'audibility' from sound. (5-6) The opposition based on uncertainty (the attribute of 'having to be proved') and certainty (provedness of the predicate) gives rise to the cases of sophisms per Uncertainty and per Certainty respectively. The attribute which is to be established is one which is uncertain, and the

opposite of it is one which is established and so certain, and they are the respective attributes of the subject and the example. When the opponent reverses these attributes (by attributing to the example uncertainty which is the characteristic of the predicate of the subject and attributing to the subject certainty which is the characteristic of the predicate in the example) he is said to employ these two counterfeit rejoinders (sophisms). (For example, the opponent adopts this procedure when he insists that) the attribute of 'being a product' which belongs to sound is not the self-same attribute of the jar (being associated with an unproved predicate in the former and with a proved predicate in the latter), and likewise, the attribute (of 'being product') is not the same in sound as it is in the jar (being associated with a doubtful predicate in the former and with the same as established in the latter). (7) The opposition based on the analogy of the contingency of some other attribute constitutes the sophism called Parity per Contingency. For example, (when one argues as follows): "Some products are found to be soft, e.g., a blanket, bed, etc.; some again are hard, e.g., an axe; likewise, some products, such as the jar, will possibly be non-eternal, and some products, such as sound may be eternal" (here the contingency of such attributes as softness or hardness, though found in a product, is made the basis of the affirmation of the contingency of permanence in regard to sound). (8) The opposition based on the extension of the analogy of the probandum is called Parity per Probandum. The following argument is an illustration. If sound is similar to a jar, it follows that a jar is similar to sound. But sound has to be proved (to be impermanent) and so (by parity) the jar ought also to be subject to proof. Such being the case, one to be proved cannot possibly serve as example for another which is equally to be proved (since the example is always one in which the predicate is a proved fact). If, however, the similarity were not (symmetrical, the jar cited as example) would not be an example all the more since the divergence (between jar and sound is pronounced). (9) The sophisms called Parity per Contact

and per Non-contact arise when opposition is disjunctively based on attainment and non-attainment respectively. The following argument is an instance in point: Well, the fact of 'being produced' is the reason advanced by you, but does it prove the predicate by coming in contact with it or out of contact? On the former alternative (the position transpires to be as follows); Contact is possible between two present facts and not between one present and another absent, and when both (the probans and the probandum) are equally present, which can possibly be the probandum and the probans? (10) And if, on the other hand, there is no contact it is logically impossible that one should be the probans (of the other without an actual relation) since this would involve unwarranted extension (11) When the opposition is based upon unwarranted interrogation it is called the sophism of Parity per Interrogation. (It arises when one argues): If the fact of being a product be the probans of its impermanence, what again is the probans of being a product and what again is the probans of that probans (and so on without end)? (12) When the opposition is set up on the analogy of the heterologue, it is called the sophism of Parity per Heterologue. The following situation is an illustration. Suppose one argues: Sound is impermanent, it being a consequence of effort, like a jar and in refutation the sophist makes the following rejoinder: As jar which is a consequence of effort is found to be impermanent, so also the space cited as a heterologue which though permanent is found to be the consequence of effort since it is perceived subsequently to the effort of digging a well. This instance of the rejoinder should not be regarded as tantamount to exposure of the fallacy called Inconclusive reason, since the opposition is based upon a method quite different from that of the former. (13) The opposition based upon non-generation gives rise to the sophism called Parity per Non-generation. For example, when one asks "Wherein does the property 'being produced' exist when the subject itself, viz., 'sound' has not been

produced?" Such being the case impermanence cannot be established (in sound) for the impossibility of the probans. (14) The sophism based upon similarity or dissimilarity which has already been illustrated is turned into the sophism called Parity per Doubt when it is affirmed in the form of a doubt. For example, "Is sound non-eternal by reason of similarity to the jar on the ground of its being product?" or "Is it eternal by reason of its dissimilarity to the jar or its similarity to space in respect of incomposite constitution?" (15) The sophism based upon parity per similarity or parity per dissimilarity is converted into what is called the sophism 'Parity per Neutralisation' when the former is propounded with the intention of setting up a second (rival) thesis. Thus, for instance, when in opposition to that very syllogism (which has been used all along as the centre of dispute) viz., Sound is non-eternal, as it is a product, like the jar", (the following syllogism is employed) viz., "Sound is eternal, since it is audible like sound-universal" (class character inherent in all sounds)." The difference (of the present sophism from those based upon similarity and dissimilarity) is to be understood to consist merely in the difference of the mode of statement. (16) When the opposition is based upon the allegation of impossibility of the occurrence of the probans in all the three time-determinations (past, present and future) the sophism called Parity per Non-probantiveness arises. The probans is that which is an instrument of proving (the probandum). Now the question arises whether such probans exists, either before or after or synchronously with the probandum. If it (probans) be (supposed to exist) before (the probandum), of what can it bet he probans when the probandum does not exist? If the probans be (supposed to come) after (the probandum), it must be held that the probandum exists prior (to the probans) and what can a probans avail when the probandum (for the proof of which it is held in request) exists as an accomplished fact (before the occurrence of the probans)? Finally, if it be held

that the probans and the probandum exist simultaneously together then none of them can play the role of probans or probandum in regard to the other like the left and right horns of a cow, (17) The opposition based upon (logical) implication gives rise to the sophism Parity per Implication. (The following is an example). If sound be non-eternal by reason of its similarity to non-eternal things in respect of the property of 'being produced', it follows by implication that what bears resemblance to eternal entities should be eternal. But sound has resemblance with such eternal entities as space and the like in respect of incomposite constitution. This variety is nothing more than a variation in the mode of statement. (18) If the opposition is based upon non-difference, it would be a case of Parity per Non-difference. For instance, if the quality of 'being product' be the common property of sound and jar, and if on the basis of this common property the two are recognised to be non-different, then all things should have to be regarded as non-different (on the basis of the property of existence which is present in all). (19) The opposition based upon the presence of logical ground is called Parity per Presence of Logical Ground. Thus, for instance, if the non-eternity of sound be inferred from the character of 'being a product' serving as a logical ground, then why should it not be regarded as eternal on the ground of its incomposite constitution? What is intended by this sophism is that the upshot must be a case of indetermination, since there are present in both the alternatives equally cogent logical grounds and thus it is nothing but a variation of the manner of statement at bottom. (20) The opposition based upon apprehension is called Parity per Apprehension. The following situation is an illustration. When a person puts forward the argument "Sound is non-eternal since it is a consequence of effort," and the opponent raises the objection as follows (it gives rise to the sophism under question): Certainly, the fact of being the consequence of effort cannot be the ground of the inference of impermanence. That alone is asserted to be the logical ground (or probans) without which the probandum is

not apprehended. But lightning and such other phenomena are found to be impermanent though they are not the consequences of effort. And even with regard to sound itself which is produced by the breaking of a tree and the like due to the impact of a violent storm, it is equally found to be (not an outcome of effort). (21) The opposition based upon non-apprehension is called Parity per Non-apprehension. Thus, for instance, in the aforesaid argument in which the ground is asserted to be 'the outcome of effort', the opponent may employ this type of sophism in the form of the argument as follows: "Sound is not the product of effort. It undoubtedly exists before it is articulated though it is not perceived owing to the presence of an obstructive barrier". It may be urged in opposition. "The barrier is not perceived (and hence it must be fictitious). The non-apprehension of sound (in spite of the absence of a barrier precluding its apprehension) proves that sound (unarticulated) certainly does not exist". The answer is; No, non-apprehension is equally present with regard to the alleged non-apprehension of the barrier (which goes unperceived). The fact that the non-apprehension of a barrier is unperceived shows that it does not exist. The non-existence of this (non-apprehension of the barrier) establishes the existence of the apprehension of the barrier. It follows, therefore, that the non-apprehension of sound prior to its articulation is occasioned by the apprehension of obstructive barrier, and it is thus on a par with roots, posts water etc., which lie underground (hidden from view). The conclusion is established that sound is eternal, since it is not the product of effort (as alleged by the Naiyāyika). (22) The sophism based on parity per eternity consists in urging the necessity of sound being eternal by urging the dilemma of eternity and non-eternity with regard to the attribute to be proved (probandum). It occurs when in opposition to the assertion "Sound is non-eternal" the opponent urges the dilemma: Is the character of being non-eternal which is predicated of sound non-eternal or eternal? If it be non-eternal, then it is of necessity subject

to cessation and thus with the cessation of the character of non-eternity sound must be held to be eternal. If, on the other hand, the attribute of non-eternity be itself eternally present, then the very fact that the attribute is eternality present and further that the presence of an attribute without a substratum is impossible entails the consequence that sound too, being a substratum of the attribute in question, must be eternally present. The non-eternity of this (substratum) makes the eternal presence of the attribute an absurdity. The conclusion, therefore, follows (from the consideration of both the horns of the dilemma) that sound is eternal eitherwise. (23) The sophism called Parity per Non-eternity consists in the opposition derived from the supposed truth of the proposition "All existents are non-eternal". Thus it may be contended: If you seek to prove that sound is non-eternal on the ground of some attribute shared in common with the jar which is non-eternal, then it must be admitted that all existents are non-eternal since they must share in some common attribute with the jar. If, on the other hand, the non-eternity of other entities is not proved notwithstanding the community of attribute, there is no reason why this possibility be not admitted in the case of sound also. This sophism differs from Parity per Non-difference in that it seeks to establish a specific attribute by showing that all entities are non-eternal (whereas the other sophism seeks to prove that they are non-different), (24) The opposition based on the demonstration of the diversity of the character of the outcome of effort constitutes the sophism called Parity per Character of Outcome. It occurs when in opposition to the assertion. "Sound is non-eternal because it is an outcome of effort", the opponent propounds the following sophism: "It is a matter of observation that there are two varieties of effort—by one something that was non-existent, e. g., a jar is brought into existence and the other serves to make manifest by removal of obstruction something which has already been in existence, as is found to be the case with roots, posts, etc., lying buried underground. Such being the condition of things, it is obviously a case of doubt

whether sound is produced or made manifest, since the diversity of outcomes of effort is an established truth". The sophism based upon parity per character of outcome differs from Parity per Doubt, because there is a difference in the manner of assertion of doubt. °

65. Though as a matter of fact the number of sophisms is practically infinite if stress be laid upon the difference of the contents of the assertions, we have demonstrated herein only twentyfour types as we intend (to avoid overlapping contents and) to show only unmixed instances. The solution of all types of sophisms lies in the examination of the probans as to whether it embodies the characteristic, viz., incompatibility with the opposite. It is obvious that such attempts at throwing the dust in the eyes cannot be successful if the probans possesses the unmistakable characteristic of a sound probans. The necessity of concomitance between a product and an outcome of effort is securely established and it cannot be alleged that the non-apprehension of sound is due to obstruction of some barrier, but must be explained by reason of its being a contingent phenomenon. When, however, the opponent employs a sophism, the proponent ought to formulate sound refutation and never to take his stand upon other sophisms by way of opposition since this would only lead to a consequence incompatible (with the canons of honourable dialectic).

66. As regards casuistry, it should be regarded as nothing but sophism, since it also lacks the character of a sound answer. It has been already remarked that the number of sophism is infinite according as it is based upon the difference in the manner of demonstration (and so there is no incompatibility if cases of casuistry are subsumed under sophisms when they are found to embody the characteristics of the latter). As for casuistry, it consists in the refutation of the statement put forward by the proponent by ascribing a meaning different (from what is intended). It is of three different types, viz., (1)^r based upon ambiguity, (2) based upon generalisation and (3) based upon metaphor. Of these,

(the first variety, viz.,) Verbal Ambiguity consists in the refutation of the proponent when he makes use of a verbal expression susceptible of double meaning by putting upon the same a meaning altogether different from one intended by him (the proponent). Thus, for instance, when a person makes the assertion "The boy is *navakambala* (possessed of a new blanket, or possessed of nine blankets)" intending to convey the meaning of 'new' (by the word *nava*), the opponent seeks to refute this statement by attributing the meaning of number (nine) by rejoining "How can he have nine blankets (when he has only one) ?" (2) When by way of presumption a statement is made in general terms, which taken literally may extend to unintended cases, and the opponent seeks to refute it by attributing to it the character of a logical probans it gives the illustration of casuistry based upon generalisation. Suppose, for instance, that there is an occasion of eulogising a particular Brāhmaṇa endowed with learning and right conduct and a man delivers himself in a casual way of the statement "Learning and piety are (as a rule) quite natural in Brāhmaṇas" (without meaning that Brāhmaṇahood is the necessary concomitant of learning and piety, but only bases it on probability). Suppose again that a casuist seeks to refute this by making a counter-charge on the supposition that Brāhmaṇahood is made the logical ground and rejoins "If learning and piety be the properties of Brāhmaṇas, then they should be equally present even in the uninitiated Brāhmaṇa on the ground of his Brāhmaṇahood", (it becomes a case of the second type of casuistry). (3) Casuistry based upon metaphor consists in the opposition based upon the refutation of the primary meaning of a word used in a figurative or a metaphorical sense. Suppose a man makes the statement "The platforms are shouting" and the opponent opposes it as follows: "How can inanimate platforms shout ? It is certainly the men on the platform who are shouting", (the opposition becomes a case of casuistry based on metaphor). Now, the solution of all the three types of casuistry is found to be furnished by the

scrutiny of the denotative capacity of a word sanctioned by the usage of normal adults. (XXIX)

67. Since the statement of proof and refutation is a matter of frequent occurrence in legitimate discourse, the author propounds the definition of a legitimate discourse (in the following aphorism):

(Aph.) The statement of proof and refutation in the presence of judges and other members of the council with a view to the preservation of truth is called a legitimate discourse.
(XXX)

68. 'Proof' is the argument propounded by the proponent in order to establish his thesis and 'refutation' is the counter-argument set forth by the opponent in order to controvert the aforesaid thesis. The opponent also has to offer proof in order to establish his own thesis, and the (original) proponent has to submit counter-arguments in refutation of the position of the opponent. Thus the proponent has his own 'proof' and 'refutation', and the opponent too has also his own 'proof' and 'refutation' (in opposition). A legitimate discourse thus consists of the assertions of these two sets of arguments and counter-arguments as employed respectively by the proponent and the opponent. What is the procedure? In reply (to this question the author) says: 'in the presence of the judges and other members'. Judges are the members of the council, who are possessed of the following qualifications set forth in the definition given as follows: "Those are called judges who are equally familiar with the philosophy of their own school and that of others, men of high pedigree, freely chosen by both the parties, tolerant (of small peccadilloes), possessed of long acquaintance with the methods of legitimate discourse, and as impartial as the weighing balance". The expression 'other members' stands for the President, Proponent and the Opponent. The discourse thus rests on four factors, and is known as Debate. And if even one of the factors be wanting, it would forfeit its title to be regarded

as a legitimate Debate. It is a truism that neither the, proponent nor the opponent can hope for success in the pursuit of their respective plan of 'proof' and 'refutation' according to their free convictions, unless there be present (to maintain order and discipline) judges endowed with the qualifications set forth before, and a President who is free from partiality and has equal consideration for both (proponent and opponent), capable of discriminating between rightful and wrongful procedure, and able to enforce the observance of duties incumbent upon the different castes and graduated stages of life. Nor would it be possible that the mass of people who (are incapable of independent judgement and) are prone to blindly follow in the footsteps of persons happening to gain the upper hand will unwaveringly pursue the path of right conduct, once their convictions are upset by a set of fools who on account of their wrong education are vociferous with their sophistical arguments (and determined to subvert the moral order). (The author) states the purpose of such debate by the words: 'with a view to the preservation of truth'. By the word 'truth' is to be understood 'conviction of truth' which is uppermost in the minds of persons known for their rectitude, and this has to be preserved from the onslaughts of sophistry created by a set of people misguided by a vicious training.

69. (Q) The preservation of truth is the objective of Disputation or Wrangling as has been stated (in the NS, IV, 2.50): Disputation and Wrangling are resorted to for the purpose of defending conviction of truth just as a hedge of thorny brambles is set up for the protection of sprouting seeds. (A) No, even a legitimate discourse which is held to be liable to the application of censure is equally directed to the preservation of truth. Nor can it be contended that it is not a fact that it falls within the scope of censure. It is apparent from the definition of 'legitimate discourse' laid in the aphorism (NS: I.2.1.): "A legitimate discourse consists in the propounding of a thesis and a counterthesis,

each supported by an argument consisting of five members, not standing in opposition to the established truth, and in which the establishment of a thesis and the refutation of the counterthesis are sought to be achieved by means of recognised organs of knowledge and legitimate reasoning." The expression 'not standing in opposition to the established truth' implies the recognition of the censure called the admission of a position incompatible with established truth'; the expression 'consisting of five members' again implies the application of censures called 'incomplete'. 'redundant' and the 'five fallacies', in all, of the eight types of censure, and these are rather indicative of other types of censure (that can possibly be applied even in a legitimate discourse). It follows, therefore, that Disputation and Wrangling are not approved forms of Debate, since it is legitimate discourse alone that is competent to achieve the defence of truth.

70. (Q) It has been urged that Disputation and Wrangling are certainly legitimate forms of debate, since they are distinguished by characteristics (which are not found in a 'legitimate discourse' and that it is so is obviously deducible from) their respective definitions viz., "Disputation is that which is endowed with the said characteristics (aiming at the establishment of a thesis by means of accredited organs of knowledge and refutation of the counter-thesis by Reasoning) in which casuistry, sophism and censures are employed in addition in support and refutation" and "Wrangling is (a debate) which is destitute of the establishment of the thesis opposite to the position refuted." (A) No, this is not admissible. Wrangling which does not aim at establishing the opposite position (of what is refuted) cannot be regarded as a legitimate form of debate. How can a mere wrangler, who does not claim to establish his own position and seeks to refute the position of the opponent by means of any argument that comes handy, lay claim to respectful attention (and consideration)? As regards Disputation though it is entitled to be regarded as a legitimate form of Debate in virtue of the consideration that both the proponent and

the opponent respectively aim at establishing (their own position) and refuting (the opposite thesis), still it cannot be regarded as a different species of Debate from what is called a 'Legitimate Discourse'. The reason is that a legitimate discourse can entirely account for it (Disputation). It has been urged that the purpose (of a Disputation) is not served (by a Legitimate Discourse) in view of the frequent application of Casuistry, Sophism and Censures (in the former). But this is not a legitimate contention, inasmuch as the application of Casuistry and Sophism which are only the simulations of refutation is to be ruled out of court and as for Censures, they are incompatible with a legitimate Discourse also. It is a truism that such improper devices as the use of whip, slap, and gagging of the mouth are not regarded as legitimate means of securing defeat of the opponent. The application, on the other hand, of legitimate censures is not anywise repugnant to a Legitimate Discourse. Thus there is no difference in character between a Disputation and a Legitimate Discourse. As regards such coveted personal interests as gain, honour and reputation, they are apt to follow as a matter of necessity upon the achievement of the main objective, viz., the preservation of the conviction of truth and thus cannot be prevented (from operating as incentives) even in a (dispassionate) Philosophical Discourse, since (such desires) are natural to human beings.

71. (Q) It is contended (by the Naiyāyika) that there is a fundamental difference between a Legitimate Discourse and a Disputation, because the application of Casuistry and Sophism, which are illegitimate forms of argument, is banned in a Legitimate Discourse whereas it meets with approbation in Disputation. As has been observed (by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in NM. p. 11) "How can such misguided zealots vociferously rattling forth the tiny tit-bits of sophistry and those even not properly taught and apt to show their proficiency in the vigorous pursuit of wrangling be defeated except by recourse (to Casuistry and so on) ? The

gracious sage has propounded Casuistry (and Sophism) "with a view to guard against the eventuality that the mass of people, who are apt to follow blindly in the footsteps of others who show the way, may be inveigled into treading the wrong path being deluded by (the sophistry of) those (artful persons)".

(A) No, this cannot be a legitimate procedure. It is improper to secure refutation of the opponent with unfair arguments. High-souled persons do not seek to attain, as a matter of established practice, either victory or fame or wealth by unfair means. It has been contended that (resort to such tactics) does not entail an offence when the opponent is found to be possessed of superior resources and a victory on his part is calculated to bring about loss of religion (on the part of the vanquished) and a legitimate counter-argument does not present itself owing to the loss of presence of mind, and in these circumstances the proponent attempts to throw dust (in the eyes of the opponent) by means of even unfair dialectic, realising that the emergence of a doubtful situation is preferable to certain defeat. But the contention is not convincing. It only shows that employment of such sophisms may be necessitated by a situation of exceptional gravity, but this cannot be regarded as the consideration powerful enough to vindicate the justice of its being considered as a distinct type of Debate. Suppose that the proponent is driven to employ an unfair argument even in a Legitimate Discourse in deference to the peculiar nature of a particular substance, time, place and function, will that alone make it assume the character of a different kind of Debate? It is, therefore, established that a Legitimate Discourse alone is entitled to be considered as the only form of Debate in view of the fact that the claims of Disputation and Wrangling have been successfully demolished. (XXX)

72. Considering that Legitimate Discourse is terminated by either victory or defeat, the author propounds the definition of victory and defeat (in the next aphorism).

(Aph.) *Victory consists in the proof of one's respective position.*
(XXXI)

73. The proof of one's respective position either by the proponent or the opponent constitutes (his respective) victory. This again is compassed by repudiation of the charges brought against the probans employed in support of one's position, and by demonstration of defects in the probans employed in support of the opponent's position. The opponent succeeds even when he does not adduce a probans in support of his position in defeating the proponent by proving that the probans employed by the proponent is contradictory. The reason is that exposure of the contradictoriness (of the probans employed by the proponent) is tantamount to the statement of a probans in support of one's position. As has been observed: "The other party (opponent) defeats the proponent when the former shows the probans employed to be contradictory." (XXXI)

(Aph.) *Defeat consists in the failure of proof.* (XXXII)

74. The failure to establish one's position whether by the proponent or by the opponent constitutes defeat (of the party concerned). This failure is due to the statement of a false probans, or to the inability to repudiate the charges advanced by the opponent against the probans employed in spite of its being legitimate. (XXXII).

75. But a question is raised. If failure to prove one's position constituted defeat, what would then be the nature of censure? It is common knowledge that a debate ultimately culminates in censure. In reply the author says:

(Aph.) *That is censure of the proponent or the opponent.*
(XXXIII)

76. 'That', in other words, 'defeat itself' constitutes the censure of the proponent and the opponent, and not execution or imprisonment and the like. Or, that defeat alone consisting in the failure to prove one's position is called censure (in a figurative way), since it is the cause of

censure and it (censure) cannot be anything different as has been (erroneously) propounded by others: "The occasion of censure is misunderstanding or default of understanding" (NS, I. 2. 19). (XXXIII).

77. In opposition to this the author asserts:

(Aph.) *Mere misunderstanding or default of understanding does not constitute censure*. (XXXIV)

78. Misunderstanding is understanding which is perverted, vitiated and worthy of condemnation. It consists in regarding a false probans as a legitimate probans and a false confutation as a legitimate confutation. As regards 'default of understanding' it consists in the failure to accomplish the object due to be accomplished. This ('failure to accomplish') is again (illustrated by) the 'failure to achieve' the confutation of the probans (employed by the other party), and the repudiation of the objection (of the opponent), and this constitutes 'default of understanding'. It is held that the proponent is defeated in either way, viz., when he fails to attend to what is to be done or resorts to the opposite course. The expression 'mere misunderstanding and default of understanding' means misunderstanding and default of understanding *per se*. The expression 'does not (constitute censure)' means that it is not the cause of defeat. On the contrary, the failure to prove one's own position alone (is the cause of defeat and censure). It follows from the repudiation of misunderstanding and default of understanding as the occasion of censure that the varieties of the same are also to be repudiated as occasions of censure.

79. These (censures) are again (said to be) of twenty-two varieties. They are as follows: (1) abandonment of the thesis; (2) amendment of the thesis; (3) contradiction of the thesis; (4) repudiation of the thesis; (5) amendment of the reason; (6) irrelevant digression; (7) meaningless jargon; (8) unintelligible assertion; (9) want of syntactical construction; (10) violation of the temporal order; (11) deficiency; (12) superfluity; (13) tautology; (14) failure of reproduction; (15) want of comprehension; (16) bewilderment; (17)

evasion; (18) acceptance of the charge; (19) overlooking the censurable; (20) censure of the uncensurable; (21) acceptance of the opposite position; and (22) fallacies of reason also. Of these, silence, want of comprehension, bewilderment, evasion and overlooking the censurable are the different modes of default of understanding. The rest are the varieties of misunderstanding.

80. Of these, the definition of 'abandonment of the thesis' is given in the aphorism. (NS, V. 2. 2.): 'Abandonment of the thesis' consists in the admission of the property of the counter-example in the example cited by one's own self (the proponent). The interpretation of this as given by the Bhāṣyakāra (Vātsyāyana) is as follows: "When the proponent is assailed by the assertion of a property which is the opposite probandum and he admits the property belonging to counter-example in the example cited by himself, he abandons his own thesis and this becomes a case of 'abandonment of the thesis'. Suppose, for example, the proponent puts forward the argument 'Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, just as a jar is' and the opponent assails it (by the argument) 'A universal is perceptible by a sense-organ, but is observed to be eternal, why then sound also should not be so (eternal) ?' If in the situation the proponent does not terminate the debate, though realising the fallacy in the probans adduced by himself, but, on the contrary, asserts 'If a universal, though perceptible, be eternal, let the jar also be eternal (on your own showing)', he abandons his own thesis. The proponent in such a case abandons his whole position including the conclusion by admitting the eternal existence of the example (the jar which he has) cited in proof (of his position). And by abandoning his own position, he is said to abandon the thesis, since the position is grounded upon the thesis" (NB.V. 2. 2.)

(Criticism) The interpretation given here entirely lacks relevancy since it amounts to direct abandonment of the example inasmuch as the predicated attribute is abandoned

in the example alone. It is only indirectly that the reason, application and conclusion too are abandoned, since the unsoundness of the example entails the unsoundness of these factors (as a matter of necessity). It becomes, therefore, entirely devoid of bearing (upon the issue) to assert that it is only a case of 'abandonment of the thesis'.

The author of the Vārttika (Uddyotakara), on the other hand, proposes the following interpretation: "The word '*dr̥ṣṭānta*' (in the original aphorism NS. V. 2. 2. does not mean example but the thesis which follows from the etymological meaning of the term, viz..) that which is *dr̥ṣṭa* (observed) and *anta*, that is to say, that which is observed (to be established) at the end, and this is the thesis. The word *svadr̥ṣṭānta* therefore comes to mean one's own thesis and *pratidr̥ṣṭānta* is but the counter-thesis. When the proponent is driven to admit the presence of the attribute predicated in the counter-thesis as the predicate in his own thesis, he abandons his (original) thesis. [Suppose, for example, the proponent first asserts the syllogism 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by a sense-organ', and the opponent opposes it by asserting that universals also are perceived by sense-organ but they are nevertheless eternal and so the probans 'to be perceived by a sense-organ' is inconclusive. If now the proponent makes a fresh assertion] well, if a universal, though perceivable by sense, is eternal, let also sound be so (eternal)"—(the proponent is said to surrender his thesis) (NV, V. 2. 2).

(Criticism) This interpretation also is not quite sound, since it makes it impossible to arrive at an exclusive (and exhaustive) determination of the nature of the 'abandonment of the thesis'. It is certainly not a fact that 'abandonment of the thesis' arises only when the proponent admits the presence of the predicate of the counter-thesis in his own thesis, and so this would be the only possible mode of 'abandonment of the thesis'. It is also found that a person originally makes assertion of one predicate and next asserts

the opposite predicate for various reasons such as personal embarrassment on account of a censure or a rebuff received, or owing to a natural timidity which makes him fight shy of the council, or absentmindedness. And it is a truism that human error may naturally be induced by causes more than one. (1)

81. When the matter of the thesis is controverted by the opponent and the proponent asserts some other property as the probandum with reference to the same subject it turns out to be the occasion of the censure, viz., 'amendment of the thesis'. Suppose, for instance, that the proponent asserts the syllogism "Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by sense-organ" and the opponent drives home the failure of necessary concomitance (between non-eternity and sensibility) on the basis of universals. If in the circumstance (the proponent) observes (in defence) "It is quite legitimate that a universal, though sensible, is eternal since it is ubiquitous whereas sound is non-ubiquitous" the proponent here asserts a new thesis, viz., "Sound is nonubiquitous" in opposition to his original thesis "Sound is non-eternal" and thus makes himself subject to censure 'amendment of the thesis'.

(Criticism) But this variety also is as unsound as 'abandonment of the thesis' since it can be induced by causes more than one. How again can there be a difference in this variety from 'abandonment of the thesis' when there is no difference in respect of the surrender of position in both the varieties? Just as the admission of the predicate of the counter-example in the example cited by oneself involves surrender of position, so also does the 'amendment of thesis'. Just as again the 'amendment of the thesis' is resorted to for the purpose of establishing one's position so also is the admission 'Let sound also be eternal like that (universal)' made through mistake for the purpose of establishing the thesis 'Sound is non-eternal'. Just again as this (veering of position) is an absurdity (and hence impossible) in a man who is not under delusion, such also is the 'amendment of

the thesis'. If the difference of conditions be made the basis of the difference of these (two occasions of censure), it will make the admission of other undesirable cases of censure), inevitable (in addition to the recognised types). If these (additional cases) can admit of inclusion in this ('abandonment of the thesis') 'amendment of the thesis' can (with equal propriety) be subsumed under the same 'abandonment of the thesis'. (2)

82. " 'Contradiction of the thesis' consists in contradiction between the thesis and the reason" (NS, V. 2. 4) and this is an occasion of censure. It is illustrated in the following syllogism: 'Substance is distinct and different from qualities since no entity different from colour and the like is perceived'. Herein is a contradiction between the thesis and the reason. If there be a substance different and distinct from qualities, how can there be non-cognition of an entity distinct from colour and the like? If, on the other hand, there be no cognition of an entity different from colour and the like, how can you affirm (the proposition) 'Substance is different from quality'? In the circumstance the proponent is declared vanquished for his assertion (of a clause) repugnant to the thesis.

(Criticism) This verily is an untenable position. For the probans (only) serves to demonstrate that the thesis (employed) does not possess the requisite characteristics of a thesis proper and this amounts to a statement in different words that the present case is nothing different from 'abandonment of the thesis'. Or, it is case of a fallacy of reason called contradictory and is not a defect of the thesis. (3)

83. When the probans employed in support of one's position is confuted by the opponent and (the proponent) finding himself unable to meet the objection, repudiates his thesis, he becomes liable to the censure called 'repudiation of the thesis'. Suppose, for instance, the proponent asserts the syllogism 'Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense' and (the opponent) exposes the fallacy of inconclusive reason on the basis of universals. If, in the

circumstance, the proponent retorts "Who says that sound is non-eternal? he is vanquished on the ground of repudiation of the thesis.

(Criticism) This, too, does not differ (in substance) from 'abandonment of the thesis' since (the proponent) here realises that his reason is inconclusive (and practically surrenders his thesis) and consequently 'repudiation of the thesis' is not practically different from 'abandonment of the thesis'. (4)

84. When a reason stated without a qualification is refuted (by the opponent) and (the proponent) qualifies it by an adjective, it becomes a case of censure called 'amendment of the reason'. If the aforesaid syllogism is controverted as before on the ground of lack of necessary concomitance in the case of universal and the proponent seeks to qualify the reason (perceptible by a sense-organ') by the adjective 'being possessed of a universal', he becomes liable to the censure called 'amendment of the reason.'¹

(Criticism) (The admission of) this involves far-reaching consequences. For instance, if example, application or conclusion be stated without qualification and (the opponent) finds fault with them and (the proponent turns round and) proposes to add a qualifying adjective (in each case), this would make inevitable the admission of other types of censure viz., 'amendment of the example' and so on—there being

1 A thing may be perceptible by a sense-organ and yet eternal, for instance, a universal. So when the proponent seeks to establish that 'Word is non-eternal' on the ground of its being perceptible, he is guilty of employing an inconclusive reason. If in the situation the opponent charges him with the fallacy of inconclusive reason, and the proponent seeks to wriggle out by proposing the adjective 'being possessed of universal' he is convicted of giving up his original reason and resorting to a fresh one. Of course, the charge of inconclusive reason is avoided when the syllogism is put in the form 'Word is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, being possessed of a universal'. The rider 'being possessed of a universal' serves to eliminate universal which though perceptible are not possessed of other universals according to the dictum 'A universal cannot be informed by another universal'.

absolute uniformity in the objections and their solutions here as elsewhere ('amendment of the reason').(5)

85. When a person makes assertion of a fact which is entirely different from and has no bearing upon the matter under consideration, he is liable to censure called 'irrelevant digression'. For instance, when a man asserts the syllogism "Word is non-eternal, the reason (*hetu*) is that it is a product. The word *hetu* (reason) is derived from the root \sqrt{hi} with the *kṛt*-suffix *tu*. It is thus a significant word (*pada*). Significant words are of four kinds, viz., nominal base (*nāman*), a verb-form (*ākhyāta*), an indeclinable (*nīpata*), and a prefix (*upasarga*) and then sets forth the nature of these nominal bases, and so on, he is liable to the censure called 'irrelevant digression'.

(Criticism) Well, the question is this. Is this irrelevant digression', which is regarded as an occasion of censure, calculated to bring about defeat when the reason adduced in support or refutation is found to be valid or when invalid? Certainly there is no occasion (for the censure) when the reason is valid. If a person has successfully established his thesis and then like ordinary people even begins to dance in joy, what is there to be found fault with in his conduct? And even supposing that the reason is invalid, does it become an occasion of censure after the opponent has established his thesis or before he does so? On the first alternative, the establishment of the opponent's thesis itself encompasses the defeat of the proponent and the defeat is not due to this (irrelevant digression). On the second alternative, again, the question of defeat does not arise simply because both the parties are on the same footing as neither has established his position. (6)

86. The mere utterance of a number of unmeaning syllables in succession is the occasion of censure called 'meaningless jargon'. For instance, "Word is non-eternal because a, b, c, d are e, f, g, h, like i, j, k, l".

(Criticism) Well, does this variety also become an occasion of censure because (the reason employed) is absolutely devoid of all meaning, or because it has no bearing

upon the probandum? The first horn of the dilemma is opposed to reason, since a word absolutely devoid of meaning is an impossibility. As regards the series of letters articulated in succession, they too have a meaning in the shape of the phonetic values which are represented by them¹. If the second horn of the dilemma be admitted, all the types of censure would be reduced to this variety of 'meaningless jargon' inasmuch as there is no difference *inter se* so far as this lack of bearing upon the proof of the probandum is taken into consideration. If the difference caused by slight variations is made the ground of the difference of the types of censure, then a mimic cry, a wave of the hand and a poke in the sides of the opponent's body and such other acts, should also be regarded as occasions of censure in view of their lack of bearing on the probandum. (7)

87. If a syllogism aiming at establishing a conclusion or at demolishing it be such as not to be capable of being understood, though reiterated thrice, by both the council and the

1. The meaning of a word is that which is expressed by it. The expressed meaning is in the generality of cases a fact which is apparently independent of the word. But if we look closer it will transpire that the fact expressed as the meaning is coloured by the expression and this is the reason why two synonyms do not express an absolutely identical fact. Thus in poetry the same fact is best expressed by the same word repeated twice and a different synonym fails to bring out the identity aimed at. Cf. "The sun rises red and red it sets. The behaviour of the wise is absolutely uniform in prosperity and in adversity."

udeti savitā tūmrā tū mṛa evāstameti ca.
sampattau ca vipattau ca sādḥūnām ekarūpatā.

If the word 'red' be replaced by a synonym, say scarlet, the uniformity stressed will not be secured so much as by the repetition of the same word. This shows that the content or the meaning of a word is not only an objective fact but also its own self, rather a complex of the two. Even when a word has no meaning in the shape of an objective fact, it has a meaning so far as its own form is concerned. Accordingly, Hemacandra asserts that a word absolutely devoid of meaning is an impossibility.

other party, it becomes an object of censure called 'unintelligible assertion'.

(Criticism) Hereupon we propose to make the following observation: Is the failure on the part of the council and of the opponent to understand the meaning of the syllogism propounded by the proponent, though reiterated for three times, due to their dull understanding, or recondite expressions or swift articulation? On the first alternative, even a person who propounds a logically sound syllogism runs the risk of falling a victim to this censure, since there is every possibility of his being not understood by the council and the opponent on account of their dullness of intellect. On the second alternative, there is a risk (of the application) of this (censure) to the syllogism of epistolary debate since it is an usual occurrence that owing to the employment of recondite expressions in them, such syllogisms are not understood by the council and the opponent though they may be men of high intellectual equipment. If it be contented that when the syllogism in question fails to be understood by these parties (the council and the opponent) the proponent explains the meaning of the same (and so the debate proceeds without hitch), then here also let the proponent himself explain the meaning of the recondite expressions (to the satisfaction of the parties concerned). If no explanation be forthcoming (from the proponent), he will be declared to have failed to score victory, but not to be defeated so long as the opponent does not establish his own position. As for swift articulation, it is quite possible that the council and the opponent should somehow succeed in gaining insight into the meaning inasmuch as they are conversant with the final position of both the advocates. If, on the other hand, the proponent's argument be found to be unmeaning nonsense absolutely devoid of any bearing upon the matter at issue, the failure of understanding on the part of the council and the opponent will not make it unintelligible assertion, just as the utterance of (unmeaning) syllables in succession (is not deemed as a case of the censure

called 'unintelligible assertion'). So this 'unintelligible assertion does not differ from the censure called 'meaningless jargon'.

88. When a series of words without connection between the antecedent and the consequent is pronounced and consequently there is failure of the proposition to establish any meaning (connected judgement), it becomes a case of censure called 'want of syntactical construction'. Such (unconnected statements) as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' and the like are instances in point.

(Criticism) This variety, too, does not differ from meaningless jargon'. Just as the letters e, f, g, h are devoid of meaning and purpose, so are also the words in the instances quoted above. If, on the other hand, the meaninglessness of words be regarded as a different variety of censure on account of its difference from the meaninglessness of letters, then the meaninglessness of sentences (for want of logical connection between the antecedent and the consequent) should be regarded as a different type of censure on account of its difference from both the aforesaid types. It is frequently found that sentences also are employed without reference to the logical relevancy of the antecedent and the consequent. The following case will serve as an illustration: "The conch was on the banana, the banana was again on the trumpet and in that trumpet again there was the firmament of extraordinary magnitude. These conch, trumpet, banana and firmament became like the Ganges in fury".

89. Again it might be contended that meaninglessness of a sentence (i.e., a meaningless sentence) is at bottom nothing but meaninglessness of words (i.e. meaningless words) since a sentence is nothing but a collection of words. But in that case meaninglessness of a word (i.e., a meaningless word) would not be anything different from meaninglessness of letters (i.e., meaningless letters) since a word is nothing but a collection of letters. But if that be the case (in other

words, if meaninglessness of a word be derived from meaninglessness of letters) a word as such would have to be regarded as meaningless (as a matter of universal necessity) since (its constituent) letters are meaningless in all cases. If so, the contingency of a sentence also being devoid of meaning would be unavoidable since a sentence is nothing but a collection of words, and words by themselves are devoid of meaning. If, on the contrary, a word be regarded as significant in relation to its own meaning, a letter also should be regarded as significant in relation to its own meaning just as is the case with the base and the suffix. It is a truism that neither a base nor a suffix independently by itself is a completed word, but still they are not regarded as devoid of meaning. If these (constituent elements of a word) be condemned to be meaningless on account of their lack of an independent self-manifest meaning, a word also would be open to such a charge. Just as the meaning of the base is manifested only by the suffix (associated with it) and the meaning of the suffix, on the other hand, is manifested by the base (to which it is added), and (this is evident from the fact) that neither of them can be used by themselves in isolation, so also in the sentence *Devadattas tiṣṭhati* (Devadatta is standing), the meaning of the word ending in suffix *si* (*Devadattas*) is manifested by the word ending in the suffix *ti* (*tiṣṭhati*) and the meaning of the word ending in the suffix *ti* (*tiṣṭhati*) is manifested by the word ending in the suffix *si* (*Devadattas*), as mutually associated). And so it is never found to be the case that these words (as constituent parts of the sentence) are employed by themselves (being incapable of conveying a self-sufficient meaning). The relative significance of a word in reference to another word (with which it is in construction) is in the same position as the relative significance of a suffix in reference to a base, and of a base in reference to a suffix which are (not infrequently found to consist of isolated) letters. (9)

90. When the sequence of the statement of thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion is violated and the

sylllogism is stated with the reversal of the order of the members, it becomes a case of censure called 'violation of the temporal order'. Even in a syllogistic argument the sequential order is also a condition of the understanding (of the process of inference) by another person (for whose conviction the argument is made) just as it (i.e. the order) is found to be the case (in the process of) subjective understanding (inference).

(Criticism) This (argument) too is not cogent at all. It is found that persons possessed of (average) intelligence do comprehend the drift of an argument even when the members are stated in opposition to the customary order. It has been contended that where the order of the members of a syllogism, thesis and the rest is reversed, the understanding of the meaning of the propositions is due to their adjustment in the proper order through memory and not due to the improper order (in which the argument is stated), just as it is the case with a corrupted word which as soon as it is heard gives rise to the recollection of the correct word, and then the meaning is understood and thus the understanding of the meaning is really due to the (correct) word (known) through a medium. But this (defence) entirely lacks substance, because the process of understanding does not really occur in this wise. (The analogy of correct word is besides the point). That word alone is the denoter, and not anything else, of the meaning which is understood as soon as a word is uttered. Were it not the case, it might (with equal plausibility) be contended that a correct word help the recollection of the (so-called) corrupt word (which is the familiar form) and the correct order gives rise to the memory of the so-called incorrect order and the understanding of the meaning is due to this (intermediary process). It may however be urged that this (contention, if true) would make the inculcation of (correct) words (in standard grammatical works) absolutely nugatory. No, (it is far from our purpose to decry the value of standard grammatical works); what we want to establish is that

the position of the advocate (of the conventional order) is liable to lead to such undersirable contingency. Moreover, it is found that so-called corrupt words are also the subject of grammatical treatment (in standard works of Prakrit Grammar and they are shown to be governed by fixed laws and so it is doubtful whether the palm of superiority should be accorded to Sanskrit words or Prakrit words). If it is made the rule that the use of true Sanskrit words gives rise to religious merit and departure from this generates demerit (as has been propounded by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*), then this would deprive the performance of the ceremonies declared to be means to merit and demerit in other systems of religion of all its value. Not only this, but the necessary determination of merit and demerit would be made impossible since it is not an unusual experience that the appellation of meritorious is applied to the unmeritorious and *vice versa* (and language, Sanskrit or Prakrit, cannot be made the rational criterion of religious merit or demerit). Even taking for granted that understanding of the meaning takes place in that very order, still the statement which violates the order in which meaning is understood should be dubbed 'meaningless jargon' and not a case of 'violation of temporal order'. (10)

91. The syllogism to be employed must consist of five members and if it be lacking in any one of the members, it would be a case of censure called 'deficiency'. (The *raison d'être* of this censure lies in the fact that) the conclusion cannot be established if there be lack in the organ of proof and all the five members headed by the thesis constitute the organ.

(Criticism) This, too, is not a sound case. The establishment of conclusion has been shown even to be accomplished without the employment of all the five members. The conclusion cannot be established only when (the two members)—the thesis and the reason are not stated. (So it is in consonance with the requirements of reason that) only when there is deficiency of anyone of these (two members), it

should be regarded as a case of 'deficiency' and not otherwise. (11)

92. When a conclusion is established by means of one reason or one example, the statement of a second reason or second example constitutes the occasion of censure called 'superfluity' inasmuch as such statement does not serve any additional purpose.

(Criticism) This also is not supported by reason. If such statements are conducive to the establishment of the position there is no reason why it should be regarded as an occasion of defeat. If such (addition of reason or example be regarded as cases of superfluity why should you (the Naiyāyika) endorse the possibility of the convergence of different cognitive organs (upon an identical object of knowledge)? The endorsement (of this possibility) should, on the other hand, be an occasion of the censure of superfluity. If it be not regarded as an occasion of censure on the ground of its fulfilment of a (necessary) purpose in that it (the subsequent cognition) furnishes verification which is conducive to the confirmation of (previous) cognition, then the advantage may be the same in the other case also. When a fact is established by means of one reason or one example, the addition of a second reason or a second example need not necessarily be superfluous inasmuch as it may fulfil exactly the same purpose. Nor should it be thought to involve a *regressus ad infinitum* since there may be a situation in which further demand (for an additional reason or example) may be set at rest. It is exactly on a par with the case of other cognitive organs (which are not called in request when the conviction has reached the maximum level and so the possibility and necessity of verification by another species of knowledge do not give rise to an infinite regress even according to the Naiyāyikas). (If you Naiyāyika be such a stickler for economy) then why should you make use of such expressions as *kṛtaka* (product) in which suffix *ka* has the same meaning as the base (*kṛta*, and no additional meaning

of its own); why again should you state the universal concomitance in the form *yat kṛtakam tad anityam* (that is impermanent which is a product) by insertion of *yat* (which) and *tad* (that) when a compound word (sic. *kṛtakānityam*) would also convey the same meaning? Why should not employment of a sentence in such a case be an object of censure on the ground of superfluity? If it be held that such (apparently superfluous expressions) are the necessary means of communication of a special meaning and as such they are not (cases of censure of superfluity), then why should the employment of more than one reason or example which are (equally effective) means of (communication of additional meaning) be an occasion of censure? As regards the statement of a reason or an example which does not serve any additional purpose it becomes an occasion of censure on the ground of its lack of meaning and purpose and not on the ground of superfluity. (12)

93. The reiteration of word and meaning except in subsequent reference is an occasion of censure called 'tautology'. Reiteration of the same word (verbal tautology) occurs when the same sound is uttered again. For example, 'Word is not eternal, and word is not eternal'. The reiteration of meaning (material tautology) arises when the same meaning is conveyed first by one expression and again conveyed by a synonymous expression. For example, 'Word is not eternal, and sound is perishable'. (The two sentences convey the same meaning only in different language). But in subsequent reference, the reiteration does not constitute a fault, as for example, in the case of the conclusion in which there is restatement of the thesis on the basis of the (re-) statement of the reason.

(Criticism) With reference to these two varieties, it should be understood that it is reiteration of the same meaning and not the reiteration of the same word that is liable to censure. There is no tautology when there is difference of

meaning though the language be the same. The following instance (shows that verbal repetition does not involve tautology): "(What a pity!) the automaton (in the shape of a servant) indentured for a paltry sum of money laughs aloud when the master indulges in laughter; sets up a loud cry when he weeps; begins to run with girded loins and perspiring when he accelerates his walking pace; when he is in a censorious mood it sets about showering abuses (even) on what is possessed of merit and free from fault; and again when he dances, it begins to cut capers at random."¹

The point is that the members of the council are to be enlightened by the same or other verbal expressions provided they are expressive of unambiguous meaning. The employment of words which do not express a clear sense whether once or time and again is a case of 'meaningless jargon' and not tautology. Again has it been observed that there is a further case of tautology when one makes an express statement, by means of (expressive) words, of a sense which is known by implication. As for instance, when one asserts 'There is no rain, if there is no cloud' and again expressly states in so many words 'it rains, when there is cloud' which is obviously understood by implication, it becomes a case of tautology. The use of language is necessitated for the communication of a meaning and what does it serve when the meaning is understood otherwise?

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1. The verse quoted satirises the conduct of a servant who has no independent judgement of his own, but slavishly imitates the movement of his master in order to carry favour with him. The quotation is meant to show that though the same words are repeated in the original, they do not give rise to tautology since there is difference in the shades of meaning. We have not, however, attempted to preserve the sameness of verbal expression, since this would not give out the correct sense. The point of contrast lies in the fact that the same word is used for the servant's conduct in imitation of that of the master with the addition of adverbial prefixes conveying exaggeration on the servant's part.

(Criticism) This variety again becomes a case of censure on the ground of superfluity since it only conveys a sense already understood and not for any other reason (say, tautology). So this also does not differ from 'meaningless jargon'. (13)

94. The failure to reproduce (on the part of the opponent the argument), though enunciated by the proponent three times and understood by the council, constitutes the censure called 'failure of reproduction'. The *raison d'être* (of the censure lies in the consideration) that when he fails even to give utterance (to the argument employed), what (part of the argument) can he be expected to assail by way of refutation?

(Criticism) In this connection, (it may be asked whether 'failure of reproduction' complained of is understood to be constituted by) the non-reproduction of the entire argument propounded by the proponent, or of that part of the argument, without which the conclusion cannot be established (that is to say, of the essential condition which necessarily leads to the establishment of the thesis). Now, the first of these alternatives is untenable, inasmuch as the possibility of refutation is not precluded for a person even though he does not care to reiterate the whole argument propounded by the other party. To take a typical instance, suppose one argues "All is impermanent, because of being existent" and the other party quotes only the reason and shows that it is vitiated by the fallacy of the contradictory reason by asserting the proposition "The reason 'because of being existent' is contradictory", the further vindicates (his argument) by asserting "If things were absolutely momentary, then they would not have any reason to be existent, because exercise of causal efficiency (the only accepted criterion of existence) in every possible way is incompatible (with momentary existence)". What will be the point in the reiteration of the other parts (of the argument) when this much

constitutes the sufficient confutation of the reason adduced by the proponent ? So it must be admitted that 'failure of reproduction' is constituted by the non-utterance exclusively of that (part of the argument) without which the conclusion cannot be established. If, on the other hand, the opponent proves unable to refute (the proponent's thesis) on account of the lack of adequate knowledge of the contents of the science (of logic), then he will be liable to be censured for lack of knowledge of the counter-argument and not for 'the failure of reproduction'. (14)

95. The censure called 'want of comprehension' is constituted by the failure of the opponent to comprehend the meaning of the propositions asserted by the proponent although the same are comprehended by the council. Unaware of the object of refutation as he is, what can he refute ? It must on no account be confounded with 'failure of reproduction', because it is observed that a person is unable to reproduce (a statement) even though he is aware of its meaning.

(Criticism) This (species of censure) also lacks justification. The censures 'abandonment of the thesis' and the rest will forfeit their title to separate status because in all these cases simple want of comprehension can be found to be operative. If, on the contrary, they are regarded as so many species (of 'want of comprehension'), there will be no ground for adherence to the determinate enumeration of censures, because the number of censures can be indefinitely multiplied on the basis of variant degrees of non-comprehension of the opponent's argument. (15)

96. The censure called 'bewilderment' consists in the failure (of the opponent) to realise the argument refutative of the proponent's thesis though it is understood and reproduced (by the said opponent).

(Criticism) This too does not differ from 'want of comprehension'. (16)

97. "The interception of the debate under the pretext of an emergent situation is evasion" (NS, V. 2. 19) which is an occasion of censure. Suppose that a person realises the impossibility of establishing the position advocated by him, and seeks to adjourn the debate by making such statements as "I have to attend to this work which will suffer (if neglected)" or "My throat is choked by cold". The person who cuts off the debate (by making such excuses) is declared to be vanquished on the charge of 'evasion.'

(Criticism) This too is not anything different from 'want of comprehension'. (17)

98. When a person does not refute the allegation of defect by the opponent against his own position but, on the contrary, makes the counter-allegation of the persence of the same defect in the opponent's position he makes himself liable to the censure called 'acceptance of the charge'. Suppose for instance, the opponent argues "You are a thief, because you are a male, just as notorious thieves are (males)" and the proponent makes the counter-assertion "You too are (then) a thief, being a male (person)". In the situation, the propoent has accepted the allegation of 'being a thief' made by the opponent and is accordingly censured on the ground of 'acceptance of the charge'.

(Criticism) It also does not differ from 'want of comprehension'. Or, it may be (construed as the assertion of) 'the fallacy of inconclusive reason. The proponent himself realises the inconclusiveness of the probans employed by himself (viz., 'being a male person' in imitation of the opponent) and only seeks to expose the inconclusiveness of the probans ('being a male person') by asserting "The charge will equally hold good even against your own position, as you too are a male (person)."¹ (18)

1. It is a case of *tu quoque* argument. What Hemacandra, following Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, seeks to emphasise is that the *tu*

99. The censure called 'overlooking the censurable' arises from the failure to bring home censure against the person who is liable to censure. The term 'censurable' stands for the person who ought necessarily to be charged with a defect by the exposure of the point of censure. In other words, he is a person who ought to be confronted with the charge "An occasion of censure occurs on your part and so you are defeated." If the other party overlooks this lapse and fails to convict the opponent of the censurable defect, the former is declared to be vanquished on the charge of 'overlooking the censurable'. The verdict, however, is to be declared by the council, when pressed with the enquiry 'Which party is to be adjudged vanquished?' It cannot be expected that the censurable party should expose his own defect by asserting "Though I am liable to censure, you have overlooked it".

quoque argument is not necessarily tantamount⁷ to admission of the guilt alleged by the opponent. It may be legitimately interpreted as the statement of the fallacy of inconclusive reason. When the proponent flings back the charge of theft against the opponent by asserting that he too cannot escape the charge if the attribute of 'being a male person' be an unfailing criterion of 'being a thief, it does not follow that the proponent accepts the truth of the universal proposition 'All males are thieves.' What he is interested to prove is that there is no necessary concomitance between 'being a male' and 'being a thief' and hence the attribute of 'being a male' has no bearing upon the probandum. In other words, this mode of *tu quoque* assertion may be regarded as an effective refutation of the opponent's argument. Uddyotakara, however, complains that such *tu quoque* assertions are not legitimate ways of exposing a defect in the opponent's argument. The proponent ought to assert unequivocally that the opponent is guilty of a fallacy. The roundabout course involved in *tu quoque* arguments is rather symptomatic of ignorance of the real defect, and hence is liable to censure. Hemacandra has also asserted prior to this alternative explanation that the *tu quoque* argument does not differ materially from 'want of comprehension'.

of other fallacies such as a non-existent probans, it can be regarded as a legitimate occasion of censure only when the opponent has established the opposite thesis independently, and not otherwise. (22). (XXXIV)

103. Having examined the occasions of defeat as propounded by Akṣapāda, the author now proposes to subject the same as formulated by the Buddhists to scrutiny :

(Aph.) Nor are again the statement of other than an essential condition of inference, asādhanāṅgavacana, and the exposure of what is not a defect, adoṣodbhāvana, (the legitimate occasions of censure).

(Alternatively)

(Aph.) Nor are again the non-statement of what is an essential condition of inference and the non-exposure of what is a defect (the legitimate occasions of censure).
(XXXV)

104. Defeat is constituted by the failure to establish one's thesis and neither by the statement of other than an essential condition of inference, nor exposure of what is not a defect—the position asserted by Dharmakīrti in the following terms: "The statement of other than an essential condition of proof, and the exposure of what is not a defect are the occasions of censure (respectively) of the two (the proponent and the opponent). Other cases are not legitimate (occasions of censure) and as such are not admitted (to be occasions of censure)" (VN, v. 1.)

105. (Criticism) Regarding this point (we must ask) whether the party concerned, viz., the proponent or the opponent, inflicts defeat upon his opponent on the ground of 'the statement of other than an essential condition of proof' or 'the exposure of what is not a defect' *after having established his thesis or not having done so*. On the first alternative, the defeat of the opponent is secured by the establishment of one's own thesis and exposure of any defect in the opponent's

position is superfluous. On the second alternative, even the exposure of the defects such as 'the statement of other than essential condition of proof' will not lead to the victory of either party since both the parties have failed to establish their respective thesis.

106. The following is an interpretation of this (statement of Dharmakīrti): "*sādhana* (understood in the sense of an act) means proof and *aṅga*, necessary condition, of it is the probans endowed with triple characteristic; and non-statement of it consists either in maintaining silence or statement of any other (irrelevant) matter; and this constitutes an occasion of censure of the proponent. Or, *sādhana* (understood as an instrumental case) is but the probans with the triple characteristic (which is the instrument of proof) and its *aṅga*, necessary condition, is its justification which consists in the demonstration of the proof contradictory of the opposite possibility. The non-statement of this is an occasion of censure of the proponent. The interpretation may with equal propriety be sponsored by the advocate of five-membered syllogism. He too can assert (taking stand upon this interpretation) that the Buddhist logician is to be adjudged vanquished for non statement of the five-membered syllogism which is the (sole) condition of proof (of a thesis). It has been contended (by the Buddhist) that the non-statement of this (five-membered syllogism) does not expose him to defeat, since the thesis and the conclusion (the first and last members of Nyāya syllogism) are understood by implication from the statement of the minor premise (in which the probans known to be concomitant with the probandum is predicated of the subject). The statement again of what (sic. the thesis and the conclusion) are understood (by implication) would involve (useless) tautology, because even the assertion of these (to members) unbacked by the assertion of the probans (in the subject) does not lead to the establishment of the conclusion. But the contention is futile, since this would make the omission of the minor

premise an inevitable consequence. It has been maintained that the assertion of the minor premise, in other words, affirmation of the probans in the subject, though understood by implication (of the knowledge-situation), is yet resorted to in such (a typical syllogism) as "All that is existent is momentary, as for instance, a jar, (major premise); sound is existent (minor premise)" for the purpose of rebutting (the apprehension of the fallacy of) 'non-existent reason' arising from the lack (of the knowledge) of the probans in the subject. [If this be a legitimate justification of the obvious tautology involved in the assertion of the minor premise, though the knowledge of the probans invariably carries with it the knowledge of its existence in the subject and thus the assertion of the probans in the subject in the minor premise is a reiteration of a known fact], then why should not the assertion of the thesis, though known by implication, and the assertion of the conclusion be a legitimate procedure particularly when they respectively serve to rebut the doubt of the substratum of the probandum, and to demonstrate the unified meaning of thesis, reason, illustration and application? Certainly thesis and the remaining propositions cannot be (thought to be) mutually related unless they be shown to express a unified meaning just as thesis and so on relating to a different subject are not. (Q) Well, if the thesis leads to the establishment of the conclusion, the assertion of reason and the rest is perfectly useless. If not, it will not serve as a necessary condition of inference. (A) Then in your case too the statement of reason should suffice for the establishment of the conclusion, and so illustration would be a superfluity. Otherwise it (the statement of reason) will not be a necessary condition of inference. And thus the cases (viz., the logical necessity of thesis and of reason) are equally balanced. It may be urged that illustration serves to demonstrate the necessary concomitance between the probans and the probandum, and so it is not a superfluity. If on the contrary, the said (necessary concomitance) were not exhibited in it (the illustration), the

probans would fail to prove (the probandum). But the contention is devoid of logic. [If illustration were a necessary condition for securing the cogency of the probans], then one cannot make 'existence' the probans for inferring the impermanence of all entities, since such probans would have no cogency because no external example is available for illustration. If necessary incompatibility with opposite alternatives be put forward as the proof of the cogency of 'existence' and the like attributes, then the same criterion will prove the logical cogency of every possible probans and so illustration will have no *raison d'être*. Moreover, how can one justify a probans by showing its incompatibility with the opposite and at the same time repudiate (the logical cogency of) the thesis? If, on the contrary, the thesis were not stated, what could be understood as the locus of the probans and the probandum? If you answer that they would relate to the subject known antecedently to the thesis supposed to refer to it, then (by parity of reasoning) the logical justification should concern the probans independently implied and not (the probans) expressly stated. If you justify the express statement of the probans, though implicitly known, for helping the understanding of persons of dull intellect, why should the express statement of the thesis incur your displeasure?

107. As regards the second interpretation of the expression 'other than an essential condition of inference' given as follows "The express statement of concomitance in difference subsequent to the statement of the probans with concomitance in agreement, or the express statement of concomitance in agreement subsequent to the statement of concomitance in difference, though one is known by implication from the other, constitutes tautology and hence is not an essential condition of inference"—this too lacks in propriety. Does the proponent expose himself to the defeat when he proves his thesis on the strength of a legitimate probans or when he does not prove it? On first alternative, he does not run the risk of defeat simply because

one notices a redundant statement which has no necessary bearing upon the deduction of the conclusion, since it does not involve contradiction (of the conclusion independently proved). One may argue : "Then the proponent should not be subject to defeat even if he sets about reciting a dramatic piece (though it has no bearing upon the conclusion to be reached)". It is quite true. We do not see any reason why should offence be taken even if the person dances after having established his conclusion, which is not an unusual occurrence in the world. (If you insist on such unnecessary formality) then the person who adduces a sound probans should also be declared to be vanquished if he indulges in such innocent diversions as chewing beetle, movement of the eyebrows, giving out a mimic cry, or waving of the hands. If again, the verdict of defeat is to be pronounced upon the proponent for such superfluous activity when he fails to prove his position, it is to be considered whether the defeat of the proponent is adjudged on the basis of superfluous expression which may be rebuked as a lapse, *after or before the opponent has established his own conclusion*. On the first alternative, the proponent will be considered defeated by the successful establishment of the thesis by the opponent, and the pressing home of the fault of superfluous expression will be redundant. The reason is there can be no verdict of victory on the basis of such superfluity unless the thesis of the opponent has been established. On the second alternative, both the proponent and the opponent should be awarded victory or defeat simultaneously, because there is no difference so far as the failure to prove one's thesis is considered.

108. It has been contended that victory and defeat do not depend upon the proof of one's position or the failure of such proof. But they are based upon knowledge and want of knowledge. The proponent who has to propound the probans for establishing his position ought to assert what he knows to be a sound probans, and the opponent

who has to make a refutation ought, on the other hand, to assert the refutatory argument (which he knows to be as such). Thus when it is possible to deduce the conclusion either from the statement of the concomitance in agreement or from the statement of the concomitance in difference, but yet the proponent makes both such statements, and in the situation the opponent demonstrates the statement of an unessential condition on the part of the proponent in the council, the latter (the proponent) suffers defeat because his ignorance of what is a sound probans is proved. But the opponent should win victory because he establishes his knowledge of what is a refutation. The contention appears to be plausible so long as it is not subjected to a critical examination. The issue can be decided by the consideration whether the opponent exposes the fault of superfluous statement on the part of the proponent *when he has produced a sound argument, or an unsound one.* On the first alternative, how can the proponent be convicted of the ignorance of a sound probans when (as a matter of fact) he lacks in the knowledge of the requisite number of such reasons? On the second alternative, the opponent's knowledge of refutatory argument is not established, since he does not expose the fallacy in the reasons advanced (by the proponent). It may be contended that he is aware of what constitutes a refutation when he has proved his knowledge of the fault of redundant statement. But he also proves ignorant of what is refutation because he has shown his ignorance of the fallacious reason. In the circumstances, he cannot be supposed to have vanquished the proponent absolutely because he has proved his inability to ward off the ignominy of defeat involved in the failure to expose the defect present in that (argument of the proponent). It may be contended that the exposure of fallacies of reason is superfluous for the opponent when he establishes his (title to) victory solely by the discovery of the fault of superfluous expression. But it is open to the objection how can the discovery of superfluous expression contribute to

his victory when his defeat is established on the ground of his failure to discover the fallacy of the reason. If you affirm that the victory of the opponent is established when he discovers the superfluity of expression as well as the fallacy of reason, then why should you suppose that the assertion of concomitance in difference after the assertion of concomitance in agreement, or the assertion of the concomitance in agreement after the assertion of concomitance in difference should be a ground of defeat? Moreover, (if knowledge and want of knowledge be the criterion of victory and defeat as you assert, we do not find any reason) how should the advocacy of the thesis and the counter-thesis respectively by the proponent and the opponent be exempted from the charge of futility, particularly in view of the fact that there must be present the knowledge or ignorance of the competency of the probans in one position or the other. It is not a fact that the knowledge of the competency of a probans on the part of one party or the ignorance (of the same) on the part of the other party (which transpires) after the examination of (the subject of dispute such, for instance, as) the perishability or imperishability of word, does not serve as the condition of victory or defeat. If, however, both the proponent and the opponent be equally ignorant of the competency of a probans, in that case on whose behalf will victory or defeat be awarded, when there is no difference (between them)? If you answer "on behalf of neither" then it follows that the proponent who employs a superfluous expression in the formulation of his argument is judged to prove his ignorance of the competency of his probans (supposed to be implied by his addition of a superfluous condition), and the opponent who discovers the fault of superfluous expression is judged to prove his knowledge of this fault alone (and not the competency or otherwise of the probans and hence in the circumstance neither should be awarded victory or defeat. It does not follow that the person who knows the demerit of anything

should also know the merit of it. Thus, for instance, a man who knows that a poisonous substance has fatal power may happen to have no knowledge of its power to heal leprosy. The conclusion irresistibly follows that victory cannot be determined on the basis of knowledge of the competency of the probans, nor defeat on the basis of lack of such knowledge, inasmuch as (both the alternatives) are exposed to the charges set forth above. But (the position we maintain, viz.,) that victory accrues from the establishment of one's own position and defeat from the failure to do so is free from all blemish, particularly in view of the fact that it does not make the advocacy of a thesis and its counter-thesis a futility. When, however, one party is categorically and unmistakably found to establish his position on some valid ground and the other party fails to establish the position advocated by him, the (undesirable) issue of simultaneous victory or simultaneous defeat of both the parties does not arise.

109. As regards the explication of the phrase *adoṣodbhāvāna* given as follows : "If taken as a case of direct negation the phrase *adoṣodbhāvāna* means 'negation of discovery of defect' and if taken as a case of indirect negation it would mean the exposure of what is (not a real) but an apparent defect and of other (inconsequential) defects'; both these cases are legitimate occasions of censure of the opponent," it (the aforesaid interpretation) is accepted by us as appropriate provided the proponent employs a syllogism free from fault and establishes his position, and not otherwise. As for the defeat involved in superfluous statement, it has already been refuted by us. Just as the syllogism of five members is considered to labour under the censure of superfluity, so likewise it may be urged that the syllogism of three members labours under the defect called 'deficiency,' inasmuch as there is no ground for discrimination. It must be admitted that all the five members beginning with thesis are necessary conditions of inference and this will be in conformity with the statement "Thesis, reason, illustration, application and

conclusion are the members of a syllogism" (NS, I. 1.32). The non-statement of any one of these (members) would necessarily involve the defect called 'deficiency' and this is in accordance with the statement "That which is devoid of any one (of the members) is 'deficient' " (NS, V. 2.12). It is established that there is no other ground for the adjudication of victory and otherwise (defeat) except the ground set forth by us and further elaboration will be an unnecessary prolixity. (XXXV).

110. This Debate which has already been spoken of as resting on four factors is sometimes carried on through the medium of epistles. Hence it is necessary that we should state its definition in this connection, inasmuch as resort to such (medium of debate) with its nature unknown cannot be conducive to victory and also as it is not possible to penetrate into the contents of such an epistle sent by an opponent unless one is fully acquainted with its specific nature.
